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John Jay and the Law of Nations in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution 
 
Benjamin C. Lyons 
 
 
My dissertation examines the role of “the law of nations”—as international law was known in the 
eighteenth-century—in the diplomacy of the American Revolution.  My method is to assess the way 
in which European and American diplomats used this law in a series of negotiations involving Spain, 
France, Britain, and the United States in a conflict over the Mississippi River.  I argue that European 
statesmen based their conduct on a set of pragmatic norms, derived from precedent, which were 
known as the customary law of nations.  American revolutionaries were generally naïve in their use 
of this law, having had no prior experience with international affairs.  John Jay—the emissary tasked 
with defending American interests in the Mississippi—was an exception to this rule.  Among Jay’s 
most notable attributes was the tenacity with which he defended the statehood of the United States, 
and its corresponding right to the privileges and protections afforded by the law of nations.  The issue 
lay at the heart of the conflict over the Mississippi, and Jay’s conduct, I demonstrate, was decisive to 
its outcome.  In my last two chapters I explore the source of Jay’s perspicacity and suggest that he 
likely derived his understanding of the law of nations from the treatises of Samuel von Pufendorf—a 
leading proponent of a theoretical version of the law of nations that was popular in intellectual 
circles at the time.  Pufendorf was an authority in “moral philosophy”, or the scientific study of 
natural moral law; and he defined states as corporate moral persons, whose rights derived from a 
universal law of sociability.  Jay was educated at King’s College in New York City (1760–1764), and 
the president of King’s, Samuel Johnson, was one of the preeminent authorities in British North 
America on Enlightenment-era theories of natural law.  Johnson gave Pufendorf a central place in his 
curriculum, and it was Pufendorf’s theories, I argue, combined with the authority with which Johnson 
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 “We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America… appealing to the 
Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do… solemnly publish and declare, 
That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States;… and that as 
Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, 
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.”  
       - The Declaration of Independence 
 
 “When the United States became one of the Nations of the Earth, they publishd the Stile or 
name by which they were to be known & called, and as on the one Hand they became subject to the 
Law of Nations, so on the other they have a Right to claim and enjoy its Protection & all the 
Priviledges it affords.”  




In the dissertation that follows I examine the nature, source, and significance of the American 
declaration in 1776 that, “as Free and Independent States, they [the united States of America] have 
full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other 
Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.”  David Armitage, among others, has 
argued that the Declaration was an expression of early American conceptions of “the law of nations.”  
I refine that argument by explaining: 1) the role of the law of nations in early-modern statecraft, 2) its 
particular impact on the diplomacy of the American Revolution and 3) its roots in or connection to 
the American Enlightenment.  In the process I focus particular attention on the question of how states 
were established during the eighteenth century—and thus became “subject to the Law of Nations” 
with a corresponding “Right to… enjoy its Protection & all the Priviledges it afford[ed].”2  
                                                
1 Jay to Vergennes, c. September 11, 1782 (unsent), in Elizabeth Nuxoll (ed.) The Selected Papers of John 
Jay. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014, vol. 3, p. 123 (hereafter cited as SPJJ). 
2 David Armitage, “The Declaration of Independence and International Law,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan. 2002): 39–64.  See also David M. Golove and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “A 
Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International 
Recognition,” New York University Law Review 85 (October, 2010), pp. 953–960, for an overview of the tenuous 
nature of American claims to statehood during the Revolution. 
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My method for exploring these issues has been to examine the records of a revolutionary-era 
dispute between Spain and the United States over rights to the Mississippi River.  The dispute, which 
continued through the Revolution and was not fully resolved until 1796, also involved France and 
Great Britain, and it thus enables a truly international inquiry into the role of law in the diplomacy of 
the early-modern era.3  The conflict also draws needed attention to John Jay, the emissary charged 
with defending American interests in the Mississippi, whom I present as the preeminent American 
authority on the law of nations during the Revolution.  I argue in particular that Jay’s convictions 
regarding the statehood of the United States were crucial to the outcome of the conflict over the 
Mississippi, and offer new insight into early American conceptions of the law of nations. 
In my first two chapters I lay out the context for the dispute and show how European 
statesmen used a customary law of nations, derived from precedent, to adjudicate the honor and 
interests of their respective sovereigns. Most Americans, I demonstrate, were unable to employ that 
law with precision, as they had no prior experience with diplomacy.  Jay proved to be an exception to 
that rule and, as I argue in my next two chapters, he effectively employed principles derived from a 
theoretical law of nations to compensate for his lack of experience, and defend the legal rights of the 
United States.  In my last two chapters I point to the combined influence of Samuel von Pufendorf, a 
leading proponent of the theories on which Jay relied, and Samuel Johnson, president of King’s 
College in New York (Jay’s alma mater), as the most likely source of his perspicacity.  
                                                                                                                                                       
  
3 The dispute was a consequence of the Treaty of Paris (1763), by which France had given Spain title to the 
territory west of the Mississippi, while Spain had ceded control of Florida and the Gulf Coast east of New Orleans—
then known as “west Florida”—to Great Britain. When the American Revolution began, the Spanish saw an 
opportunity to recover the Gulf Coast, which would enable them to close the Mississippi to foreign shipping, and 
better protect their colonies in New Spain (Mexico) from Anglo-American attack or elicit trade.  The policy ran 
counter to American conceptions of the Mississippi as an outlet for commercial goods, which (they hoped) would 
one day be produced in the trans-Appalachian West.  For now antiquated research on the issue see especially: 
Thomas P. Abernethy, Western Lands and the American Revolution. New York: Russell & Russell, 1959 [1937]; 
Frederic A. Ogg, The Opening of the Mississippi: A Struggle for Supremacy in the American Interior. New York: 
Haskell House, 1969 [1904]; and Paul C. Phillips, The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. New 
York: Russell & Russell, 1913.  For a pre-history of the conflict see the more recent work of Paul W. Mapp, The 
Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011. 
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The Law of Nations 
 At the heart of my inquiry is the question of how the concept of a “law of nations” was 
understood during the eighteenth century.  Most scholars today equate that term with the works of 
Pufendorf (1632–1694) and his intellectual peers, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Emerich de Vattel 
(1714–1767).4  They show how the authors and their treatises contributed to early modern political 
theory and to the later development of modern international law.5  They generally conclude, 
however, that the treatises had little impact on the conduct of early-modern statecraft—a realm in 
which statesmen were said to have relied on a more pragmatic set of norms, known as “the public 
law of Europe,” that were derived from precedent and the text of earlier treaties. 6 
                                                
4 The principal works of each author were: Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (1625); Pufendorf, On 
the Law of Nature and Nations (1672); and Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758).  For an introduction to Grotius, see 
Charles S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland: A Study in Political and Legal Thought. Chicago: 
Nelson Hall, 1981; for Pufendorf: Leonard Krieger, The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of 
Natural Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965; for Vattel, see: Frank Ruddy, International Law in the 
Enlightenment: The Background of Emmerich de Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens.  Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1975. 
Other writers, who have received less scholarly attention, include: John Selden (1584-1654), Jean Jacques 
Burlamaqui (1694-1798), and Christian Wolff (1679-1754).  Historians have also begun to note the earlier influence 
of scholastic authors such as Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and Alberico Gentili 
(1552-1608).  See for example, Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (eds.) The Roman Foundations of the 
Law of Nations: Alberio Gentili and the Justice of Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
5 For the treatises’ influence on early modern political theory, see especially: Craig Carr and Michael 
Seidler, “Pufendorf, Sociality and the Modern State,” History of Political Thought 17 (1996): 354-378; Knud 
Haakonssen, “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought,” Political Theory 13 (1985): 239-265; Michael 
Seidler, “Religion, Populism, and Patriarchy: Political Authority from Luther to Pufendorf,” Ethics 103:3 (1993): 
551-569; Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius 
to Kant. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.  For their contribution to the development of modern 
international law, see Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations.  New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1947.  The link between the law of nations and modern international law has been challenged recently by 
Martti Koskenniemi who argues that, “[N]o continuous tradition of international legal thought exists,” he writes, 
“from early modernity—Gentili, Vitoria, Suárez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, however one wants to date the moment 
of inception—to the twentieth century,” “International Law and raison d’état: Rethinking the Prehistory of 
International Law,” in Kingsbury and Straumann (eds.), Roman Foundations, p. 297.  See also the first two chapters 
of Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, in which the author argues that the connection is a myth, invented by 
internationalist lawyers in the 1870s who needed an intellectual genealogy for their reform efforts. 
6 See for example the “Introduction” to Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace. New York: W. J. Black, 
1949, in which P. E. Corbett writes: “though kings, judges and professors have heaped praise upon The Law of War 
and Peace, the book can hardly be said to have exercised much visible influence upon events,” p. xvii.  Randall 
Lesaffer concurs, writing that, “Scholarly doctrine [meaning the treatises] certainly did not constitute the major 
source of inspiration for the diplomats who negotiated and wrote the peace treaties of the early modern age… who 
first and foremost relied on older peace instruments,” “Alberico Gentili’s ius post bellum and Early Modern Peace 
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A mystery arises, however, when one examines the law of nations in relation to the founding 
era of the United States.  Here, a distinguished body of historians contends that the law of nations—
as expressed in the treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel—had a significant impact on early 
American conceptions of foreign affairs.7  In particular, the treatises are thought to have influenced 
major founding-era documents such as the Declaration, the Articles of Confederation, and the United 
States Constitution.8  Not only so, but they were also cited in cabinet debates and federal case law 
pertaining to international affairs, during the 1790s and beyond.9  But this leads to a conundrum, for 
why would early American jurists and statesmen have relied so heavily on the treatises if they were 
in fact irrelevant to the conduct of statecraft in Europe?10  Were the Americans really that naïve or 
out of touch with international norms?  If so, why did their naiveté persist as long as it did?  
                                                                                                                                                       
Treaties,” in Kingsbury and Straumann (eds.) Roman Foundations, note 12, p. 214.  For reference to the term “the 
public law of Europe,” see Eliga Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making 
of a New World Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 7, 17.  See also Abbé de Mably, The 
Principles of Negotiations: Or an Introduction to the Public Law of Europe Founded on Treaties. London: James 
Rivington and James Fletcher, 1758. 
7 David C. Hendrickson, for example, writes that “from 1776 onward appeal to the law of nature and of 
nations… was woven closely into the fabric of the American position [on foreign affairs], and might even be 
mistaken for being the American position,” Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2003, p. 53. 
8 For the law’s influence on founding-era documents see especially: Armitage, “Declaration”; Peter S. 
Onuf,  “A Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians,” Diplomatic History 22:1 (Winter 1998): 71-83; 
Gregg Lint, “The American Revolution and the Law of Nations, 1776-1789,” Diplomatic History 1 (Winter 1977): 
20-34; Golove and Hulsebosch, “A Civilized Nation”; Tara Helfman, “The Law of Nations in The Federalist 
Papers,” Legal History 23:2 (August 2002): 107-128; and Peter S. Onuf and Nicholas Onuf.  Federal Union, 
Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions: 1776-1814. Madison: Madison House, 1993.   
9 For the law of nations as a facet of early American case law see especially: Vincent Chetail, “Vattel and 
the American Dream: An Inquiry into the Reception of the Law of Nations in the United States,” in Chetail and 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy (eds.) The Roots of International Law: Liber Amicorum Peter Haggenmacher. Martinus: 
Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 251-300; Edwin D. Dickinson, “The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United 
States,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 101 (1952-1953): 26-56; and Stewart Jay, “The Status of the Law 
of Nations in Early American Law,” Vanderbilt Law Review 42 (1989): 819-849; and Andrew Tutt, “Treaty 
Textualism,” Yale Journal of International Law, 39 (2014): 284-358. 
10 Historians of early American diplomatic history concur that the law of nations had little influence on the 
conduct of statecraft in that era.  The concepts that mattered most, they assert, were mercantilism and balance of 
power theory. See for example, James H. Hutson, “The Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy,” 
Diplomatic History 1:1 (January 1977): 1-19; Daniel Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of 
Nations and the Balance of Power. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985; and Jonathan Dull, A 
Diplomatic History of the American Revolution.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. 
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 An ideal way to resolve such questions, I eventually concluded, would be to survey the 
diplomatic record of the Revolution and examine the way in which European and American 
emissaries had used law in negotiations.  The results, I hoped, would enable me to determine: 1) 
whether, or to what degree, the law of nations had been a factor in the conduct of early modern 
diplomacy; and 2) whether American emissaries had relied on the treatises for assistance in that 
realm, and to what effect.  The editors of The Selected Papers of John Jay had just published a 
volume of papers on Jay’s tenure as Minister to Spain (1780–1782).  I also discovered a published 
volume of reports by Conrad Alexandre Gérard, the first French Minister to the United States (1778–
1779).  With these two sources—one American and one European—I began my inquiry.11 
I soon found several instances in which Jay and Gérard cited “the law of nations” in their 
correspondence.  To my surprise, however, neither man linked that term to the treatises of Grotius, 
Pufendorf, or Vattel.  They rather used it in reference to a more pragmatic set of laws that apparently 
governed matters such as diplomatic protocol or privateering.12  After further reading I realized that 
the “law of nations” in this context was simply another term for “the public law of Europe”—i.e. the 
rules derived from precedent that were thought to regulate the conduct of early modern statecraft.13  
In other words, it appeared that there had actually been two versions of the law of nations—one 
contained in the treatises and the other derived from political precedent.  If so, I wondered, what was 
the relationship between them?  And why had historians discounted the significance of the pragmatic 
rules, and placed so much emphasis on the treatises instead?   
                                                
11 Nuxoll (ed.), SPJJ, vol. II.  John J. Meng (ed.), Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alexandre 
Gérard: 1778-1780. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1939. 
12 See for example, Gérard’s dispatches of September 1, 1778, and May 21, 1779, in which he references 
the law of nations in relation to international negotiations, and the adjudication of territorial disputes, Meng, 
Despatches, 250, 673.  See also Jay to Floridablanca, May 11, 1782, in which Jay assured the Secretary of State that, 
in the event of war between the United States and Portugal (an event that was rumored to be imminent), “the Law of 
Nations will be punctually observed towards the Spanish Merchants,” Nuxoll, SPJJ, II: 792. 
13 See note 6 above. 
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It took many months of reading and reflection before I found satisfactory answers to such 
questions, but in brief, I finally concluded that “the law of nations” was not an early-modern version 
of international law at all.  Nor was it wholly bound up in the treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf and 
Vattel.  It was rather a multi-faceted concept that consisted primarily of the precedent-based rules 
that Jay and Gérard referenced in their correspondence.  The treatises, while also important, were 
viewed as philosophical attempts to identify laws of nature that governed the political realm.14 They 
may have influenced early-modern conceptions of moral reasoning, but they never functioned as 
volumes of “international law,” in the way that we think of that term today. 
Historians have missed this point, I argue, for at least three reasons.  First, the pragmatic or 
customary law of nations—as Vattel called it—was generally unwritten.15  Certain core principles 
were expressed in the text of major treaties, but for the most part, the law constituted a socialized 
body of knowledge that statesmen learned through experience—making it difficult to study, and 
making it tempting for historians to lean heavily on the treatises for insight, which are lucid, learned, 
and readily accessible.16 
                                                
14  The treatises represented philosophical attempts to ground the law of nations in the immutable laws of 
nature that were thought to govern the political realm. I.e. just as Galileo, Newton, Descartes and a host of other 
astronomers, philosophers, and mathematicians had uncovered laws governing the physical universe, so too writers 
such as Grotius and his successors hoped to discover the natural laws of morality that governed human society—
including international affairs and diplomacy.  As M.S. Anderson put it, “the expanding current of eighteenth-
century thought and feeling… centred around the idea of nature… as the ultimate source of true morality, and of 
natural rights…. The greatest ambition of the social sciences… was to construct a science of humanity which would 
embrace and explain the workings of societies as Newtonian physics had done so much of the natural world,” 
Modern Diplomacy, 166-167.  As Vattel put it, “The Law of Nations is the science of the rights which exist between 
Nations or States, and of the obligations corresponding to these rights,” Law of Nations, Book I, Introduction, §6. 
15 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I, “Introduction” wrote that “the voluntary, the conventional, and the 
customary law, form together the positive Law of Nations, for they all proceed from the agreement of Nations,” §27.   
 
16 For a useful introduction to the customary law of nations as it pertained to diplomatic protocol, see: M. S. 
Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy: 1450-1919. London: Longman, 1993, 40-100; and Jeremy Black, A 
History of Diplomacy. London: Reaktion Books, 2010, 59-118.  For the multi-faceted nature of the customary law of 
nations, see: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-1769, 
Book IV, Chap. 5, in which he writes that “in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like… the 
lawmerchant, which is a branch of the law of nations, is regularly adhered to,” p. 68.  Bound volumes of treaties 
were sometimes published as an aid to diplomacy.  Benjamin Franklin, for example, gave John Adams “a printed 
Volume of Treaties” in 1776 as an aid to drafting Congress’s “model treaty” with European states. L. H. Butterfield 
(ed.), The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
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More importantly, the customary law of nations was not very law-like in either its effects or 
operations—a fact that renders it unappealing to historians interested in the antecedents of modern 
international law.  It was a useful tool for resolving routine conflict or points of protocol, but when it 
came to major international conflict, the customary law was more typically twisted, manipulated and 
wielded as a rhetorical weapon.17  The results have led many modern observers to conclude that it 
was little more than a fig leaf for self-interest,18 and to privilege the treatise writers, whose 
aspirational principles align far more closely to modern ideals—even if those ideals were not actually 
realized or implemented during the eighteenth century.  
Lastly, scholars inclined to regard the treatises as the embodiment of eighteenth-century 
conceptions of the law of nations can take comfort from the fact that, starting in the 1760s, Anglo-
American jurists and legal scholars began to cite the works of Grotius et al. as authorities on the law 
of nations, in domestic case law pertaining to international affairs.  Citations of this kind create the 
impression that the treatises were equivalent, in content, authority, and weight of influence, to the 
customary law of nations, and that the two can be studied interchangeably.19   
                                                                                                                                                       
1961, vol. 3, p. 338. Such volumes are of limited value to anyone lacking the socialized knowledge needed to apply 
their provisions to the conduct of foreign affairs.  The French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, was typical in having 
learned diplomacy through experience, first as an official at the French embassy in Constantinople, and later as 
ambassador to Sweden.  See Orville T. Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the 
Age of Revolution, 1719-1787. Albany: State University of New York, 1982.  
17 I will elaborate on this point over the course of the first four chapters of the dissertation. 
18 Eliga Gould, for example, writes that the public law was “whatever Europe’s rulers said [it was],” 
Powers of the Earth, 5.  Randal Lesaffer concurs that it led to “political compromises” that made “no allowance for 
the dictates of justice,” “Alberico Gentili,” 214.  Jonathan Dull believes that international law in the early modern 
era was a fig leaf for self interest and that power was all that mattered.  Conversation in New Haven, CT, January 
19, 2015.   
19 In the 1764 case Triquet v. Bath, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield opined that, “the law of nations, in its full 
extent was part of the law of England,” and went on to state that the law was “to be collected from the practice of 
different nations [i.e. the customary law of nations]… [and] the authority of Grotius, Barbeyrac, Bynkershoek, 
Wiquefort, [i.e. the treatises].”  Quoted in David J. Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American 
Constitution: Prevailing Wisdom. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 239, with citation to 3 Bur., at 
1478, 1481, 97.  William Blackstone concurred, writing that “the law of nations…is here adopted in its full extent by 
the common law,” and was to be “collected from history and usage and such writers of all nations and languages as 
are generally approved and allowed of,” Commentaries, Book IV, Chap. 5, p. 68.  Early American jurists followed 
suit in numerous cases during the 1790s and beyond.  For scholarship in this field, see note 9 above. 
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The citations, however, are misleading.  For one thing, jurists generally cited the treatises, not 
because they were deemed authoritative in the diplomatic realm (they were not), but because they 
were the only written version of the law available.20  Furthermore, jurists only incorporated a small 
facet of the law of nations in the context of domestic case law.21  When it came to diplomatic 
disputes that, as Blackstone put it, were “incident to entire nations,” they held that states had to 
resolve their differences through war, which was “an appeal to the god of hosts,” or through appeal to 
“compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements”—in the “construction” of which, Blackstone added in 
conclusion, “we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of nature” (emphasis added).22  
In sum, I argue that the scholarly literature on “the law of nations” is incomplete and partially 
misrepresents the nature of that concept. It offers insight into the content of the treatises—and their 
application to Anglo-American case law, and importance to early American statesmen looking for 
theoretical insight into the nature of states and empires.  We know very little, however, about the 
content of the customary law of nations and its role in diplomacy.  Most significantly, we know 
almost nothing at all about the connection or relationship between the customary law of nations and 
the content of the treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel; or how those treatises influenced the 




                                                
20 Andrew Tutt, for example, writes: “Because pronouncements on the law of nations by courts and 
legislatures were somewhat rare and difficult to find, treatises were often used as evidence of binding international 
law and its principles,” “Treaty Textualism,” p. 294 with citation to Jay, “The Status of the Law of Nations.” 
 
21 Blackstone is often cited as having opined that,  “the law of nations…is here adopted in its full extent by 
the common law” (see note 14 above.)  But Blackstone’s statement was qualified by his parenthetical remark that it 
was only adopted, “wherever any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction.”  He went on to 
limit that jurisdiction to “civil transactions, and questions of property between the subjects of different states.” 
Commentaries, Book IV, Chap. 5, p. 68.   
22 Blackstone, Commentaries, “Introduction,” Book I, p. 43 
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I do not claim to have conducted an exhaustive study of international law in the early modern 
era.  I have rather surveyed a select set of primary sources with the goal of identifying the basic 
features of the laws that governed statecraft during the American Revolution.  A core reality that 
quickly emerges—in sharp contrast to modern conceptions of international law—is that states in this 
period were understood, by definition, to enjoy unimpaired sovereignty.  They were “free and 
independent”—as the Americans also asserted their new state to be—and no power on earth had the 
authority to pass judgment on their conduct.23  In this sense, there was no law. 
Nevertheless, independence notwithstanding, states could not escape their need for the 
cooperation and assistance of their neighbors.  International commerce as a whole required a high 
degree of regulation.  In addition, pairs of states often saw fit to sign treaties of “amity and 
commerce,” by which the particular terms of trade between their merchants were established.  Most 
consequential of all were the treaties of alliance—offensive or defensive; temporary or perpetual—
that states signed with the goal of either advancing their material interests or defending against the 
assaults of their neighbors.  None of this is novel.  These are merely the basic elements of the 
“balance of power” system that prevailed in Europe during the early modern era.  If any one state 
acquired an excess of power, the theory held, other states would ally and wage war against that state 
until the equilibrium was restored.   
One aspect of the system, however, that has received insufficient attention in the scholarly 
literature is the basic problem of trust or confidence that arose in connection with these many 
“compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements.”  An issue at the heart of every treaty negotiation was 
whether the promises of one’s counterparts could be relied upon.24  How could a state afford to place 
                                                
23 In the relevant portion of his Commentaries, for example, Blackstone repeatedly characterizes the 
international system as one in which no state “will allow a superiority in the other,” such that they have no “superior 
jurisdiction to resort to upon earth for justice,” Introduction, 43; Book IV, Chap. 5, p. 68.  This element of the 
system is said to be a product of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), but I have not explored its origins in depth.  
24 See Xabier Lamikiz, Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and 
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their fate in the hands of another legal entity if there was no mediating law or judicial authority that 
could resolve disputes that might arise between them?  The answer came in the form of a host of 
norms and protocols—the customary law of nations—a sizeable portion of which were designed to 
strengthen the validity of international treaties and agreements.   
The content of these protocols, and their influence on negotiations, will be described in the 
course of my analysis, but an essential feature was the sharp distinction between official and 
unofficial communications.  The former were marked by rigid ceremonies and conventions.  At the 
start of negotiations, for instance, diplomats would exchange letters or credentials that established 
their authority to speak on behalf of their respective sovereigns.  The letters had to follow fixed 
stylistic conventions, which determined their authenticity.  Any statement made after their exchange 
was considered legally binding.  Statements made prior to their exchange—or in violation of stylistic 
conventions—carried little weight and could later be denied without consequence.   
Rules of this kind did not merely govern diplomatic negotiations.  They encompassed almost 
every type of international communication—and also governed the treaties, pacts and agreements 
that were eventually signed at the conclusion of such negotiations.25  In the absence of a mediating 
authority, such agreements ultimately derived their force or validity from the “good faith” of the 
signatories.  Not all signatures carried equal weight.  There were hierarchies of honor, which 
typically corresponded with rank or title of nobility.  At the top of the hierarchy was the sovereign, 
who was viewed, by definition, as the embodiment of the state, and of its character.26  When a 
                                                                                                                                                       
their Overseas Networks. Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2010 for an inquiry into the problem of trust implicit in 
international or trans-Atlantic communication during the eighteenth century, and how it was addressed.  See also 
Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, for the use of ritual in lending, weight, and confidence to promises made in treaties. 
25 At the conclusion of major battles, for example, generals would sign conventions, establishing the terms 
under which the defeated army would surrender and give up its arms and materiel.   
26 Gérard’s statement to the American Congress that “His Catholic Majesty [Carlos III of Spain] is too great 
and too generous to desire an acquisition of territory; that he is limiting himself to administering well the states that 
Heaven had given him,” is typical of the rhetoric surrounding the king, which was designed to preserve and establish 
the king’s reputation for disinterested virtue, Gérard to Vergennes, February 17, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 529. 
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sovereign affixed his seal to a given agreement, a moral obligation was understood to have been 
created that could—in theory—only be violated in the most exceptional of circumstances.  
The system worked both because sovereigns generally cared about their personal reputation, 
but also because they had an interest in doing so.  Reputation was a kind of asset or public credit, on 
the basis of which states secured the cooperation of their neighbors.  Without it, even the most basic 
transactions could not be carried out.  Yet it was not the only type of asset available; nor did every 
sovereign place equal emphasis on preserving it.  Power, wealth, territory, and the affection of one’s 
people were also valued to varying degrees, and sovereigns frequently faced the temptation to choose 
between reputation and another type of asset.27  It was in the context of adjudicating such conflicts 
that statesmen often manifested the duplicity that observers find so unseemly and contrary to modern 
international law; for few among them were so callous as to violate a given commitment without at 
least attempting to preserve their sovereign’s honor. They invariably sought to justify their behavior 
by offering a pretext, excuse, or explanation, and they became remarkably adept at manipulating the 
law with the goal of preserving both the honor and the interests of their respective sovereigns.   
Much of what I have just set forth is familiar to historians of the ancien régime.28   Where I 
distinguish myself from the literature at large is in first arguing that rhetoric of this kind was more 
coherent and law-like than has been recognized to date.  Statesmen, I have discovered, were not only 
                                                
27 Louis XIV of France was an oft-cited example of a king who cared most about power.  His grandson, 
Louis XV, aspired to be virtuous but succumbed to personal weaknesses and instances of poor judgment. See Peter 
Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745. New York: Routledge, 1996; and G. P. Gooch, 
Louis XV: The Monarchy in Decline. London: Longmans, 1956.   
28 I do not engage directly with literature on the ancien régime as it has little to say about the role of law.  
An important exception to that rule, which deserves mention, is Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European 
Politics, 1763-1848, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, which is conceived as a study of the “international system” and 
its “constituent rules of a practice,” p. xii.  Schroeder’s primary focus is on the 1830s, but he opens with a review of 
diplomatic practices in the revolutionary era, writing that they consisted of: “compensations; indemnities; alliances 
as instruments for accruing power and capability; raison d’état; honour and prestige; Europe as a family of states; 
and finally, the principle or goal of balance of power itself,” p. 6.  Schroeder does not explain in any detail, however, 
how these principles functioned in the context of diplomatic negotiations. 
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skilled at manipulating law to suit their particular interests.29  They were also adept at judging the 
validity of their counterparts’ claims and assertions.  And they used the results of their analysis to 
evaluate one another’s public character or reputation.  The principles by which such judgments were 
rendered were precise and sophisticated—constituting a kind of moral law that stabilized the 
international system to the extent (as described above) that statesmen cared about their reputations. 
The issue of honor and reputation was particularly important to the dispute over the 
Mississippi in that all of the monarchs involved—Carlos III of Spain, Louis XVI of France, and 
George III of England—placed primacy on virtue.30  As a result, their ministers and emissaries—
whose conduct I have reviewed in the course my research—exercised considerable discretion in 
violating the customary law of nations, especially when tied to the content of treaties.  As a general 
rule, statesmen only broke their promises when necessary to preserve their core interests, and then 
typically only when they could shield their conduct from public view or justify it with a reasonable 
excuse or pretext.31  The results were messy, and justify the criticisms that are often leveled against 
early modern diplomacy.  Yet the law did constrain the conduct of statecraft in ways that were at 
least somewhat predictable to those versed in the system.  
                                                
29 See again, note 19 above.  Georg Schwarzengerger also writes of the “secret archives, diplomatic 
correspondence, [and] sophisticated treaties,” of statesmen like Richelieu that “attest to the competence, the training 
in casuistry, and the growing richness, of the practice of European international law,” in “The Grotius Factor in 
International Law and Relations: A Functional Approach,” Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts 
(eds.)  Hugo Grotius and International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 306. 
 
30 I develop these points more fully in my second chapter, but Carlos III had come to the throne in 1759 
after decades of misgovernance and had made it his ambition to restore the power and dignity of the Spanish empire.  
Louis XVI was only nineteen years old when he succeeded to the throne of France in 1774 and did not have a well-
formed policy, yet he did aspire to be virtuous.  The ministers who advised him viewed that quality as vital to their 
plans to restore the preeminence of France in European politics—in that other states would only permit France to 
acquire a preponderance of power if they could trust the disinterested character of the French king. As Vergennes 
once wrote, “if all this should end through an injustice, the King risks less in suffering it than in committing it.  
Damage to his interests can be repaired; nothing would compensate him for the loss of his reputation,” Vergennes to 
Montmorin, April 21, 1780, in Doniol, IV:476; and Doniol, IV:453. 
31 The French ministers, for example, aspired to preeminence because they believed that it was the natural 
destiny of France, as the largest and most centrally located state in Europe, to assume responsibility for preserving 
the balance of power and promoting peace in the continent as a whole.  See especially Murphy, Vergennes.  George 
III justified the harsh measures that he adopted in North America as necessary to suppress an illegal rebellion, and 
protect the interests of his people—most of whom, he asserted, were still loyal at heart. 
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The point that merits the most emphasis at this juncture is that the conduct of early-modern 
diplomacy required statesmen to exercise moral, legal, and strategic judgment—both in justifying 
their own conduct and in defending themselves from the legal machinations of their adversaries.  
Such judgments, I have found, were based on a shared set of moral and legal principles.  The content 
of those principles is difficult to ascertain with precision in that—like most aspects of the customary 
law of nations—it was unwritten.  They approximate the language pertaining to gentlemen in the 
private realm—though they are not nearly as rigorous.  As Vergennes once put it, “[the laws of] 
politics are not quite as strict as they are for [individual] morality.”32  Their existence, however, 
posed a major problem for Americans who had no prior experience with diplomacy. 
 
The Spanish-American Conflict Over the Mississippi 
The Spanish-American dispute over the Mississippi, to which I referred at the outset of my 
introduction, offers a remarkably fruitful set of records with which to demonstrate the relevance of 
such laws to the diplomacy of the American Revolution.  The territory in question was immense and 
far from coastal bases of power.  Although the Spanish and Americans had launched expeditions into 
the region, neither had established a permanent base.  As a consequence, the issue had to be resolved 
through diplomacy and through appeal to the law of nations.  The problem was that the records that I 
have examined suggest that the customary law of nations did not offer an effective means of 
adjudicating disputes of this kind.  It established general principles, such as rights based on conquest 
or prior occupation or agreements reached in prior treaties.  None of these principles or standards, 
however, was relevant in the present instance.33 
                                                
32 Vergennes to Monteil, Sept. 14, 1779, quoted in Murphy, Vergennes, 126.  See Golove and Hulsebosch, 
“Civilized Nation,” 972-973 for a helpful discussion of the literature on gentlemanly discourse. 
33 See Gérard’s reports of December 22, 1778 and February 18, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 433-35 and 
525-29, for references to the principle of rights based on conquest.  The text of the Treaty of Paris (1763) was the 
treaty that was most often referenced in the context of these negotiations.  Because the treaty had granted the lands 
 
 14 
As a consequence, the legal rhetoric surrounding the dispute quickly devolved into moral 
posturing over the propriety of American policy in relation to 1) the Franco-American Treaty of 
Alliance, and 2) the competing policy of the Spanish crown.  With respect to the Franco-American 
alliance the issue was tied to Article 11, in which Louis XVI had guaranteed to the United States 
their “Possessions, and the additions or conquests that their Confederation may obtain during the 
war” from the “Dominions” of Great Britain in North America.  The question was whether the trans-
Appalachian west constituted a “Possession” of the United States—in which case France was honor 
bound to support the American cause—or if it should rather be categorized as a potential addition, 
which might be granted to either Spain or the United States at the end of the war.  
In the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Alliance, Vergennes had offered his opinion that 
the Mississippi was a proper boundary between Spain and the United States.34  Eleven months later, 
he wrote to Gérard that he would be “astonished” if the Spanish did not agree.35  By early 1779, 
however, his position had changed.  For one thing, the war taking far longer and proving to be far 
more costly than he had anticipated.  He had also learned that the Spanish hoped to acquire control of 
the Mississippi so as to keep the Americans at a distance from their silver mines in New Spain. 
Finally, Vergennes needed to appease Carlos III, whose military cooperation he needed to bring the 
war to rapid and successful close.  He consequently instructed Gérard to prepare the Americans for 
the necessity of adjusting their policy and their territorial aspirations.36 
                                                                                                                                                       
in question to Great Britain, it was of little value to either the Americans or the Spanish.   
34 See relevant portion of Arthur Lee’s diary in Richard Henry Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, LL.D., 2 volumes. 
Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1969 [1829], vol. 1, p. 46, entry of December 12, 1777, in which Lee 
writes that, with respect to the boundaries, Vergennes had objected that “Spain would not be satisfied with the 
indeterminate boundary between their dominions and the United States,” to which the Americans answered “that the 
line drawn by the last treaty of peace with England, the Mississippi, would be adopted, and would prevent all 
disputes… This was admitted as adjusting the matter properly.” 
35 Vergennes to Gérard, October 26, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 359. 
36 See again Vergennes to Gérard, October 26, 1778, Meng, Despatches, 359-60, in which he instructed 
Gérard to tactfully prepare the Americans for the necessity of ceding the Mississippi—if Spain should desire it.  
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The problem posed by Article 11 was easily dispensed with in that the language was 
ambiguous and the French had never committed, in writing, to defend the Americans’ border 
pretensions.  Over the remainder of the war, the arguments that Gérard and other French statesmen 
would deploy in seeking to alter American policy were often moral in nature.  Gérard in particular 
emphasized the noble and generous character of Louis XVI who had come to the aid of an oppressed 
people without requiring any compensation in exchange.  How, he asked, in the face of such 
generosity, and in light of the tremendous costs that the French were bearing, could the Americans 
presume, on the basis of the alliance, to demand territories to which they had neither right nor title?37 
Gérard also framed the Spanish counter-claims in moral terms, asserting that his Catholic Majesty, 
Carlos III “too great and too generous to desire an acquisition of territory; that he is limiting himself 
to administering well the states that Heaven had given him,” and that his sole objective was to 
remove from his border “a worried and entrepreneurial neighbor.”38  
Arguments of this kind offer a sample of the type of legal rhetoric that Americans faced over 
the course of the war.  Not every issue was as consequential, and in conflicts with the British 
Congress could look to French ministers, like Gérard, for help in responding in a manner consistent 
with the prevailing norms in Europe.  Each case required the Americans to exercise two separate but 
interrelated types of expertise.  They needed a precise understanding of the customary laws of 
nations that were in dispute; and they needed an accurate understanding of: 1) the validity of the 
pretexts or excuses available to them; 2) the validity of the pretexts that were being employed against 
them; and 3) the stakes or consequences with respect to their reputation.39   
                                                
37 As I discuss in my first two chapters, France actually allied with the United States in 1778 under the 
conviction that if the Americans won their independence, Britain’s hegemony in Europe would be destroyed. 
38 Gérard to Vergennes, February 17, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 529. 
39 As discussed in my first chapter, Gérard helped Congress resolve a dispute with England over the 
implementation of the convention of Saratoga.  Yet Gérard later “declared to them with force that all of Europe 
suspected them of having inherited the invasive and turbulent spirit of their ancestors.”  Gérard to Vergennes, Dec. 
22, 1778, Meng, Despatches, 433.  The Americans needed to know the accuracy of that assertion. 
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The treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, it turns out, were relevant to the Americans’ 
need.  As already noted, the treatises did not constitute codified versions of the customary law.  They 
were works of “science” in that their authors were trying to use the new Baconian method of 
empirical observation to identify and articulate the laws of nature pertaining to politics.40  Yet the 
methods that they employed and the conclusions that they reached bore on the conduct of European 
politics in ways that were useful—in potential—to the Americans who looked to them for guidance. 
Grotius, for example, had surveyed the records of states in antiquity looking for points of 
commonality with respect to the laws governing war and peace.  General agreement on a given point 
of law, he argued, was evidence of a universal moral principle.41  In the course of his lengthy treatise 
he opined on a wide variety of questions related to the conduct of statecraft; and although—as 
already noted—his opinions were not considered binding in the context of European diplomacy, he 
helped to establish the notion that statesmen were not the final arbiters of the law.  Another set of 
laws existed outside the European state system, that were accessible through reason and to which any 
state could appeal, regardless of its power or political sophistication.   
Pufendorf had broadened this notion of a natural law of nations by deriving law from the 
universal principle of “sociability.”  He observed that human beings were so constituted as to require 
the assistance of their peers.  This was evidence, he argued, that God willed that human beings live 
together in society.42  From this first principle of natural law he went on to derive a host of related 
                                                
40 It was the art of applying natural law to nations “with a precision founded upon right reason,” Vattel 
wrote, that “constitutes of the Law of Nations a distinct science,” Book I, Introduction, §3. 
41 See Book I, chap. 1 of On the Law of War and Peace (1625).  For a helpful analysis of Grotius’ 
underlying philosophy see Charles S. Edwards, The Law of Nature, the Law of Nations and the Law of War in the 
Thought of Hugo Grotius. PhD, Princeton University, 1969.  It is important to note that Grotius did not believe that 
laws derived in this fashion constituted the entirety of natural law.  They rather constituted the only facet of the law 
of nature—as pertaining to politics—that could be identified using the Baconian method. 
42 Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations, Book I, Chap. 2, § 9.  On this point, Pufendorf was 
disputing with Hobbes, who famously argued that the natural state of man was one of war.  The concept of 
sociability dates back to Aristotle but only Pufendorf made it the basis of all natural moral laws.  See also Richard 
Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law,” in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early 
Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 99-119. 
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moral standards, at the heart of which was the principle that: “A man shall not harm one who is not 
injuring him; he shall allow everyone to enjoy his own possessions; he shall faithfully perform 
whatever has been agreed upon; and he shall willingly advance the interests of others, so far as he is 
not bound by more pressing obligations.”43   
Unlike Grotius, Pufendorf had little to say about the particulars of statecraft or diplomacy.44   
He focused his analytic energies on the natural moral duties pertaining to individuals.  Such duties he 
argued were applicable to the conduct of statecraft in that states were corporate moral persons, 
which “upon being constituted, take on the personal properties of men.”45  Hence arose, “the law of 
nations,” which was merely another term for such duties, when used in the context of diplomacy.  
Pufendorf’s theory rendered the law of nations even more accessible to Americans many of whom 
were familiar with the notion of natural moral law as it pertained to individuals.46  A major weakness 
in Pufendorf’s theory, however, was its excessive idealism, since European statesmen did not 
consider themselves bound by such strict standards.47     
It fell to Vattel, whose treatise was published in 1758, to render Pufendorf’s conception of 
the law of nations more relevant to diplomacy.48  Vattel agreed that states were corporate moral 
persons, bound by the law of nature.  He noted, however, that states differed from individuals with 
                                                
43 Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations, Book II, Chapter 2, § 9 
44 Book VIII, chapters 6-10 deal with the law of nature as applied to the conduct of war and diplomacy. 
45 Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations, Book II, Chapter 3, § 23.  “[T]he most convenient 
definition of a state,” he wrote, “appears to be this: ‘A state is a compound moral person, whose will, intertwined 
and united by the pacts of a number of men, is considered the will of all, so that it is able to make use of the strength 
and faculties of the individual members for the common peace and security,’” Book VII, Chap 2, §13. 
46 I will discuss this issue in greater detail shortly, but the apex of the college curriculum in the colonial era 
was a course entitled “moral philosophy,” which in the eighteenth century centered on such theories of natural moral 
law.  The best introduction to the topic is Norman Fiering, Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth Century Harvard: A 
Discipline in Transition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981. 
47 See again, Vergennes’ statement that “[the laws of] politics are not quite as strict as they are for 
[individual] morality.” Vergennes to Monteil, Sept. 14, 1779, quoted in Murphy, Vergennes, 126. 
48 Vattel actually derived his understanding of natural law from Christian Wolff, whose formulation of 
natural law was similar to Pufendorf’s, and likely derived from Pufendorf, who lived seventy years before him. 
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respect to their nature and with respect to the type of moral dilemmas that they confronted on a 
routine basis.  He argued that it was thus necessary to modify the laws of nature and render them 
applicable to the nature of states.49  He did this through a series of topical essays in which he sought 
to demonstrate, with examples drawn from recent political history, the type of reasoning that 
statesmen ought to employ in applying natural laws to their conduct.   Vattel, it is important to note, 
did not aim to create “laws” per se that would restrict the conduct of statecraft.  He believed that 
states were free and equal, and that no power on earth had the right to judge their conduct.50  He 
rather sought to persuade statesmen to voluntarily bring their conduct into line with the dictates of 
natural law by demonstrating the benefits that would accrue to those who did.51 
As theoretically relevant as such treatises may have been to the dilemmas of early modern 
statecraft, European statesmen rarely cited them as authorities in the context of diplomatic 
negotiations.52  So why did the Americans look to the treatises for insight into the law of nations?  
Part of the answer lies in that there was no other written source of law available.53  Equally 
important, however, was that the treatises were highly respected in the intellectual realm.  As M. S. 
                                                
49 “[A]s the natural law in its proper sense is the Law of Nature for individuals, being founded upon man’s 
nature, so the natural Law of Nations, is the Law of Nature for political societies, being founded on the nature of 
those societies.” Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, Preface, p. 7a. 
50 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I, Chap. 1, §4.  “Nations,” he later wrote, “are equal and independent, and 
can not set themselves up as judges over one another,” Book III, Chap. 3, §40.   
51 “Why may we not hope,” Vattel wrote, “still to find among those who govern some wise statesmen who 
are convinced of the great truth that even for sovereigns and States the path of virtue is the surest way to prosperity 
and happiness?... To fancy that men, and particularly men in power, are going to follow strictly the Laws of Nature, 
would be grievous self-deception; but to lose all hope of making an impression upon any of them would be to 
despair of human nature.” The Law of Nations, Book II, Chap 1, §1. “The reputation of faithlessness,” he later 
argued, “is harmful to a ruler, and the fear of it thereby becomes effective even with those who care little to deserve 
the reputation of virtuous men and who easily dispose of the reproaches of conscience.” Book II, Chap. 12, §171. 
52 During his tenure as American minister to Spain, John Jay would write that Vattel was “prohibited” in 
Spain and that his opinions carried no weight.  Jay to Gouverneur Morris, Sept. 28, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:575. 
53 Historians often cite a letter that Benjamin Franklin sent to a friend in Europe, in 1775, thanking him for 
three copies of Vattel’s treatise—one of which Franklin had circulated in Congress.  “It came to us in good season,” 
Franklin wrote, “when the circumstances of a rising State make it necessary frequently to consult the law of 
nations.” Franklin to Dumas, December 19, 1775, in Francis Wharton, (ed.) The Revolutionary Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the United States. Washington: GPO, 1888, vol. II, p. 64 (hereafter cited as Wharton, RDC). 
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Anderson has put it, “the expanding current of eighteenth-century thought and feeling… [was] 
centred around the idea of nature… as the ultimate source of true morality.”54  The treatise writers—
and Pufendorf in particular—were revered for their contributions to that endeavor, especially as it 
related to the nature and moral obligations of states.55  Their theories were consequently appealing to 
Americans who aspired to legitimize their revolution by basing their conduct on the most advanced 
moral science of the age.56 
The fact remains, however, that the treatises were not widely cited in the context of European 
diplomacy, and one should not expect that they would necessarily have helped early American 
emissaries to conduct more effective negotiations.57  For the most part, that is what the diplomatic 
record of the Revolution demonstrates.  Americans tended to adopt one of two postures toward law 
and diplomacy—neither of which was terribly effective.  On the one hand were the proponents of 
republican virtue who argued that the United States should stand aloof from European corruption, 
                                                
54 Modern Diplomacy, 166-167.   
55 See note 5 above.  According to scholars of early modern political philosophy, Pufendorf was 
particularly influential in this context, especially in Scotland and North America.  J.B. Schneewind, for example, 
writes that he “exercised unparalleled influence for over half a century.  His two major works on natural law… were 
translated into every major European language, reprinted innumerable times, and used as textbooks in dozens of 
universities on the continent and in Scotland and the American colonies.” “Pufendorf’s Place in the History of 
Ethics,” Synthese 72:1 (July, 1987), p. 123 
56 “Ever since we have been an Independent nation,” Alexander Hamilton would later write, in 1795, “we 
have appealed to and acted upon the modern law of Nations as understood in Europe,” Defense XX, October 23 and 
24, 1795. As early as 1775, Hamilton himself, in his essay, The Farmer Refuted, had urged his readers to peruse the 
works of “Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Burlemaqui,” for insight on that subject.  The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton, vol. 19, p. 341 and vol. 1, p. 86.  See also J.G.A. Pocock, “Political Thought in the English 
Speaking Atlantic, 1760-1790, Part I: The Imperial Crisis,” in The Varieties of English Political Thought, 1500-
1800. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 246-282.  
It is difficult to grasp Pufendorf’s influence on revolutionary-era conceptions of law as his theory was 
eclipsed, at the end of the eighteenth century, by the works of Immanuel Kant. Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of 
Natural Law.”  Kant indicted, “the whole lot of the natural lawyers—Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel—as ‘miserable 
comforters’ whose legal principles were devoid of any binding force,” Martti Koskenniemi, “Into Positivism: Georg 
Friedrich von Martens (1756-1821) and Modern International Law,” Constellations 15:2 (2008): 189-190. 
57 Randall Lesaffer has argued that “legal doctrine certainly played a role, although somewhat in the 
background,” “Alberico Gentili,” note 12, p. 214.  Armitage, “Declaration,” suggests that American reliance on the 
treatises was ineffective because the theories of Kant and Jeremy Bentham had already eclipsed natural law theories 
of the law of nations in Europe.  I contend that American reliance on natural law was generally ineffective in Europe 
because statesmen had never regarded the natural law theories of the treatises as authoritative. 
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eschew formal alliances, and render independent judgments in legal disputes.58  Statesmen in this 
mold, such as Arthur Lee or John Adams, took a bold and independent approach to the conduct of 
diplomacy.  Their actions, however, tended to clash with European sensibilities (the customary law 
of nations) in a way that damaged the reputation of the United States.59 
In response, other members of Congress adopted a deferential posture toward Europeans—
and toward France in particular—when it came to matters of law and diplomacy.  They conceded 
their inexperience, and argued that United States should rely on French expertise in this realm.  
Revolutionaries of this kind tended to place implicit trust in Gérard’s repeated promise that the great 
and magnanimous Louis XVI—“would care for the interests of the United States as for his own.”60  
Such confidence led them, in June 1781, to pass a resolution requiring that American ministers 
abroad “undertake nothing in the negociations for peace or truce without [the French Ministry’s] 
knowledge and concurrence; and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and opinion.…”61   
That policy, I go on to demonstrate, left Congress vulnerable to manipulation, for as 
discussed above, the French did not actually support all of the Americans’ territorial ambitions.  In 
the spring of 1779, for example, several members of Congress asked Gérard for his advice on a then 
on-going debate in Congress over the Americans’ prospective terms of peace: 
                                                
58 Gérard referred to them as the “partisans of war” and judged (incorrectly) that they favored a policy of 
reconciliation.  See Jack Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental 
Congress. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 243-263, on partisan divisions in Congress.  
59 According to Benjamin Franklin, Adams held “that to think of gratitude to France is the greatest of 
follies, and that to be influenced by it would ruin us.  He makes no secret of his having these opinions, expresses 
them publicly, sometimes in presence of the English ministers.” Franklin to Livingston, July 22, 1783, in Wharton, 
RDC, VI: 581.  Earlier in his tenure in Europe, Adams had so offended the French, with his refusal to follow their 
advice, that Vergennes had asked for his recall. That dispute is discussed in chapter 3, pp. 174-175.  See Golove and 
Hulsebosch, “Civilized Nation,” 936, 943 for a discussion of how states acquired legitimacy through their 
“performance” of the law. 
60 Gérard to Vergennes, May 21, 1779, Meng, Despatches, 655. 
61 The documents pertaining to the drafting of these instructions are in Wharton, RDC, IV:479-505.  The 
policy was adopted at the urging of the French minister in Philadelphia, Luzerne (who succeeded Gérard in the fall 
of 1779), and in response to the Vergennes’s repudiation of John Adams.  Congress did not recall Adams, but they 
expanded the American peace delegation to include John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, and Henry Laurens. 
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They testified to me… that the majority… were ignorant of the most basic elements; and they 
begged me to instruct them on the true principles of the matter, of the usages and rules 
established between the Powers of Europe, i.e. of the real situation of things…; in sum, to 
give them my opinion concerning the present incident and to give them my advice.62  
 
Gérard obliged, but in so doing he distorted the customary law (presenting as sacrosanct principles 
that European statesmen did not consistently adhere to) in an effort to moderate the American policy 
and bring it into line with French interests.  As noted above, such conduct was routine in Europe and 
it was actually incumbent upon the Americans, as members of the international community, to know 
the law well enough to evade snares of this kind; yet few among them were able to do so.  
In this context, the Americans needed an emissary with expertise in the philosophical theories 
on which they had staked their identity—who was also adept at using the customary law of nations.  I 
argue that the only American who possessed such breadth of expertise, and that was John Jay—the 
American minister to Spain, and co-negotiator of the Treaty of Paris.63  As I demonstrate in my third 
and fourth chapters, the record of Jay’s diplomacy reveals an acute understanding of both the 
procedural rules of diplomacy, as well the concept of national honor as manifest in the person of the 
sovereign and the sovereign’s representative.  Over time, Jay’s careful adherence to such standards 
earned him the confidence of Congress and the respect of European statesmen.64  It also earned him 
the standing needed to render effective independent judgments in matters pertaining to law and 
diplomacy.  During the final months of the war, in particular, Jay would render a series of moral and 
legal judgments regarding American obligations vis-à-vis France and Spain—on the basis of which 
the dispute over the Mississippi was resolved in the Americans’ favor. 
                                                
62 Gérard to Vergennes, April 4, 1779, Meng, Despatches, 595. 
63 Jay’s co-negotiators were John Adams and Benjamin Franklin.  I have already discussed Adams 
approach to diplomacy.  Benjamin Franklin was among those inclined to trust the French.  According to Gerald 
Stourzh he also cared little for “legal arguments in international relations.”  Benjamin Franklin and American 
Foreign Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954, p. 219. 
64 Gérard, for example, found Jay to be “a man of enlightened mind, free from all prejudice, capable of 
elevated views…. I am much mistaken if we will not have to regret it, if his Presidency [of Congress] is as short as it 
seems it must be.”  Gérard to Vergennes, December 19 and 22, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 430-31, 435. 
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My point is not to celebrate that victory but to demonstrate the relevance of law to real world 
events.  Jay’s perspicacity prompts me to ask, in conclusion, where he acquired his knowledge of the 
law of nations.  Jay was a lawyer before the Revolution and his familiarity with legal matters was 
likely of much help.65  He was also well versed in the history of the Dutch War for Independence, 
which offered legal precedents on which the Americans could draw.66  He had served as president of 
the Continental Congress—in which capacity he had corresponded with American emissaries abroad, 
and conversed frequently with Gérard on matters related to law and diplomacy.67  Finally he was 
reputed to have had an unusually principled or legalistic personality.68  All of these sources help to 
explain Jay’s capacity in the customary law of nations. None of them, however, explain the most 
distinctive aspect of his diplomacy: his oft-stated conviction that the United States had become a 
state, not as a result of French recognition, but as a result of the Declaration of Independence.69   
As I demonstrate throughout the dissertation, Jay’s conception of statehood was important, 
for the customary law of nations was not merely a medium for diplomacy.  It was also a marker of 
legitimacy in that only states—as opposed to other political entities—were entitled to use the forms 
and protocols it established or enjoy the privileges and protections that it afforded.70  The law set 
                                                
65 See Herbert A. Johnson, John Jay: Colonial Lawyer. PhD, Columbia University, 1965; and “John Jay: 
Lawyer in a Time of Transition, 1764-1775,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 124:5 (May 1976): 1260-
1292, for Jay’s early law career. 
66 See Jay to Vergennes, circa September 11, 1782 (unsent), in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III: 121-145, in which he 
offers a detailed overview of the Dutch posture toward independence during their war with Spain. 
67 Jay recorded that “Mr Gerard used very frequently to spend an Evening with me & sometimes we sat up 
very late.  As the Evening advanced he often became more open and spoke without Reserve on the Subject of the 
Views of Spain and the Interest of America with respect to her.” Jay, Life of John Jay, I: 100. 
 
68 Jay would write to his secretary in Spain: “I believe there are few Instances of Persons conducting 
Business with the same minute attention that I do.”  Jay to Carmichael, October 2, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:277.  See 
also for example his principled opposition to independence in 1774, when he argued: “The Measure of arbitrary 
Power is not full, and I think it must run over, before We undertake to frame a new Constitution.” Diary of John 
Adams, entry for September 6, 1774, Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, Volume 2, p. 126. 
69 See the quote by Jay with which I open this introduction. 
70 See again Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, who describes the process by which states and sovereigns had, 
over time, asserted exclusive rights to direct and control all matters pertaining to international affairs.  
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standards for military conduct, and the treatment of prisoners.  As noted above, it also established the 
protocol by which communication between states became binding, or tied to the character of the 
sovereign. Throughout the war, such facets of the law posed problems for the British who were loath 
to interact with Americans in accordance with standard protocol—since to do so would constitute a 
tacit concession of American statehood.71  They also posed problems for the Americans who did not 
always know whether, or how strongly, to assert their legal prerogatives. 
Insofar as questions of this kind were tied to core issue of independence, the French were a 
consistent source of support to Congress, and their ministers repeatedly helped the Americans defend 
their “dignity” as a state against British machinations.72  When it came to the dispute over the 
Mississippi, however, they were less scrupulous.  At key moments during Jay’s tenure abroad, 
French and Spanish statesmen pressed him to cede ground with respect to the Americans’ rights 
under the law of nations, in order to advance the course of negotiations in which they had a material 
interest.  In so doing, they were not necessarily guilty of impropriety.  Vergennes sincerely believed 
that he was acting in the Americans’ best interest in bringing the war to a speedy conclusion.  They 
Spanish court argued, with some validity, that American statehood was not yet fully established.  Yet 
Jay repeatedly, and at considerable risk to both his own reputation and that of the United States, 
refused to yield; and he did so in a way that did not provide his counterparts with valid ground for 
complaint under the customary law of nations.  
                                                
71 The British also justified their misconduct in battle on the grounds that Americans were “rebels” who did 
not merit the protections afforded by the law.  See relevant commentary on this issue in Gérard to Vergennes, 
September 1, 1778, and September 29, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 250 and 318.   
72 Both Gérard and Vergennes would repeatedly stress the importance of maintaining the Americans’ 
“dignity” as an independent and co-equal entity in the international realm.  See for example Gérard’s memo of 
December 22, 1778 in which he assured members of Congress that their dignity would not be compromised by a 
refusal on the part of Spain to lend aid to the American cause, Meng, Despatches, 433; or his dispatch of May 4, in 
which he wrote that “the suspicions and animosities that had arisen among the former and current Commissioners 
were as infinitely prejudicial to the dignity as to the interests of the United States,” Meng, Despatches, 615. In his 
instructions of October 26, 1778, Vergennes was also at pains to warn Gérard that his “language must be directed in 
such a way that we may not be suspected of wanting to interfere with the internal affairs of Congress and of 
arrogating to ourselves the right to direct it,” Meng, Despatches, 361—though as will be seen later, Vergennes was 
willing to manipulate events, when needed, to bring the Americans into line with French interests. 
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As noted above, Pufendorf held that states were corporate moral persons whose existence 
derived from conformance with natural law—an opinion with which Vattel concurred.  As I argue in 
my fifth chapter, it was theories of this kind that lay at the root of Jay’s diplomacy.73  But this 
argument raises one last question: The treatises were generally well known in North America prior to 
the Revolution, so what made Jay’s use of such theories so distinctive?  Part of the answer may lie in 
Jay’s legalistic personality.  Yet it also appears to be the case that most Americans had only a general 
or superficial knowledge of the treatises, and little understanding of natural law theories on which 
they rested.74  Jay’s advantage was that he had studied Pufendorf under the tutelage of Samuel 
Johnson, the president of King’s College in New York City. 
Johnson, as I demonstrate in my sixth and final chapter, was one of the only American-born 
intellectuals in the colonial era to have acquired deep expertise in European theories of natural law.75  
He not only taught those theories with authority, he interpreted them in a way that was relevant to 
colonial intellectual concerns—weaving the concept of natural law into an intellectual synthesis of 
Protestant and Enlightenment conceptions of moral authority.  Jay later purchased a copy of Vattel in 
1772.  I contend that it was the combined influence of Pufendorf and Vattel, imbued with Johnsonian 
rigor and authority, that informed Jay’s conception of the law of nations.76 
                                                
73 Each independent State,” Vattel wrote, “claims to be, and actually is, independent of all the others…. 
[T]hey ought to be regarded as so many free individuals who live together in a state of nature, and recognize no 
other laws than those of nature, or of its divine author.” Book I, Preface, 9a. 
74 Craig Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, makes this point on p. 266. See also Philip Hamburger, “Natural 
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,” Yale Law Review 102 (1992-1993): 907-960, which argues that a 
generalized conceptions of natural law, perceptible in election day sermons, informed judicial opinions during the 
founding era; and Lee Ward, The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004.  John Adams had not read any of the major treatises prior to 1758.  The Diary and 
Autobiography of John Adams. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961, vol. 3, p. 271-272 
75 As I discuss in my last chapter, Johnson had devoted his life to the development of a theory of 
knowledge that blended Protestant and Enlightenment conceptions of moral authority into a unified whole.  He 
infused the theory of natural law with a combination of scientific rigor and divine authority that was both 
characteristic of the era and yet remarkable for its rigor, erudition and intellectual authority. 
76 Jay’s copy of Vattel, with a dated inscription, can be found in the Columbia Law Library.   
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In sum, the philosophical treatises on the law of nations were useful to Jay in that they helped 
him address the unique challenges that confronted “a rising state” in early modern Europe.77  New 
states were a rarity in this period, and the customary law of nations did not specify how they were to 
acquire legitimacy.  The answers that it did offer were bound up in the concepts of national character 
and the proper use of law.78  The former was problematic for the Americans in that they did not have 
a “sovereign” per se.  As for proper use of the customary law of nations, although Jay was at pains to 
comply with its dictates, he could not afford always to defer to the opinions of his European 
counterparts.79  The treatises offered him grounds for establishing the statehood of the United States 
on the character of its people—including Jay as their representative—and a conceptual framework 
for rendering the kind of independent judgments that made his diplomacy so effective.  
A brief word about sources, as I conclude.  The principal sources on which I have based my 
analysis are the papers of John Jay, the papers of Samuel Johnson, the dispatches of Conrad 
Alexandre Gérard, and the treatises of Pufendorf and Vattel.  I have also made selective use of some 
edited volumes of documents that are listed near the beginning my bibliography.  Unfortunately, I did 
not to have the time or resources needed to visit any archives in Europe, and have had to rely instead 
on the documents published in the NHPRC’s Emerging Nation: Documentary History of the Foreign 
Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, along with a few smaller 
collections of published papers.  At some point I hope to explore more fully the contrasting way in 
which sovereigns like George III or Carlos III conceived of the law of nations and applied it to their 
conduct of foreign affairs.  For now, my focus is on John Jay and his use of the unique intellectual 
resources that he encountered at King’s College.   
                                                
77 The phrase comes from Franklin’s letter to Dumas, in December 1775.  See note 53 above.  
78 See Golove and Hulbsebosch, “Civilized Nation,” 953-958 for a helpful discussion of the connection 
between statehood and national credit, and the problem posed by the fragmentary nature of American sovereignty.  
79 As Jay wrote to Congress in the fall of 1782, “Let us be honest and grateful to France, but let us think for 



























Security was tight on the docks of Toulon as the crew of Le Languedoc—flagship for the 
Comte d’Estaing’s battle fleet—made preparations for departure.  The date was April 11, 1778.  The 
fleet’s secret destination: the United States of America, where the French hoped to strike a crippling 
blow—both military and diplomatic—against the British counterinsurgency.  In the nearby village of 
La Seyne, Conrad Alexandre Gérard, newly-appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, 
dashed off a parting note to his superior, the Comte de Vergennes: “I would not leave Europe without 
begging you to permit me to renew the homage of eternal gratitude that I owe to your goodness, and 
the zeal that animates me for your glory, independently of all I owe to the service of the King.  These 
are powerful springs.  It is by their action on my soul, that I dare hope to show myself worthy of the 
confidence which you have been good enough to accord me.”1  Two days later, Gérard and his 
retinue were quietly carried out to Le Languedoc —by then already at sea—and the venture began. 
Gérard would reach Philadelphia in July and for the next fifteen months—until his departure 
in October 1779—he would send a steady stream of reports back to Paris, describing the strategies 
and arguments that he deployed in defending French interests.  Those reports contain a wealth of 
hitherto untapped insight into the law of nations, its role in eighteenth-century diplomacy, and its 
particular influence on the American Revolution.  They demonstrate 1) that the law was important—
even central—to the conduct of eighteenth-century statecraft; 2) that it was derived from precedent, 
the text of treaties, and a corpus of shared principles that statesmen acquired through long experience 
in the field, and finally, 3) that Americans were largely ignorant of the law and its role in statecraft—
a weakness that left them vulnerable to manipulation by both foe and friend. 
                                                
1 This citation is taken from Elizabeth Kite, “Notes on Franco-American Relations in 1778,” Records of the 
American Catholic Historical Association 32:2 (June, 1921), p. 143.  Unless otherwise noted, all other references to 
Gérard’s correspondence are taken from the French documents published in Meng, Despatches and Instructions of 
Conrad Alexandre Gérard, and are translated by the author of this dissertation.   
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Gérard was an unusual choice to head a foreign legation in time of war in that he was not of 
noble birth and had never served abroad in a ministerial capacity.  He was a career civil servant 
whose prior experience was as personal secretary to the French Foreign Minister.2 Yet his papers are 
a particularly valuable source of insight into the role of law in the diplomacy of the American 
Revolution.   For one thing, Gérard had received legal training in his youth and thus had both a 
propensity and the capacity to deploy law effectively in his negotiations.3   Second, as Vergennes’s 
former assistant he was intimately familiar with the strategic priorities of the French court—priorities 
to which he would often make reference in his correspondence.  Third, he possessed particular 
expertise with respect to French policy vis-à-vis the United States, having conducted background 
research on the Revolution, and having negotiated the terms of the Franco-American Treaty of 
Alliance with the American agents, Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee.   
Finally—and as reflected in the quote with which I opened—Gérard was highly motivated to 
win the approval of his superiors.  As a former secretary, selected for a post for which he lacked the 
usual experience and preparation, he was both conscious of the trust that had been accorded him and 
fearful of making mistakes.  Those factors, combined with Gérard’s distance from Europe and the 
difficulties involved in trans-Atlantic communication, prompted him to write long and frequent 
                                                
2 Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, p. 88, states that high-ranking posts were reserved for the aristocracy, and 
that “the education provided by schools and universities… [was deemed] of little use,” in equipping diplomats with 
the “quickness of wit, courtly manners and an impressive appearance, social polish and savoir faire” that they 
needed to establish the dignity of their sovereigns. The best preparation, it was said, was to travel widely and 
volunteer at a foreign embassy.  It was also helpful to study the dispatches and memoranda or earlier generations of 
diplomats—though members of the aristocracy were often unwilling to receive mundane training of this kind.  In 
many cases, the preferred path to promotion was to serve in the military and then later join the foreign service at a 
very high rank.  Gérard was a university-educated lawyer and was not a member of the aristocracy. 
3 The only biography on Gérard is an amateur work by Ruth Strong Hudson, The Minister from France: 
Conrad-Alexandre Gérard, 1729-1790. Euclid, OH: Lutz Printing & Publishing Co., 1994, which notes that Gérard 
received a doctorate in jurisprudence from the University of Strasbourg in 1748, p. 19.  John Meng also includes a 
sketch of Gérard’s life in his introduction to Despatches, 5-25.  For dated scholarship on Gérard’s tenure in 
Philadelphia see: John J. Meng, “French Diplomacy in Philadelphia: 1778-1779,” The Catholic Historical Review, 
24: 1 (April, 1938): 39-57; and Elizabeth S. Kite, “Conrad Alexandre Gerard and American Independence,” Records 
of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia 32:4 (December, 1921): 274-294. 
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reports, detailing the strategies that he deployed.4  Those strategies were replete with references to 
the law of nations and offer needed insight into its role in eighteenth-century diplomacy. 
As I stated in my introduction, most scholars writing on the law of nations today depict the 
law as almost entirely bound up in the philosophical treatises of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Samuel 
von Pufendorf (1632–1694), Emerich de Vattel (1714–1767), and other European authors whose 
collective publications are presented as the embodiment of eighteenth-century conceptions of 
international law. Some scholars will acknowledge, or make passing reference to the fact, that 
statesmen in the eighteenth century based their conduct on a separate body of law—also termed the 
law of nations—that was grounded in precedent and the text of early modern treaties.  With the 
partial exception, however, of historians interested in the development of early modern diplomacy, 
no one to date has examined the content of this political law of nations, or described its role in the 
diplomacy of the revolutionary era and its relationship to the theories of Grotius and his peers.5 
Over the course of his tenure in Philadelphia, Gérard used legal arguments in connection with 
three specific issues, each of which sheds light on the political law of nations and its role in 
diplomacy.  First, on arrival in Philadelphia Gérard was tasked with establishing the terms of the 
Franco-American Alliance.  Second, in the months that followed, he played an active role in 
thwarting British attempts to commence peace negotiations with Congress, while also advising 
Congress on the related issue of how to act in connection with the disputed Convention of Saratoga.  
Third, and finally, over the spring and summer of 1779, Gérard was charged with bringing American 
territorial aspirations into line with French strategic interests.  
                                                
4 Over the course of his tenure in Philadelphia, Gérard would send Vergennes 135 dispatches, or an average 
of about two per week.  Gérard was likely chosen for the task because he was fluent in English and was familiar 
with French policy and strategic objectives for the Revolution.  Lord Stormont, the British ambassador to Paris, 
would later described Gérard as the “main Hinge on which the whole turns.”  See Hudson, Minister, 63.   
5 See again Anderson, Modern Diplomacy and Black, History of Diplomacy, 59-118. 
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Gérard’s arguments in each case reveal that the law of nations was a set of pragmatic rules 
and protocols that governed routine aspects of international affairs such as inter-state communication, 
the ratification of treaties, and the exchange of prisoners.  Furthermore, it was through the use of the 
law that states acquired legitimacy in the international realm in that a) only states—as opposed to 
other political entities—were allowed to use the law and b) law was the medium through which states 
established their public reputation—either by bringing their conduct into line with the dictates of law, 
or by offering sophisticated justifications for what might otherwise be regarded as unlawful conduct.  
Reputation, in turn, functioned as a kind of moral credit on the basis of which states sought assistance 
from each other in time of need.  In addition, the law of nations offered a collection of shared 
principles, a kind of moral idiom, on the basis of which states and sovereigns sought to resolve 
disputes lying outside the realm of military power.  
Those facets of the law pertaining to international legitimacy were particularly important 
during Gérard’s tenure in Philadelphia in that the United States was in the process of establishing 
both its statehood, and its initial reputation.6  Its significance was further enhanced by the fact that 
France and the United States were allies, and were related in such a way that disparities in military 
power had relatively little influence on negotiations.7  Finally, it is apparent from Gérard’s papers 
that the Americans, while generally aware of the law of nations, lacked the sophisticated and 
socialized knowledge of the law necessary to use it effectively in their negotiations—though there 
was one American, John Jay, who had occasion to observe Gérard’s conduct and would later deploy 
the insights that he gleaned with much effect and to the detriment of French interests. 
 
                                                
6 In the Declaration of Independence the members of Congress had asserted that “as Free and Independent 
States” the United States had “full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and 
to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.” 
7 As will be discussed later, Vergennes was at pains to keep the Americans bound to France through ties of 
gratitude, and he avoided any steps that might offend the Americans or prompt them to abandon the alliance.  
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Case I: Establishing the Treaty of Alliance 
 Among the papers that Gérard carried with him to Philadelphia were written instructions 
from Vergennes, detailing the core objectives of his mission. In the instructions, Vergennes made 
clear that Gérard’s first priority on arrival was to ensure that the American Congress acknowledged 
the Franco-American treaty of alliance to be in force, and its terms binding on both signatories.  
Vergennes’s chief concern was with Article VIII of the alliance, in which both France and the United 
States had vowed not to conclude, “Truce or Peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of 
the other first obtain’d.”  Vergennes had added this language to the treaty with the goal of preventing 
the Americans from reconciling with Great Britain prematurely.  He considered it to be the “first and 
most essential” stipulation of the treaty, and the basis of French national security during the war.  The 
process by which this article came into effect offers initial insight into the role of law in the 
diplomacy of the Revolution.8 
The importance that Vergennes ascribed to this article was rooted in two related issues.  First, 
the French were persuaded, in early 1778, that they were more committed to the cause of American 
independence than were the Americans themselves.  France’s interest in the event was premised on 
the then widespread belief that if Great Britain lost its North American colonies its power would be 
dramatically reduced, enabling France to resume its rightful place at the center of European politics.  
Vergennes thought it very likely, in the absence of French military support, that the Americans would 
be compelled by circumstances to reconcile with England and he was determined to prevent peace on 
the basis of any terms short of full and complete independence.9 
                                                
8 See Vergennes to Gérard, March 29, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 126.  For an overview of French 
objectives for the war, see Edward S. Corwin, “French Objectives in the American Revolution,” The American 
Historical Review 21:1 (October 1915): 33-61. 
9 See especially, Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and 
Diplomacy, 1774-1787. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 37-44. 
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Second, Vergennes also feared that, even if France offered the United States a military 
alliance, the Americans might prefer to reconcile with England rather than to bind themselves to a 
nation that, until recently, had been their foremost enemy.   They might even use the prospect of a 
French alliance to win better peace terms from England and then leave France to fight England alone 
and without hope of profit.10  Here again, article VIII offered France assurance that the United States 
was committed to its new ally, and would turn a deaf ear to all British offers.  What would the 
Americans decide?  That was the question, the answer to which Gérard was to settle immediately on 
arrival in Philadelphia. 
Two related factors lent added urgency to this issue as Gérard made his way across the 
Atlantic in the spring of 1778.  Back in December 1777, news had reached Europe of the remarkable 
American victory at Saratoga, in which an entire British army under John Burgoyne had surrendered 
to Horatio Gates.  The event had shocked the British public, which began to demand a change in 
policy.  In response, the British government under Lord North had declared its intent to offer the 
Americans generous terms of peace—virtually everything the Americans could possibly want, short 
of full independence.  Parliament repealed the bills that had offended the colonies in the lead-up to 
war, and a commission was dispatched to North America, with instructions to commence 
negotiations for peace.  It was this prospect of imminent Anglo-American reconciliation that had 
prompted the French—over the course of December 1777 and January 1778—finally to commit to a 
policy of open support for the United States.11  Vergennes hoped that a Franco-American alliance 
                                                
10 In the aftermath of the Seven Years War (1756-1763) France was no longer the military equal of Great 
Britain.  The decision to recognize the United States in 1778, and risk certain war with England, was a gamble, 
taken in hopes that France could win a quick victory and restore the balance of power at relatively little cost.  Any 
chance of victory, however, was contingent on the Americans remaining in the war, and tying down a substantial 
portion of the British army.  If the United States should betray France, and make peace with England, the French 
would be left to fight Britain alone and the consequences would be catastrophic. 
11 Vergennes had been preparing for the possibility of war on behalf of the United States since early 1776.  
He had needed time to restore the strength of the navy and also to persuade Louis XVI that such a war would be in 
the long-term interest of France.  
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would persuade the Americans to reject any British offers.  Yet until Gérard was on site, and the 
treaty was in force, he could not be certain. 
Vergennes’s second cause for anxiety was entirely of his own making—and this factor in 
particular helps to illustrate how statesmen manipulated law in the context of diplomacy during this 
period.  In the final round of negotiations leading to the treaty of alliance, Vergennes had insisted that 
the alliance not become effective immediately upon ratification, but rather that it be made defensive 
and eventual in nature—meaning that it would only come into effect in the event that Great Britain, 
“in Resentment of that connection and of the good correspondence, which is the object of the said 
Treaty, should break the Peace with france.”12  Vergennes had insisted on this language for two 
reasons: First, it served to protect the honor of Louis XVI by casting Britain as the aggressor in the 
ensuing war and France as the innocent victim—which had done nothing wrong in recognizing 
American independence.  Second, the language served to strengthen France’s claim to assistance 
from Spain under the terms of a separate alliance that those two crowns had signed some seventeen 
years earlier.13 
The problem was that the language also made activation of the Franco-American alliance 
dependent not upon mere ratification—as would normally have been the case, but on the subjective 
question of whether Great Britain and broken “the Peace with france.”  The legal question of what 
constituted a breach of peace or state of war had generated much intelligent discussion in Europe, but 
                                                
12 See Miller, Treaties, II:35-41. 
13 In 1700, Philip V became king of Spain putting the Bourbon family on the throne of both France and 
Spain.  A combination of family ties and shared strategic interest had led the two crowns to form three alliances in 
the following decades.  The third alliance, signed in 1761 near the end of the Seven Years War, was still in force in 
1778.  Under the terms of the alliance, the enemy of one country was the enemy of the other.  In 1776 and 1777, 
Vergennes had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Spain to voluntarily sign on to his plan for an alliance with the 
United States, against England.  Spain had refused and Vergennes now hoped to use the added pressure of the 
alliance—by portraying England as the “enemy of France”—to compel Spain to assist France in the pending war.  
France had the ability, in 1778, to contend against England on its own for approximately one year. If the war should 
last longer than that, Spanish assistance would become essential.  See Dull, French Navy.  In the negotiations 
leading to the Treaty of Alliance, Gérard—who was then the chief French negotiator—insisted that the treaty be 
eventual on the grounds that “they were not to suppose that the entering into the [Franco-American treaty of amity 
and commerce] was a legitimate cause of war, but as it might occasion it they had reason to provide against that 
event.” See diary of Arthur Lee, in R.H. Lee, Life of Arthur Lee. Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1829, vol. 1, p. 388. 
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there was nothing close to a consensus rule at that time.14  The ideal, in theory, was that war should 
be preceded by a formal declaration on the part of the belligerent.  In practice, that rarely happened.  
For one thing, states often had a strategic interest in initiating war via surprise attacks on their 
enemies.15  On other occasions, states had an interest in denying the existence of war, even when 
being provoked by a neighboring state—preferring to overlook those insults rather than risk a 
conflict that they were not prepared for.16 
Over the course of 1778, a remarkably intricate set of legal maneuvers played out as 
France—which had a major interest in seeing the peace with England broken—presented its recent 
recognition of the United States as a pacific event of the most ordinary kind.  England, which fully 
intended to punish France for having interfered so egregiously with its domestic affairs, played along 
with the game and maintained the fiction of peace—at least long enough for its peace commissioners 
to reach North America and hopefully strike a deal. What made the situation even more complex—
and excruciating for France—is that in the last analysis the only party whose legal opinion really 
mattered was the American Congress.   
If the Americans preferred reconciliation with Britain, they had ample grounds—under the 
prevailing legal regime in Europe—for arguing that the peace between France and Britain was still 
intact, and that the alliance—including Article VIII—was not yet in effect.  If, by contrast, they 
preferred to cast their lot with France, they would also be well within their rights to seize upon the 
                                                
14 See Steven C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, 100-110 for an extended discussion of the various standards adopted by states throughout this era, along 
with corresponding commentary from the leading writers on the law of nations. 
15 D’Estaing’s battle squadron, which carried Gérard to Europe, had been instructed to launch surprise 
attacks against British forces in North America, which presumably had not yet learned of France’s decision to 
recognize the United States.  John J. Meng, “D’Estaing’s American Expedition: 1778-1779,” American Society of 
the French Legion of Honor 6:3-4 (1936), 220-262. 
16 Over the course of 1778, for example, the new Spanish governor in New Orleans, Bernardo de Gálvez 
began to attack British shipping in the area.  This normally would have provoked a strong response from England.  
The British, however, had no interest in opening another front in the war, and chose to ignore the provocation.   
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slightest act of hostility on the part of Great Britain—the recall, for example, in March of the British 
ambassador to France—as evidence that the terms of alliance were now fully binding.  The law, at 
least in this context, was highly ambiguous, leaving statesmen ample room to interpret it as they saw 
fit.  Vergennes could only wait and hope for the best. 
Two weeks after Gérard’s departure, Vergennes thought it necessary to send a note, stressing 
the importance of the matter:  
You must show them [the Americans] that it is only for their sake that we have made war… 
and that as a consequence the engagements we have made with them have become absolute 
and permanent, that our aims have become the same and should henceforth be inseparable.  I 
repeat this point, Monsieur, although it is in your instructions, because it is the most 
important of all those that the King has confided to your care, and should be the essential 
base of all your negotiations.17  
 
In June, Vergennes received encouraging news that a British frigate had attacked a French 
ship in the English Channel, thus bolstering his case for a breach of peace.  Whatever comfort he 
derived from the event, however, was soon undermined by a report from Philadelphia alleging that 
the Americans had been given to understand that “The [French] King…  had no thought of requiring 
that they not make peace separately for themselves, in the case where useful and advantageous terms 
should be made them.”18 Vergennes wrote to Gérard that such an opinion “would destroy the entire 
system upon which our treaty of alliance rested….  I know too well your prudence, zeal, and 
intelligence not to be certain that you will occupy yourself with it immediately on arrival.”19 
                                                
17 Vergennes to Gérard, April 22, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 137. 
18 The rumor had its roots in a report that the American commissioners in Paris had sent to Congress on 
December 18, 1777—immediately following a conference with Gérard. Gérard had purportedly informed them that 
Louis XVI had decided to recognize and ally with the United States and that he would “not so much as insist that if 
he engaged in a war with England on our account we should not make a separate peace; he would have us be at full 
liberty to make a peace for ourselves whenever good and advantageous terms were offered to us.  The only 
condition he should require and rely on would be this: that we, in no peace to be made with England, should give up 
our independence and return to the obedience of that government.”  Wharton, RDC, II:453. 
19 Vergennes to Gérard, June 26, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 142. 
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Finally, in July, Vergennes’s nerves were again set on edge by a (false) report that the British 
peace commissioners had been empowered to offer the Americans independence.  “If this new plan 
should arrive in America,” he wrote to Gérard… 
…while Congress is still uninformed in a precise manner of the existence of war, it might 
believe itself free to treat with the court of London and to accept, without our concurrence, 
the independence that she would offer.  You will sense for yourself, Monsieur, how such a 
development would damage our affairs, and consequently how important it is to prevent it.  
Mr. Franklin and Mr. Adams have assured me… that the Congress is incapable of doing 
anything opposed to our treaties and to the friendship on which they are based…. [I]t is 
necessary that you receive [this assurance] directly from the leaders of Congress.20 
  
As Vergennes’s letters made their way slowly across the Atlantic (the first letter would not 
arrive until November), Gérard was basking in the glow of Congressional gratitude for the French 
alliance, oblivious to Vergennes’s concerns.  He had reached Philadelphia on July 12, and in his first 
report of July 15 he wrote:  
There is nothing, Monseigneur, to equal the eagerness with which nearly every member of 
Congress, and other important individuals, have come to see me and to express to me their 
feelings about the Alliance and the proceedings of the King.  I would fear seeming to 
exaggerate if I repeated the words that the most phlegmatic among them have used…. Every 
day I see on familiar terms the principal members of Congress, and the frankness with which 
they take me into their confidence seems to be as much a part of the public character as it is 
due to their principles and to the confidence that the King's conduct has instilled in them….  
They seem to fear not paying me honor enough.21 
 
As gratifying as Gérard’s reports were at one level, they did not contain the specific 
assurance that Vergennes was looking for.  By October, he had received nine such reports, none of 
which confirmed that Congress had officially recognized the terms of the treaty to be in effect.  On 
October 26, Vergennes sent Gérard a rather pointed dispatch: “The first and most immediate effect 
that the state of war should have produced is to have made our eventual alliance definitive.  You 
were directed to explain this to Congress; I cannot imagine that you have encountered the least 
                                                
20 Vergennes to Gérard, July 28, 1778 in Meng, Despatches, 191-92. 
21 Gérard to Vergennes, July 15, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 148-50. 
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contradiction in this regard.  We are in perfect security, and I have no doubt that the first dispatches 
that I receive from you will confirm us [in that opinion].”22 
Gérard would not receive that letter until January, yet by the end of November, he had 
received Vergennes’s earlier dispatches, and these spurred him to action.  In early December he 
asked Congress to officially renounce any right to a separate peace with England.  The American 
answer was delayed by the resignation of Henry Laurens, the president of Congress, on December 
9.23  In mid-January, however, Gérard received a resolution from the new president, John Jay, in 
which Congress publicly declared: “That as neither France nor these United States may of right, so 
these United States will not, conclude either truce or peace with the common enemy without the 
formal consent of their ally first obtained; and that any matters or things which may be insinuated or 
asserted to the contrary thereof tend to the injury and dishonor of the said States.” Vergennes’s fears 
were finally laid to rest—at least for the time being.24 
The events surrounding the establishment of the treaty of alliance—and of Article VIII in 
particular—offer several initial insights into eighteenth-century international law and its role in 
diplomacy.  The most basic observation is that diplomacy was in fact conducted on the basis of an 
established legal code.  Vergennes clearly believed that article VIII had substantive meaning and, if 
                                                
22 Vergennes to Gérard, October 26, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 356. 
23 Laurens was the President of Congress.  He had resigned in protest after Congress refused to censure 
Silas Deane for criticizing Congress in the Philadelphia press.  Deane had until recently been one of three American 
agents in Paris, and had helped to negotiate the treaty of alliance.  One of his fellow agents, Arthur Lee, had accused 
Deane of misappropriating public funds, leading to Deane’s recall.  Deane was never charged with any crime but his 
inability to prove his innocence—he was a terrible record keeper—made it impossible for him to prove his 
innocence.  The investigation led to sharp divisions in Congress that lasted for years.  For an overview of Arthur 
Lee’s life and diplomacy see Lee, Life of Arthur Lee; and Louis W. Potts, Arthur Lee, a Virtuous Revolutionary. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981.  For insight into Congressional politics in this era see H. 
James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974; 
Benjamin H. Irvin, Clothed in the Robes of Sovereignty: The Continental Congress and the People Out of Doors. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.  For insight into the office of president of Congress see Calvin Jillson 
and Rick K. Wilson, Congressional Dynamics: Structure, Coordination, and Choice in the First American 
Congress, 1774-1789. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994; and Jennings B. Sanders, The Presidency of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-89: A Study in American Institutional History. Gloucester, MA: P. Smith, 1971 [1930]. 
24 Gérard to the President of Congress, December 7, 1778, in Wharton, RDC, II:855; Congress’s resolution 
was dated January 14, 1779, see Wharton, RDC, III:23.   
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properly established, offered real protection to French interests.  It is equally evident that both 
Vergennes and the British court viewed the issue of a “breach of peace”—the trigger that would 
activate the Franco-American treaty of alliance—as a legal matter, even if the legal criteria available 
for resolving the issue were not precisely defined. 
Second, there is little to suggest that this “law” was explicitly based on any written code, 
treatise or other external source of legal authority.  Vergennes and his counterparts seemed rather to 
be acting on a shared understanding of the rules governing international affairs—likely learned 
through experience.  Statesmen, it appears, were socialized into the intricacies of international law 
and knew intuitively which facets of the law were clearly established and which were subject to 
dispute.  They also knew how their counterparts were likely to manipulate the law in the course of a 
given negotiation, and they adjusted their strategies accordingly.  (Here, it should be noted, 
Vergennes was taking a risk in allying with Americans who were not socialized in the law and could 
not be counted on to interpret it in accordance with European conventions.)25 
Finally, it seems that in the absence of a judge or judiciary, international law was enforced 
through a code of honor.  In its declaration of January 1779, for example—the declaration on which 
Vergennes pinned the security of the treaty of alliance—the American Congress had concluded: 
“[A]ny matters or things which may be insinuated or asserted to the contrary thereof tend to the 
injury and dishonor of the said States” (emphasis added).  The weight that Vergennes attributed to 
that declaration seems to indicate that public affirmations— made in proper form by a sovereign 
power and tied to that sovereign’s honor—provided a measure (perhaps the only measure) of security 
under the law.  How the concept of honor functioned in relation to the law—and how it could also be 
manipulated in pursuit of state interests—will be more clearly seen in the next two cases pertaining 
to the British peace commissioners, who had arrived in North America a few weeks prior to Gérard.  
                                                
25 See again Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 88 for the training that members of the foreign service typically 
received.  It is notable that Gérard, despite his legal training and experience in the foreign ministry, did not grasp the 
urgency of establishing the treaty of alliance until he had received a specific reminder from Vergennes.   
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Case II: The Carlisle Peace Commission and the Convention of Saratoga 
 
The British peace commissioners, whose mission caused Vergennes so much anxiety, 
reached New York in early June and immediately sent Congress a letter, conveying their purpose and 
urging that negotiations begin.  Though Gérard was not yet on the scene, the Americans needed just 
four days to demand, as a prerequisite to any negotiations, British recognition of American statehood 
and the withdrawal of all British forces from North America.  The commissioners lacked the will or 
authority to grant such terms and so the matter came to an impasse, where it remained when Gérard 
arrived on July 12.26 
Gérard was clearly pleased with the American response, as evidenced by his early dispatches, 
yet he soon became concerned about another issue that threatened to entangle Congress in 
negotiations with the commissioners.  At the conclusion of the battle of Saratoga, as was typical in 
this era, the British and American generals had negotiated the terms of a “convention,” establishing 
the terms under which the British army would formally surrender.  As expected, the British general, 
John Burgoyne, had pledged his honor as a gentleman that none of his soldiers would fight against 
the United States for the duration of the war.  In exchange, the Americans had pledged to release his 
army in the very near future.27 
In the weeks that followed, however, the Americans had begun to doubt the wisdom of that 
agreement.  Their principal concern was that the British might try to circumvent the convention and 
return the soldiers to the field.  Conventions were not the most durable of agreements.  States could 
try and slip some soldiers back into another army or, even worse, try to void the pact altogether by 
                                                
26 See James Kirschke, Gouverneur Morris: Author, Statesman and Man of the World. Thomas Dunne 
Books, 2005, 82.  The text of Congress’s letter can be found in JCC, 11:615.  For a fuller description of the Carlisle 
Commission from the British perspective see Charles Ritcheson, British Politics and the American Revolution. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954.  
27 For a fuller analysis of the fate of what became known as “the convention army,” see William M. 
Dabney, After Saratoga: The Story of the Convention Army. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 
1954, and Richard Sampson, Escape in America: The British Convention Prisoners, 1777-1783. Chippenham, 
Wiltshire: Picton Publishers, 1995.  
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accusing the victorious party—on the basis of some trumped-up charge—of having nullified the 
convention.  In this case, the threat was magnified by the fact that the British could simply assign the 
defeated soldiers to some other portion of the British Empire, where they would take the place of 
troops who could then be sent to North America.   
Back in November 1777, Congress had asked Burgoyne to submit a detailed physical and 
biographical description of his officers—information that the Americans would need to enforce the 
terms of the convention going forward.  Burgoyne had refused.  Not only so, but he also accused the 
Americans, in writing, of having treated his officers improperly and he coupled the accusation with a 
charge that the Americans had broken their public faith.  Congress seized on the letter, and especially 
the accusation of a breach of faith, as evidence that Burgoyne was laying the groundwork for a future 
repudiation of the convention.28  On January 8, 1778, Congress issued a formal declaration stating 
that Burgoyne’s entire army would remain in captivity until the British government had also ratified 
the convention.29   
When the British peace commissioners reached New York in June, they wrote separately to 
inform Congress that they had been empowered by Parliament to supply the required ratification.  
When Gérard arrived in July, the members of Congress were in the midst of preparing a response to 
the British offer, and they asked Gérard for his advice.  Gérard immediately noted that the 
commissioners were basing their authority on a letter from Parliament, which was unacceptable in 
                                                
28 See committee report in JCC, 10:29-35, which narrates the entire history of the events, and summarizes 
the content of letters exchanged over the previous two months between Burgoyne and the generals in charge of the 
convention army.  The committee report states that, “the declaration of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, ‘that the 
public faith is broke,’ is of itself sufficient to justify Congress in taking every measure for securing the performance 
of the convention, which the law of nations, in consequence of this conduct, will justify.” 
29 In making its determination the committee made passing reference, without citation, to “the judgment of 
the most approved writers,” which they said was in agreement with the decision.  They relied most heavily, 
however, on the practice of British officers at the conclusion of earlier battles in Canada, in 1775 and 1776.  The 
committee stated in conclusion that a decision to require the ratification of the British government was “consistent 
with the safety and the honour of the United States,” JCC, 10:30. 
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the international realm.  Only the authority of the king could suffice.  In his report to Vergennes, 
Gérard went on to say: 
…that in all transactions between independent Nations it was necessary first to examine the 
power of the one in whose name negotiations were conducted as well as the nature and form 
of the power of those sent to negotiate and conclude; that the King of England by his 
prerogative, and under the constitution, is alone authorized to negotiate; that he has not given 
full powers to the Commissioners, who act only by virtue of an act of Parliament and on 
principles of dependence, subject to ratification, which is not sufficient in either political or 
military matters.30 
 
In addition, Gérard noted that the commissioners’ letters were domestic in nature—drafted in 
a style appropriate for official correspondence within the British Empire, but not for letters between 
states in the international realm.  If Congress acted on the basis of such letters, and permitted 
negotiations to proceed “under any other titles than those that the law of nations and the usage of 
sovereign powers admitted... [the result] would be to retain a disgraceful mark of subordination.”31 
Three benefits would flow from such a stance, Gérard observed.  First, the Americans would 
safeguard their independence.  Second, they would ensure that Burgoyne’s army remained in 
American hands—for the British would have allowed several armies to be held captive before they 
took any step that implied even a tacit admission of American independence.  Finally, the Americans 
would ensure their “dignity” in the eyes of other European states, by conducting themselves in a 
manner deemed lawful and appropriate under the circumstances. 
                                                
30 Gérard to Vergennes, August 16, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 226. 
31 Gérard to Vergennes, September 1, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 250.  A separate issue had also arisen 
concerning ammunition boxes, which the British were rumored to have destroyed in violation of the convention.  
Gérard’s opinion was that if the Americans could substantiate this accusation, then “the fundamental and inherent 
clause of every convention under the law of nations would be executed in holding prisoner the troops that had 
violated their agreement.” See Gérard to Vergennes, August 16, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 226.    
P.J. Marshall writes that, “[I]t was official [British] policy, for as long as it was practical to do so, to deny 
recognition to the United States and to regard the individual colonies as the only legally constituted bodies.  Over 
the course of the war, however, “some practical concessions that amounted to de facto recognition had to be made. 
American prisoners captured in arms by the British were effectively treated as prisoners of war… [and e]ventually 
even Henry Laurens, the most important American to fall into British hands…qualified as a prisoner of war to be 
exchanged for lord Cornwallis.” The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America, c. 1750-1783. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 356. 
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Shortly thereafter, the British Commander-in-Chief in New York, General Clinton, informed 
Congress that he had also received a letter—this time from a British cabinet minister—authorizing 
him to ratify the convention.  Gérard objected on the same ground as before.  Only the authority of 
the king would suffice.  In a conference with the president of Congress in late September, Gérard 
cautioned that even the word of King George III was not entirely reliable in the present conflict for: 
“the laws of England state that the King does not need to abide by treaties made with rebels—and 
[he] has already given proof of this by breaking several covenants made in the course of war.”  Not 
until “the king recognizes American independence,” could his good faith be relied upon.32  The issue 
served to highlight the clear legal distinction between domestic subjects and “free and independent 
states,” under the law of nations. 
Gérard helped Congress handle two other issues involving the commissioners, before their 
departure on November 25.  On August 11, and without Gérard’s advice, Congress had publicly 
objected to the presence on the commission of George Johnstone, whom Congress accused of at least 
three instances of trying to subvert members of Congress to promote the cause of reconciliation. The 
problem was that by objecting to Johnstone’s presence, Congress had implicitly recognized the 
legitimacy of the other commissioners.  It would be safer, Gérard advised, to avoid all 
communication with the commissioners and convey messages anonymously through the public press. 
Finally, in early October, the British commissioners declared their intent to disseminate terms of 
peace among the American people under a flag of truce.  Congress stated that they would treat as a 
spy any commissioner caught making such an attempt.  Gérard assured Congress that their stance 
was in accord with accepted European norms.33 
                                                
32 Gérard to Vergennes, September 1, 1778, and September 29, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 250 and 318.  
Though some officers were exchanged, the majority of Burgoyne’s men were not released until the end of the war.   
33 See JCC, 11:770-774; Gérard to Vergennes, September 1, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 250; and Gérard 
to Vergennes, October 17, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 324. 
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Gérard’s interactions with Congress on matters pertaining to the British peace commissioners 
highlight several additional aspects of international law and its role in eighteenth-century diplomacy.  
First, it remains evident that statesmen in this era did not rely directly on the opinions of the major 
theoreticians on the law of nations in conducting international affairs.  With the exception of a 
passing reference to “the most approved writers”—in the Congressional committee report from 
January 1778—no one involved in these disputes cited the treatises as legal authorities.  Some 
participants may have read the treatises, which may in turn have informed their general outlook on 
international law, but when it came to resolving international disputes, it was the legal opinion of 
other statesmen that seems to have been determinative.  
Second, statesmen displayed a notable degree of flexibility in enforcing the law.  Public 
declarations tied to honor, it turns out, may have lent some stability to the international system, but 
they were not ultimately binding.  Honor and interest were perpetually at odds and, as the events 
surrounding the convention of Saratoga demonstrate, there were occasions on which interest trumped 
honor, leading states to violate their commitments.  Yet statesmen did not seem to be surprised by 
these violations.  They seem rather to have viewed them as necessary features of the system—
indicating perhaps that though they appreciated legal stability, they also had an interest in a system 
that permitted violations in extraordinary circumstances. 
What is notable, however, is that even in such instances, law continued to function—and lend 
stability to the system—by conditioning the terms or bases on which states justified their violations.  
Statesmen could not simply break their word without cause.  They had to rigorously seek out excuses 
based in the law—excuses that would be persuasive to their peers.  The American demand, for 
example, of royal ratification of the convention, was a legitimate basis for holding Burgoyne’s 
troops.  And the British conceded that point by trying to deceive the Americans into accepting a 
lesser form of ratification, rather than complying.   
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What the events make clear is that while honor was arguably the foundational basis of the 
law of nations, states did not accrue honor purely as a consequence of their perfect fidelity to 
commitments or treaties.  Honor was rather accrued through shrewd and competent use of the law of 
nations—whether one was upholding or violating one’s commitment.34  In this context, diplomacy 
became the art of knowing not only what the rules were, but also when and how they were likely to 
be broken.  Success required an intimate, socialized knowledge of and familiarity with the law and 
the way that it was strategically deployed in foreign affairs. 
The importance of honor raises one final and related question: What was at stake?  What did 
states gain by complying with the law, and what consequences did they suffer for failing to act 
lawfully?  It seems that the honor of a state—much like the honor of an individual—functioned as a 
kind of credit in the international realm, making it easier (or more difficult) for a given state to form 
agreements and obtain assistance from other states in time of need.  Of course, as Machiavelli had 
infamously argued, the moral law governing the conduct of states was different from that which 
governed individuals, but states still had to abide by their own law. 
Finally, in an era in which the right to conduct foreign affairs was limited to “free and 
independent states,” the ability to competently deploy the law of nations seems to have functioned as 
a marker of legitimacy.  While the Americans seem to have been well aware of the law of nations, 
and generally able to deploy it, they did not possess anything close to the certainty of knowledge that 
Gérard’s advice afforded them.  They were susceptible to traps and needed assurance that 
controversial policies were legitimate.  Gérard’s advice then enabled the Americans to defend their 
interests in a manner that preserved both their credit and their legitimacy in the eyes of Europe.   
  
                                                
34 Had the Americans, for example, fulfilled their commitments and released Burgoyne’s troops in January 
1778—in the face of Burgoyne’s public accusations—they would have been pitied, not respected, by other European 
states if the British subsequently violated the convention and returned the troops to service.  Likewise, the 
Americans’ reputation would have suffered if they had held the troops without offering a valid excuse.  
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Case III: Negotiating the American Terms of Peace  
Over the fall of 1778, Gérard gradually turned his attention toward a second major facet of 
his instructions: preparing the Americans for the accession of Spain to the treaty of alliance.  Gérard 
was well aware, thanks to his previous work for Vergennes, that France could only afford to contend 
alone against England for about one year.35  If victory were not in hand by early 1779, France would 
have to have the assistance of another European ally, or it would face near-certain defeat.36  Spain 
was the obvious—and perhaps only—choice for an ally, given its large navy and historic ties to 
France.  Vergennes knew that the Spanish would almost certainly demand territorial concessions as 
the price for their assistance.  Gérard was to inform the Americans that if Spain’s assistance were 
required, it might be necessary give them east and west Florida, along with a share in the 
Newfoundland fisheries.37 
On his arrival in Philadelphia, Gérard found that a Spanish “observer” by the name of Juan 
de Miralles was already established in the city.  Miralles lacked official powers, but he was widely 
(and correctly) understood to be a conduit of information to and from the Spanish court.38 Miralles 
                                                
35 See Vergennes to Louis XVI, December 5, 1778, in John Hardman and Munro Price (eds.) Louis XVI and 
the Comte de Vergennes: Correspondence 1774-1787. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1998, pp. 269-271, in which 
Vergennes informs the king that an alliance with Spain is necessary to prevent the destruction of the French navy.  
36 Spain and France had formed an alliance in 1761 known as the “Family Pact”—as Carlos III and Louis 
XV were both members of the Bourbon family.  Over the course of 1776 and 1777 Vergennes had tried to persuade 
the Spanish to agree to his plans for a war in support of American independence.  The Spanish feared, however, that 
war would leave their colonial possessions vulnerable to conquest.  They also had little interest in supporting a 
colonial rebellion, or strengthening the United States, which they saw as their future enemy in North America.  See 
especially Dull, French Navy; Paul W. Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011; Abraham P. Nasatir, Borderland in Retreat: From Spanish Louisiana 
to the Far Southwest. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976; and Phillips, The West. 
37 Vergennes to Gérard, March 29, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 128.  The borders of East Florida 
corresponded to the borders of the present state of Florida.  West Florida encompassed the lands extending westward 
to the mouth of the Mississippi River—the southern half of Mississippi and Louisiana today. 
38 Gérard to Vergennes, July 18, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 170.  Miralles had reached North America 
some six months prior to Gérard.  He was familiar with Spanish objectives for the war, but had received no specific 
instructions from Madrid since his arrival.  See Light Townsend Cummins, Spanish Observers and the American 
Revolution: 1775-1783. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991.  For additional insight into the role of 
these “observers” see William Broughton’s PhD dissertation on Francisco Rendon: Spanish Agent in Philadelphia, 
1779-1786; Intendant of Spanish Louisiana, 1793-1796, University of New Mexico, 1994. 
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was personally friendly with many prominent Americans, but he informed Gérard that the Spanish 
court viewed the United States as a future enemy and would seek to keep the Americans confined to 
the Atlantic coast at the end of the war.  Spain’s territorial demands would include not only the 
Floridas, but also exclusive rights to the Mississippi River—which the Spanish hoped to close to 
foreign commerce.39 Gérard urged Miralles to do nothing that would precipitate the enmity of the 
United States, but he also began to suggest to numbers of Congress that “the good of the States” 
might “require that they draw a permanent line of separation between the Spanish possessions and 
their own.”40   
The issue took on sudden urgency in late January, when Gérard received a letter from 
Vergennes, informing him that the Spanish Court had just offered to mediate a peace between Britain 
and France.  Louis XVI had accepted the offer.  If George III agreed, then negotiations might well 
begin in the very near future.41  Vergennes asked that Congress settle upon possible terms of peace, 
and then send a commissioner to Europe to represent their interests at the peace table.  It was critical, 
Vergennes noted, that the Americans’ demands not be “too exacting or too rigorous,” lest they “stop 
the salutary work of peace.”  Vergennes thought it would be “very useful” if the terms should include 
renunciation: 1) of Canada and Nova Scotia (or at least of Canada), 2) of fishing rights off the cost of 
Newfoundland and 3) of the “Floridas, or of that portion of those colonies which will be found 
suitable to the Court of Madrid.” 
                                                
39 Gérard to Vergennes, July 25, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 185-87.  Miralles did not mention the 
Newfoundland fisheries as a prominent Spanish objective, yet Gérard knew that Vergennes hoped to obtain a portion 
of the fisheries for France, and also wanted the option of offering rights to Spain in the event that Spain’s primary 
territorial objectives could not be obtained.  If the Mississippi River were closed to commerce, it would be difficult 
for American farmers who might settle in the west, to export their surplus produce to outside markets. 
40 Gérard to Vergennes, October 20, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 344; See also Gérard to Vergennes, 
December 22, 1778, and January 28 and 29, in Meng, Despatches, 433-35, 491-95, and 499-501.  Gérard found little 
resistance among the Americans to the idea of ceding Florida to Spain, but considerably more opposition to the idea 
of ceding either rights to the Mississippi or American claims to the Newfoundland fisheries.  
41 Vergennes actually knew that the Spanish offer of mediation had no chance of success, since neither 
France nor England was ready to compromise on the question of American independence.  Yet he needed to go 
along with the Spanish effort, to keep alive the possibility that Spain might eventually join the war.  He may also 
have viewed the occasion as an ideal opportunity to discover the Americans terms of peace.  
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As for rights to navigate the Mississippi, Vergennes thought it likely that the Americans 
would “insist on the freedom of navigation… on account of the establishments that they propose to 
establish on the Ohio,” adding that he would be “surprised” if Spain should reject that demand.  Yet, 
he admitted that he did not yet know Spain’s perspective on the issue, and he suggested that Gérard 
would do well to obtain better information from Miralles, and then judge for himself the relative 
merits of the Spanish and American claims.42   
As Gérard pondered these instructions, he was already aware—based on earlier 
conversations—that the Americans would not yield easily to Spain’s demands.  Vergennes made the 
task even more difficult by instructing Gérard to apply “care,” “dexterity,” and “prudence” in his 
negotiations, and—as he later wrote in December—to fulfill the instructions “without giving the 
Americans the slightest suspicion regarding the purity of our intentions, or of our commitment to the 
principles that form the base of our alliance with the United States.”  “The King,” Vergennes 
emphasized, “entrusts this matter with complete security to your lights and to your wisdom, being 
well persuaded that… [you will] not compromise it.43   
Gérard took a few days to ponder the task before him and then notified the President of 
Congress, that he had “subjects of the highest importance” to communicate to Congress.44  Eight 
days later, on February 16, Gérard appeared in person before the full body of Congress assembled, 
and conveyed the substance of his instructions.  The essential components of Gérard’s strategy both 
                                                
42 Vergennes to Gérard, October 26, 1778, Meng, Despatches, 359.  Vergennes seems to imply here that he 
expected the Americans to claim western borders on the Mississippi River, which is significant in light of Gérard’s 
intense and subsequent opposition to those claims.  For background on American interest in the Mississippi region 
and the importance of the issue in the lead-up to the Revolution, see Clarence Walworth Alvord, The Mississippi 
Valley in British Politics: A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in 
the American Revolution, 2 vols. New York: Russell & Russell, 1959 [1916]. 
43 Vergennes to Gérard, October 26, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 361; and December 25, 1778, Meng, 
Despatches, 453. 
44 Gérard received Vergennes’ instructions in late January 1779, and wrote to the President of Congress on 
February 8, 1779—see Wharton, RDC, III:38.  
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in the opening speech and in his further communications over the months that followed, offer 
additional insight into the role of law in the diplomacy of this era.  
The essence of Gérard’s strategy was to hold before the Americans’ eyes the character of 
Louis XVI, and demand that Congress adhere to the example that the king was setting before them.  
“I [made] them feel,” Gérard wrote on the day after his initial audience before Congress, 
the exactitude of his Majesty in fulfilling all the duties of the alliance, whether in the 
operations of war, or those of the Cabinet; I promised in his name, that he would always 
fulfill them religiously; that he counted on America following his example; that he espoused 
the interests of the united States as his own, and that he would never make peace without the 
independence of America being the first condition of it.45 
 
If that were not enough, Gérard also asserted that Louis XVI had “no ambitions of Conquest of his 
own.”  He “would not have refused the favors of Providence,” had the fortunes of war had made 
additional conquests possible; but under the present circumstances the king trusted that the 
Americans would not delay for one moment, an opportunity to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, 
and obtain their core objective.46 
In highlighting “the independence of America” and the king’s “invariable attach[ment]” to 
that object, Gérard was drawing Congress’s attention to the treaty of alliance—according to which, 
Gérard asserted, “the war had but one sole fundamental and essential object, that of the independence 
of the States.”  The actual text of the treaty stated that: “The essential and direct End of the present 
defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence… of the said 
united States” (emphasis added); but the treaty also guaranteed to the Americans, their: “Possessions, 
and the additions of conquests that their Confederation may obtain during the war, from any of the 
Dominions now or heretofore possessed by Great Britain in North America.”47   
                                                
45 Gérard to Vergennes, February 17, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 526. 
46 The British were at that point in possession of New York, Savannah, and Newport. 
47 See Miller, Treaties, II:40. 
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In the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Alliance, the French and Americans had 
discussed questions relative to the American boundaries, but the “Possessions” of the United States 
had not been defined.  Gérard now sought to limit the term to the territory literally possessed at the 
start of the war—on the eastern seaboard.  All additional claims—such as the Newfoundland 
fisheries, or the territory extending west to the Mississippi—were potential “conquests,” to which the 
Americans had no absolute right.  The Americans might present those territories as desired 
acquisitions, but they could not make them a sine qua non of peace.  The only ultimatum that they 
could legally insist upon was their independence.48 
The verbal response that Gérard received after his speech was promising, and one week later, 
he was able to report: “I have every day, Sir, new proofs of the readiness of Americans for a prompt 
peace with no condition other than independence.”49 Yet as weeks went on without decisive action, it 
gradually became clear that Gérard would not prevail so easily.  A sizable minority—led by Samuel 
Adams of Massachusetts and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia—was adamantly opposed to any terms 
of peace that did not include clear title to the Newfoundland fisheries.  An indeterminate number was 
also committed to clear title to navigation rights on the Mississippi.  These “partisans of war” as 
Gérard began to call them, did not form a majority, yet because Congressional rules required a 
supermajority to pass treaty resolutions, they were able to block the passage of any peace terms that 
did not satisfy their demands.   
They based their claims on two purported points of law.  With respect to the western lands, 
they held up the authority of the colonial charters—the western borders of which, in several cases, 
                                                
48 For discussions between the American agents in Paris (Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane and Arthur Lee) 
and their French counterparts (Vergennes and Gérard), on the subject of American territorial aspirations, see Lee, 
Life of Arthur Lee, 357-390.  During a conference with Vergennes in December, the subject of western boundaries 
had come up and Vergennes explicitly agreed that—with respect to the need for a border between Spain and the 
United States—“the line drawn by the last treaty of peace with England, the Mississippi, would be adopted, and 
would prevent all disputes.” Vergennes further indicated that the concessions the Americans laid out vis-à-vis the 
fisheries—in their “model treaty”— were “deemed sufficient,” p. 361.  See also Gérard to Vergennes, March 1, 
1779 in Meng, Despatches, 546 for Gérard’s insistence that independence be the sole ultimatum of peace. 
49 See Gérard to Vergennes, February 25, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 542. 
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extended westward without limit—and asserted title to all lands lying within the dominion of George 
III, and also encompassed by the charters.  As for rights to the fisheries, they noted that France had 
transferred rights to the fisheries to England at the end of the Seven Years War, and that the New 
Englanders had used those rights ever since.  In declaring their independence they were entitled to all 
territory that they had used as colonies.  They also asserted the general principle of freedom of the 
seas.50 
The members of Congress who agreed with Gérard’s basic position—the “partisans of 
peace”—soon came to ask his assistance in rebutting these arguments.  Confessing themselves to be 
“ignorant of the most basic elements” of the question at hand, they “begged” him, “to instruct them 
on the true principles of the matter, of the usages and rules established between the Powers of 
Europe, i.e., of the real situation of things with respect to the fishery of Newfoundland.”51  Over the 
weeks that followed, Gérard began to supply them with arguments that they could deploy in the 
course of Congressional debates. 
With respect to the western lands, Gérard noted that at the time the colonial charters were 
granted, the English had been ignorant of the continental interior, thus had not laid claim to any 
known or defined territory.  He added that the interior of the continent had later been contested, and 
had also been claimed and even settled by France prior to the Seven Years War.  Finally, though the 
British had won the territory at the end of that war, George III had subsequently excluded the 
Americans from it, in his Proclamation of 1763.  The charters consequently had no binding legal 
authority.   
As for the fisheries, the English would be sure to respond that “the [Americans had] enjoyed 
the fisheries by a pure beneficence of the Crown and that if they were still subjects all would depend 
on the good pleasure of the King or of Parliament.”  Furthermore, “the sole title that the Americans 
                                                
50 See Gérard to Vergennes, April 4, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 594-95. 
51 Gérard to Vergennes, April 4, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 595. 
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possessed to the fisheries was in their quality as Subjects of Great Britain…. In becoming free and 
independent they cannot conserve rights to the United States that appertained to them only as 
subjects.”52 
As cogent as these arguments may have been, they had little to no effect on the debate within 
Congress and as time dragged on, Gérard returned repeatedly to “the faithful and generous conduct 
and pacific views of the King”— “the most powerful brake that one can oppose to the party of 
War”—and the urgent need for the United States to acquire a similar character.53  Gérard had first 
raised the issue of American character back in December, when he had asserted that “the eyes of all 
the universe” were upon the United States to see if their conduct would serve to establish “in a 
positive and authentic manner… the peaceful character that must be inherent to a republic.”  The 
issue was of tremendous consequence, for “all Europe” also suspected the Americans of having 
“inherited the invasive and turbulent spirit of their ancestors.”54  
In a conference in early March, with the “partisans of peace,” he warned that if Congress 
should persist in demanding territory—“by the sole right of conveniences”—to which it had neither 
right nor title the Americans would surely be censored “for not consulting any but the voice of their 
interest.”  Making his “lamentations full of feeling,” Gérard held up to the members gathered before 
him the consequences they would suffer should they “lose what is called here all character, all 
consideration, all confidence, in giving to [their] reputation a strong tint of ambition and of avidity 
and [thus] risking the inestimable advantages of independence to the hazard of war.”55 
Gérard then turned to the character of Louis XVI, asserting that the greatest obstacle that the 
king had faced in deciding whether or not to support American independence had been the need to 
                                                
52 See Gérard to Vergennes, May 21, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 667-68. 
53 Gérard to Vergennes, May 21, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 657. 
54 Gérard to Vergennes, December 12, 1778; and December 22, 1778 in Meng, Despatches, 420, 433. 
55 Gérard to Vergennes, March 3, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 550. 
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“convince himself of the justice” of the American cause.  He had demanded no compensation for his 
assistance to date and would not form a single demand that was not “perfectly analogous with the 
spirit and the letter of the alliance.”  Yet what could the king think if he now heard that Congress 
wanted “on the basis of the presumed credit of the Alliance, to obtain possessions concerning which 
the States had not even a right of conquest”?  He could only view such claims, “with 
astonishment.”56 
Finally, in a legal memo that he drew up in May for the benefit of his allies, Gérard warned 
again that if Congress should persist in making extravagant demands Europeans would have no 
choice but to conclude that the United States had “examined neither her rights nor her position nor 
her means…[but only] her interest.”   “The new Republic will be regarded as activated by ambition 
and by thirst for Conquests… [and this] conduct will fill the spirit of the friends of America with 
discontent and distrust.”  “How will Spain,” Gérard asked in conclusion, “be able to consider similar 
principles, supported in a manner so unlimited and absolute, when this sophisticated manner of 
arguing can become as contrary to its interests and to its tranquility as it is contrary to the Law of 
reason and of Nations?”57   
This final set of negotiations between Gérard and the members of Congress serves to 
highlight one last feature of the law of nations: its role as a moral weapon by which states sought to 
pressure one another into adopting desired policies.  The Americans were particularly vulnerable on 
this front because, though they prided themselves on their republican virtue, they did not understand 
precisely how virtue functioned in the context of European diplomacy.  In upholding the opinion of 
“all Europe” as a standard to which the Americans should aspire, Gérard was presenting a selective 
picture of the law of nations.  It was true that European statesmen valued the ideals contained in the 
                                                
56 Gérard to Vergennes, March 3, 1779; February 25, 1779; and March 1, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 550, 
542, 546. 
57 Gérard to Vergennes, May 21, 1779 in Meng, Despatches, 667-75. 
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law.  Yet it was also true that they were highly adept at manipulating legal arguments so as to 
preserve their interests at the same time.  
The particular problem on the American side was that neither party in Congress knew how to 
respond appropriately to Gérard’s arguments.  The “party of peace” placed far too much trust in the 
purported disposition of the king, “to procure to America all the advantages that circumstances would 
permit,”58 and to “concern himself with the interests of the United States as those of his own.”59  The 
reality was that Vergennes was the primary agent behind French foreign policy.  France was facing 
an existential crisis in 1779, as the war ground on with no end in sight, and he was determined to 
satisfy Spain’s desires, as far as reasonably possible, and secure Spanish assistance.  As for the 
fisheries, Vergennes thought that the Americans had ample fishing grounds off their own coast he 
hoped to retain the Newfoundland fisheries for France.    
The “party of war” was properly attuned to American interests, but they did not know how to 
defend those interests in accordance with standard European protocol and use of the law.  The 
interests of France aside, Gérard seems to have been genuinely dismayed by the arguments deployed 
by the Adams-Lee faction, not only because they interfered with his immediate objectives, but also 
because they seemed to portend future trouble for the Franco-American relationship and for the final 
peace negotiations in Europe. As unpredictable and unreliable allies the Americans had the potential 
to become a major liability to France.60   
                                                
58 Gérard to Vergennes, March 3, 1779, Meng, Despatches, 550. See also Gérard to Vergennes, February 
17 and 18, in Meng, Despatches, 525-29, 530-32. Gérard noted that the Americans had difficulty governing their 
existing territories.  “An increase so enormous [as the acquisition of the western lands] would augment 
immeasurably this inconvenience, and would tend to cause this immense Empire to collapse under its own weight.” 
Gérard to Vergennes, January 28, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 494.  
59 Gérard to Vergennes, May 14, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 643. 
60 In early April, Samuel Adams laid claim to all of the rights that Britain had obtained in North America 
under earlier treaties with France.  If this principle were to become established Gérard reported, “Soon the 
Americans will… aspire to establish themselves in the four corners of the world as universal heirs of the English and 
to participate in the advantages and principles that they have established.” See Gérard to Vergennes, April 4, in 
Meng, Despatches, 598. 
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This combination of weaknesses would prove highly detrimental to the American cause in 
the months ahead.  In 1780, John Adams—an affiliate of the Adams-Lee faction—arrived in Europe 
as the newly appointed commissioner of peace and within a very short time had so thoroughly 
alarmed Vergennes with his erratic behavior and refusal to conform to European convention that 
Vergennes urged Gérard’s successor in Philadelphia, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, to secure his 
replacement.  Luzerne was not able to have Adams replaced, but he did dilute his authority by 
persuading Congress to appoint four additional commissioners.  More importantly, Luzerne also 
persuaded Congress to make all of the commissioners fully subject to the oversight of the French 
court in their negotiations.61   
The great irony is that in doing so, the French induced the Americans to permit precisely the 
kind of “disgraceful blemish of dependence” which Gérard had warned against, back in December 
1778—when dealing with the British peace commission.  No self-respecting state in the international 
realm would ever have permitted another sovereign to exercise control over their unique prerogative 
under the law of nations to negotiate terms of peace.  The event served to highlight the fact that, in 
the last analysis, the Americans would not be fully independent until they demonstrated their 
capacity to confidently interpret and deploy the law of nations in a way that accorded both with their 
interests and the standard conventions of the day. 
 
 
                                                
61 Congress’s instructions to the peace commissioners, of June 15 1781, read: “For this purpose you are to 
make the most candid and confidential communications upon all subjects to the ministers of our generous ally, the 
King of France; to undertake nothing in the negociations for peace or truce without their knowledge and 
concurrence; and ultimately to govern yourself by their advice and opinion, endeavoring in your whole conduct to 
make them sensible how much we rely on his majesty’s influence for effectual aid in everything that may be 
necessary to the pace, security, and future prosperity of the United States of America.” Wharton, RDC, IV:505.  
Congress’s decision was highly consequential, for as Vergennes stated in a dispatch to Luzerne on 
September 25, 1779, the Americans “can have a share in [rights to the fisheries] only in so far as they assure 
themselves of them by arms, or through a future truce or peace” (emphasis added). By gaining control of the 
negotiations Vergennes put himself in a position to determine whether or not the Americans would avail themselves 
of the only method still open to them at the close of the war.  See William Emmett O’Donnell, The Chevalier de la 
Luzerne: French Minister to the United States, 1779-1784. Bruges: Desclés de Brouwer,1938, p. 79. 
 
 56 
Jay and Gérard 
One member of Congress who had occasion to observe Gérard’s conduct and learn from it 
was John Jay, a representative from New York who arrived in Philadelphia in early December 1778, 
and was elected president of Congress soon thereafter.62  Gérard thought highly of Jay, reporting to 
Vergennes on the occasion of Jay’s election: “I have held several conversations with the new 
President; we have, Sir, exhausted the matters most interesting to France and the United States… I 
will confine myself to say that one can not show feelings more suitable on all the points concerning 
which I discussed with him.”  He went to describe Jay as “a man of enlightened mind, free from all 
prejudice, capable of elevated views [who] shows himself sincerely attached to the alliance and an 
enemy of the English…. He speaks with candor and good faith and he offers himself voluntarily to 
good reasons that one alleges to him.  I am much mistaken if we will not have to regret it, if his 
Presidency is as short as it seems it must be.”63  
Gérard soon came to confide in Jay, who—in a manuscript history of his negotiations with 
Spain—later described how:  
“Mr Gerard used very frequently to spend an Evening with me &... [a]s the Ev’g advanced he 
often… spoke without Reserve on the Subject of the Views of Spain and the Interest of 
America with respect to her…. These several matters being under the Consideration of 
Congress I restrained myself from entering into a Discussion of them with him, and confin’d 
myself to now and then throwing in a loose general observation by way of keeping up the 
Conversation….  From this silent attention and appearance of moderation I am persuaded he 
supposed I concurred with him in Sentiment and induced him to go greater Lengths than he 
might [otherwise] have done.  I sh[oul]d have considered the matters [at hand] within the 
Restrictions of private Con[ver]sation and sh[oul]d never have mentioned them, but I soon 
                                                
62 Jay’s election came about as a consequence of the battle then raging in Congress over how to resolve the 
on-going dispute between Arthur Lee and Silas Deane, two of the earliest American agents in Europe.  Lee had 
accused Deane of misappropriating funds, prompting Congress to recall Deane.  Deane arrived in Philadelphia in 
July, but by December had still not been given an opportunity to clear his name—in part because he did not have the 
records needed to establish his innocence.  In exasperation Deane finally published a public letter, criticizing 
Congress’s conduct.  The members of Congress elected not to censure Deane for his conduct, prompting Henry 
Laurens, the president and a supporter of Arthur Lee, to resign in protest.  Jay was quickly elected in his stead, in 
part because of his abilities and in part as a place holder for General Philip Schuyler, another representative from 
New York who was then absent from Congress, who was do back in March.  Schuyler did not return and Jay held 
the office until his nomination, in September 1779, as minister to Spain.  
63 Gérard to Vergennes, December 19 and 22, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 430-31, 435. 
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found that he conversed in like manner with many others and that he was endeavoring to 
carry these Points of Congress.” 
 
Later in the summer of 1779, when suspicion of Jay’s pending appointment as minister to Spain 
began to circulate, both Gerard and Miralles, Jay wrote, “expressed much Satisfaction at the Prospect 
of that Event.., tho I have Reason to think that both of them entertained higher opinions of my 
Docility than were well founded.”64 
 
Conclusion 
 The law of nations was understood to be a set of norms and procedures designed to ensure 
reliability of international commitments.  The law was derived from historic precedent and the text of 
treaties, and there is no evidence that the treatises of Grotius or Vattel were ever cited as legal 
authorities.  The law was enforced through a code of honor tied to character of the sovereign, who 
was viewed as a fount of disinterested virtue in an otherwise unstable world.  Negotiations often 
involved moral or legal posturing as statesmen sought to advance their interests without damaging 
the king’s honor.  Diplomacy, in this context required technical knowledge of international 
procedures, as well as an intuitive or socialized understanding of the moral standards, on the basis of 
which the law was interpreted and enforced.  Law also functioned as a source of legitimacy since 
only states were entitled to use these procedures or enjoy the protections that the law afforded.   
The Americans were at a disadvantage in this environment in that they had only a limited 
knowledge of the law of nations, and no experience deploying law or legal rhetoric in negotiations.  
They faced an added obstacle in that their claim to statehood—and with it their right to use the law in 
diplomacy—was not yet fully accepted in Europe.  In the face of these challenges, Gérard offered an 
invaluable source of legal counsel—especially when it came to disputes with the British; and he 
                                                
64 From the fourth page of John Jay’s unpublished account of his role in the Revolution, contained in 
William Jay (ed.), The Life of John Jay: With Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers. New 
York: J. & J. Harper, 1833, vol. I, pp. 99-101. 
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helped the members of Congress deploy legal arguments in a way that advanced both their interests 
and their reputation as a legitimate member of the international community.  When it came to 
territorial disputes, however, in which France had an interest in altering American policy, Gérard 
took advantage of the Americans naiveté.  Despite their republican principles, Americans were 
especially vulnerable to arguments based on the beneficent character of Louis XVI.   
The president of Congress, John Jay, who would later serve as American minister to Spain 
and co-negotiator of the Treaty of Paris, often had occasion to work with Gérard, and he was thus 
accorded an early opportunity to study the law of nations as it was used in the context of European 
diplomacy.  In the chapters ahead I will follow Jay to Europe and study his conduct, and his 
distinctive use of law, during his tenure abroad.  First, however, I will turn my attention to the way in 








































In the chapter that follows I will examine the lengthy negotiations by which Spain was 
brought into the war against England, in the spring of 1779, as an ally of France, but not of the 
United States.  The negotiations revolved around the text of a treaty, known as the Pacte de Famille, 
or Family Pact, that the French and Spanish kings has signed in the summer of 1761.1  The Pacte was 
a perpetual treaty of alliance, the primary purpose of which was to establish naval parity with the 
British—in the wake of Britain’s overwhelming victories in the Seven Years War (1756–1763).   The 
terms of the treaty specified the amounts of aid that the two crowns should provide each other in time 
of war.  It also specified the circumstances under which the treaty would come into force. 
A fact not often told in the standard narrative history of the American Revolution is that the 
French had begun to prepare for a war on behalf of American independence, as early as the fall of 
1775.  The French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, had predicated his ministry on restoring the prestige 
of Louis XVI, and with it the rightful place of France as the arbiter of the peace in Europe.2  He saw 
the American Revolution as an unparalleled chance to destroy the foundations of Britain’s empire 
and restore the balance of power in Europe.  The chief obstacle that he faced in pursuing these 
ambitions was that the French were no longer capable of beating England in a lengthy naval conflict.  
Vergennes needed an ally, and Spain was the best option.  The question thus arose as to whether the 
Spanish could be persuaded to sign on to an alliance against England or, failing that, if they could be 
compelled to lend aid on the basis of the Pacte de Famille.  
                                                
1 The name derives from the fact that the kings of France and Spain were members of the Bourbon family.   
2 American historians have a tendency to present the Franco-American alliance as a product of Franklin’s 
ingenuity.  See for example Edmund S. Morgan’s statement in The Birth of Republic, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1956, that “Franklin exploited [Vergennes’s] fear of [Anglo-American reconciliation] to win the 
greatest diplomatic victory the United States has ever achieved,” p. 84.  As I will discuss shortly, the chief obstacles 
holding back the French were the need to prepare their navy for war (Dull, French Navy); and their desire to bring 
the Spanish into the war as an ally, so that the war could be won as quickly as possible. 
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Carlos III welcomed an opportunity to reduce British power (he had been planning for war 
with England since 1763), but he was loath to endorse a colonial rebellion.  He also feared that the 
Americans would prove to be unfaithful allies.  In the event that the Americans prevailed, he was 
concerned that they would replace England as Spain’s foremost enemy in North America.  For two 
years, Vergennes tried without success to bring the Spanish into agreement with his policy.  Finally, 
in the wake of the American victory at Saratoga, he decided to throw the dice and go it alone, hoping 
that the British would capitulate quickly.  That plan failed, and by December of 1778, Vergennes was 
compelled to plead for Spanish assistance—and pay a high price for it—or face defeat.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the French and Spanish strategic aspirations in 1775, 
and then traces the process by which the dispute was resolved, in the spring of 1779, with the signing 
of the Convention or Aranjuez.  The negotiations bring into relief two aspects of the international 
legal regime: 1) the inherent tension between the interests of states and treaty commitments tied to 
the honor of the sovereign; and 2) the methods by which disputes over the proper interpretation of 
treaties were peaceably resolved.  The answer is that they were resolved through rhetorical contests 
that, at first glance, appear to justify the view that diplomacy in this era was a Machiavellian exercise 
in duplicity.  Yet a close reading of the negotiations reveals an underlying order and coherency to the 
rhetoric, which did in fact constrain state behavior.  It did so because states had an interest in a stable 
international system in which commitments could be relied upon—so long as they retained an ability 
to violate those commitments in exceptional circumstances.    
My findings highlight the importance of a socialized knowledge of the law of nations to the 
conduct of diplomacy—and the corresponding challenge that novice American emissaries faced 
during the war.  The negotiations also cast the Revolution in a new light, not as a struggle for liberty 
but as a vehicle through which the European states sought to strengthen their relative positions in the 
European system.  Finally, it reveals the contest to have been not only about power, but also about 
competing conceptions of morality and the ideal international order. 
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French Strategic Ambitions During the Reign of Louis XVI 
When Louis XVI acceded to the throne of France in May 1774, it seemed that a new era in 
French politics had begun.  The same might be said of any incipient reign, but it was especially true 
in a case where just two kings, Louis XIV (1643–1715) and Louis XV (1715–1774), had held power 
during the preceding 130 years.  Those successive reigns had seen France rise to the very pinnacle of 
influence before falling—in the aftermath of the Seven Years War (1756–1763)—to the status of a 
second-rate power.3  In the aftermath of that latter contest, Louis XV had retreated from the realm of 
international politics, no longer willing to run the risk of war.  His ministers, especially the Foreign 
Minister, the Duc de Choiseul, continued to plot revenge against England; but at critical junctures, 
when war seemed imminent, the king stood in their way—ultimately sacking Choiseul in 1770 as a 
means of forestalling conflict.  The king’s disinclination to war was not entirely a product of 
temperament.  The magnitude of England’s victory in 1763 was such that the French were no longer 
capable of challenging the British on their own.  Yet Louis XV also showed little inclination to 
foment long-term policies that would alter the new status quo, and restore the power and influence of 
France.  His death opened an opportunity for those who aspired to do just that.4 
French foreign policy in this era lay in the hands of the king, his council (the conseil d’etat), 
and a small circle of ministers charged with the conduct of war and diplomacy.5  The king had the 
                                                
3 For a history of the Seven Years War see Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763: Britain 
and France in a Great Power Contest. New York: Longman, 2011; Matt Schumann and Karl Schweizer, The Seven 
Years War: A Transatlantic History. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
4 For an overview of Louis XV’s reign, see again Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime France; and 
Gooch, Louis XV.  For the removal of Choiseul in 1770, see Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, The Spanish 
Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 279, where Louis XV is 
quoted as having written to Carlos III: “War would be horrible for me and for my people… if Your Majesty could 
make some sacrifice to preserve the peace… that would be a great service to the human race and to me in 
particular.” 
5 For an explanation of the conseil d’etat and its role in policy making during this era, see the introduction 
to Hardman and Price, Louis XVI.  The king met twice weekly, on Sundays and Wednesdays, with the council to 
review correspondence from his ambassadors, and other points of business.  Officially, the council was the king’s 
principal source of advice.  In reality, it was an archaic and cumbersome institution, made up of anyone who had 
been invited to attend over the preceding decades. Because an invitation was understood to convey a lifetime 
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authority to manage foreign policy if he wished to do so.  In reality, a given king’s engagement with 
affairs of state varied depending on capacity and inclination, and the character and capacity of his 
ministers.6   Louis XVI seems to have aimed for something of a middle ground in this regard.  He 
was nineteen years old when he came to throne in May 1774, and had a number of intellectual 
interests and ideals that he wished to pursue—a preference for the navy over the army, a fascination 
with England, and a desire to establish a moral tenor to his reign distinct from that of his 
predecessor.7  Yet he lacked both the experience and the confidence needed to set policy on his own.8  
A number of court factions were competing at the time for positions of influence in the new regime.  
Not wishing to fall under their sway, the king, in filling out his cabinet, looked further afield for 
ministers who shared his ideals and whom he thought could be counted on—by virtue of their 
temperament and life circumstances—to prefer his agenda over their own.  The two ministers who 
would exert the greatest influence over the king in the years ahead were the Comte de Maurepas, 
Louis XVI’s unofficial first minister, and the Comte de Vergennes, his foreign minister. 
Maurepas was 72 years old when he took office.  He had served Louis XV, in the 1730s and 
1740s, as minister of the navy.  In 1749 he had fallen victim to a court coup, and had spent the 
                                                                                                                                                       
appointment, the number and variety of members grew to the point that it became nearly impossible to reach a 
consensus on delicate and controversial points of policy—especially those requiring any degree of secrecy.  Over the 
course of Louis XVI’s reign, and especially after war broke out in 1778, most major policies were conceived in ad 
hoc comités consisting of the ministers most directly involved with a given issue.  With respect to the conduct of the 
American war, the comité usually consisted of Maurepas, Vergennes and Sartine, the Minister of the Navy. 
6 Both Louis XIV and Louis XV, for example, had acceded to the throne at the age of five.  Regents ruled 
on their behalf until they reached maturity—at which point personal advisors continued to guide foreign affairs until 
each king finally gained the confidence needed to personally conduct affairs of state.  Even then, a bevy of officials 
continued to compete for ministerial offices and the right to exert some degree of influence over the direction of 
French foreign policy. 
7 Louis XVI was very interested, for instance, in reading the published accounts of British Parliamentary 
debates.  For an overview of his reign, see John Hardman, Louis XVI: The Silent King. London: Arnold, 2000. 
8 Orville Murphy quotes Louis XVI as having written to Maurepas in 1774: “I am only twenty years old 
and I do not possess all the knowledge which I need,” Vergennes, 255-56.  Maurepas reportedly promised to teach 
him “how not to need a prime minister,” p. 108.  Murphy adds that, “Louis was a serious student of statecraft.  He 
studied and worked, sometimes ten to twelve hours a day, reading official papers, financial figures, and notes from 
his ministers,” p. 253. 
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subsequent 25 years in political exile.  He was considered a wise and able administrator with few 
political allegiances; and he still retained an intense interest in naval policy.  Louis did not give 
Maurepas an official title, but he soon became the king’s closest personal advisor—meeting with him 
almost daily and acquiring the coveted right to attend the king’s weekly travails or personal meetings 
with each of the other ministers.  As for Vergennes, he was 56 years old in 1774 and had spent a 
career in the French foreign service—serving with distinction in Portugal, the Ottoman Empire, and 
Sweden.  He brought to his office a reputation for personal rectitude, hard work and devotion to the 
throne.  Having lived abroad for most of the preceding 35 years, he also had few political ties.  
Though Vergennes had little experience with naval affairs, he shared the king’s fascination with 
England and saw that power as France’s chief rival for influence in Europe.  By 1776, Vergennes’ 
influence was second to that of Maurepas, and on Maurepas’s death in 1781, he became the king’s 
principal advisor.9   
 Ministers in the French court did not always, or even often, agree on major matters of 
foreign policy.  Some preferred a policy emphasis on the eastern powers, Austria and Prussia, while 
others looked across the Channel to England.  Some were in favor of active foreign intervention 
while others were more cautious.  Some thought that French economic interests required the 
accumulation of colonies while others considered colonies to be a costly burden on the state.  In the 
early years of Louis XVI’s reign, with a new political vista lying open ahead, it was a highly 
significant fact that Louis XVI and his two leading ministers were largely in agreement on the 
importance of England and naval affairs.  A third policy focus soon came to the fore that meshed 
                                                
9 Murphy states that Louis XVI chose Vergennes based on favorable comments in the papers of his father.  
The dauphin, who had died in 1765, characterized Vergennes as someone with a “sense of order, sagacious and 
capable,” Vergennes, 206.  For additional analysis of the relative influence of the king’s ministers, see introduction 
to Hardman and Price, Louis XVI; Orville Murphy, “Charles Gravier de Vergennes: Profile of an Old Regime 
Diplomat,” Political Science Quarterly 83:3 (September 1968): 400-418; and John C. Rule, “Jean-Frédéric 
Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain et Maurepas: Reflections on His Life and His Papers,” Louisiana History: The 
Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, 6:4 (Autumn, 1965): 365-377. 
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neatly with the first two: the conviction that the acquisition of prestige—rather than territory—should 
be the focus of French foreign policy.10 
The link between prestige and the French monarchy had roots extending far back into French 
history, but the major factors contributing to its importance in the eighteenth century were the post-
Westphalian concept of a balance of power, combined with size and geographic position of France at 
the heart of Europe.  Balance of power theory was the notion that the dominant factor in European 
foreign affairs was not ethnic, religious or dynastic affiliation but the overriding necessity of 
preventing any one state from acquiring a disproportionate influence over its peers.  Whenever a 
given state became too powerful, its neighbors would naturally ally against it and restore the balance 
of power.  Perfect equality was not possible, but relative equality was the ideal.  While the theory 
was useful as an explanation of reality, the reality itself was dismal.  Europe, it seemed, was 
condemned to a perpetual cycle of war in which smaller states, in particular, became pawns in the 
feuds of their larger neighbors.  The need, some argued, was for a neutral arbiter—a state strong 
enough to discipline its peers, yet sufficiently benign that it did not attract an alliance against itself.11 
                                                
10 A clear presentation on the importance of French prestige to Vergennes’s foreign policy is contained in 
John J. Meng, The Comte de Vergennes: European Phases of His American Diplomacy (1774-1780). Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1932.  On July 28, 1775, for example, Vergennes wrote to Ossun—the 
French ambassador to Spain—arguing that England’s “weakening… will prepare the way for the two crowns to 
retake… that place of superiority both as to consideration and influence, which is always the recompense of a wise 
and well-directed administration,” quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 46.  The full text of Vergennes’s letter can be found 
in Henri Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France à l’établissement des Étas-Unis d’Amérique: 
Correspondence Diplomatique et Documents, 5 vols. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1886-1892, vol. 1, p. 114 
(hereafter cited as Doniol).  Doniol’s five volume work contains numerous extracts and transcriptions of documents 
from the French national archives and is considered the standard source of published records, for those unable to 
visit the French archives.   
See also Orville T. Murphy, “The View from Versailles: Charles Gravier Comte de Vergenne’s Perceptions 
of the American Revolution,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, Diplomacy and Revolution: The Franco-
American Alliance of 1778. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981, pp. 107-149. Murphy argues that 
Vergennes, “defined the European balance of power so as to give France a superior position in the system rather 
than perceiving her as one nation among the several who kept the system ‘balanced.’…  The job of holding the 
balance of power theoretically required great self-restraint and a sense of duty toward others, especially the smaller, 
weaker powers.” p. 114; See also A. Temple Patterson, The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to Invade 
Britain in 1779. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960, p. 37. 
11 The ideal of France as “the arbiter of Europe” is captured in a letter from Bernis (an influential French 
statesman) to Choiseul in 1759: “The object of the politics of this crown has been and always will be to play in 
Europe the superior role which suits its seniority, its dignity, and its grandeur; to reduce every power which attempts 
 
 66 
The concept of a neutral arbiter was particularly attractive to a subset of French policy 
makers who, especially during the reign of Louis XV, promoted the idea that France—a large, 
inherently powerful state situated in the center of Europe—had a duty, even a calling, to take on the 
role of arbiter for the benefit of all Europe.  Louis XIV, they conceded, had erred in seeking such an 
excess of power that his neighbors were justified in allying against him.  Louis XV would not make 
that mistake, but would win the confidence of all Europe with his magnanimity and disinterested 
virtue.  Three events had combined to frustrate this vision.  At the apex of his power in the early 
1740s—having enjoyed great success in the War of Austrian Succession—Louis XV had tried to 
establish his benevolent character by returning his most valuable conquests to his enemies.  However 
popular the decision might have been abroad, it was widely reviled in France and cost the king 
politically.  Second, the king’s reputation for virtue suffered a blow when his serial marital infidelity 
became public in 1745.12  Lastly, and most importantly, Louis’s brief reign as “arbiter of Europe” 
was cut short by England’s refusal to cooperate.  During the Seven Years War (1756–1763) the 
British did not merely weaken Louis XV’s influence, they crushed it, capturing most of his colonial 
possessions and leaving France a shadow of its former self. 
In the years that followed, the French endured a range of humiliations.  Their military was 
forbidden by treaty to fortify the port of Dunkirk, and forbidden by threat of force to rebuild the 
navy.  English ambassadors abroad shamelessly demanded the preeminence—measured in seating 
arrangements and other signs of status—that had traditionally been accorded to France.  Most 
poignantly, the loss of influence was evidenced in 1772 when Austria, Prussia and Russia partitioned 
                                                                                                                                                       
to force itself above her, whether by trying to take away her possessions, or by arrogating to itself an unjust pre-
eminence, or, finally by seeking to take away from her influence and credit in the general affairs [of Europe],” 
quoted in Murphy, Vergennes, 213.  In one of his first memos to Louis XVI, in 1774, Vergennes also wrote that 
France “should be the arbiter of Europe and the protector of the status quo,” quoted in Murphy, “View from 
Versailles,” 111.  Murphy offers a more extensive commentary on Vergennes’s vision of Louis XVI as the arbiter of 
Europe in Vergennes, 211-221. 
12 The king, thinking that he was dying, had confessed his infidelity to a priest.  He recovered, however, 
and his subsequent actions only served to exacerbate his reduced reputation.  Gooch, Louis XV, 95-105. 
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Poland—a traditional ally of France—forcing France to stand by in silence, powerless to intervene.  
What was particularly galling to the French statesmen who championed France’s role as arbiter of 
Europe, was that England had apparently done all of this, not with the goal of becoming arbiter itself, 
or acting in the interest of the public good, but rather for its own selfish interests.  Louis XV’s 
ministers chaffed under the new restraints and plotted revenge, but the king himself seemed resigned 
to his fate and no major policy initiatives were permitted in the last decade of his reign.  The 
accession to the throne of a new king—personally inclined toward virtue, fascinated with England, 
and favoring a restoration of French naval power—now seemed to portend a reversal of fortune.13 
 
The Decision to Intervene on Behalf of the United States   
French foreign policy experts were hardly caught by surprise when fighting broke out near 
Boston in the spring of 1775.  They had been anticipating the event for over a decade.  After 
negotiating the Treaty of Paris (1763), Choiseul boasted that he had ceded lands west of the 
Appalachians “on purpose, to destroy the English.  They were fond of American dominion, and I 
resolved they should have enough of it.”  And Vergennes, who had been serving at the time in 
Constantinople, later recalled having “told several of my friends there that… it would not be long 
before England would have reason to repent of having removed the only check that could keep the 
Colonies in awe.”14  According to the conventional wisdom of the time, colonies could only be kept 
in submission by military force or by the presence of a hostile neighbor that kept the colonists 
dependent on the metropole for military protection.  In the case of North America, conventional 
wisdom also held that England could not possibly govern such a vast empire from afar.   
                                                
13 See Patterson, Other Armada, 11.  See also the aforementioned reference to the removal of Choiseul in 
1770 when his policies threatened to involve France in another war. 
14 The quote by Choiseul is taken from Ogg, Opening of the Mississippi, 291.  The quote by Vergennes is 
found in Phillips, The West, 14. 
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Throughout the latter half of the 1760s, and into the 1770s, the French had monitored 
developments in British North America closely, looking for signs of discontent, and analyzing the 
issue of what France should do if—or when—a rebellion finally began.15  There were many 
advantages that they stood to reap from a rupture between England and its colonies in North 
America.  The foremost flowed from the role that the colonies were understood to play in sustaining 
Britain’s military and economic dominance.  They were an integral part of vast web of trade, 
involving the sugar islands of the West Indies, the African slave trade, the textile industry of the 
home islands, and the international network of trade that extended as far as China.  North Americans 
supplied food to the West Indies, raw material to the shipping industry and also consumed an 
increasing volume of sugar, manufactured product and foreign imports.  If they ceased to play their 
part, many observers expected the economy of the British Empire to suffer an irreparable blow.16   
On the military front, the British derived additional advantage from the very large merchant 
fleet that carried this trade.  In the age of sail, maritime nations kept a sizable portion of their navies 
at home in peacetime, as a cost saving measure.  Whenever war began, a tremendous advantage 
accrued to the nation that could outfit the largest navy in the shortest amount of time.  Though 
England’s chief rivals were quite adept at building ships, they did not have the same capacity to man 
them—limiting the size of their navies and also their effectiveness, since many sailors and officers 
                                                
15 See Meng, Vergennes, 29.  Phillips also writes that: “The writings of prominent Americans and even the 
sermons of New England ministers were carefully searched for evidences of disaffection, and American merchants 
in French ports were interviewed in regard to the attitude of the colonists… In the French archives are bundles of 
reports concerning America,” The West, 15. 
16 In February 1779, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, the French ambassador to Madrid: “If we succeed 
only in interrupting Britain’s trade, you may depend on it that the resultant alarm and despondency will be as great 
as if we had landed in some part of the island,” quoted in Patterson, Other Armada, 39.  Gérard also stated to the 
Americans in Philadelphia that “the system adopted by the King… proved that His Majesty was persuaded that as 
soon as the separation of America and England should be effected, the latter power would be so weakened, that the 
allies would have no reason to fear; that… France had shown herself equal to and in some ways superior to the 
manner the enemy deployed in using the resources that he has drawn from America; that this resource ceasing, and 
France being able to use hers after the abasement of the Tyrant of the Seas, it was assured in a few years of a 
decided superiority.” See Gérard to Vergennes, March 8, 1779 in Meng, Despatches, 564.  P. J. Marshall writes that 
there was also widespread fear in Britain that the loss of America would lead to loss of other colonies and the end of 
British power, Making and Unmaking of Empires, 359. 
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lacked sufficient training or experience at sea.  The issue was particularly consequential when it 
came to outfitting “ships of the line”—the 70+ gun battleships that were one of the key measures of 
military power in this era.  Should Britain’s trade diminish—and with it the size of its merchant 
marine—and should it lose access to the American sailors who were also drawn upon in time of war, 
its capacity to wage war would be severely diminished.17 
None of these arguments meant, of course, that France was compelled to take an active role 
in the American Revolution.  Secret aid might accomplished the same end and spared France the risk 
and cost of war.  In the lead-up to French intervention, many argued that Britain would never succeed 
in subduing the colonies, and that the French had only to wait for the fruit of Britain’s failure to fall 
into their laps.  There were three problems with this argument.  First, from a military perspective, it 
was hard to imagine that the Americans could achieve independence on their own.   At best they 
might secure a grant of semi-independence, similar perhaps to the Irish model, leaving Britain in 
possession of most of its current advantages.18  Second, Vergennes had secondary hopes that the 
United States could be drawn into the French economic orbit, and benefit French commerce in the 
way that it had the British.19  Finally, and most importantly (at least to Vergennes) there was the 
factor of French prestige.  If France was to recover its rightful place as the arbiter of European 
international affairs, it was essential that Louis XVI take an active role in humbling the “tyrant of the 
seas,” and thereby win the admiration and gratitude and of all Europe.20 
                                                
17 Nearly all information pertaining to the French Navy comes from Dull, French Navy.  See also John 
Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, pp. 310-317, for a discussion of the French and 
Spanish navies and the difficulties that they faced in outfitting their ships in time of war.  There is also an excellent 
passage in Temple, Other Armada, 21-28 on the difficulties that France faced in training and outfitting its navy in 
light of Britain’s dominance of the seas. 
18 As late as 1782, Lord Shelburne, the British Colonial Secretary, and later Prime Minister, would express 
hope that an accommodation along the lines of Britain’s relationship with Ireland could be reached. 
19 See Meng, Vergennes, 29 
20 See again Meng, Vergennes, and Murphy, Vergennes.  The premium that Vergennes placed on prestige 
would have major ramifications for French policy during the war.  Vergennes had to be careful not to weaken 
Britain overly much, lest he provoke the fears of other European powers.  He had to eschew all but the most modest 
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At least three major factors would have to come into alignment before war could be provoked 
with England:  The viability of the American rebellion would have to be assayed, the approuvé of 
Louis XVI would have to be obtained, and the navy would have to be restored to full capacity.  The 
first of these—assessing the rebel movement—was arguably the most challenging.  Despite France’s 
considerable interest, since 1763, in the concept of a colonial rebellion, Vergennes knew surprisingly 
little about realities on the ground in North America.  There were no direct trade links between 
France and the colonies, and few loyal Frenchmen had settled in the British domains.21  What 
Vergennes knew with certainty was that France was the historic enemy of all Britons, and there was a 
real danger, it seemed, that the Americans might use an offer of French recognition as leverage to 
negotiate better terms of peace with England—and then leave France to fight the British alone.22  In 
1775, Vergennes sent a secret agent to meet with members of Congress in Philadelphia.  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
territorial acquisitions, and he was compelled to conduct himself—at least to his own satisfaction—with an extra 
measure of integrity, in order to preserve the king’s reputation.  As he wrote to Montmorin, the French Ambassador 
to Spain, in April 1780, Louis XVI would lose more from committing an injustice than he would from suffering one.  
See Samuel F. Bemis, The Hussey-Cumberland Mission and American Independence: An Essay in the Diplomacy of 
the American Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931, p. 106.  Patterson offers an excellent account 
of the dangers that France would face if it were to awaken the fears of other European powers.  He writes that 
Vergennes: “feared that if France tried to crush her utterly it would be at the risk of transferring that jealousy to 
herself, resurrecting the specter of Louis XIV before the eyes of Europe, and creating a hostile coalition of 
Continental states alarmed for the balance of power.  In July 1778, he wrote to Montmorin: “We must work 
resolutely to weaken this enemy of ours, but we must not display intentions which would only do us harm because 
the jealous that they would arouse against the House of Bourbon would give England friends and allies.”  On June 
21, 1779, he wrote to Baron de Breteuil, the French ambassador in Vienna: “France should fear aggrandizement 
rather than seek it…. Placed as she is in the center of Europe, she is bound to have influence over all matters of 
importance.  But her King… should look on his throne as a tribunal instituted by Providence to secure respect for the 
rights and property of other sovereigns.”  He wrote elsewhere, “Even if I could destroy England, I would abstain 
from doing so, as from the wildest folly; but there is nothing I would not do to make her alter that jealous policy 
which, equally harmful to her and to ourselves, is at bottom nothing but trickery,” cited in Other Armada, 37-38. 
21 There was a sizable minority of French Huguenots in the British colonies, but they could not be expected 
to provide intelligence to the French ministry. 
22 This factor—combined with Vergennes’s desire to draw the Americans into the French economic orbit—
explains his decision not to require compensation for French military assistance.  As he put it in a memo to 
Floridablanca on July 24, 1777, the goal would be to ensure a total separation with England by “keeping the 
Americans bound to France by a debt of gratitude,” quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 63.  Vergennes also hoped to leave 
the British in possession of Canada—contrary to the Americans’ wishes—as a means of reminding the Americans, 
going forward, of their need for French military assistance. See Vergennes to Gérard, March 29, 1778, in Meng, 
Despatches, 129.  In addition to supplying the Americans with aid, the French also began to turn a blind eye to 
American privateers who sought to sell their prizes in French ports, and replenish their supplies. 
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American agents in Paris—Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, and Benjamin Franklin—were also a useful 
source of information.  It was not until the American victory at Saratoga, however, that Vergennes 
felt comfortable risking war with England—and even then he doubted the Americans’ reliability.23 
Vergennes faced a different type of challenge in securing the approval of the king.  The fact 
that Louis XVI had an interest in England, and in naval affairs, did not mean that he was ready to 
start a war.  His personal sense of honor—so valuable to Vergennes as a means of establishing the 
king’s reputation as arbiter of Europe—revolted against the notion of provoking war or meddling in 
the affairs of a neighboring sovereign.24  To overcome the king’s reluctance, Vergennes would apply 
three main arguments.  First, he argued that war was inevitable, as even in victory, the British would 
be sure to recoup the cost of war by capturing French or Spanish possessions in the West Indies. 
Second, Vergennes framed the question from an historical perspective, and urged the king to 
consider the greed and injustice of British policy in the last war, as well as earlier occasions on which 
the British had launched unprovoked attacks on their enemies.  Finally, Vergennes presented the war 
as both an act of charity to an oppressed people, and an act of public service, taken out of concern for 
the balance of power and the well-being of Europe.  The king did not grant approval immediately, but 
he permitted preparations for war to proceed.25 
The last factor, restoring the navy to full strength was a more straightforward matter.  As 
already noted, Louis XVI favored a foreign policy focused on naval affairs.  Vergennes was also able 
to present rearmament as a defensive move—made necessary by England’s having augmented its 
                                                
23 The agent, a young officer by the name of Bonvouloir, met with Benjamin Franklin, John Jay and one 
other member of the Committee of Secret Correspondence. 
24 Conrad Gérard would inform the American Congress, in 1779, “that the greatest difficulty, that had 
deferred the determination of the King in favor of America, had been his wish to convince himself of the justice of 
their cause.”  See Gérard to Vergennes, March 3, 1779 in Meng, Despatches, 550. 
25 In his conference with Shelburne in the fall of 1782, Rayneval would state that the war was undertaken 
on the grounds that it was necessary to prevent one’s enemies from gaining a disproportionate amount of power.  
See a copy of his report from October, 1782, published in Wharton, RDC, V:822.  See also Murphy, “View from 
Versailles,” 120-126 for a general discussion of how Vergennes reconciled his own sense of integrity with his plans 
to falsely frame the pending war as an act of British aggression. 
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forces in dealing with the Americans.  Finally, the fact that the English were tied down in North 
America meant that they were, for the time being, in no position to threaten war in response.  France 
thus had a brief window of time in which to restore at least a portion of its deterrent capacity.26  The 
most potent argument against the policy was economic.  The French state was heavily in debt and 
navies were expensive, even in peacetime.  In the spring of 1776, the French minister of Finance, 
Turgot, wrote a lengthy memo, urging the king to eschew re-armament in favor of domestic 
economic reform.27  The intricacies of the subsequent policy debate are not recorded, but Turgot’s 
advice was rejected and in May (for other reasons having to do with court politics) he was forced to 
resign.  The way was cleared for Sartine, the minister of the navy, to proceed.28 
By the fall of 1777 most of the major pre-requisites for war were in place.29  Though the king 
was still undecided, the navy was nearly at full strength and the Americans had persevered in the face 
of considerable hardship—though they had not won any major victories.  Assuming that Louis XVI 
finally gave his approval, just two final details needed to be arranged: Vergennes needed to secure 
the assistance of Spain and, having done that, he needed to choose the most strategic moment to cast 
                                                
26 Murphy, “View from Versailles,” 115, states that the fact that “England, for fleeting moment, was off-
balance, exposed, and vulnerable…[made] the moment le plus beau.”  Citation to Doniol, 1:570. 
27 Turgot argued that they were even more of a burden in peacetime because the government had no basis 
for increasing taxation—as it did in time of war.  Murphy, Vergennes, quotes Turgot as having written to Louis 
XVI: “[D]espite economies and improvements already made since the beginning of the reign, there is a 20,000,000 
livres difference between receipts and expenses…. The path of economy is possible; to follow it requires only a firm 
will.”  War would the “greatest of misfortunes since it would make reforms impossible for a long time, if not 
forever,” p. 254. 
28 In the meantime, Vergennes arranged for the Americans to receive two million livres worth of economic 
aid (half of it came from Spain).  The goal was to protract the war—giving France time to prepare while 
simultaneously weakening both the British and the Americans.  The desirability of weakening the British was 
obvious.  As for the Americans, Vergennes needed to ensure that their behavior in the pending war was reasonable 
and that they remained dependent on France.  He also had no interest in seeing a strong state emerge that would 
become master of the entire continent. See John J. Meng, “The Place of Canada in French Diplomacy of the 
American Revolution,” Le Bulletin des Recherches Historique 39:11 (November, 1933), p. 685.  2 million livres was 
roughly equivalent to £87,000—enough to construct about 4 ships of the line, but little in comparison to the several 
hundred million livres that France would spend annually once the war began.  See Robert A. Selig, “Conversions 
Between Eighteenth Century Currencies” in The Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route in the State of 
Delaware, 1781-1783. Self-published, Delaware, Dover, 2003; see also Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 314.  For a general 
overview of these events, see Meng, Vergennes, 50-58; and Dull, French Navy, 30-49. 
29 Dull, French Navy, 99. 
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the dice.  On December 4, 1777, the moment arrived, without warning, in the form of news of the 
American victory at Saratoga.  The king permitted negotiations with the Americans to proceed and 
Vergennes sent an urgent dispatch to Montmorin, the French ambassador at Madrid: 
Take for your motto, Monsieur le Comte, and make them adopt it where you are: Aut nunc 
aut nunquam [now or never].  Events have taken us by surprise, they have developed more 
rapidly than could have been expected.  The lost time, if there has been any, is not altogether 
our fault; but there is no more to lose.  I like to flatter myself that everything is now 
complete, and that if Spain wishes to say the word, and the favorable word, we shall forestall 
the English, or at least thwart them; if, contrary to all hopes, we disregard or we neglect the 
most interesting conjuncture that heaven could present us, the reproaches of the present 
generation and those of posterity will forever blame our criminal indifference.30 
 
The Spanish, however, held back—setting the scene for a legal and diplomatic contest that 
reveals much about the legal character of eighteenth-century European diplomacy.  First, however, it 
is necessary to step back and review the nature of the Franco-Spanish relationship, the importance of 
Spain to Vergennes’s strategy for the pending war, and the reason for Carlos III’s reluctance to join 
the war against England.   
 
Spanish Strategic Ambitions During the Reign of Carlos III 
When the United States declared their independence in July 1776, Carlos III of Spain was in 
the midst of decades long program to restore the power and prestige of the Spanish empire.31  A 
vigorous 60 years of age, with over 40 years of experience as head of state—25 years as King of 
Naples and Sicily and 17 as King of Spain—his ambition was to centralize the state, revitalize the 
economy, expand the military and enable Spain once again to capture and employ the full wealth 
potential of its immense empire.  His methods drew heavily on new ideas acquired during his tenure 
in Italy, but his vision was almost entirely mercantilist in nature—the goal being to shield Spain’s 
                                                
30 Doniol, II, 644, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 66. 
31 The Spanish empire had been in slow but seemingly irreversible decline over the 150 years preceding 
Carlos III’s access to the throne.  The loss of the Spanish Netherlands had been the first major blow.  England’s 
conquest of Gibraltar (1704) and Minorca (1707), combined with the steady deterioration of the economy, seemed to 
confirm Spain’s status as a second rate power. 
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economy from foreign influence, and to create, to the greatest extent possible, a self-sufficient and 
semi-isolated imperial entity.  The plan included an eventual showdown with England over control of 
the Americas, but it did not foresee, or in anyway desire, a colonial rebellion in British North 
America—an event that complicated Carlos’s plans, especially as his principal ally, France, began to 
show interest in the American cause.32  In this section I analyze Spain’s relationship with France in 
greater detail, but first some additional context. 
 To observers then and now, a major factor in Spain’s decline over the late-sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries was the fact that they economy had come to revolve around the extraction of 
American gold and silver to the exclusion—or at least the detriment—of other types of enterprise.  
The overriding necessity of protecting shipments of ore, for instance, meant that all trade with the 
colonies was funneled through the southern city of Cádiz, from whence two massive convoys carried 
goods to the Americas each year—returning with bullion and other natural resources some months 
later.33  The inefficiencies of this system, along with high taxes, heavy regulation, and the 
inflationary effect of bullion on the Spanish economy, combined to make Spanish goods and 
manufactures more costly than their foreign counterparts.  As Spanish businessmen consequently lost 
market share—and with it manufacturing experience and capital—the quality of their output suffered 
as well.  The result was a steady deterioration over time, the consequences of which were most 
                                                
32 For a review of Carlos’s early years in Italy, see Anthony Hull, Charles III and the Revival of Spain. 
Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1980, pp. 48-82.  Carlos was born in Spain, the fifth son of Felipe V, 
but was sent to Italy at the age of fifteen to rule territories to which the Bourbon family had hereditary title.  Carlos 
was not only exposed to new ideas in Italy, he was also given a chance to implement them while reflecting on 
Spanish policy from a distance. When his half brother, Ferdinand VI passed away prematurely in the summer of 
1759, Carlos had a clear vision for his reign and Spain, and a well formed set of policies that he hoped to implement.  
Within a year of his arrival in Spain, his wife passed away.  He never remarried, but devoted his time energies to 
governance—as well as to the daily hunt, a pastime to which he was addicted. 
33 One convoy went to Vera Cruz, in New Spain (Mexico).  The other went to Puerto Bello in Panama—
where goods and ore were exchanged in connection with Spain’s colony in Peru. 
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poignantly seen in the fact that by 1700 some 90% of the finished goods shipped to the colonies each 
year were of foreign origin—with England and France being the principal suppliers.34 
Spanish policy makers were aware of the problem, but it was difficult to address for at least 
three core reasons.  First, at the conclusion of a series of recent wars, foreign powers had extracted 
treaty provisions from Spain whereby their merchants acquired the right to sell goods in Spain at a 
reduced tariff—in some cases paying only the tax that Spanish merchants paid.  (Some powers 
extracted an additional provision, which exempted their merchants’ goods from search or seizure by 
Spanish authorities—thus providing an effective shield for smuggling silver out of Spain.)  The state 
still maintained a strict prohibition on the direct sale of foreign goods to the colonies, but this was 
easily circumvented by the Spanish merchants in Cádiz who would ship foreign produce to the 
Americas, under the name of their firms, in exchange for a fee or a commission.  This contributed to 
the second problem, which was that a number of domestic interest groups—including the Cádiz 
merchants, and various firms that had a monopoly on aspects of the convoy system—had an interest 
in maintaining the status quo.35  The third and final problem was that the crown lacked the 
institutional wherewithal singlehandedly to effect change. 
This last problem had roots going back to at least the fifteenth century.  Spain was 
historically composed of a number of distinct kingdoms, each of which had its own set of traditions, 
and its own ruling nobility.  During the course of the Reconquest, a power sharing arrangement had 
developed whereby these kingdoms ceded a portion of their authority to the central crown, while 
                                                
34 Geoffrey Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1979 is especially helpful in describing the economic conditions that Carlos would inherit in 1759.  Walker 
states that only 5% of goods shipped to the New World in 1700 were of Spanish origin, p. 13.  Richard Herr, The 
Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, p. 147, puts the figure at 12%.  
Lynch states that “American treasure [accounted for]… about one-quarter of ordinary revenue” in 1778, Bourbon 
Spain, 325; Herr adds that: “By its dependence on English cloths and hardware, Spain had for over a century been 
‘the darling—the silver mine of England’; and English, French, and other merchants had at the same time supplied 
the bulk of goods for the Spanish colonies by licit trade through Cadiz and illicit smuggling,” 148. 
35 See Walker, Spanish Politics, 1-14 for an excellent overview of the colonial trade’s chief defects.  See 
also Herr, Revolution in Spain, on the merchants in Cádiz. 
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retaining a high degree of autonomy in local matters.  These basic parameters remained in effect until 
1700, when Carlos II of the Habsburg family died childless, leaving the throne to the Bourbon family 
of France—a major event in European politics, which prompted a major war.  In the course of that 
war, the first Bourbon king, Philip V, curtailed many local privileges and centralized the state.  The 
nobility were resentful, but made the best of the new situation by moving to Madrid and co-opting 
the state institutions.  Chief among these was the Council of Castile, where most major policy 
decisions were made.  The landed nobility came to dominate the council—outnumbering the king’s 
own ministers—which gave them considerable control over government policy. 
 This then was the problem that Carlos faced when he acceded to the throne in 1759.  The 
state still derived some 25% of its annual revenue from colonial bullion—and took in additional sums 
of customs revenue—but smuggling was endemic, and the net reality was that foreigners captured 
much, if not most, of the profit potential in Spain’s immense American market.  Carlos could not 
raise tariffs to protect domestic industry, or even shield the colonies from smuggling, without a 
stronger military.  He could not strengthen the military without revenue; and he could not increase 
revenue without reforming the economy, which threatened to anger both the foreign merchants, and 
the domestic interest groups that favored the status quo. He set out to solve the problem by reforming 
the organs of state policy making, strengthening the military, revitalizing the economy and extracting 
revenue from the colonies.36 
During the first six years of his reign, Carlos took a bold approach, declaring war on England 
in 1762—in the waning years of the Seven Years War—and then enacting a policy of comercio libre 
in 1765.  The war was a disaster that resulted in the loss of the Floridas, and the new trade policy 
                                                
36 Lynch, writes: “His basic policy was strength not welfare: the aim was to make Spain a great power 
through state reform, imperial defence, and control of colonial resources,” Bourbon Spain, 250. 
 
 77 
prompted a domestic rebellion that came close to costing Carlos his throne.37  Thereafter, he 
proceeded more cautiously, though still in the same general direction.  He initiated a naval 
rearmament program that steadily expanded the size of the fleet.  He modernized the training of both 
the navy and the army.38  He steadily expanded the scope of the comercio libre policy.  He 
dispatched officials to the colonies—most famously José de Galvéz—with dictatorial powers to root 
out corruption, dismantle entrenched interest groups, and increase revenue.39  Finally, as opportunity 
permitted, he began to impose higher duties on foreign imports and to encourage domestic 
manufactures.40  All the while he prepared for what he believed was an inevitable war with England 
over control of the Americas, and the Spanish market in particular.41 
When it came to policy-making in Madrid—and the obstacles posed by the nobility on the 
Council of Castile—Carlos employed two approaches.  During the early years of his reign, he 
promoted intellectual innovators to high office—without regard for their status in the nobility—and 
met separately with them to formulate some policies without the participation of the Council.  (Many 
of these men were Italians, and the most famous was the Marquis de Esquilache, Carlos’s minister of 
finance, who conceived of the comercio libre policy.)  The problem with this approach was that it 
                                                
37 The new policy licensed merchants outside of Cádiz to conduct direct trade with a limited portion of the 
Spanish empire—though not the convoy ports of Vera Cruz and Puerto Bello.  Though the initial effects were 
limited, the merchants in Cádiz were strongly opposed and, according to Steins, instigated the major rebellion in 
1766 that forced Carlos to flee the capital.  See Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, Apogee of Empire: Spain and 
New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759-1789. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, pp. 81-118. 
38 Carlos aspired to shift the navy from a defensive posture to one capable of offensive action.  By 1779 the 
fleet had up to 60 ships of the line.  Lynch, Bourbon Spain, argues that the policy was unsuccessful, and that Spain 
won few naval victories during the war. 
39 Gálvez’s visita began in 1767 and featured over 3,000 trials, with 85 condemned to death, 73 to 
whipping, 674 to life in prison, and 117 to banishment, see Kuethe and Andrien, Spanish Atlantic World, 278.  
Gálvez would return to become head of the Council of the Indies, and eventually Minister of the Indies. 
40 See, Herr; Kuethe and Andrien, 283; Lynch; Stein and Stein.  The free trade program was expanded in 
1774 and again in 1778.  In 1767, Carlos also famously expelled the Jesuit order from Spain and the colonies, 
confiscated their property, and even persuaded the pope, in 1773, to dissolve their entire order. 
41 While both England and France supplied goods to the Spanish market, the English were the chief culprits 
when it came to illicit smuggling.  Also, because France was Spain’s principal ally, Carlos was limited in how 
forcefully he could resist French requests for access to the American market. 
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generated resentment among the nobility.  In the aftermath of that policy’s implementation, when 
rebellion broke out in the winter of 1766, Carlos was forced to accept Esquilache’s resignation as a 
means of restoring order.  Carlos still retained another Italian, the Marquis de Grimaldi, as Secretary 
of State.  Grimaldi was not a bold thinker; however, Carlos now took a different approach to 
reform—co-opting the Council of Castile by appointing reform-minded members of the nobility to 
run it.  The most famous was the Conde de Aranda, a member of the nobility from the province of 
Aragon, who became president of the Council of Castile in March 1766.42 
Aranda is frequently cited as one of the most remarkable figures in eighteenth-century Spain.  
He was a military figure, ruthlessly devoted to the concept of monarchy, and the hierarchical system 
of nobility, but also widely read, conversant in the new ideas of what we today call the 
Enlightenment, and in favor of a bold policy of economic, and military reform.  For seven years 
following his appointment to the Council reform proceeded largely under his direction and because 
of the energies that he brought to his task.  Aranda had at least one great weakness in that he had a 
fierce temper and an implacable resentment of the low-born intellectuals that Carlos was still 
employing in office.  (Aranda was the nominal head of a group of Spanish-born aristocrats—
popularly known as the Aragonese faction—who idealized the traditional structure of authority and 
were outspoken advocates for traditional aristocratic rights and privileges.) Over time, tensions 
between Aranda and Grimaldi became particularly acute.  In 1773, the king was finally forced to 
resolve the issue, which he did by sending Aranda into political exile as ambassador to France.43 
                                                
42 See Hull, Charles III, 104-116; and Kuethe and Andrien, Spanish Atlantic, 235-236. 
43 Aranda is often described as tour de force or a law unto himself (see for example, Hull, Charles III, 116).  
He was a fiercely devoted patriot, but was also an acerbic personality who clashed repeatedly with his fellow 
ministers.  He objected in particular to the king’s policy of promoting those with no historic ties to the Spanish 
nobility.  For an analysis of the Aragonese faction at court, see Rafael Olaechea. El Conde de Aranda y el ‘Partido 
Aragones’. Zaragoza: Libreria General, 1969.  For a more general overview of his life and influence see Rafael 
Olaechea and José A. Ferrer Benimeli, El Conde de Aranda: Mito y Realidad de un Politico Aragones. Zaragoza: 
Libreria General, 1978, and María-Dolores Albiac Blanco, El Conde de Aranda: Los Laberintos del Poder. 
Zaragoza: Caja de Ahorros de la Inmaculada de Aragón, 1998. 
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Three years later, in the aftermath of a disastrous attack on Algiers, the Aragonese faction 
took its revenge and forced Grimaldi out of office as well.  The king replaced him, however, not with 
a member of the nobility but with another middle-class professional—this time a Spanish-born 
attorney by the name of José Moñino y Redondo, who had recently earned the title of Conde de 
Floridablanca for his work in persuading the Vatican to disband the Jesuit order.44  Floridablanca 
won the king’s complete confidence.  From the date that he formally took office, in February 1777, 
Carlos ceased to involve himself directly in affairs of state.  He gave Floridablanca his full backing 
and—most significantly—permitted him to begin to meet separately with other ministers and to 
formulate policy without the participation of the Council of Castile, or even the presence of the king.  
These structural changes did not enable Floridablanca to achieve every objective that Carlos had in 
mind, but they did give him a firm grip on foreign policy, and on the question of how Spain should 
respond to the nascent colonial rebellion in North America.45 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
During this period, Carlos III also advanced his agenda through the work of “visitors” or officials sent to 
the colonies to impose structural reform.  The most influential was José de Gálvez, who was sent to the Americans 
from 1767-1771 and who eventually rose to become president of the Council of the Indies and then Minister of the 
Indies.  Like Grimaldi, he was a professional with no family ties to the nobility.   
44 Floridablanca was not of noble birth and did not have a landed estate, or personal wealth, or hereditary 
connection to any of the great families.  Little has been written on Floridablanca’s tenure, but for some insight see 
Antonio Rumeu de Armas, El Testamento Político del Conde de Floridablanca. Madrid: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, Escuela de Historia Moderna, 1962. 
45 See Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 296-97.  Floridablanca would say of his own influence: “In highest policy 
matters the king’s confidence in me is without limits; and other ministers, seeing the king’s determination to rely on 
me in everything of importance, come to consult me with astonishing frequency.”  The quote is taken from a letter 
from Floridablanca to Azara, dated October 7, 1777. 
 
 80 
Spain’s Perspective on the American Revolution 
Carlos III’s did not often express his views on the American Revolution in writing.  On 
learning that France had signed an alliance with the United States, he is reported to have said, 
“Believe me, the circumstances are most critical, and prudence is essential.  Spain is not the same as 
France.”46 Most of what we know of his opinions must be discerned through the policies of his 
ministers, combined with our general knowledge of his reign.  We know that he had been preparing 
for war with England for just over a decade when the Revolution began; and that he hoped to use 
such a war to adjust Spain’s commercial treaties with England, and to recover territory integral to the 
empire—Gibraltar, Minorca, and the Floridas ranking, as already said, high on his wish list.  The fact 
that a substantial portion of Britain’s forces were tied down in North America arguably made the 
American Revolution an ideal occasion on which to accomplish those objectives.  Yet the advantages 
had to be weighed against the fact that the Americans were engaged in a colonial rebellion.  Carlos, 
whose own subjects were still smarting under the harsh new policies that he had imposed, via 
Gálvez, could ill afford to sanction such an event.  He also had no interest in seeing an independent 
state established in North America—especially one like Great Britain, with a powerful proclivity for 
territorial expansion, trade and smuggling.47  Finally, war was expensive and there was always the 
risk—evidenced by the events of 1762—that plans could go awry leaving Spain worse off than 
before. 
Grimaldi left office in February 1777, too soon to leave many clues as to the precise policy 
that he would have adopted, but he was clearly opposed to Vergennes’s strategy of engaging Spain in 
a war on behalf of the United States.48   In the fall of 1775, after Vergennes had conveyed his 
                                                
46 Montmorin to Vergennes, January 28, 1778, quoted in Phillips, The West, footnote on p. 81 
47 The Spanish view of the United States as a potential enemy will be discussed in greater depth later in this 
chapter. 
48 Many Spanish nobles resented the fact that an ethnically French king ruled Spain, and they preferred a 
strategic orientation toward England.  It was also true—Carlos’s desires for economic independence 
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strategic vision, Grimaldi expressed hope that the combined Bourbon forces might rather be used to 
conquer Portugal instead.  When Vergennes rejected that plan, Grimaldi proposed an invasion of 
Ireland instead—with the ostensible goal of forcing England to give up territory elsewhere in 
exchange for its recovery.  In May, 1776, Grimaldi asked Vergennes to send 10,000–12,000 French 
troops to San Domingo, to help defend against a possible British attack.  When Vergennes declined, 
on the grounds that war had not yet begun, Grimaldi grew cool.  He agreed to join France in sending 
the Americans a total of 2 million livres worth of secret aid—including blankets, uniforms, 
gunpowder and other types of supplies49—with the goal of prolonging the war, thus giving France 
and Spain time to rebuild their navies and weigh their options while Britain and the United States 
weakened each other and became more pliant.50   
Grimaldi’s clearest statement came on February 4, 1777, just a few days before he left office.  
In response to yet another request from Vergennes for a declaration of war against England and an 
alliance with the United States Grimaldi conveyed his concern that the Americans would take 
advantage of the alliance to secure better terms of peace with England, leaving the Bourbons to fight 
England on their own.  In that event, he argued, it was Spain’s colonies in the Americas that would 
                                                                                                                                                       
notwithstanding—that England was a more natural trading partner than France was, since the English were willing 
to purchase Spanish wines, fruits and nuts that the French had no interest in.  Grimaldi, by contrast, was viewed as a 
minister who favored a tilt toward France rather than England.  Yet having personally negotiated the Family Pact in 
1761, he was poignantly aware of the risks of going to war on France’s behalf. 
49 Two million livres was roughly equivalent in value to £87,000, the sum needed, for example, to construct 
four ships of the line.  It was an immense help to the Americans, but was a small amount in comparison to the 
several hundred million livres that France and Spain would each spend annually at the height of the war.  See Lynch, 
Bourbon Spain, 314 for the estimated cost of building ships of the line.  Murphy states that France’s total expenses 
for the war would eventually surpass 1 billion livres, Vergennes, 399; Murphy also writes that annual naval costs in 
the year that Louis XV died were in the vicinity of 20-25 million livres, whereas by 1778, the annual naval budget 
was close to 100 million, p. 245.  
50 For the Bourbon’s motivation in providing the Americans with aid, see both Aranda to Grimaldi, June 7, 
1776 and Grimaldi to Aranda, June 27, 1776 in Juan F. Yela Utrilla, España Ante la Independencia de los Estados 
Unidos. Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 1988, pp. 560 and 562, in which Aranda states and Grimaldi repeats that the goal 
of providing secret aid would be to leave the English destroyed and colonists rendered more reasonable at the outset 
of their independence; Vergennes wrote on the occasion: “The warring powers should first be allowed to exhaust 
themselves and not until the colonies declared their independence should France intervene, for it was not in accord 
with the king’s dignity to ally himself with insurgents,” March 12, 1776, “Considerations sur l’affaire des Colonies 
anglois de l’Amerique,” in Doniol I:278, quoted in Phillips, The West, 35.  Murphy, Vergennes, 234-35 adds that the 
French hoped that the Americans would emerge from the war in a weak, dependent and relatively docile condition. 
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be especially vulnerable to British conquest.  In addition, Grimaldi reiterated Carlos III’s reluctance 
to endorse a colonial rebellion.  “The King our master,” Grimaldi wrote, “possessing such vast and 
important domains in the Indies, should be very reticent about making a formal treaty with the 
provinces, which can still be considered only as rebels…. The rights of all sovereigns in their 
respective territories should be extremely sacred, and the example of a rebellion is too dangerous for 
His Majesty to wish to sustain it openly.”51  The following week, Grimaldi’s replacement, 
Floridablanca, arrived from Italy and a new policy came into effect.   
Floridablanca opposed an alliance with the United States for the same reasons that Grimaldi 
had, but he differed from his predecessor in his determination to make the best of the situation and 
extract as much benefit for Spain as he possibly could.  His basic strategy, in the lead-up to war, was 
to play the British and French off one another to see who would pay the highest price for Spanish 
assistance.  To the British he offered Spanish neutrality in exchange for Gibraltar or some equivalent.  
To the French, he hinted at the possibility of active military support, while making it clear that 
France would have to agree to specific terms that would favor Spanish interests.52  He specifically 
disavowed any intent to ally with or recognize the United States, and he expressed hope that the 
rebels would emerge from the war weak, divided, and semi-independent at best, dependent on the 
Bourbons for survival.53 
                                                
51 See Grimaldi to Aranda, February 4, 1777, in Yela Utrilla, España, II:62 
52 See Phillips, The West, 54-55 
53 Floridablanca’s hostility to the United States will be discussed in greater detail in the pages ahead.  He 
specifically hoped that France would recover Canada, enabling French forces to keep the Americans confined to the 
coast.  Vergennes, who knew that the presence of French troops in North America would alarm the Americans, 
rejected that idea.  See Vergennes to Gérard, March 29, 1778 in Meng, Despatches, 129; and Vergennes to Gérard, 
October 26, 1778 in Meng, Despatches, 360, where Vergennes writes: “[The Spanish agent in North America] 
believes it would be good policy for us to confine the Colonies on the north while Spain confines them on the south.  
You know that we have a contrary opinion because our possessions on the American continent would be apt only to 
inspire distrust in the Americans and to bring them automatically closer to Great Britain.  We persist in regarding the 
matter from that point of view, and we shall never vary.” 
 
 83 
It is worth noting that Spanish officials were not fully united in their support for 
Floridablanca’s policy.  Aranda, for example, who was still in exile as ambassador to France and 
watching the situation closely, favored a rather different plan.  In brief, Aranda was persuaded that 
England had no hope of suppressing the American rebellion; that the United States was destined to 
become a great power; and that Spain’s best option would be to confront that reality head on and 
negotiate a favorable alliance with the Americans, while they were still in a state of weakness and 
disposed to make concessions.  Aranda would then have wholeheartedly engaged in the proposed 
alliance with France, in hopes of securing through war the territories that Floridablanca was trying to 
obtain through diplomacy.  For his part, Floridablanca was so thoroughly opposed to Aranda’s 
proposals that he wrote to him only rarely and conducted nearly all relations with France via 
Montmorin, the French ambassador in Madrid.54 
 
A Brief History of the Pacte de Famille 
At the outset of the American Revolution, the crowns of France and Spain were strategically 
united by a treaty of alliance known as the Family Pact—or Pacte de Famille.  The origins of the 
alliance—and the explanation for its name—dated back to 1700 when, as previously noted, Carlos II 
of the Habsburg family died without issue, leaving the Spanish throne to the Bourbon family.  
Because the Bourbons already ruled France, there now existed a theoretical possibility that the two 
kingdoms might one day unite under a single ruler—an event that would destroy the balance of 
power in Europe.  A major war ensued, at the conclusion of which the Bourbons were permitted to 
retain both kingdoms on condition that they promised never to unite their crowns as feared.  
Nevertheless, alliances were permitted, and on three occasions over the course of the succeeding 
                                                
54 See Joaquin Oltra, El Conde de Aranda y Los Estados Unidos. Barcelona: PPU, 1987 for a detailed 
discussion of Aranda’s policy preferences and lengthy transcripts of his dispatches to Floridablanca.  See also 
Miguel Gómez del Campillo, El Conde de Aranda en su Embajada a Francia (años 1773-1787): Discurso Leído en 
el Acto de su Recepción. Madrid: Diana, 1945 
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century, the two kingdoms did join forces in time of war.  The first two alliances—signed in 1733 
and 1745 respectively—were of limited duration.  The third and final alliance, signed in August 
1761, was perpetual in nature and was still in effect when the American Revolution began.55 
The context in which this third alliance was signed was the Seven Years War.  That war, 
which began in 1756, had started out well for France.  Starting in 1759, however, the tide had turned 
in England’s favor and by 1761 France was facing the possibility of near total defeat.  Hoping to 
recover at least some of those losses, and strengthen France’s position in the ensuing negotiations, 
the French Foreign Minister, Choiseul, sought an alliance with Spain—which had remained neutral 
to that point in the war.  Carlos III agreed, in part because Spain could not afford to let France be 
destroyed, and in part because he hoped to take advantage of the belligerents’ exhausted condition to 
recover territory that Spain had lost earlier in the century—ideally Gibraltar and Minorca—at 
relatively little cost.56 
The decision proved to be a disaster as Spanish forces were slow to mobilize and the British, 
whose war machine was already in high gear, quickly captured Havana and Manila.  In the end, 
Spain’s losses were partially mitigated by the fact that Britain agreed to exchange the two ports for 
the Floridas, while France gave Spain the western portion of Louisiana as compensation for the 
Floridas.57  Nevertheless, Spain now faced the prospect of Britain occupying the northeast corner of 
the Gulf in perpetuity—a most convenient base for smuggling—as well as the Straits of Florida 
through which the Spanish convoys sailed each year.  The defeat was also major blow to Carlos’s 
pride, and all the more because Choiseul had settled on preliminary terms of peace with England 
without consulting either Carlos or his minister—thus creating the impression that France regarded 
                                                
55 Most general histories of this period contain an overview of the origins of the Pacte de Famille.  For a 
more detailed analysis, see Vicente Palacio Atard, El Tercer Pacto de Familia. Madrid: Marsiega, 1945. 
56 See Hull, Charles III, 97-105. 
57 East Florida was roughly equivalent to the modern state of Florida.  West Florida encompassed the 
territory along the Gulf coast that is today the southern half of Mississippi and Alabama, along with the western tip 
of the Florida panhandle. 
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Spain as a junior partner in the alliance.  Meanwhile, for their part, the French were disgusted with 
Spain’s inability to play a more significant role in defending Bourbon interests.  In brief then, neither 
Spain nor France was happy with outcome of the alliance.  Yet, it was perpetual in nature, and in the 
near term—with England now the preeminent power in Europe—it played a useful role in deterring 
further attacks.58 
In the years that followed, the attention of both Bourbon powers turned toward preparations 
for the next war with England, in which they hoped to reverse their recent losses.59  Both viewed the 
Family Pact as vital to that effort, yet beneath the veneer of amity and cooperation, it soon became 
clear that their interests and aspirations were not fully in line.  There were three core points of 
tension: economic policy, strategic policy, and a sharp difference of opinion as to which state should 
control or determine the timing and direction of the ensuing conflict.  At the heart of the economic 
dispute was the question of who would profit from Spain’s colonial market.  France’s goal was to 
help Spain expel British smugglers with the expectation that French merchants would supply the 
resulting demand for finished goods.60  By contrast, as already noted, Carlos III was determined that 
Spain become economically independent.  He needed French military assistance in the near term, but 
over time he hoped that Spanish manufactures would meet the needs of the colonies.  From 1763 
                                                
58 Military strength in this era was often measured in terms of the number of “ships of the line”, or 50+ gun 
battleships, that a given state could put to sea.  Neither France nor Spain could match England on its own but the 
size of their combined fleets was—at least on paper—greater than the British fleet.  See Dull, French Navy, and 
Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 310-315.  The numbers masked the fact that both France and Spain had difficult securing 
trained sailors for their fleets and were not nearly effective as England was at outfitting ships quickly in time of war.  
For French views of Spain in connection with the Pacte de Famille see Allan Christelow, “French Interest in the 
Spanish Empire during the Ministry of the Duc de Choiseul, 1759-1771,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review, 21:4 (November, 1941): 515-537.  See also Vergennes’s statement: “[I]t is necessary that we be able to 
fulfill its obligations, because, whether it should be from design or from lack of means that we should fail in 
carrying out these obligations, the treaty would thereby by annulled… [and] France would be the first to feel the 
disastrous consequences,” Doniol, 1:19, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 41. 
59 The specific plans conceived in 1763 were predicated on the expectation that war would begin in 1768.  
See Kuethe and Andrien, Spanish World, 278-279. 
60 Murphy points out that the value of French trade with its colonies had fallen off “to less than a seventh of 
what it had been before the [Seven Years War].”  France was consequently in urgent need of foreign markets.  He 
notes that in 1768, “Spain and France had signed at Madrid a convention defining Article Twenty-four of the Family 
Compact,” Vergennes, 212. 
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onward the issue was a continual source of friction as the French pressed for trade privileges that 
Carlos III steadily refused to grant.61 
On the strategic front, the tension surrounded the particular goals and objectives that each 
power would pursue in a future war with England.  The Spanish placed a priority on territorial 
acquisitions.  Perpetually at the top of their list of desiderata were Gibraltar and Minorca, and control 
of the territories surrounding the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.62  As already noted, French 
policy makers were divided on the desirability of recovering colonies, or acquiring new ones.  Their 
chief aim was to weaken England, restore the balance of power, and enable France to play a major 
role in European politics once again.  They understood Spain’s desire for territory, but they were not 
prepared to pay a high price for those aspirations.  The third and final source of tension, which was 
intimately connected to the first two, surrounded the question of who would decide when war with 
England would begin, and what strategy ought to be employed.  Both states were in a somewhat 
precarious situation; and neither wanted to be dragged into a risky war in pursuit of objectives that 
did not align with their core interests.63 
Until 1774, one final factor conditioned the alliance and affected its utility as an offensive 
threat to English power, and that was the respective disposition of the French and Spanish kings.  
Although Choiseul, the French foreign minister was ready for war with England at the opportune 
moment, Louis XV was not.  First in 1770 and then again in 1772, the Spanish took steps that 
indicated their readiness for a showdown, only to be rebuffed by France.  In the first event, a dispute 
                                                
61 See especially Christelow, “French Interest.”  An additional source of friction on the economic front was 
caused by the fact that the French had little need for Spanish wines, fruits and nuts, which were some of Spain’s 
chief export products. 
62 Some Spanish policy makers also harbored a desire to conquer Portugal and/or to resolve ongoing border 
disputes involving Brazil and the Spanish colony in what is today Uruguay. 
63 See A. S. Aiton, “Spanish Colonial Reorganization under the Family Compact,” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 12:3 (August, 1932): 269-280; Kuethe and Andrien also argue in Spanish World, that Choiseul 
maintained the illusion of an intimate alliance in hopes of securing trade concessions from Spain, but he had no 
intention of getting involved in a war that Spain might initiate, pp. 278-279. 
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had arisen between Spain and England over the Falkland or Malvinas Islands.  Spain occupied the 
islands in 1770 and took a belligerent stance against England, fully expecting that France would back 
its claims to possession.  Instead, Louis XV fired Choiseul, and sent a letter to Carlos III entreating 
him to back down and spare France a disastrous war.  Two years later, the Spanish presented 
themselves as ready to intervene, with France, on behalf of Poland—which was being partitioned by 
Russia, Prussia and Austria.  Again Louis XV declined.64 
The accession of Louis XVI to the throne, in 1774, seemed to portend new possibilities for 
the alliance and in 1775 the Spanish tried again, this time seeking French aid in a territorial dispute 
with Portugal.65  Vergennes, however, newly appointed as minister of Foreign Affairs, declined—his 
attention already drawn to the brewing conflict in North America.  Within months the relative 
posture of the two states would be inverted, with France new urging Spain to join a war that seemed 
especially suited to French aspirations—especially in light of the policies and objectives that 
Vergennes sought to establish both for his own ministry and for the reign of Louis XVI. 
 
The Relevant Terms of the Pacte de Famille 
Tensions between France and Spain, over the proper policy to adopt vis-à-vis the American 
Revolution, were mediated through the terms of the Family Pact.66  The details of this mediation—
the negotiations by which the tensions were resolved—reveal much about the role and character of 
law in late-eighteenth-century European diplomacy.  Before proceeding to that analysis, it is 
                                                
64 See again, Kuethe and Andrien, Spanish World, 278-279.  Murphy, Vergennes, notes that in the first 
major policy paper that Vergennes submitted to Louis XVI, he pointed to the partition of Poland as epitomizing the 
humiliation that flowed from France’s loss of prestige, p. 213. 
65 For a discussion of tensions between Spain and Portugal in 1775 and 1776 see Meng, Vergennes, 46-56. 
66 The full text of the treaty is contained in G. F. Martens, Recueil de Traités d’alliance, de paix, de trêve… 
et plusieurs autres actes servant à la connaissance des relations étrangères des puissances et états de l’Europe… 
depuis 1761 jusqu’à present. Gottingue: Dieterich, 1817-1835, vol. 1, pp. 16-28. 
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necessary to begin with a review of the treaty and its precise terms. The treaty opens with a preamble 
that establishes the base and duration of the treaty: 
The blood line that unites the two monarchs who reign in France and Spain, and the 
particular sentiments that they have for each other, and of which they have given so many 
proofs, have engaged His Most Christian Majesty and His Catholic Majesty to arrange and 
conclude between themselves a treaty of friendship and union under the denomination of 
family pact, the principal object of which is to render permanent and indissoluble, as much 
by their majesties as by their descendants and Successors, the obligations that are a natural 
consequence of their parentage and family… 
 
The first four articles lay out the foundational principles of the treaty, to wit, that the two 
kings “will henceforth regard as their enemies any Power that becomes that of one or the other of the 
two Crowns,” and that “whoever attacks one Crown attacks the other.”67  Despite the totality of that 
commitment, Article IV goes on to conclude that, “the two contracting parties have judged it 
appropriate to fix the first Aids that the power requested will be obliged to furnish to the requesting 
party.”  These “first Aids” are then specified in the following eleven articles.  The essential term is 
that each crown commits—within three months of receiving a request from the other—to placing 
twelve ships of the line and six frigates, fully armed, at the disposition of the requesting party,68 as 
well as 8,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry (in the case of France) and 10,000 infantry and 2,000 
cavalry (in the case of Spain).69  The mere demand for these aids is all that is necessary to obligate 
the other party to supply them.  No explanation may be required, or used as a pretext for refusing to 
provide them70, and the forces may be used for either offensive or defensive action.71  
These specified aids, however, were merely an expression of friendship.  Article XVI went 
on to emphasize that “the intention of the two Kings is, that war begun by or against one of the two 
                                                
67 Articles II and III also contain a mutual guarantee of the two crowns’ respective possessions, and extends 
that guarantee to the King of the Two Sicillies. 
68 Article V 
69 Article VI 
70 Article XII 
71 Article XIII 
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Crowns become peculiar to and personal to the other.”  It was therefore agreed, “that as soon as the 
two Kings find themselves in war declared against the same enemy or enemies, the obligation to give 
assistance will cease, and… will be succeeded by an obligation… to make war jointly, employing all 
their forces.”  As a consequence of this latter obligation, the “two high contracting parties” would 
form “particular conventions, relative to the circumstances” of that war, whereby they would concert 
their “efforts and their respective and reciprocal advantages, as well as their plans and operations, 
both military and political.”  Finally, these conventions having been made, “the two Kings will 
execute them together… in perfect accord.”72 
The next two articles turn to the issue of peace negotiations.  “The two parties” promise to 
“conclude nothing without the concurrence of the other” and to “share all information of interest to 
the other as related to the pacification, that in war as in peace each of the two crowns will regard the 
interests of their allies crown as they do their own.”73  Furthermore, “the advantages that one power 
may obtain will be used to compensate the losses that another may have sustained, such that just as in 
the operations of war the two Monarchies of France and Spain in all the extent of their denominations 
will be regarded and act as if they formed but one sole power.”74  The treaty finally concludes with 
nine additional articles that address details such as additional rights pertaining to the King of the Two 
Sicillies,75 and a prohibition on inviting other powers to accede to the pact.76  Article XXIV grants 
the merchants of each crown reciprocal trading privileges.  Finally, article, XXVII, contains a 
formula for determining which crown’s ambassador will have precedent in foreign courts.77 
                                                
72 Article XVI 
73 Article XVII 
74 Article XVIII 
75 Article XIX 
76 Article XXI 
77 Article XXVII 
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Negotiating the Convention of Aranjuez, Phase I: 1775–1777 
In the spring of 1774, soon after taking office, Vergennes wrote a lengthy memo to Louis 
XVI, outlining French foreign policy, and placing particular importance on the Pacte de Famille.  
The alliance with Spain, he wrote, “establishes a unity of views and of conduct which admirably 
fulfills the double object of opposing English naval power with the superior united forces of the two 
monarchies, and of holding in check the tendency of England to attack France by her unwillingness 
to break with Spain…. It is therefore natural that the king should regard the Family Compact as the 
foundation of his policy.”78   Writing ten years later, Vergennes’s chief counterpart during the 
American Revolution, the Conde de Floridablanca, expressed a rather different view of that treaty.  
He conceded that it was in Spain’s interest to live at peace with a neighbor as powerful as France, 
and “to remove any friction that might deprive Spain of the assistance” that France could provide.79  
Yet he urged the Spanish Council of State never to forget France’s potential to become the “greatest, 
most dangerous, and most fearsome enemy,” that Spain could possibly have.80  The root problem, 
Floridablanca asserted, was that France viewed Spain “as a subject, and subordinate power, affecting 
always to command us and hold us always at their disposition.”81   
The French, Floridablanca continued, tried to “soften that air of domination” by encouraging 
a unity of viewpoint on the grounds that it was useful for “all nations” to see that the Bourbon crowns 
were “intimately united, and that there is neither method nor intrigue capable of separating us.”  That 
                                                
78 Vergennes to Louis XVI, Doniol, I:20, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 39. 
79 The quote is taken from a document entitled, “Instrucción Reservada,” which Floridblanca wrote as a 
policy guide for the Spanish State Council in 1787.  The full text of the document can be found in Antonio Ferrer del 
Rio, Obras Originales del Conde de Floridablanca. Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1867, pp. 213-272. This particular 
quote is taken from Article CCCII, p. 258. 
80 Article CCCXXXIV of “Instrucción Reservada,” Ferrer del Rio, Obras, 262. 
81 French policy, he went on to assert, was specifically designed: 1) to extract as many commercial 
advantages from Spain as possible; 2) to treat Spain as a subordinate power, “una potencia subalterna,” that should 
serve France’s strategic designs and 3) to prevent Spain from acquiring the strength or prosperity necessary to 
compete with France or “throw off France’s yoke of domination.” See Article CCCXIV, p. 260. 
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was merely a pretext, however, designed to cover their goal of “directing our affairs, inserting 
themselves into our business,” and presuming to be “the arbiter of our deliberations.”82  As a 
consequence, Floridablanca concluded, Carlos III had ordered his ministers to base their future 
relationship with France on the maxim that Spain “will never be such a friend of [France] as when 
we are entirely free or independent,” and that “friendship is not compatible with domination,” or 
“with the despotism of some men over others,” but rather demands “reciprocal equality and 
liberty.”83  The two courts should maintain strict separation of their domestic affairs, and even 
foreign policy, attempting to concert military action only after careful consideration of their 
respective interests.   The Council should “take great care,” in particular, not to “enter any war,” on 
France’s behalf, “nor take a step that can cause a war, without careful examination, without our 
consent, and without preparations proportional to the size and consequences” of the conflict in 
question.84 
Floridablanca’s 1787 policy statement was a direct outgrowth of his experience in negotiating 
the terms of Spain’s participation in the American war for independence.  A number of scholars have 
analyzed those negotiations with the goal of understanding French or Spanish foreign policy.85  In the 
pages that follow, I will review them with the goal of understanding how law functioned in the 
context of diplomacy during this period.  To summarize the salient points already discussed, the 
overarching goal of Spanish foreign policy under Carlos III was to initiate reforms—political, 
commercial, and military—that would enable the state to recover lost territory, shield its colonies 
from foreign interference, and negotiate new commercial treaties with Britain and France; results that 
                                                
82 Article CCCXV-XVI of “Instrucción Reservada,” Ferrer del Rio, Obras, 260. 
83 Article CCCXVII of “Instrucción Reservada,” Ferrer del Rio, Obras, 260. 
84 Article CCCXXII of “Instrucción Reservada,” in Ferrer del Rio, Obras, 261. 
85 See especially Meng, Vergennes; Phillips, The West; Dull, French Navy; Corwin, French Policy; 
Patterson, Other Armada; Thomas E. Chávez, Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002. 
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in combination would create space for Spanish trade and manufacturing to develop.  By contrast, 
French foreign policy under Louis XVI (and more specifically under Vergennes) was aimed at 
restoring France to its rightful position as arbiter of European politics—while also opening up 
foreign markets for French manufactures.  France saw the nascent colonial rebellion in North 
America as a heaven-sent opportunity to accomplish its goals with little cost or risk.  Spain saw the 
United States as a threat to the future of its American empire.  
Negotiations began in the summer of 1775, several months after news of Lexington and 
Concord reached Europe, when Vergennes began to hint at the possibility of an alliance with the 
Americans.  The Spanish Secretary of State, Grimaldi, was not enthusiastic.  He proposed a joint 
conquest of Portugal as an alternative—offering France a “colonial establishment in South America” 
as compensation.  When that plan was rejected, he wrote again in January 1776, to suggest a joint 
invasion of Ireland—ostensibly on the grounds that England could thus be pressured to yield other 
territory, like Gibraltar, Jamaica, or the Floridas, in exchange.86   Vergennes was opposed to any 
direct attack on England on the grounds that it would alarm other European states and prevent Louis 
XVI from earning the trust needed to serve as arbiter of the peace. Negotiations were at a stalemate 
until April, when Vergennes secured formal approval from both Louis XVI and the Spanish Court, to 
supply the American insurgents with a combined 2 million livres in secret aid.  The goal, which both 
states could agree on, was to prolong the struggle in North America and weaken the British—leaving 
them vulnerable to whatever plan the Bourbon powers might later agree upon.87 
                                                
86 In December, the French ambassador to Madrid presented his case to the Spanish court that: “The 
opportunity was at hand… to ruin [England’s] commerce in the Mediterranean, the Levant, and in Africa, and to 
build up the trade of France and Spain on its ruins.”  Ossun to Vergennes, December 11, 1775, quoted in Phillips, 
The West, 40.  Regarding Spain’s proposed invasion of Ireland, Grimaldi wanted “to utilize the insults offered her in 
South America and the lack of consideration shown her in Europe by the Court of Lisbon” as an excuse for 
launching a pre-emptive war.  See Meng, Vergennes, 48-50. 
87 See again Aranda to Grimaldi, June 7, 1776 and Grimaldi to Aranda, June 27, 1776 in Yela Utrilla, 
España, II:560, 562. 
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Negotiations intensified in the spring of 1776 with a territorial dispute between Portugal and 
Spain on the southern border of Brazil.  Grimaldi invoked Article V of the Family Pact and asked 
France to send 10,000–12,000 troops to San Domingo to prevent its being taken by the English—
Portugal’s ally—in the event of war.   France was obligated to provide the troops immediately and 
without explanation.  Vergennes, however, resisted the request.  In a letter to his ambassador in 
Madrid, he noted that San Domingo was “a cemetery” for troops.  Though there was some benefit to 
preparing for war against England, the time for war was not yet at hand.  He instructed D’Ossun to 
reject the Spanish request on moral grounds, noting that “the august sovereigns of France and Spain” 
did not base their policy upon “political expediency” alone but rather on “virtuous principles.”  
Because the Bourbons had “neither a motive nor a pretext, I might even add, nor a real interest in 
declaring” war against England they should do nothing to provoke even the slightest chance of 
British retaliation.  Far better to let Britain wage against herself since “[s]he has the generosity to 
spare us even the trouble and expense of her destruction.”88   
Vergennes’s refusal, no matter how it was couched, constituted a serious provocation.  
Within a month, the Spanish expressed their irritation by capturing a French merchant ship and 
seizing its cargo on the grounds that it contained illegal contraband.  It was now Vergennes who 
began to accuse the Spanish of manipulating the Family Pact to its own advantage.  In a letter to 
d’Ossun, on June 29, he characterized Spain as “puffed up by her former grandeur.”  “Ties of blood,” 
he continued, “are no more…than words devoid of meaning if one side believes that it may take 
advantage of everything and that the other side should suffer everything.”  He detailed the ways in 
which France had faithfully fulfilled its obligations—even going beyond what was required by the 
terms of the alliance—and he elaborated more fully on the theme that Spain regarded itself “as the 
dominating power and… considered France inferior.”  D’Ossun was to contend that Spain was “in 
                                                
88 Vergennes to Ossun, May 14, 1776, Doniol, I, 427, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 53. 
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direct violation of all treaties, and the nations of Europe and Africa were watching the outcome.  The 
dignity of France rested upon the result.”89  He was to seek an audience with Carlos III if necessary.  
Of particular importance was a passage in which Vergennes highlighted in considerable 
detail, the particular obligations of kings.  “One of the primary duties of Kings, for which they are 
accountable, is to do justice.  They owe it to their equals, who can render it unto them, and to their 
subjects, who can implore them; it is the essential base of all the Royal virtues, without which their 
greatness is nothing more than a social connection.”  He went on to argue that Louis XVI had 
adhered to this standard with exactness, in particular in sparing his people from the bloodshed of 
unnecessary war and he urged Spain to consider that its true interests lay in a similar conduct.  The 
advice was accompanied, however, by a suggestion that the King possessed all the resources 
necessary to defend the honor of his Crown, and to fulfill all of his engagements”—even without 
Spain’s help, if necessary.  The reality was, of course, that French foreign policy would be severely 
constricted without Spain.  If the Spanish should refuse to back down, at least, Vergennes wrote in 
conclusion, we can comfort ourselves with the thought that we did everything possible to prevent a 
rupture.90  
In August 1776, soon after news of the American declaration of independence arrived, 
Vergennes proposed an immediate declaration of war against England.91  Before Grimaldi could 
reply, however, news reached Europe of the American defeat at Long Island, and the need for 
                                                
89 Doniol I, 439-444, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 55-6. The issue was resolved soon after by news that 
Portugal had attacked Spanish positions, forcing Spain to send its own troops to the Americas and leading Grimaldi 
to seek France’s help in mediating an on-going dispute between Spain and Algiers so that he could concentrate his 
forces against Portugal. Murphy, Vergennes, also quotes Vergennes as having written that Spain “believes itself to 
have the right to give the law to the universe,” p. 238. 
90 Doniol, I, 441, 443. 
91 The report to the French council was entitled, “Considerations on the part that it behooves France to take 
with respect to the English under the present circumstances,” Doniol, I, 567 and following.  See also Meng, 
Vergennes, 58; and Murphy, Vergennes, 240.  Murphy notes that all of the moral arguments that Vergennes had 
used in resisting Spain’s desire for a preventive war against Portugal disappeared as he advocated precisely the same 
type of war against England.  The difference was that England was already guilty of a similar infraction, having 
launched an ‘odious’ surprise attack against France in 1755. 
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immediate action had receded.  Early the following year, in January, Vergennes tried again, formally 
asking the Spanish court to commit to both an alliance with the United States and war with Great 
Britain.  This time, each member of the Spanish State Council was asked to submit a formal written 
opinion.  Grimaldi summarized the consensus in a response dated February 4.  He began by noting 
that it was a time of general peace in Europe and that the crown that broke the peace without 
provocation would suffer the opprobrium of other powers, and deprive itself of the help that it might 
otherwise have justly received from its allies.  It was appropriate for Spain to use the occasion to 
bolster its own defenses, but it seemed better to let England bear the consequences of being the 
aggressor. 
Grimaldi did acknowledged that the situation presented a unique opportunity for the House of 
Bourbon to “abate the pride” of their common and natural enemy.  The question was whether they 
could assure themselves of the promised gains.  The greatest risk was that the colonists and the 
British might reconcile and then fall with fatal effect on the French and Spanish colonies.  It is true, 
that an alliance with the Americans would mitigate that risk, but it could not remove it entirely.  The 
Americans were giving ground militarily on almost every front.  If their effort failed, Spanish and 
French interests would suffer.  All that aside, Carlos III could also not afford to sanction a colonial 
rebellion.  Grimaldi finally concluded by expressing irritation that the colonists were conducting 
themselves from the outset as if they were already a recognized and independent power, imposing 
onerous obligations on others while making no firm commitments themselves, nor offering any 
proportional compensation for the assistance they were requesting.  The best policy, he concluded, 
was to let England continue to expend its resources for now and revisit the issue at some future 
point.92   Less than two weeks later, Grimaldi would step down, bringing to a close the first phase of 
the negotiations.   
                                                
92 The opinions of the ministers, and Grimaldi’s letter—which is addressed to Aranda, the Spanish 
ambassador in Paris—are all printed in volume II of Yela Utrilla, España Unidos, 49-63. 
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Several aspects of law in diplomacy stand out from the events reviewed thus far.  The first is 
that the details of a given treaty clearly mattered.  Grimaldi’s request for 10,000–12,000 troops was 
slightly more than the 8,000 troop minimum that France was obliged, in the Family Pact, to provide 
on request, yet it was close enough to impose a real obligation—evidenced by Spain’s palpable 
irritation and the minor diplomatic crisis that ensued.  A second and related observation, however, is 
that the language of a given treaty was rarely taken at face value, but was subject to a rigorous 
process of negotiated interpretation.  It seems that states had a variety of grounds on which they 
might resist satisfying an apparently obvious obligation.  As Vergennes admitted, in refusing to send 
troops to San Domingo, political expediency was a major factor.  Yet it would not do to make that 
the primary reason for refusal.  Some pretext had to be found.  In this case, Vergennes aimed for the 
moral high ground, contending that the Bourbon crowns had neither motive, pretext or interest in war 
with Britain at that moment and that they should do nothing that would possible provoke that war.   
The matter then shifted to the Spanish who had to formulate their own response, and ideally 
shift the moral burden back on France.  In this case, the Spanish contended that the French were 
imposing an unjust financial burden on Spain.  When that failed to achieve the desired result, they 
expressed their irritation through the capture of the French merchant ship, creating a crisis that was 
placed before the king.  Only rarely was the authority and judgment of the king invoked, and when it 
happened it was done with the assumption that the king, who stood above the fray as a virtuous 
arbiter, would do right.93  In this case, circumstances intervened to give Spain a motive or a face-
saving excuse for backing down.  If they had not, however, there would have been little that France 
could have done except to seek restitution the next time Spain had a need for French assistance. 
Finally, a third observation is that war also required proper provocation or justification.  
Vergennes had refused to send troops to San Domingo on the grounds that the Bourbons had neither 
                                                
93 There is a sense that the opinion of the king constituted a kind of moral capital, which needed to be 
safeguarded and carefully applied in the most advantageous manner possible. 
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a motive, nor a pretext, nor an interest in war with Britain at that particular moment, and should do 
nothing to start one precipitously.  Interest, of course, played an outsized role in determining policy 
and it was possible to invent a pretext for war—as the Spanish intended to do in 1776, to justify their 
planned invasion of Portugal.  But it was expedient for the pretext to have at least some basis in fact.  
If it did not, then as the Spanish suggested in rejecting Vergennes’s plans in January 1777, the 
aggressor nation would face the opprobrium of other states, which would refuse future aid.   
Diplomacy then was the art of persuading one’s counterparts, both friend and foe, that one’s 
policies had a principled basis—appearances to the contrary not withstanding.  Whether one was 
successful or not in making that case had consequences that were chiefly manifest in the willingness 
of other states to lend aid or cooperation.  A state that broke the rules without proper justification, 
would pay a price in the next round of negotiations.  England’s purported pride and aggression in 
1763, for instance, was now used to justify an unprovoked war.  France’s refusal to send troops to 
San Domingo in 1775 would be used as grounds for Spanish intransigence in the War for American 
Independence.  A cynic might say that it all boiled down to interest, but for many participants, the 
goal seems rather to have been a careful effort to balance principle and interest—albeit with interest 
playing a sizable role.  Law provided the medium through which interests were adjudicated in a 
somewhat principled manner.  An astute and persuasive use of the law could enable a given state to 




Negotiating the Convention of Aranjuez, Phase II: 1777–1779 
On February 15, José Moñino y Redondo, the Conde de Floridablanca, assumed the role of 
Secretary of State, and as already discussed, quickly acquired the preeminent role in determining 
Spanish policy.  In an early exchange of correspondence with France, he affirmed the importance of 
the Family Pact.  It soon became clear however, that there were two points on which he differed 
substantively from Grimaldi.  First, he placed the concept of mediation at the forefront of his 
deliberations.  The question was not whether or when to go to war, but rather how to take advantage 
of the situation to extract advantages for Spain with the least possible risk.  As he put it in a letter to 
Aranda, dated April 7, 1777, “We do not need to undertake war in order to augment our power.”94  
Second, he was determined that Spain should be fully independent of foreign influence and that 
Spanish interests, rather than those of France, should determine whatever course of action that 
Spanish Court ultimately settled upon.95  
Floridablanca moved quickly on the first issue, proposing the idea of Bourbon mediation of 
the Anglo-American conflict, in exchange for some territorial concession, in one of his first meetings 
with the French ambassador.  The French declined to participate, seeing little likelihood of success 
and as the policy ran counter to their own objectives for the war.  Floridablanca then began to deploy 
what would be one of the signature features of his diplomacy, the use of delays designed to give 
Spain time to augment its strength while looking for an opportune moments to accomplish its 
objectives.  In July 1777, when Vergennes pressed him again for a decision, he noted that the 
Spanish treasure fleet was not due to return until May 1778, and asked France to wait at least that 
long before initiating any hostilities.  Vergennes conveyed his displeasure in a lengthy memo dated 
                                                
94 Quoted in Phillips, The West, p. 48 or 69. 
95 As Phillips put it, Floridablanca’s policy “was calculated to make Spain independent and France a 
suppliant,” The West, 48.  Citation to Bancroft, United States, vol. V, p. 137 and Montmorin to Vergennes, 
December 23, 1777.  Samuel F. Bemis also writes that Floridablanca had “resolved that Spain should not follow 
blindly and implicitly in the wake of French policy… [and had] determined that any move made on the part of his 
government during this war was to be primarily for the advantage of Spain,” Hussey-Cumberland, 5-6. 
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July 24, that bore the approuvé of Louis XVI.  Turning Spain’s fear of an Anglo-American 
reconciliation to his advantage he argued that war was “imminent” and that if Great Britain did not 
“conquer the Americans in this campaign, she will come to an accommodation with them in order 
that she may fall upon France and Spain more heavily.”  The only prudent course of action was to 
forestall the British by declaring war on the Americans behalf.   
In response to Spain’s fear that the Americans might still betray the Bourbons, Vergennes 
argued that the solution lay in making their assistance “sufficiently effective to assure a total 
separation and forcer les Americains à la gratitude” [bind them with ties of gratitude].  We should 
prepare, he argued, “for a close alliance offensive, defensive and perpetual, obliging both parties not 
to make peace separately... [A] middle path will merely manifest weakness…. If we wish to serve 
America effectively, and to be served by her, now is the moment to inform her; if on the other hand 
we are going to do nothing, honesty and humanity require us to tell her so.”  Vergennes went on to 
entice Floridablanca with the prospect of conquering the Floridas while warning that Spain would 
receive nothing—and could potentially lose much—if the belligerents came to terms without the 
Spanish having played a decisive part in the war; and should the Americans be defeated, England 
will attain, “so much power that for centuries to come the two crowns will regret having permitted 
it.”96  Floridablanca demurred on the same grounds that Grimaldi had given in February.  The risks 
were too great.  Spain wanted territory not prestige, and the Americans were in no position to offer 
any compensation for the assistance that they stood to receive. 
 The correspondence continued in a similar vein through the fall until finally, on December 3, 
1777, Vergennes sent Floridablanca an ultimatum, declaring that France stood ready to proceed with 
an American alliance, without Spain if necessary.  The very next day, news of the American victory 
                                                
96 Vergennes to d’Ossun, July 24, 1777, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 63-4 and Phillips, The West, 56. 
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at Saratoga reached Paris.97  Two days later, Louis XVI approved a memo, formalizing France’s 
intent to ally with the United States—though nothing was to be settled upon until Spain had had a 
chance to respond.  On December 7, the American commissioners were informed of the new policy; 
and then on December 11, Vergennes sent the aforementioned dispatch to Montmorin in Madrid: 
“Take for your motto, Monsieur le Comte, and make them adopt it where you are: Aut nunc aut 
nunquam [now or never]….98 
Vergennes’s urgency reflected his ever-present conviction 1) that France had to maximize the 
psychological impact of its aid if it were to overcome American suspicions of all things French and 
2) that Britain and the United States were on the verge of reconciliation.  “It is possible,” he 
concluded, “that no matter what diligence we use, the English may anticipate us with the Americans, 
but it is also possible that our assurances and our demonstrations of good will may eventually 
succeed in counterbalancing their insidious offers.”99 
Floridablanca was unmoved.  Recognition of the United States, he replied, was tantamount to 
a declaration of war.  He cited the continued vulnerability of the Spanish treasure fleets.  He 
disagreed that Britain and the colonies were on the verge of reconciliation.  He noted that Spain was 
still disappointed with France’s refusal to supply troops for the defense of San Domingo, and he 
reaffirmed that “under no circumstances would the king treat with rebels.”100   Spain’s objectives in 
the current conflict, he subsequently wrote to Aranda, were to recover “Gibraltar, Minorca… the Bay 
                                                
97 Meng, Vergennes, 64. 
98 Vergennes to Montmorin, December 11, 1777, Doniol II:641-644, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 66.  The 
Comte de Montmorin had replaced d’Ossun in September as French ambassador to Spain.  On December 11, 
Vergennes had written: “It is possible that no matter what diligence we use, the English may anticipate us with the 
Americans, but it is also possible that our assurances and our demonstrations of good will may eventually succeed in 
counterbalancing their insidious offers.”  Previously, on December 5, Vergennes had also expressed concern that if 
Washington captured Howe in Philadelphia, the Americans might win the war too quickly, in which case France 
could expect little gratitude from the Americans, having only weakly contributed to the establishment of their 
independence, Doniol 2:623n, cited in Murphy, “View from Versailles,” 131, and Murphy, Vergennes, 250. 
99 Meng, Vergennes, 65. 
100 Montmorin to Vergennes, December 23, 1777, quoted in Phillips, The West, 74. 
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of Honduras, and the coast of Campeche,” and to drive the English from the Gulf of Mexico.  Every 
effort should be made to achieve these goals without the risk of war—and without encouraging the 
creation of an independent state in the new world that would threaten Spanish territory, and set a bad 
example for Spain’s American colonies.101   
Louis XVI might possibly have withheld his approval in the face of Spain’s intransigence, 
but in early January, news arrived of an imminent outbreak of war between Austria and Prussia.102  
The French had a defensive treaty of alliance with Austria that obligated them to join that conflict—
unless they had a legitimate pretext for refusing.  As Vergennes framed the matter, peace was no 
longer an option.  The king had to choose between war in the east on behalf of Austrian objectives or 
war at sea against England, on behalf of objectives that aligned with the core interests of France.  The 
king yielded to the force of reason and permitted formal negotiations with the Americans to 
proceed.103  At the same time, he sent another letter to Spain, answering Floridablanca’s objections 
and conveying a formal request for Spain to join the alliance.  Floridablanca’s reply, which arrived 
on February 4, said that it was impossible for Spain to make a decision without being better informed 
of the nature of the proposed alliance with the United States.104  As Montmorin reported separately, 
in a dispatch dated January 28, Floridablanca had declared: “You believe that the actual 
                                                
101 Floridablanca to Aranda, January 13, 1778, quoted in Phillips, The West, 75. 
102 The War of Bavarian Succession was fought from July 1778 to May 1779. 
103 See Dull, French Navy, and Meng, Vergennes, for a full discussion of this decision.  It is conceivable 
that Vergennes could have invented another pretext for staying out of the Austrian war if he had a motivation for 
doing so—in which case it is possible to argue that he took advantage of Louis XVI’s youth and inexperience in 
framing the decision as he did. 
104 See Meng, Vergennes, 68; When negotiations began in December, the first question that Gérard had 
posed to the Americans was what terms they would demand from France to shut their ears to the British offers of 
peace on any terms short of independence.  When the actual treaty was negotiated, the French insisted on a perpetual 
treaty of alliance and also insisted that it be eventual in nature, see Lee, Life of Arthur Lee. 
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circumstances are most happy for the two crowns…. I regard them as most fatal for Spain.” He 
censured Aranda for his role in these events and asserted that the king would never consent to war.105 
On February 6, 1778, the French cast the dice and allied themselves with the United States.106   
News of the event was immediately dispatched to Philadelphia, in hopes of forestalling whatever 
proposals of peace the British might make.  The news was also sent to Madrid in hopes that the 
Spanish might now change their mind and submit to the new reality.  From a legal perspective, the 
negotiations now entered a new phase.  At no point since 1775 had Vergennes invoked the Family 
Pact as imposing an obligation on Spain to enter the war.  While he could have tried to activate 
Article V, and asked Spain for the requisite aids, he would have been on shaky ground given 
France’s recent refusal to provide similar assistance.  More importantly, he needed far more than a 
handful of ships and a few thousand soldiers.  He needed Spain’s full engagement in the war.   
Now that war had begun, however, Vergennes could point to several additional clauses that 
clearly imposed an obligation on Spain to enter the conflict.  The most useful was Article I, in which 
the signatories had committed to “henceforth regard as their enemies any Power that becomes that of 
one or the other of the two Crowns.”   If that were not enough, Article IV set for the foundational 
principle that “whoever attacks one Crown attacks the other.”  Finally, Article XVI added that as “the 
intention of the two Kings is, that war begun by or against one of the two Crowns become peculiar to 
and personal to the other,” it is therefore agreed, “that as soon as the two Kings find themselves in 
war declared against the same enemy or enemies, the obligation to give assistance will cease, and… 
will be succeeded by an obligation… to make war jointly, employing all their forces.”  The one 
problem with this argument was that in the spring of 1778, a state of war did not yet exist.  
                                                
105 Montmorin to Vergennes, January 28, 1778, quoted in Phillips, The West, p. 81. The king was also said 
to have declared, “Believe me, the circumstances are most critical, and prudence is essential.  Spain is not the same 
as France.” 
106 Two treaties were signed.  The first was a public treaty of amity and commerce, whereby France 
recognized the United States.  The second was a secret treaty of eventual alliance, which would take effect only in 
the event that the peace between Britain and France was broken. 
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Vergennes sought to hasten matters in March, by informing the British court of the Franco-American 
treaty of amity and commerce, but though the British promptly recalled their ambassador, they did 
not declare war or commence hostilities. 
In April, Vergennes wrote to Floridablanca, urging him, nevertheless, to concede the 
inevitable and join the alliance.   Neutrality was futile, he argued, and Britain in North America 
posed a greater danger to Spanish interests than the United States, which would “remain quiet with 
the inertia that is characteristic of all constitutional democracies.”107  Floridablanca was unmoved.  
He noted that hostilities had not yet begun and he “professed to believe that they might be postponed 
indefinitely.”108  He also rejected out of hand the notion that the Family Pact imposed any obligation 
upon Spain under the present circumstances.  As he later put it to the Spanish State Council, “It is not 
possible to give a greater proof of the spirit of domination that reigns in the French cabinet, that 
without informing Spain, and without its consent and awareness, it wanted to commit it to a war, as a 
despot might do with a nation of slaves.”109   “Everyone knows,” he continued: 
… that the circumstances that must converge to verify a casus foederis.  With respect to a 
defensive war, it is necessary that the party which has been attacked have given no just 
motive to the aggression and reprisal, and that they have carried out, before the rupture… all 
the acts of mediation that humanity and the universal right of the people require.  In the case 
of an offensive war, it is all the more necessary and obligatory to concert with oneself before 
hand and examine whether justice, prudence, and respective power permit undertaking 
war.110 
 
In the present case, none of these conditions had been met and Spain was justified in refusing its aid. 
Vergennes nevertheless still held the stronger cards for as both parties knew, Spain could not 
and would not allow the French to be utterly defeated.  It was almost inevitable that Spain would 
                                                
107 Vergennes to Montmorin, April 3, 1778, quoted in Phillips, The West, 82. 
108 His letter is summarized in Meng, Vergennes, 70. 
109 The fact that France had done this over Floridablanca’s explicit objections, and had then informed 
Britain of its actions in hopes of provoking war, only cemented Spain’s case. 
110 The quote is taken from Article CCCXX of “Instrucción Reservada,” in Ferrer del Rio, Obras, 261. 
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have to enter the war at some point.  The question was when and on what terms.111  In April, 
Floridablanca had established the fact that hostilities had not yet begun, and that Spain was under no 
immediate obligation.  Around that time, the treasure fleet arrived from the Americas, removing one 
practical excuse for delaying.112  In early May he formally set forth a new policy, which would be to 
offer to mediate the conflict in exchange for some territorial concession from Britain.  Vergennes 
professed to be entirely amenable to this proposal, but he inserted one condition, which he was quite 
certain would doom the Spanish effort: Louis XVI, he said, was determined to uphold his 
commitment to the United States, which must be granted their independence.113  It was just a matter 
of time, he believed, before Spain was forced to admit the futility of their project.  Indeed, when 
Spain subsequently approached England with a formal proposal, the British insisted that France 
disavow recognition of the United States as a first step.  Floridablanca purported to be offended and 
broke off negotiations leading Montmorin to believe that Spain would come around soon. 
On June 17, 1778, the British attacked the French frigate La Belle Poule, which clearly broke 
the peace and fulfilled the requirement of Article IV of the Family Pact.  Floridablanca now pointed, 
however, to the clause in Article XVI that obliged the two Kings, finding themselves in “war 
declared against the same enemy” to concert their forces.  The present war, he noted, had not been 
declared by either England or France.  Furthermore, the clause only obligated the two “high 
contracting parties” to form “particular conventions, relative to the circumstances” of that war, 
                                                
111 The audacity of Vergennes’s strategy becomes clearer when we understand that he was aware, in 
February 1778, that France did not have the capacity to fight a protracted war against England on its own.  French 
finances, for one thing, were in a perilous state.  More importantly, the maximum size of the French navy was 
constricted by the relatively small number of trained sailors and officers in the French navy.  The navy would enjoy 
parity with England until the following year, at which point England would enjoy a steadily increasing advantage 
that could only be counterbalanced by Spain’s entrance into the war.  (According to Hardman and Price, Louis XVI, 
fn. 4 on p. 271, France would have 66 ships of the line in the spring of 1779, while England would have 90).  
Vergennes likely justified his policy on the grounds that there was a chance that England might capitulate quickly—
seeing that they could no longer win the war without great expense.  It is more likely, however, that Vergennes knew 
that the Spanish would eventually join the war, rather than permit the defeat of their principal ally in Europe.  See 
Dull, French Navy, for a detailed exposition on the French navy in this period. 
112 See Phillips, The West, 94. 
113 Vergennes to Montmorin, May 1, 1778, Doniol III, 63, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 70-71.  
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whereby they will concert their “efforts and their respective and reciprocal advantages, as well as 
their plans and operations, both military and political.”  The terms of such conventions had yet to be 
determined.  
Floridablanca was fully aware that the chances of mediating peace between the belligerents, 
on the basis of American independence, was low, but he had another reason for delaying.  He was 
also aware that France was not capable of persisting alone in a war against England for any length of 
time and he hoped that by the fall of 1778, France’s failure in the war, and the possibility of total 
defeat, would compel Vergennes to soften his commitment to the Americans and/or pay a very high 
price for Spanish assistance.114 Despite Britain’s initial rejection, therefore, he continued to maintain 
an active correspondence with the British, suggesting that Spain might be willing to remain neutral in 
exchange for territory.  By the fall, as the campaign season came to a close, Floridablanca was ready 
to concede that war was inevitable—though he still deferred action, committing himself only to 
preparing for war in the spring, and suggesting in the meantime that it was necessary to listen to the 
British “no matter how ridiculous” their propositions might be—but France was now in exactly the 
predicament that Floridablanca had expected.  The French battle squadron under D’Estaing, which 
had been sent to North America in April, had achieved almost nothing and French finances were 
under severe strain.115  
It was at this point that Floridablanca proposed a new method of resolving the core issue of 
American independence.  Perhaps, he suggested, a long-term truce might be declared on the basis of 
uti possidetis—a legal principle whereby the opposing parties in war retained whatever territory they 
happened to possess at the moment the truce began.  (In this case, Britain would have retained 
                                                
114 See Patterson, Other Armada, 42.  Patterson writes that all of Floridablanca’s “maneuvers were directed 
to thrusting upon France the three alternatives of either accepting Spanish mediation leading to a peace which might 
stultify French policy in America and from which Spain as mediator might draw more advantage than France herself 
did, or continuing the war without effective Spanish aid, or agreeing to co-operate in a full-scale invasion of Britain.  
In this, Florida Blanca’s aim was to drive France, since she would find the first two courses unacceptable, to accept 
the last.” 
115 Doniol, III, 574, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 72. 
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possession of New York, Newport, and Savannah.) Vergennes was not ready to accept uti 
possidetis—“We can not think,” he wrote to Montmorin, “of letting any of the states, either New 
York or Rhode Island, remain in dependence on Great Britain without contradicting our first 
principles.”116—yet as pressure for an end to war began to mount, he eventually, “profess[ed] himself 
willing to enter into such peace negotiations as Spain might be able to arrange with Britain on the 
basis of a long truce——perhaps one modeled on the truce of 1607 which had been an important step 
leading to the eventual independence of the Dutch Republic from Spain—during which time the 
United States, under the guardianship of the two Bourbon Powers, might be allowed to come into 
gradual enjoyment of full independence.”117   
Separately, Floridablanca also insisted that, once Spain entered the war, the two powers 
should concentrate their efforts on an invasion of England—which he deemed the surest way of 
compelling the British to surrender Gibraltar.118  He also asked France to specify the territorial gains 
that Spain would receive at the end of the war, and asked how this promise would be guaranteed.  On 
December 5, Vergennes presented Spain’s proposal to Louis XVI.  He characterized the “views and 
pretensions of Spain” as “enormous” but added that “your majesty cannot fight long with equality 
                                                
116 Vergennes to Montmorin, quoted in Phillips, The West, 100. 
117 Meng, Vergennes, 73.  It was at this point that Vergennes wrote to Gérard, asking him to discover the 
Americans’ peace terms.  If the colonists should win their independence outright, Floridablanca expressed “hope 
that they be placed in dependence on the Bourbon crown and kept in a state of anarchy such as existed in Germany.” 
See Phillips, The West, 93.  Montmorin wrote to Vergennes on November 12, 1778, “It is only too apparent that 
Spain regards the United States as likely to become her enemies soon, and consequently, far from allowing them to 
draw near her possessions, she will leave nothing undone to prevent them, and particularly on the banks of the 
Mississippi,” quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 73  Montmorin added that Floridablanca “wishes to make the Spanish 
colonies forever impossible of access to the United States, which he mistrusts as much as he does the English,” 
Doniol, III, 585, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 74.  Floridblanca also declared that “his master would never enter into 
an alliance with the Americans, nor even recognize them, for they were likely soon to become an enemy,” but had 
rather resolved to drive them from the Mississippi Valley.  Quoted in Phillips, The West, 103-4. 
118 According to Patterson, Other Armada, 42, Floridablanca first proposed an invasion of England in 
August 1778.  In December, Floridablanca then asked Vergennes to propose a concrete plan of invasion.  His goal, 
Montmorin wrote, “is to find out if you share the views of the Spanish Ministry.  If they think that you are lukewarm 
in adopting them, they will undoubtedly confine themselves strictly to furnish the minimum aid stipulated by the 
Family Compact.” The minimum support required was 12 ships of the line, 6 frigates, 10,000 infantry and 2,000 
cavalry. Montmorin added that even these ships, if provided, would certainly be “badly manned and commanded by 
her most ignorant and unpleasant officers.” 
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alone against the English and that a prolonged war that would not be exempt from disadvantages 
could lead to the destruction of your navy and even your finances.”  It was preferable, he suggested, 
to bring Spain’s resources to bear against the English quickly, rather than to delay and suffer further 
losses.  As for Spain’s demand for territory, and the possibility that Spain might quit the war as soon 
as those objectives had been achieved, Vergennes noted that “if Spain resolves to execute the family 
compact, it is mandatory that neither of the two powers may make peace except in concert and with 
the consent of the other,”119 meaning that France would have leverage to insist on Spain’s remaining 
in the war until French objectives had also been achieved. 
The king permitted negotiations to continue on that basis, and Vergennes asked Floridablanca 
to set out in writing the specific territories, or other benefits, that Spain desired in exchange for an 
alliance.  Floridablanca demurred, insisting that the French take the first step and propose the best 
terms that they could offer.  According to Montmorin, Floridablanca wanted to ensure that 
Vergennes was firmly committed to the Spanish objectives. “If [Floridablanca] discovers that we are 
proceeding half-heartedly, he will forgo the war, and will furnish in only the strictest interpretation 
the assistance stipulated in the Pacte de Famille, and this not without seeking pretexts to defer its 
payment.”120  On February 12, 1779, Vergennes sent Floridablanca a draft proposal, which included a 
clause committing the two nations to “insure and to recognize the independence of the United States” 
and which guaranteed to Spain: the Mississippi River along with the port of Mobile and Pensacola; 
the expulsion of the English from the Bay of Honduras; the revocation of the English privilege to cut 
wood on the Bay of Campeche; and the return of Gibraltar.121 
Floridablanca wrote back, objecting to the requirement that he recognize the independence of 
the United States, and expressing concern that France’s obligations were weakly worded.  “Spain 
                                                
119 See Vergennes to Louis XVI, December 5, 1778, in Hardman and Price, Louis XVI, 269-271. 
120 Quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 74. 
121 Seen Meng, Vergennes, 78. 
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could never recognize the independence of the American republic,” he asserted, “until England had 
done so,” for fear of setting a bad example.  The king would go no further than to offer secret aid and 
an invasion of England was essential.  “We do not wish,” he told Montmorin, “to commit Spain to 
entering the war merely in order to fright England into a peace from which nothing but the 
independence of the Americans would be obtained….  We are perfectly ready… but you must… 
convince us that that you do not want us to declare war simply in order to terrify the English into 
making peace by a naval promenade in the Channel.”122  At this point Vergennes became embittered, 
characterizing Floridablanca a “minister who most often puts caprice in place of wisdom” and adding 
that, “Nothing is gratuitous on the part of Spain.” He offered to join a guarantee of territory for Spain 
to the guarantee of American independence, and agreed on March 8 to provide an invasion plan, that 
“which will be sufficiently to the taste of M. de Florida Blanca,” but he “vigorously rejected any 
agreement that would nullify the Franco-American treaty.”123 
Throughout these months, Floridablanca had been trying, without success, to persuade the 
British to permit mediation to proceed on the basis of a long-term truce.  On March 27, the British 
rejected the proposal, stating that “under no circumstances” would the king “recognize the 
independence of the United States” to any degree.124  Floridablanca issued a final ultimatum on April 
3, giving the British a few days to reconsider or face war.  He then presented Montmorin with a 
revised treaty of alliance, pressing him to sign immediately without further advice from Paris.  The 
revisions voided Spain’s obligation to recognize the United States; added Minorca and the entire 
coast of Florida to the list of desired territories; and made peace specifically conditional on Spain’s 
                                                
122 Montmorin to Vergennes in late February 1779, quoted in Patterson, Other Armada, 45. 
123 The passage pertaining to American independence is quoted in Phillips, The West, 105.  The passage on 
the plans of invasion is quoted in Patterson, Other Armada, 46. According to Patterson, the goal would be to 
combine 30 French ships of the line with 20 Spanish ships on May 15.  The British were expected to have only 35-
45 ships of the line.  Once control of the channel was established the invasion could begin, 47-48. 
124 Meng, Vergennes, 79. 
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having secured the return of Gibraltar.125  Montmorin revised the clause concerning American 
independence to read: 
The Most Christian King, in exact execution of the engagements which he has contracted 
with the United States of North America, has proposed and asked that His Catholic Majesty, 
from the day when he declares war upon England, recognize the sovereign independence of 
the said States, and that it offer not to lay down arms until that independence is recognized by 
the King of Great Britain, as this point will have to be the essential basis of all peace 
negotiations that may be brought about in the future.  The Catholic King has desired and 
desires to please his nephew, the Most Christian King, and to procure for the United States all 
the advantages to which they aspire and which they may be able to obtain.  But as His 
Catholic Majesty has not yet concluded with them any treaty by which their reciprocal 
interests have been regulated, he reserves to himself the doing so and the agreement at that 
time upon all that shall relate to the said independence; and from now on the Catholic King 
promises not to arrange, conclude or even advance through his mediation, any treaty or 
arrangement with the said States, or relating to them, without informing the Most Christian 
King and without planning in concert with him everything that shall have connection with the 
mentioned article on independence.126 
 
He also gave France the right to add an objective of its choosing as an ultimatum of war, in 
exchange for the guarantee to Spain of Gibraltar.  On that basis, he signed the convention at Aranjuez 
on April 12, 1779.127 
Several clauses from the Convention of Aranjuez bear additional mention: Article I made the 
convention conditional on Britain’s formally rejecting Spain’s ultimatum of April 3.  Article II made 
“an invasion of the European dominions belonging to Great Britain” a “necessary part” of the two 
powers’ joint military operations.128  In Article III, the signatories renewed Article XVII of the 
                                                
125 In Article IX the two kings agreed “not to lay down arms or make any treaty of peace, truce or 
suspension of hostilities without having at least obtained and having respectively ensured the restitution of Gibraltar 
and the abrogation of the treaties relating to the fortifications at Dunkirk, or in the absence of this article, any other 
object in the wish of His Very Christian Majesty.” 
126 An English translation of the treaty is found in Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their 
Diplomacy, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927, vol 1, pp. 294-299.  A partial version of the original French text is 
found in Frances Gardiner Davenport and Charles Oscar Paullin (eds.) European Treaties Bearing on the History of 
the United States and Its Dependencies, DC: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1917-1937, vol. 4, pp. 168-169. 
127 Meng, Vergennes, 80-1. 
128 This clause was a threat to Vergennes’s plan to secure for Louis XVI, the respect of all the nations of 
Europe for it left the French vulnerable to the accusation that they aimed at England’s destruction and stood to 
acquire an excess of power. 
 
 110 
Family Pact and promised “not to listen to any direct or indirect proposal on the part of the common 
enemy without communicating it each to the other,” or to sign “a treaty, convention, or any act of 
whatsoever nature without the knowledge and previous consent of the other.”  Article V specified 
additional French objectives for the war, which included: the restoration of French sovereignty over 
Dunkirk and the “expulsion of the English from the Island and the fishery of Newfoundland.”129  
Finally, Article XI specified that any other disputes arising between the two powers would be 
“settled and decided according to the text and spirit of the treaties subsisting between the two 
Monarchies, and especially the Family Compact which the two high contracting Parties promise 
anew to observe religiously.”130 
The British did not formally reject the Spanish ultimatum until May 8, and when they did so, 
they demanded an explanation for Spain’s belligerence.  Floridablanca offered a vague response, 
alluding to the insults of the Spanish flag, refusal to settle amicably, rejection of offers of mediation, 
but made no reference to the Family Pact.  Vergennes objected forcefully to this omission, writing to 
Montmorin on June 7: 
We have plenty of bad logicians here who might make poor use of it to argue that Spain, not 
believing herself bound to the obligations of the Pacte, and having based her war upon her 
own selfish and private motives, we are in a position to apply reciprocity.  These ridiculous 
arguments are destroyed by our secret agreement, but since that is not destined to be made 
                                                
129 This was significant, for the French knew that the Americans desired a share in the fisheries and Gérard 
had promised that the King would regard American interests as his own (see fn. 47, p. 21), and Luzerne would 
reiterate that promise in May 1781 (see fn. 140 on p. 180).  In reality, Vergennes thought that the Americans had 
ample fishing grounds off their own coast and he did not plan to share the fishery with any power other than Spain.  
The French objectives also included liberty of commerce in the East Indies, undisputed title to the island of 
Dominica, the restoration of Senegal, and the revocation or complete execution of the commercial treaty signed 
between France and England at Utrecht in 1713. 
130 With respect to “the text and spirit” of the Family Compact, one major point of dispute between the two 
crowns was the degree to which the treaty had the effect of unifying the policies of the two crowns.  Vergennes 
argued that it did, and that it was in the mutual interest of the two crowns to cooperate fully in weakening England.  
Floridablanca argued that it was nothing more than a standard treaty of alliance—like that between any other states 
in Europe—and that the distinct interests of the Bourbon powers ought to be recognized and given full expression.  
See his commentary in the “Instruccion Reservada, where he wrote: “The family pact, disregarding the name, which 
only looks to denote the parentage and memory of the august house of Bourbon that formed it, is nothing more than 
a defensive and offensive treaty of alliance like so many others that have been made and still exist between various 
powers in Europe,” Article CCCXX, p. 261. 
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public, false opinion will gain weight, and when weariness overtakes us, they will attack us 
because we will not submit to this flow of inconsistencies.131 
 
The two crowns subsequently published a joint declaration, to the effect that: “The true intentions of 
the Court of London being discovered, the Catholic King could no longer excuse himself from 
fulfilling to their full extent the treaties concluded with France.”132  Spain formally declared war 
against England on June 22, 1779. 
 
Conclusion 
 The process by which Spain was brought into the war as an ally of France illuminates several 
additional aspects to the role of law in diplomacy in this era.  First, treaties were a foundational 
component of the legal system and to a significant degree diplomacy was the art of resolving disputes 
over textual interpretation.  In the absence of a neutral arbiter, it was necessary for all of the various 
signatories of a treaty to agree on the meaning and applicability of a given article before it came into 
force.133  In adjudicating such disputes, diplomats relied on close reading of the text, the authority of 
historic precedent, and a socialized understanding of how particular language could be read or 
interpreted.  Precision mattered, in this context; if a treaty contained multiple clauses touching on the 
same theme, for example, a given word or phrase in one of those clauses could be seized upon to 
obviate a clear commitment contained in another.134 
                                                
131 Doniol III:793, cited in Meng, Vergennes, 82. 
132 Meng, Vergennes, 83; Spain had already agreed to similar language in the prologue to the Convention of 
Aranjuez, but that document was to remain secret. 
133 For example, in the lead up to the Convention of Aranjuez, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, on 
December 24, 1778: “It is a question of showing and convincing our ally that the war did not proceed from our act, 
and that we are in a state of legitimate defense.  If you can succeed in making them admit these two points of fact, 
we shall acquire the most solid advantage.  Spain will no longer be able, without failing in her duty to herself, to her 
interests, to her safety and to her engagements to refuse to fulfill the conditions of the Pacte de Famille.” Doniol, 
III:597, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 76. 
134 For example, Floridablanca would first focus on the phrase: “whoever attacks one crown attacks the 
other” as grounds for arguing, in the spring of 1778, that no attack had occurred and therefore a state of war did not 
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Once the clear meaning of a text had been established, the focus turned to enforcement.  Here 
there were various methods or excuses available to a party that wished not to comply with a given 
obligation.  One could point, for example, to past infidelities of the other party as a reason to do 
likewise.135  One could refuse on the basis of higher order principles;136 or point to a conflict between 
the provision and the universal rights accorded to all nations.137  None of these excuses guaranteed 
success.  They all carried a price as counterparts evaluated the relative strength or credibility of the 
argument, and adjusted their position accordingly. 
In the absence of a valid reason to refuse, one could also resist or delay implementation on 
any number of grounds. Floridablanca, for instance, used the pending arrival of the Spanish treasure 
fleet to delay war until April 1779.  He also deployed the “dignity of king” as a reason for refusing 
France’s offer of a military escort: It was “below the dignity of the king to accept [such an offer].”  
He later used the pending offer of mediation to delay, with the implicit argument that peace was 
preferable to war.138  An advantage to delaying compliance was that the action served to test the other 
party’s resolve.  Not all treaty provisions were of equal import and states had a finite amount of 
political capital available to them.  Delays had the effect of forcing the other party to reveal the 
                                                                                                                                                       
exist.  After the attack on the Belle Poule he shifted ground to Article XVI and the obligation to concert action in a 
“declared war,” noting that neither party had declared war on the other. 
135 See for example Floridablanca’s reference to France having refused troops for San Domingo in 1775. 
136 See Vergennes’s reasons for refusing to send troops to San Domingo in 1775. 
137 See Carlos III’s excuse for refusing to comply with the French demand for reciprocal equality of flags 
and customs duties, on the grounds that it was in violation of the rights of all nations. See “Instrucction Reservada” 
Article CCCXII on p. 259. 
138 An argument that Floridablanca made explicit in the “Instruccion Reservada” when he wrote that with 
respect to a defensive war “it is necessary that the party which has been attacked have given no just motive to the 
aggression and reprisal, and that they have carried out before the rupture… all the acts of mediation that humanity 
and the universal right of the people require,” Article CCCXX on p. 261. 
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degree to which it was willing to expend capital on that particular issue—information that could be 
used to advantage in other facets of the negotiation.139   
If unable to muster a plausible reason for delay, a state could insert a condition of fulfillment 
that, for all practical purposes, voided the obligation.140  Finally, one could also refuse to comply on 
the grounds of political expediency; but these were the least attractive options.  They deferred, but 
did not entirely remove the obligation—leaving open the possibility that restitution would be 
demanded in the future.141  They also came at a cost, both in that the king’s reputation for probity 
would suffer, and also in that the other party could use such infractions, in the future, to justify an act 
of retaliation.  One way to look at the negotiations is that each side was accorded a certain degree of 
leeway in modifying the terms of an agreement.  The public reputation of the king, past infractions of 
one’s counterparts, and relative strength, all constituted a kind of credit that could be deployed to 
advantage.  But the credit was limited and had to be deployed with strategic effect.  
The negotiations through which treaty disputes were adjudicated twisted language beyond 
recognition, yet there was an internal logic to the deliberations.  Statesmen learned through 
experience to assay the relative strength of their own arguments, as well as the arguments of their 
peers.  They knew how much weight they could be placed on a given argument.  They knew the 
acceptable meaning of key phrases or expressions.142  They knew when their own conduct crossed a 
                                                
139 Floridablanca noted, for instance in “Instruccion Reservada” that a number of commercial treaty 
provisions, disadvantageous to Spain, had fallen into disuse over the years, which offered evidence, he suggested, 
that they were unimportant to Britain or France and thus did not need to be enforced. 
140 In resisting France’s demand for reciprocal equality of flags and customs duties, for instance, 
Floridablanca had argued that if forced to back down and concede the point, Spain would have to compensate its 
own merchants, in a separate transaction, to nullify the advantages that French merchants would otherwise obtain by 
the concession.  See “Instruccion Reservada,” Article CCCXIII on p. 260. 
141 Louis XVI, for instance, refused to fulfill his obligations to Austria in January 1778, on the grounds that 
he was now otherwise occupied in a war with England.  It was not until December of that year, however, when the 
Austrian crisis ended, that the French felt entirely free from the possibility that they might be forced to participate in 
that war against their will. See Hardman and Price, Louis XVI, 272. 
142 Emotive language, for example, pertaining to the friendship between sovereigns was almost worthless as 
form of obligation. 
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line, leaving them vulnerable to accusation, and they were even quicker to perceive violations on the 
part of their peers.143  Finally, in all of this there was a clear distinction between the standards to 
which sovereigns were held—as the embodiment of the national character—and the standards 
applied to ministers, who could be dismissed at will.144  In sum, diplomacy involved insinuation, 
manipulation, and outright duplicity; yet it was a rule-bound process that stabilized the international 
system and created a degree of predictability and a partial basis for trust.  To operate effectively in 
this environment required judgment, discretion, nerve, and knowledge that most Americans lacked.   
In conclusion, it is worth commenting briefly on the apparent contradiction in that the 
sovereigns and statesmen who employed the stratagems outlined above considered themselves to 
be—and often were in their personal lives—moral, upright, and pious individuals, which begs the 
question of how they reconciled their conduct with objective standards of morality.  One answer is 
that their lofty moral ambitions seemed to justify at least some degree of misconduct.  The French 
and Spanish both saw themselves engaged in a contest, at the heart of which lay aspirations for 
justice and international order.  Carlos III was attempting to undo decades of royal mismanagement, 
to restore the sovereignty of his empire, and to deliver himself from the encroachments of Britain and 
its army of merchants.  Vergennes was committed to restoring Louis XVI as the arbiter of the 
European peace, not merely as a matter of pride, but as an act of public service—as a means of 
ensuring justice for small nations and preventing unnecessary war.  He saw France’s size and central 
location as evidence that Louis XVI was naturally destined to play that role. 
The problem, of course, was that other states did not share their lofty ideals, making it 
necessary—or so they thought—to employ legal devices in order to advance their noble ideals.  It 
                                                
143 See Vergennes’s complaint that “nothing was gratuitous” on the part of Spain and Floridablanca’s 
reciprocal contention that the French were treaty Spain like “a despot would [treat] a nation of slaves.” 
144 On January 12, 1779, for example, Montmorin reported that Carlos III had agreed  “to never impair the 
engagements entered into with the United States of America; he will be the first to urge us to fulfill them with the 
greatest exactitude.” Doniol, III:641, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 77.  The language was clearly exaggerated, and 
yet it represented an actual promise that Carlos III would not go so far in his opposition to French policy as to 
undermine Louis XVI’s commitments—even if he would do little to support them either. 
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was likely in this sense that Vergennes had written to one of his subordinates in 1779 that, “[the laws 
of] politics are not quite as strict as [they are] for [individual] morality.”145  Statements of this kind 
are often seen as a justification for any degree of duplicity.  But Vergennes did not say that there was 
no law—he only said that the law of politics was “not quite as strict.”  There were still limits, and the 
art or ideal of statecraft lay in striking a proper balance, of knowing where the moral boundaries lay, 
and of acting in a manner that was not only strategic and advantageous, but also in accord with the 
moral law of nations, whatever that law was.   
In this context, the Americans’ inexperience with diplomacy, and their inability to render 
appropriate legal judgments, was not only a threat to American interests, it also posed a potential 
liability to the French. Vergennes had tied his political fate to an alliance with a novice political 
entity, whose erratic conduct, and inability to understand the principles of politics could complicate 
or even undermine French aspirations.  As the events of 1778 made clear, victory was far from 
guaranteed and there was little room for error.  Vergennes had officially pledged to support the 
independence (and de jure equality) of the United States.  The reality, as Vergennes wrote to Gérard, 
was that success hinged on the use of “dexterity” to affirm Americans’ sense of dignity while subtly 
leading them into conformity with French policy.  “Our way of thinking,” he later added, “must be an 
impenetrable secret from the Americans.”146  I will return to this theme in my fourth chapter on the 
Treaty of Paris.  For now, I will follow John Jay to Europe and examine the way in which a novice 
American emissary conducted himself in this environment.  
  
                                                
145 Murphy, Vergennes, 126 citing a letter from Vergennes to Monteil on Sept. 14, 1779.  Perkins, 
Republican Empire, 45-46 also quotes Beaumarchais as having said to Louis XVI, in 1775: ‘Sire, the policy of 
governments is not the moral law of their citizens.’” 
146 Vergennes to La Luzerne, October 14, 1782, quoted by the Jay Paper editors in the “Introduction” to, 




































The crash of falling masts woke John Jay, the newly appointed American minister to Spain, 
from a sound sleep.  The date was November 7, 1779 and the American frigate Confederacy, then 
twelve days out to sea, was headed northwest off the coast of Newfoundland, en route to Europe.  
The winds, as Jay would later write to Congress, had been brisk and the sea rough—though the 
weather by no means hard—when at approximately 5:30 A.M., the ship’s three masts suddenly gave 
way and collapsed.  Incredibly, no one was harmed, and the crew needed just one day to jury rig the 
sails such that they were able make headway as evening came on.  The next morning, however, 
brought even greater misfortune: “[T]he shank of the Rudder,” Jay recorded, “was found to be 
wrenched and split.”  It now took the crew two weeks to solve this new problem—they used a web of 
rope to control the crippled mechanism—and even then the strain was so great that portions of the 
rope needed to be replaced every second day.1   The question thus presented itself: Could the ship 
still reach Europe, or should they rather point south to a French port in the West Indies for repairs? 
 On November 23, the captain held a council of the ship’s officers and received their 
unanimous advice to head for the West Indies.2  Normally the captain’s judgment would have settled 
the matter, but in this instance Congress had placed sovereignty in the hands of Jay and his fellow 
passenger, Conrad Gérard, the retiring French minister to the United States.3  The captain informed 
the two emissaries of his officers’ opinion and asked for their decision. There on the decks of the 
damaged frigate, with no higher power to mediate between them, the diplomats disagreed: Jay was 
for the West Indies, while Gérard wanted to press on toward Europe.4  Jay was just 35 years old at 
                                                
1 See, “Jay to the President of Congress,” Dec. 24, 1779, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, I: 733-743. 
2 See Nuxoll, SPJJ, I: 722-724 for “Minutes of the Council of the Commissioned Officers,” November 23, 
1779. 
3 See Wharton, RDC, III:316-318 for the text of Gérard’s parting speech, and Congress’s response. 
4 See again Jay to the President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1779, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:736-738. 
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the time, and on his first overseas assignment.  The dispute thus served as early test of his diplomacy.  
Its resolution also reveals attributes that Jay would bring to his pending negotiations in Spain.   
The genesis of the dispute lay in a set of navigation charts that Gérard had among his 
possessions.  Both men had pressing reasons for reaching Europe quickly, but Gérard felt the need 
more keenly.  He was in poor health; had been separated from his family for a year-and-a-half; and 
carried important information for the French court.  So while the crew was fixing the rudder, he had 
pored over his charts, looking for a way to avoid a lengthy detour.  His main concern was that the 
Confederacy would get becalmed in the quiet winter waters of the Caribbean, and that once they 
arrived, he and Jay would fail to find ready passage to France.  He was thus delighted to see that if 
the ship bore southeast toward the Spanish port of Cádiz, it would pass by the “Western Isles” or 
Azores.  The proximity of those islands seemed to eliminate the dangers of a European passage.  If 
the Confederacy weakened en route, it could simply stop at the Azores, from whence Gérard and Jay 
could easily reach France—thus saving eight weeks or more of travel time.   
The dispute, when it came to a head, left Jay in a delicate position.  As he later recorded, 
since Gérard, “could not with any Patience admit the Idea of being absent from Europe at so 
important a Season, should I be the means of his losing his objects, or should any public 
Inconveniences result from our not being in Europe during the Winter I should be censured.”  The 
consequences of such censure would go beyond personal loss of reputation; it had the potential to 
create acrimony with the French—whose assistance Jay would need in Spain—and to undermine 
Congress’s confidence in its new minister.5  The easiest way to resolve the issue, Jay reflected, would 
have been “to order the captain to land us on one of the Western Islands, and then leave the Ship to 
shift for herself.”  “I thought it my duty however,” he continued, “to form my decision carefully and 
                                                
5 Jay to the President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1779, Nuxoll, SPJJ, I: 738.  Jay added that he would be 
censured “not only by [Gérard], but by all those who judge of the propriety of a measure only by its consequences, 
of which number are the far greater part of Mankind.” 
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honestly, and abide by it firmly.”  He then went on to record at length, and in systematic form, the 
basis on which he reached his contrary conclusion.   
Jay first considered that the officers of the Ship “were to be presumed to be better Judges 
than Mr. Gerard or myself.”  This alone might have determined the matter, but Jay thought it also 
worth noting that the officers had “constantly, and uniformly,” expressed “regret [at] the necessity” 
of traveling to the West Indies—which suggested that they were not motivated by self interest.  
Furthermore, the officers’ decision fit with visible facts:  “[T]he quantity of Cordage consumed” in 
controlling the rudder was such that they would soon need to strip the Guns “which would thereby be 
rendered useless.”  The bolts that secured the rudder were become looser each day, and the sails were 
bad and “we had none to replace them, nor a sufficient stock of Twine to mend them.”  Finally, the 
jury masts were “not calculated for hard weather.” 
Jay then went on to consider the conditions that they would likely find in the Azores.  He 
noted that none of the islands had a protected harbor where the Confederacy could ride safely at 
anchor.  Nor would they likely find a ready supply of parts and material needed to repair the ship.  It 
was true that Jay and Gérard could easily find passage to Europe; but the captain would be compelled 
to either abandon the ship as a loss, or put his crew at risk by pressing on to Europe.  In neither case 
did Jay think the risks commensurate with saving eight weeks of travel time.  Finally, when Jay 
considered that the ship’s “stock of Provisions” would be inadequate for the journey to the Azores—
given the slower speed at which they were now proceeding with jury masts—the captain’s decision 
seemed incontrovertible, and he “positively refused to join in [Gérard’s] System.”6  
 Gérard did not dispute the result, but he “ceased to observe that cordiality and frankness, 
which had before attended his conduct toward [Jay].”  Jay responded by carefully controlling his 
emotions and avoiding any further offense.  When Gérard suggested that Jay had some private reason 
for wanting to go to Martinique, Jay “appeared not to understand him and continued to endeavor to 
                                                
6 Jay to the President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1779, Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:739-740. 
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render the conversation as light and general as possible.”  The exchange, Jay wrote, “was a Tax 
imposed on my Feelings by regard to public good; As a private Man I should have acted 
differently.”7  He also looked for opportunities to alleviate Gérard’s disappointment. On December 7, 
the day that they were to have attended a birthday party in Paris, for Gérard’s wife, Jay arranged a 
party in her honor, complete with music, “a fine breakfast,” and a cannon salute.  The results were 
partial.  “We… still observe great politeness towards each other,” Jay recorded, “but it proceeds 
more from the Head than the Heart.”8 
The final attribute that Jay displayed, which gave rise to the report by which we know of 
these events today, was his decision to send a record of his conduct to Congress.  Soon after their 
arrival in Martinique, Gérard began to tell French officers on the island that the rudder had been 
strong enough to endure the journey to Europe and that their detour to the West Indies had been 
unnecessary.9  “As we are safe in the Harbour,” Jay wrote, “these matters are now of no 
consequence, and therefore I constantly avoid the Subject.  How they may be represented at 
Philadelphia is of some moment, and therefore it appears to me expedient to trouble myself and 
Congress with this narration”—the “narration” being the report from which I have been quoting, 
which includes a copy of the officers’ written report, and also an evenhanded account Gérard’s 
reasons for preferring a direct passage to Europe.10 
The attributes that Jay displayed on board the Confederacy—the careful deliberation, the 
control of emotion, the distinction between public and private conduct, and the thoroughness with 
                                                
7 Jay to the President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1779, Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:741. 
8 Jay to the President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1779, Nuxoll, SPJJ, I: 741-743.  The birthday party is recorded 
by Jay’s wife in a letter to her mother. See Sarah Jay to Susannah Livingston, 12th [-26th] Decbr 1779, in Nuxoll, 
SPJJ, I:727. 
9 The reality was that shortly before their arrival in Martinique, the captain had tested the rudder by 
subjecting it to the kind of pressure that it would likely have endured in the east Atlantic.  Within just four hours it 
sustained so much damage that it would soon have been utterly ruined.  Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:741. 
10 Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:743. 
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which he reported his actions to Congress—would become hallmarks of his diplomacy.  To date, 
historians have located those attributes in Jay’s personality.11  I argue that they rather reflected a 
maturely conceived political philosophy, which in turn supported or informed the code of conduct 
that Jay adopted during his years abroad.  That code of conduct would turn out to be remarkably well 
suited to the challenges that Jay faced in Europe.  In the pages that follow, I will first describe those 
challenges.  I will then go on to extract from the record of Jay’s negotiations a more complete picture 
of the principles on which he based his conduct—principles that enabled him to become, I argue, the 
most effective American diplomat of the Revolutionary generation.  
 Jay’s mission to Spain has garnered little scholarly attention—in part perhaps because Jay did 
not achieve any of the goals that Congress assigned to him.12  Yet in the negotiations that he 
conducted, from January 1780 to May 1782, the credit of the United States, American rights to the 
trans-Appalachian West, and the statehood of the United States, all hung in the balance.  The 
pressure that the Spanish brought to bear, as they sought to extract concessions from the United 
States and take advantage of a predicament that Congress created for Jay soon after his arrival, made 
this one of the most difficult diplomatic assignments of the war.  The fact that Jay held his ground 
and ultimately extracted himself from Spain without causing any material loss to American interests, 
make these negotiations an unusual rich source of insight into the conduct of early American 
diplomacy, and the principles that undergirded Jay’s diplomacy in particular. 
                                                
11 Richard B. Morris attributes Jay’s conduct to his “pride and fierce independence,” Peacemakers, 223.  
His work, though written in a popular style, constitutes the only focused analysis of Jay’s diplomacy in Europe.  
Rafael Sánchez Mantero, “La Mision de John Jay en España (1779-1782),” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 24 
(1967):1389-1431 provides a useful overview of Jay’s tenure in Spain, but contains little analysis.  Herbert A. 
Johnson offers insight into Jay’s later approach to diplomacy during the Confederation period in, “Honor and 
Interest: John Jay’s Diplomacy During the Confederation,” New York History 83:3 (Summer 2002): 293-327.  A 
description of major events can also be found in the relevant chapters of Frank Monaghan’s biography, John Jay: 
Defender of Liberty.  New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935; and Donald L. Smith, John Jay: Founder of a State and 
Nation.  New York: Teachers College Press, 1968; as well as in a more recent effort by Walter Stahr, John Jay: 
Founding Father. New York: Hambeldon and London, 2005. Rebecca Gruver’s dissertation, The Diplomacy of John 
Jay, PhD, University of California at Berkeley, 1964, offers little insight into Jay’s conception of law.  
12 The only lengthy description of events is found in Morris, Peacemakers, 218-247. 
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The Challenges: Context Surrounding Jay’s Tenure in Spain 
 Jay and Gérard spent ten days in Martinique before departing for France on the French 
frigate Aurora, on December 28th, 1779.  The ship’s intended destination was Toulon, on the 
Mediterranean coast, from whence Jay and Gérard were supposed to travel to Paris.  Jay was then 
supposed to consult with both Benjamin Franklin and the Comte de Vergennes, before finally 
traveling on to Madrid.  As they approached the Straits of Gibraltar, however, the Aurora put into 
Cádiz on January 22, and there learned of a major British naval victory in the vicinity that made the 
further prosecution of their voyage impossible.13  After some consultation it was decided that the two 
ministers would continue their journey by land.  Gérard would return to Paris via Madrid, while Jay 
would begin his mission immediately, without first stopping in France.14 
 The assignment that Congress had given Jay in Spain was rather straightforward.  The 
primary objective was to secure Spain’s accession to the Franco-American treaty of alliance on 
roughly the same terms that France had agreed to—the principal goal being to maintain “the liberty, 
Sovereignty, and independence” of the United States.15  If possible, he was also to obtain a financial 
subsidy, or a loan, from the Spanish court, and resolve a looming dispute over American claims to a 
border on the Mississippi River.  Over the course of the preceding year, Gérard had repeatedly 
warned the Americans that the issue of the Mississippi could pose an obstacle to a treaty with Spain.  
But he had disavowed any certain knowledge of Spanish policy, and had encouraged the Americans 
                                                
13 On the night of January 16, the British Admiral Sir George Rodney defeated a Spanish squadron in the 
vicinity of Gibraltar.  The British then broke the Spanish siege of Gibraltar and supplied the fortress with fresh 
provisions.  The victory dealt a major blow to Spanish efforts to recover that territory. 
14 See Jay to Benjamin Franklin, January 26, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:15, for these details. 
15 The Franco-American treaty contained a secret article, permitting Carlos III to accede to the alliance on 
the same terms as France, “at such time as he shall judge proper.” The article added that: “if any of the Stipulations 
of the said Treatys are not agreeable to the King of Spain, his Catholick Majesty may propose other conditions 
analogous to the principal aims of the alliance and conformable to the Rules of equality, reciprocity & friendship.”  
Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America. Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1931-1948, vol. 2, pp. 45-47. 
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to put their hope in the generosity of Carlos III, who might be willing to offer a subsidy in exchange 
for a territorial guarantee of the Gulf Coast, and exclusive navigation rights on the River.16  
 Congress had taken Gérard’s warning into consideration, but had given little ground.  Jay’s 
instructions specified that if the Spanish should conquer “the Floridas [i.e. the British colonies of 
East and West Florida] from Great Britain,” the Americans would “guaranty the same to his Catholic 
Majesty,” but only on condition: “that the United States shall enjoy the free navigation of the river 
Mississippi into and from the Sea.”  Jay was to request a subsidy for that guarantee; and if that 
should fail, he was to ask for a loan of five million dollars, with a maximum rate of six per cent per 
year.  He was also “to endeavour to obtain” access to a Spanish port on the southern Mississippi, 
where American merchants could deposit goods for sale on the international market.17 
The reality is that Jay’s mission, as Congress had conceived of it, had no chance of success, 
and if Congress had known, in the summer of 1779, what they learned soon after Jay’s arrival, they 
would likely never have sent him.  As noted in my previous chapter, Carlos III welcomed the 
opportunity, afforded by the Revolution, to reduce British power; yet he had no intention of 
recognizing the United States unless his territorial objectives for the war had been secured.18  He was 
also loath to endorse a colonial rebellion and feared that the Americans would become Spain’s 
                                                
16 See Gérard to Vergennes, January 28, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 495.  See also his notes on the 
conclusion of his conference with Congress in February 17, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 529, in which he suggested 
that they might obtain help from Spain if they gave up Pensacola and rights to the Mississippi. 
17 See From the President of Congress, October 16, 1779, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:716-717.  In referring to “the 
Sea,” Congress meant the Gulf of Mexico. 
18 The Spanish were poignantly aware that their navy was not equal to Britain’s.  (Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 
offers the best assessment of Spanish naval strength.  The navy was large, and thus effective as a deterrent, but the 
sailors and officers were poorly trained, making it ineffective in battle, p. 314).  They hoped for a brief conflict and 
could not afford to complicate peace negotiations by tying their interests to those of the United States.  Floridablanca 
told Montmorin in January 1780 that Spain would recognize the United States on “the day we can be certain of 
dictating the law to England” and added that this could prove useful to France, if the French were forced by 
circumstances to retreat from their commitment to American independence; quoted in Morris, Peacemakers, 44. 
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foremost enemy in North America.  He hoped that they would emerge from war weak and divided, 
confined to the coast, and either attached to Great Britain, or dependent on France for survival.19   
 In forming its policy, Congress had been led astray both by a latent tendency toward over-
confidence, and by misinformation that it had received in recent years.20  In the winter of 1777, the 
former American commissioner to Spain, Arthur Lee, had met briefly with the outgoing Spanish 
Prime Minister, Grimaldi, who had offered a gift of supplies and materiel, and had also intimated that 
Spain would likely join the war the following year.21  Since then, both Juan de Miralles, the Spanish 
“observer” in Philadelphia, and Gérard had encouraged the Americans to hope in the generosity and 
                                                
19 On February 2, 1778, just prior to the signing of the Franco-American alliance, Montmorin wrote to 
Vergennes: “between England and America there is a sort of equality of enmity that makes it difficult [for the 
Spanish] to desire that either side win,” quoted in Phillips, The West, 80.  Miralles had hoped to see the French 
recover Canada, so that they could contain the United States and prevent their westward expansion.  Vergennes 
refused to consider such a policy, which would undermine his goal of securing the friendship and cooperation of the 
United States.  See Vergennes to Gérard, March 29, 1778 and October 26, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 129, 360.  
Soon after Jay’s arrival Montmorin reported that Floridablanca wanted see the United States reduced “to a nullity,” 
and thought that some form of dependence on Britain was necessary to achieve that result. Montmorin to Vergennes, 
February 22, 1780, quoted in Dull, French Navy, 184.   
20 For evidence of Congress’s excessive optimism see its initial instructions to Franklin, dated September 
17, 1776, regarding an alliance with France.  The American commissioners were also to obtain by purchase or loan, 
“eight line of battleships, of seventy-four and sixty-four guns, well manned and fitted in every respect for service.”  
They were also to seek a loan for £2 million sterling, for a term of not less than ten years and with a maximum 
interest rate of 6%.  See Secret Journals, II:34-36.   
21 See Secret Journals, II:38-40 for Congress’s first instructions regarding an alliance with Spain.  Congress 
first appointed Benjamin Franklin to serve as American commissioner to Spain (Secret Journals, II:41, January 1, 
1777) but Franklin declined on account of his age and was replaced by Arthur Lee.   Lee set out for Spain in 
February 1777, and made it as far as Burgos, about 150 miles north of Madrid where he was met by a delegation, 
headed by Grimaldi.  Grimaldi rejected the request for an alliance, but promised military supplies, for which no 
compensation would be required.  Grimaldi cited the threat of war with Portugal as a reason why Spain could not 
immediately commit to war.  He also noted that France was not yet ready and that the Spanish treasure fleet had not 
yet arrived from America.  He suggested, however, that “These reasons will probably cease within a year, and then 
will be the moment,” RDC, II:282-283.  See Richard Henry Lee, Life of Arthur Lee. Boston: Wells & Lilly, 1829, 
vol. 1, pp. 65-85 for an account of Lee’s journey.  See also Wharton, RDC, II:279-299 for related correspondence. 
Spain declined repayment in order to avoid any appearance of having supported the Revolution.  As 
Floridablanca wrote to Aranda on December 6, 1777, “[I]t is the King’s intent, respecting any assistance he renders 
to the Americans, not to bind himself with promises and contracts, out of consideration of both honor and policy, in 
light of the present circumstances of Europe, our interests, and the situation of our affairs,” Juan F. Yela Utrilla, 
España Ante la Independencia de los Estados Unidos. Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 1988, vol. II, p. 161.  According to 
Ferguson, Purse, 41, Lee later valued the Spanish gift at 187,500 livres, or about $35,000, or £7,800. Bemis, DAR, 
93 estimates the total value of all Spanish aid to the United States, during the early phase of the war, at about 
$397,200.  Of this, 1 million livres, or $185,200 was given prior to Lee’s arrival, in 1776.  The value of all 
subsequent gifts, including those given as a consequence of Lee’s visit, came to $212,000.   
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magnanimity of Carlos III.22  Congress was aware by the fall of 1779 that Spain had declared war 
against England; but they did not yet see that event as an obstacle to their policy—not knowing, for 
example, that the Spanish had already conquered much of West Florida—thus undermining their 
request for a subsidy in exchange for a territorial guarantee.23   
By January of 1780, as Jay was en route from Martinique, one last factor had arisen that 
would further undermine the American position: The military strategy on which the Spanish had 
predicated their decision to join the war in June had already ended in failure and they were now 
looking for a way of escape.  As noted in my previous chapter, Floridablanca had insisted, in the 
negotiations leading to the Convention of Aranjuez, that Vergennes agree to an invasion England.24  
The goal for the invasion, which was planned for the summer of 1779, was to bring the war to a rapid 
close, at relatively little cost to the Bourbon powers, and under circumstances that would likely force 
the British to satisfy Spain’s territorial aspirations.25  The plan had proven to be a disaster.  Disease, 
bad weather, delays in outfitting the Spanish fleet, and a host of other logistical problems had 
combined to frustrate the invasion.  By the fall of 1779, the combined fleets had returned home with 
                                                
22 Juan de Miralles was an unofficial representative who sent information to Madrid, but was not 
empowered to speak on behalf of the Spanish Court.  For an analysis of his role see Light Townsend Cummins, 
Spanish Observers and the American Revolution: 1775-1783. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991.  
Floridablanca would not give Miralles diplomatic powers for fear that this would constitute tacit recognition of 
American independence.  In December Gérard urged the Americans to “address the King [of Spain] as a sincere 
friend that one could consult and in whom one would confide one's own thoughts,” Gérard to Vergennes, December 
12, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 421; In January he sought to sustain their hope “in the generosity of the Spanish 
King,” Gérard to Vergennes, January 28, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 495; and in February he asserted that: “His 
Catholic Majesty is too great and too generous to desire an acquisition of territory; that he is limiting himself to 
administering well the states that Heaven had given him; and it is to the security of his borders and to preventing all 
trouble with his neighbors that he gives all his cares,” Gérard to Vergennes, Feb 17, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 
529.  Gérard hoped to play an instrumental role in bringing Spain into the war.  He was not authorized to speak on 
behalf of the Spanish Court, the best that he could do was to urge the Americans to send a minister to Madrid.   
23 The British forts at Natchez and Baton Rouge fell in the fall of 1779.  Mobile would surrender on March 
14, 1780.  The main base in Pensacola capitulated in May 1781.  For evidence that the Americas knew that Spain 
had declared war against England, see Jay to Washington, August 25, 1779, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:658. 
24 See Article II of the Convention of Aranjuez, which made “an invasion of the European dominions 
belonging to Great Britain” a “necessary part” of the allies’ joint military operations. 
25 A history of the attempted invasion is found in A. Temple Patterson, The Other Armada: The Franco-
Spanish Attempt to Invade Britain in 1779. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960. 
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nothing to show for their efforts.  The financial cost of the operation was enormous and the Bourbons 
were left with the likelihood of a protracted war and no guarantee of success. 
In that context, in late December 1779, Floridablanca had welcomed the arrival of one 
Thomas Hussey, an Irish priest who claimed to bear a message from the British colonial secretary, 
Lord George Germain, intimating a desire for peace.26  Floridablanca received Hussey warmly and, 
on the evenings of January 3 and 4, dictated two memos in response—written in Hussey’s voice—
that reveal the political context in which Jay’s negotiations would begin some three weeks later.  
“The Catholic King,” the first memo began, “being of a Religious and pious character and in hopes 
of avoid the effusion of human blood,” was willing to drop out of the war if the British should offer 
“a useful accommodation” that would “save the honor of his Catholic Majesty,” which he had 
recently pledged to France as a consequence of that court’s “careless and extravagant conduct.” 
 The issue of the king’s honor, the memo went on to emphasize, was particularly hard to 
overcome, “given the natural friendship and probity of this Monarch, who views his word as the most 
sacred Bond on earth.”  Nevertheless, if England would give up Gibraltar—perhaps capitulating on 
the grounds of having been starved out—Carlos III would grant the British troops an honorable 
surrender and release them for service elsewhere.  He would also compensate England for any 
captured materiel, would promise not to form any engagements with the Americans, and would 
refrain from another attempted invasion of England.  Finally, “although the King of Spain will never 
fail in his engagements with France,” he might be able to persuade Louis XVI to accept “some means 
of adjustment” vis-à-vis the Americans, short of an outright grant of independence.  Haste was of the 
essence, however, for the Spanish were expecting “any day now, the arrival of Mr. Jay,” and if the 
King should enter into an engagement with the Colonies, it was impossible that he could ever be 
                                                
26 The narrative is drawn from Samuel F. Bemis, The Hussey-Cumberland Mission and American 
Independence: An Essay in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1968.  The 
reality is that Hussey—who had a theatrical bent—had first approached Germain with intimations that the Spanish 
were interested in peace, and on that basis Germain had sent Hussey to hear their propositions.   
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persuaded to retract that decision.27 
 The next day, Floridablanca made a more concrete proposal, suggesting that the Americans 
might be granted a “feudal dependency, like the free Cities of the Empire.”  He acknowledged that 
neither France nor the United States would likely accept such an outcome voluntarily.  They might be 
persuaded to change their minds, however, if the Spanish should adopt a “useful neutrality,” and 
cease to prosecute the war against England with any degree of vigor.  England’s position would thus 
be strengthened to such an extent that the French and American allies might be compelled to accept 
“a pacification in which the point of Independence will not enter.”28  None of these proposals had 
any chance of success, for as events would prove, George III was not yet amenable to anything short 
of American subjugation; nor was he willing to give up Gibraltar.  The proposals nevertheless reveal 
the legal and political context or environment that Jay would enter some three weeks later.  
 Hussey conveyed the proposals to Germain at the end of January, who did not make any 
promises but offered to negotiate on the basis of the Treaty of Paris—i.e. all parties would return to 
the situation that they had been in at the end of the Seven Years War.  Hussey brought this message 
back to Spain, but embellished it to falsely suggest that the British might give up Gibraltar in a secret 
article.  Floridablanca took two steps in response.  On February 28, he convened a meeting of the 
Spanish council and asked for the ministers’ opinion in writing as to 1) whether Spain should 
proceed in the negotiations, and 2) if so, whether they should inform the French of their actions.  The 
latter issue was important for in Article IV of the convention of Aranjuez, the Spanish had promised 
“not to arrange, conclude, nor even to advance through his mediation, any treaty or arrangement with 
the [united] States, or relating to them, without informing [the King of France].”  They had also 
                                                
27 Floridablanca’s First Unsigned Memorandum, in Bemis, Hussey-Cumberland, 135-136. 




affirmed their prior commitment, in the Pacte de Famille, “not to listen to any direct or indirect 
proposal on the part of the common enemy without communicating it to the other.”29   
 The cabinet offered its unanimous opinion that Spain should proceed in the negotiations 
without informing the French—just as the French had done in the negotiations leading to the Treaty 
of Paris in 1763—prompting Floridablanca to prepare a set of draft treaties, as a basis for the pending 
negotiations.30  The treaties do not merit detailed examination in this context, except to note that 
there were two treaties, one public and one private; and at the heart of the private treaty was a 
formula that Floridablanca hoped would enable Louis XVI to escape his commitments to the United 
States, without violating his honor or reputation.  The formula was rooted in Floridablanca’s 
understanding that the Franco-American alliance was eventual in nature and also “conditional on 
England having declared war on France” (emphasis added).  Because, Floridablanca went on to say, 
the conflict had been waged since 1778 “by way of reprisals and without formal declaration;” 
therefore, the terms of the Treaty, “which it is understood that the Most Christian King will never fail 
to maintain,” were not yet legally binding on France. As a consequence, Louis XVI was still at 
liberty to accept an outcome in which the Americans failed to receive their independence.31 
                                                
29 See Bemis, Secretaries of State, I:296 for the relevant passage of the Convention of Aranjuez.  
Furthermore, in Article XVII of the Pacte de Famille the two kings promised “to not listen to or make any 
proposition of peace nor treat nor conclude with the common enemy or enemies, whoever they may be, but together 
and in mutual and common conference, and to reciprocally communicate all that might come to their knowledge, 
that would be of interest to the two Crowns, and in particular, on the object of pacification, such that in war as in 
peace both of the two crowns will regard the interests of the crown of their ally as their own.” 
30 In 1763, the French Foreign Minister Choiseul negotiated an end to the war with England without 
informing the Spanish or involving them in the negotiations.  He then presented Carlos III with the result, which the 
Spanish had no choice, under the circumstance, but to accept. See Bemis, Hussey-Cumberland, 35-40, for a 
discussion of the cabinet’s decision.  See also the appendix for copies of the ministers’ individual opinions. 
31 In the margins, Floridablanca noted also that France had promised to continue the war until independence 
had been “formally or tacitly assured”—the implication being that the word “tacitly” could also be used as an aid to 
devising an appropriate formula for voiding the commitment.  It is not clear where Floridablanca received his 
understanding of the Franco-American alliance, for while the alliance was “eventual” in nature, its terms made clear 
that it was to go into effect as soon as Great Britain should “break the Peace with france” (preamble) or as soon as 
“War should break out betwan france and Great Britain” (Article I).  And as I described in my first chapter, 
Vergennes had been at pains to ensure that the Americans publicly affirmed that the terms had been fulfilled and that 
the treaty was consequently in force. 
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As noted above, the Aurora had landed in Cádiz on January 22 and by the time these events 
took place, Jay’s Secretary, William Carmichael, was already in Madrid, announcing the Americans’ 
arrival.32  On February 24, Floridablanca wrote to inform Jay that Carlos III had “heard with pleasure 
the desire of the Colonies to form a connexion with Spain,” and, though he thought that it would be 
“first proper to regulate the manner, points, & reciprocal correspondence upon which the union ought 
to be founded,” Jay was at liberty to travel to Madrid and explain his “Intentions & those of 
Congress.”  Until the details of a potential treaty should be “determined on,” however, Floridablanca 
stressed that it would not be “proper” for Jay to assume “a formal Character”—though he could be 
assured, “of the honest & sincere dispositions of his royal mind… and [of] his desire that every 
difficulty whatever may be removed for [their] mutual felicity.”33  In other words, Jay would be 
received in Madrid as a private gentleman, but not as an official representative of the United States—
since formal reception would constitute a tacit and premature recognition of independence.  
Floridablanca’s conduct bears emphasis at this juncture, because it was the backdrop for 
Jay’s pending negotiations, demonstrating that Jay would be entering an atmosphere more hostile to 
American interests than members of Congress had been led to expect when Gérard encouraged them, 
“to address the King [of Spain] as a sincere friend that one could consult and in whom one would 
confide one's own thoughts.”34  As Floridablanca wrote to Aranda on March 13, Spain’s recent 
conquests on the Gulf coast would be rendered fruitless if the Americans “insisted on… free 
navigation on the Mississippi,” as he understood was their intent.35  According to Montmorin, he 
                                                
32 Jay sent Carmichael ahead so as to avoid the indignity that Arthur Lee experienced in 1777, when the 
Spanish stopped him en route to Madrid, and sent him back to Paris, for fear of alarming the British.  Carmichael 
left Cádiz on or about January 27 and arrived in Madrid on February 11.  
33 To John Jay from Floridablanca, February 24, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:41 
34 Gérard to Vergennes, December 12, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 421. 
35 See annotated summary of Floridablanca’s letter in María Francisca Represa Fernández (ed.) 
Documentos Relativos a la Independencia de Norteamérica Existentes in Archivos Españoles, Madrid: Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores, 1981, vol. VI, p. 326, with citation to Simancas Legajo 4.626, Libro 168, Nos. 379-399. 
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now wanted to see the United States reduced “to a nullity,” and thought that some form of 
dependence on Britain was necessary to achieve that result.36  In brief, Jay was being welcomed to 
Madrid primarily to pressure Britain into giving up Gibraltar—though informal negotiations might 
also take place, in the course of which, it was hoped, Jay might give ground on the Mississippi that 
could be useful in the context of future negotiations for peace.37 
More importantly, the Spanish stratagems serve to confirm points made earlier in this 
dissertation concerning the legal aspects of eighteenth-century diplomacy.  As noted in my 
introduction, diplomatic historians tend overwhelmingly to assess behavior of this kind from a 
strategic perspective, without examining the legal system on which the strategy rested—a system 
that is often dismissed as hopelessly duplicitous—a veil for self interest, the details of which were 
irrelevant in a world dominated by considerations of power.  A close examination of the Spanish 
behavior, however, makes evident, I would argue, that statesmen were in fact acting on a precise, if 
unwritten, conception of international law or legal standards.   
Law was heavily tied to the text of treaties, which in turn were tied to the honor and public 
character of the king.  The king’s honor functioned, in this context, as an asset or form of credit, on 
the basis of which states sought aid from other states in time of need.  Yet despite its importance it 
was not inviolable.  Honor was rather in perpetual conflict with material and strategic interests.  If a 
given interest (in this case the acquisition of Gibraltar) was important enough, honor might be a price 
worth paying.  Yet the price was never paid without making a concerted effort to limit the damage, 
through the use of formulae, pretexts or other forms of public justification. 
                                                
36 Montmorin to Vergennes, February 22, 1780, quoted in Dull, French Navy, 184.  A year earlier, in 
November 1778, Montmorin had also reported that Floridablanca was determined “to drive the English and the 
Americans from both banks of the Mississippi; in a word… [to] make access to the Spanish colonies forever 
impossible to the United States, which he distrusts as much as the English.” Doniol, III:585. 
37 Floridablanca had been hindered in conducting negotiations with the Americans in both Paris and 
Philadelphia in that he could not empower an emissary to speak on his behalf without tacitly recognizing American 
independence.  As the principal of the Spanish state, however, he was free to negotiate with Jay in Madrid, without 
formal letters of authorization—thus removing that obstacle.  
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While those pretexts might appear to an untrained observer to be hopelessly duplicitous, they 
were actually based on a subtle and complex moral calculus, which combined textual analysis and 
interpretation, geopolitical strategy, records of past conduct, and deeper principles of justice.  Very 
few rules were fixed or immutable.  Each situation required an act of judgment.  For example, when 
Vergennes learned in April of Spain’s negotiations with England, he did not think it expedient to file 
a protest immediately or demand a seat at the table.  Instead he was at pains to cooperate with 
Spain’s military endeavors throughout the summer and fall of 1780, for fear that Floridablanca might 
use the failure to provide aid as a pretext for dropping out of the war entirely.38   
His behavior was grounded not only in his strategic need for Spanish naval assistance, but 
also on his assessment of the relative strength of the pretexts available to Spain at the time.  
(Floridablanca could point both to France’s violation of the Pacte de Famille in 1763, and also to the 
fact that Spain had been dragged into the current war against its will—in violation of the spirit, if not 
the letter of the alliance.)  As he wrote to Montmorin, “I confess that I am not without uneasiness; 
once one has allowed oneself to go to the brink of infidelity [as Floridablanca had], it is always to be 
feared that one is likely to topple over.”  Vergennes’s behavior was finally rooted in the emphasis 
that he placed, in his policy, on establishing Louis XVI’s reputation as a moral and disinterested 
arbiter of the European peace.  “Remember,” he wrote to Montmorin, “that if all this should end 
through an injustice, the King risks less in suffering it than in committing it.  Damage to his interests 
can be repaired; nothing would compensate him for the loss of his reputation.”39 
                                                
38 This point is made by Bemis in Hussey-Cumberland, 110.  Vergennes likely expected that Floridablanca 
would justify his conduct on those grounds.  
39 Vergennes to Montmorin, April 21, 1780, in Doniol, IV:476; and Doniol, IV:453.  Vergennes’s reaction 
illustrates the fact that reputation mattered more to some kings than others.  Reputation was an asset, but it was not 
the only asset available (wealth, territory, power, or the affection of one’s citizens being others available).  It was 
especially important to France in that Vergennes’s strategy for the war was predicated on establishing Louis XVI as 
the arbiter of the peace in Europe.  It was essential that he possess a reputation for disinterested virtue if other states 
were to entrust him with the preponderance of power that the position required.  See again Murphy, Vergennes. 
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The Anglo-Spanish negotiations would continue until the early fall and were a persistent 
source of anxiety to both the French and to Jay, who eventually learned of them over the summer.  It 
is worth noting, in conclusion, that the talks did not break down only because the British refused to 
relinquish Gibraltar.  They also broke down because George III would not accept Floridablanca’s 
formula for a middle road.  Even tacit acknowledgement of American independence, in the form of a 
feudal dependency, was not acceptable.  What is striking is that Floridablanca did not soften his 
position either—thus demonstrating that there was a limit to his duplicity with respect to France.  The 
agreement that he had signed on behalf of Carlos III in the convention of Aranjuez did in fact have 
some degree of binding force, thanks largely to the fact that the Pacte de Famille was the cornerstone 
of Spain’s national security.  In other words, the treaty was subject to tortured interpretation, but if a 
valid way of escape could not be devised, then its commitments remained in force.  
The negotiations serve to reinforce the conclusion that eighteenth-century international law 
was, to a great extent, a law of contracts, enforced by the honor and good faith of the sovereign.  
Such contracts were inevitably subject to the pressure of countervailing interests.  When such 
disputes arose, diplomacy became the art of preserving both the honor and the interest of the 
sovereign.  Success in this realm required a sophisticated understanding of the norms and procedures 
that governed the international realm.  It also required knowledge of the secondary and unwritten 
rules that governed the types of arguments, or types of strategies, that could be employed effectively 
and without loss of honor.  Furthermore, one also had to know what not to say or do, lest that 
statement or action should make you vulnerable to accusation or be used as pretext for retaliation or a 
corresponding breach of faith that could prove costly.  In sum, diplomacy was a sophisticated battle 
over national character.  It was one that most Americans—acutely conscious though many of them 
were of republican virtue and honor—were thoroughly unfamiliar with.  John Jay would prove to be 




The Opening Phase of the Negotiations 
Knowing that the Spanish had previously prevented Arthur Lee (in the spring of 1777) from 
traveling to Madrid, Jay did not proceed immediately to the capital on arrival in Cádiz. He instead 
sent his secretary, William Carmichael, ahead with a letter of introduction, informing the Spanish 
ministry of their arrival and asking how the Americans ought to proceed.  On the day of 
Carmichael’s departure, Jay wrote out a set of instructions, detailing the mode of conduct that 
Carmichael should adopt—and which Jay presumably would have adopted had he made the initial 
journey himself—that offer insight into his methods.  In brief, Carmichael was to modulate his 
language and demeanor, and exercise continual discretion, with the goal of projecting a dignified and 
independent character, gathering information, and safeguarding American interests.  
 “You will proceed to Madrid with convenient Expedition,” Jay began.  If Gérard—who was to 
travel with Carmichael—should proceed too slowly, Carmichael was “to go on before him.  The 
Propriety of this however will depend much on Circumstances, & must be determined by your own 
Discretion” (italics added).  When introduced to the French ambassador, he was to treat him “with 
great Attention, Candor, & that Degree of Confidence only which Prudence and the Alliance between 
us may prescribe.”  In conversing with people at Court he was to give the impression “of our strong 
Attachment to France” yet in a way that prevented them from thinking that the Americans were 
“under the Direction of any Counsels but our own.”  He was also to cautiously gather information on 
relations between Madrid and Versailles—which Jay understood to be characterized by “mutual 
Disgusts”—on the King’s “principal Confidents”, and on the state of Spain’s finances.   
 He was to mention “as a Matter of Intelligence rather than in the Way of argument” the 
cruelties of the British army and the influence of its conduct on “the Passions of the Americans” so to 
dampen suspicions that they still retained their “former Attachments to Britain.”  He was to “do 
Justice to Virginia & the western Country near the Mississippi” recounting their growth and 
achievements and their aversion to Britain.  Yet he was to “let it appear… from Your Representations 
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that Ages will be necessary to settle those extensive Regions.”  Regarding the proposed treaty, he 
was to “let it be inferred” from his conversation that Americans were sanguine of success and that “a 
Disappointment would be no less unwelcome than unexpected.”  Finally, he was to remain attentive 
to general information about the state of the war and any military operations, and it would be 
particularly “advantageous to know whether Spain means to carry on any serious Operations for 
possessing herself of the Floridas & Banks of the Mississippi.”   
“Altho I have Confidence in your Prudence,” Jay concluded: 
…yet permit me to recommend to you the greatest Circumspection,—command yourself 
under every Circumstance.  On the one Hand avoid being Suspected of Servility, & on the 
other let your Temper be always even & your Attention unremitted.  You will oblige me by 
being very regular & circumstantial in your Correspondence, and commit Nothing of a 
private Nature to Paper unless in Cypher.40 
 
 At first glance, Jay’s advice does not appear exceptional.  If given a copy of Jay’s letter, his 
fellow Americans may have thought the content commonplace.  Yet as will be discussed later in the 
chapter, few among them put such rules into practice with anything like his degree of rigor.  What 
was distinctive about Jay was the emphasis that he placed on the details and intricacies of language 
and emotion.41  He was also atypical in his efforts to project character and establish a reputation in a 
contest that he seemed to think would be partly (or in large part) about national honor.   Finally, one 
might argue that he projected a controlled, confident, command of the situation that belied his 
relative youth and inexperience.42    
 Carmichael fulfilled his duties and three weeks later, on March 3, Jay received a letter from 
Floridablanca, inviting him to proceed to Madrid—though in a private capacity, pending negotiation 
of a treaty, which did not bode well.  Jay nevertheless projected an aura of confidence and dignity in 
                                                
40 Jay to Carmichael, January 27, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:18-20. 
41 Jay himself would say this in another context, writing to Carmichael later in the fall: “I believe there are 
few Instances of Persons conducting Business with the same minute attention that I do.”  Jay to Carmichael, October 
2, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:277. 
42 Jay was just 35 years old at the time, and had no experience as a diplomat. 
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his response: “The Honor and Probity which have ever characterized the Conduct of Spain,” he wrote 
to Floridablanca on March 6, “together with the exalted Reputation which his Majesty has acquired 
by being an eminent Example of both, have enduced the People of the united States to repose the 
highest Confidence in the Proofs they have recieved of his friendly Disposition towards them; and to 
consider every Engagement with this Monarchy, as guaranteed by that Faith, and secured by that 
Ingenuousness, which have so gloriously distinguished his Majesty, and this Kingdom, among the 
other Princes & nations of the Earth.” 
 Jay then went on—in a manner that would prove significant in the months to come— to 
ground his diplomacy on the character of the United States: “Permit me to… assure his Majesty,” he 
wrote, “that the People of the united States are convinced, that Virtue alone can animate and support 
their Governments; and that they can in no other way establish and perpetuate a national Character, 
honorable to themselves & their Posterity; than by an unshaken Adherence to the Rules, which 
Religion Morality and Treaties, may prescribe for their Conduct.”  “Having therefore the most 
perfect Conviction that the Candor and Benignity of his Majesty’s Intentions, are equal to the 
Uprightness and Sincerity of those of Congress,” he concluded, “I shall set out in a few Days for 
Madrid, with the pleasing Expectation that there will be little Delay or Difficulty, in adjusting the 
Terms of a Union, between a magnanimous monarch and a virtuous People, who wish to obtain by an 
Alliance with each other, only reciprocal Benefits and mutual Advantages.”43 
 There was nothing naïve about the confidence that Jay projected in this letter.  Floridablanca 
had made it clear, in inviting Jay to proceed to Madrid, that certain “Points” pertaining to the 
“reciprocal correspondence upon which the union [between Spain and the United States] ought to be 
founded] needed to be regulated before Jay assumed a “formal Character” in the Spanish capital. 
                                                
43 Jay to Floridablanca, March 6, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:51-52.  Jay’s reference to “religion morality and 
treaties” is significant, and should not be read as a vague reference to Protestant conceptions of republican virtue.  It 
rather encapsulated Jay’s highly refined conception of morality in the political realm as derived from Biblical norms, 
the scientific study of natural moral law, and the text of treaties or agreements among European states. 
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When “divested of the gloss which its politeness spreads over it,” Jay reported to Congress, the letter 
suggested that American independence was to be acknowledged only in exchange for certain 
“considerations” which the Americans might give for it—chief among which, Jay suspected, would 
be navigation rights on the Mississippi.  Gérard, he continued, had “often endeavored to persuade me 
that a certain resolution of congress would if persisted in ruin the business,” but “as affairs are now 
circumstanced,” he concluded, “it would in my opinion be better for America to have no Treaty with 
Spain than to purchase on such servile terms.”44 
 Jay arrived in Madrid on April 4, and paid a visit to Floridablanca the next day.  It was not 
until May 11, however, that he was granted a formal conference.45  At the meeting the Spanish 
minister stated frankly that, “there was but one obstacle, from which he apprehended any great 
Difficulty in forming a Treaty with America, and… this arose from the Pretensions of America to the 
navigation of the Mississippi.”  The issue, he continued, “was an Object that the King had so much at 
Heart, that he would never relinquish it.”  The count nevertheless “hoped some middle way might be 
hit on…to get over this Difficulty,” and urged “Mr. Jay to turn his thoughts and attention to the 
                                                
44 Jay to the President of Congress, March 3, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II: 50.  The point that Gérard had 
pressed was American claims to navigation rights on the Mississippi.  See JJ’s memoire on his negotiations with 
Spain, which is printed in William Jay, The Life of John Jay. New York: J.J. & Harper, 1833, vol. 1, pp. 97-101.  
What Jay did not yet know, and which would make the issue of the Mississippi even more difficult to resolve, was 
that the Spanish had already conquered much of the territory on the eastern bank of the river.  The British positions 
at Natchez and Baton Rouge had fallen the previous fall, and the larger British fortification at Mobile was even then 
under siege, and would surrender on March 14, 1780 (The main British fort, in Pensacola, would hold out for one 
more year, before capitulating in May 1781.)  As Floridablanca wrote to Aranda on March 13, those conquests 
would be rendered fruitless if the Americans “insisted on having establishments and free navigation on the 
Mississippi,” as he understood was their intent. The quote is taken from annotated summary of Floridablanca’s 
letter, found in María Francisca Represa Fernández (ed.) Documentos Relativos a la Independencia de Norteamérica 
Existentes in Archivos Españoles, Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1981, vol. VI, p. 326.  The book is part 
of a 15-volume annotated index of all documents pertaining to the American Revolution, housed in Spanish 
archives.  Citation to Libro 168, Nos. 379-399. 
45 Immediately on arrival in Madrid, Jay had received a letter from Floridablanca, requesting a detailed 
report on the political, military, and economic circumstances of the United States.  The report was likely intended to 
delay negotiations until further progress could be made with England.  It may also have been designed to weaken 
Jay’s position, by forcing him to articulate the many problems then confronting the United States, and by 
humiliating him by requiring him to perform clerical tasks and produce superfluous data at the request of his 
benefactor, the great king of Spain.  It took Jay about three weeks, to complete the report, and another two weeks for 
Floridablanca to review it before the first formal conference was scheduled.  
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Subject,” while emphasizing “the King’s favorable Disposition, his inviolable Regard to his Promises 
&c. &c.”46  As events over the coming weeks would prove, however, there was no “middle way” that 
would be acceptable to Spain, short of complete control of the River.  The negotiations would likely 
have quickly come to a close, but for a precipitous step that Congress had taken the previous 
November: In a state of financial desperation, Congress had drawn on Jay for £100,000 sterling, in 
anticipation of his having already secured a loan from Spain.  The decision, news of which Jay 
received in late April, left him in a predicament from which he would not emerge for two full years. 
Congress’s decision was a result or consequence of the fact that the revolutionaries had been 
paying most of their expenses since 1776 through the emission of paper money that was not backed 
by hard currency.  In the absence of native sources of silver, or specie, colonial governments had 
long relied on paper money as medium of exchange, but they had always been able to maintain the 
value of the currency by drawing down the money supply through taxation, at roughly the same rate 
as they printed bills and put them into circulation.  The problem during the war was first that 
Congressional expenses far exceeded the norm, and, second, that the states were unwilling or unable 
to draw down the supply through taxation.47  The consequences were not initially severe.  The 
“Continentals” as they were called, were issued at par value with specie in 1776 and had lost only 
half their value by April 1777.  By early in 1778, however, paper money was trading at a ratio of 4:1; 
by January 1779 was at 8:1; by April 1779 it was down to 16:1; and when Jay left for Spain in 
October 1779, it was trading at 30:1 and falling.  
                                                
46 “Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca,” May 11th, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:107.  Jay 
arrived in Madrid on April 4, but was consumed for several weeks in preparing a response to a lengthy questionnaire 
on American affairs that Floridablanca compelled him to fill out—likely as a means of delaying the negotiations, as 
he was then awaiting the arrival of the British agent, with whom he would be discussing a way out of the war. 
47 The following details are taken from E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American 
Public Finance, 1776-1790. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961.  The states were either 
unwilling to impose taxes, on the grounds that the methods of apportioning the burden were unjust, or they were 
unable to do so either because their territories were occupied by the enemy and/or popular morale would not tolerate 
heavy taxes in the midst—especially given the other economic dislocations caused by the war.  On May 21, for 
example, they passed a resolution requiring the states to send in $45M, but it soon became apparent that the states 
would not comply. See Ferguson, Purse, 33, with citation to JCC, XIV:626. 
 
 139 
 Four weeks after Jay’s departure—with a crisis ensuing and no solution in sight—the 
members of Congress concluded that they had no choice but to begin paying for a portion of their 
expenses with “bills of exchange” drawn upon Jay’s account in Spain.  Bills of exchange were 
roughly equivalent to short-term bonds that also circulated throughout the Atlantic world as a form of 
international currency.  In this case, they would be used as a medium of exchange until they 
eventually reached Jay, who would be expected to exchange them for hard currency.  These 
particular bills were made payable in “six months sight,” meaning that Jay would have six months 
from the time a given bill arrived, to make payment.  If he failed to make payment, however, then the 
holder of the bill could issue a “protest,” which would damage the credit of the issuer—in this case, 
Congress.  Congress did not spend the entire £100,000 at once.  They used the bills gradually, with 
the result that they made their way to Spain in a piecemeal and rather unpredictable manner. 48 
The issue was of tremendous consequence for if Jay defaulted on the bills, the already anemic 
credit of the United States would be destroyed, leaving the Americans even more dependent than 
they were on the beneficence of France.  The news also left Jay in the position of a supplicant, and 
undermined the aura of dignity and confidence that he had so assiduously sought to cultivate.  Yet he 
neither flinched nor panicked but rather sent a note to Floridablanca, explaining that while the 
decision might, under ordinary circumstances, “appear extraordinary” or “indelicate,” it had been 
prompted by an unavoidable crisis, and predicated on the confidence that Congress had in the 
“friendly Disposition” of the king.49  The latter point was particularly important, for it was to become 
the single most effective point of leverage that Jay would have in the coming months—the idea that 
                                                
48 The resolutions were passed on November 23, and instructions to Jay were passed on November 30.  See 
JCC, XV:1285, 1288-89, 1299-1300, 1326-27 for details. See also From the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 
December 11, 1778, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:5.  
49 As a means of preventing further depreciation in the currency, Congress had resolved to stop issuing new 
money and to depend entirely on taxes raised by the states as of January 1, 1780.  Not knowing whether the state 
would send the requisite funds—and suspecting that they would not—Congress had taken the only step that seemed 
viable under the circumstances. See “John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca,” in Nuxoll, SPJJ, 94-95, for further 
discussion of this issue. 
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the great and generous Carlos III, who had expressed publicly his friendly disposition toward the 
United States, would not now allow the new nation to default over a relatively small sum of money.50 
At the conference of May 11, Floridalanca gave his response—recounting at considerable 
length the expenses that Spain had incurred in the course of the war, and the difficulties that they 
now faced in securing specie given that the treasure fleets had been suspended for the duration of the 
conflict.  He did not refuse aid, however, and concluded his address by suggesting that it would be in 
his power to advance £25,000—40,000, by the end of the year.  In the meantime, “he would take 
such measures as would satisfy the owners of [any bills that might be presented],” on the basis of the 
king’s personal credit.  Furthermore, he promised “repeatedly and in the strongest manner” that it 
was the King’s intention to help the Americans, noting that during negotiations with Britain the 
previous year (when the Spanish had tried unsuccessfully to mediate an end to the war) Carlos III 
“would on no account be brought to sacrifice the Interest of America.”51  The Americans, he 
concluded, should be fully persuaded that Carlos III, “was not less determined at present to support 
their Interests, whether formally connected with America by Treaty or not.”52   
Because Jay’s bills were payable in “six months sight” (which was when the promised funds 
would become available) the Spanish response forestalled an immediate crisis and gave Jay time to 
formulate a response.  (It was likely with that fact in mind that Floridablanca had offered to provide 
£25–40,000 “by year’s end”—as it would keep Jay in Spain for at least that long, offering hope that 
he might be persuaded to give up rights to Mississippi in exchange for financial aid.  His presence 
                                                
50 The relative value of the sums in question will be discussed further, but £100,000 was roughly equivalent 
to the cost of five ships of the line.  If the Spanish had immediately refused aid, Jay would have also have written to 
Congress, which would have refrained from spending any remaining bills, thus mitigating the damage. 
51 The negotiations had broken down in part of George III’s demand that France renounce its alliance with 
the United States as a precondition to negotiations.  Carlos III had indeed rejected that demand.  What Floridablanca 
neglected to mention was that the Spanish had predicated their offer of mediation on long-term truce based on the 
concept of uti possidetis, whereby Britain would have retained possession of all the territory that it then had control 
of, including New York City and Newport, Rhode Island. 
52 “Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca,” May 11, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:105. 
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also provided the Spanish with leverage in their on-going negotiations with England.)  Yet the 
Spanish professions of friendship—especially when tied to the character of Carlos III, also 
accentuated the degree to which the negotiations were becoming a high-stakes contest over national 
honor.  The questions, at essence, were whether the Spanish could justifiably demand the Mississippi 
as compensation for bailing the Americans out of their financial predicament; or whether the 
Americans could justifiably ask Spain financial aid without offering any compensation other than the 
usual interest payments.  Investing in the United States was a risky proposition that would normally 
merit a demand for collateral, but the sums in question were not large in comparison with Spanish 
resources.  Could the great and magnanimous Carlos III refuse a request for aid?  On the other hand, 
would the Americans risk their credit—and perhaps their revolution—and put the issue to the test? 
In Jay’s first conference of May 11, Floridablanca had stressed the need for the Americans to 
offer some form of compensation for Spanish aid—suggesting that a number of “light Frigates, 
Cutters, or swift sailing Vessels of that Size, loaded with Tobacco or other Produce,” might due, 
which could be sailed to a Spanish port and after “discharging their Cargoes, be left at the 
Disposition of Spain.”53  In early June he followed up on this request, specifying that if the United 
States supplied Spain with “four good Frigates, and some other lighter Vessels,” outfitted with 
Spanish materiel but manned with American sailors, and to be sailed under Spanish colors, the King 
would commit to paying the full £100,000 that Congress had requested in two years time.54 
The proposal was strange in that the Spanish already had one of the largest navies in the 
world and—as Jay pointed out in his response, the holders of the bills regarded them as an immediate 
source of specie, and could never be persuaded to wait two years.  More importantly, it would defeat 
the purpose of the American request for Congress to spend the proceeds of the loan on ships that 
would immediately be given away; nor was it reasonable to ask American sailors to serve abroad in 
                                                
53 “Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca,” May 11, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:106. 
54 Floridablanca to John Jay, June 7, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:145. 
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time of war when their homeland was under siege.  Floridablanca knew all of this, of course, and it is 
almost certain that made the request in order to underscore the Americans’ obligation to reimburse 
Spain for the funds they were requesting.  He also did so knowing that the United States had nothing 
of material value to offer Spain—except for rights to the Mississippi River.  
 On June 2, Floridablanca informed Jay that two English gentlemen had recently arrived in 
Spain and assured him that they were merely passing through Madrid to make proposals about an 
exchange of prisoners and “possibly others of a different nature.” Jay, he said, should “make himself 
easy on this Subject,” and rest assured “of the King’s strict regard to Justice and good Faith and of 
his disposition to assist America.” When Jay took the occasion to ask if he might accept recently 
arrived bills for $600–700, the count “told him smiling that he might accept them, and he hoped so to 
arrange matters, as in a short Time to make him easy on that Head.”55   
 Over the following weeks, the tone of the correspondence became increasingly focused on 
national honor, as the two men parried for moral ground.  In offering funds in exchange for the 
frigates, Floridablanca stressed the generosity of the king who wished to “evince the concern” that he 
felt for “the Prosperity… of the United States.  Jay observed in response that, “The enlarged Ideas 
my Constituents entertain of the power, wealth, and resources of Spain are equal to those they have 
imbibed of the wisdom and probity of his Catholic Majesty.”  After offering a lengthy explanation 
for why the United States could not reasonably be asked to accept the offer also closed in these 
dramatic terms:  
I cannot prevail upon myself to conclude, without expressing to your Excellency my 
apprehension of the Anxiety and painful concern, with which Congress would receive 
Intelligence of the Failure of their bills; especially after the expectations they have been 
induced to conceive of the successful Issue of their Affairs here. What conclusions the 
Enemy would draw from the inability of Spain to advance the Sum in question… I forbear to 
mention…. I still flatter myself that some Expedients may be devised to surmount the present 
difficulties, and that the harvest of Laurels now ripening for his Majesty in America, will not 
                                                
55 “William Carmichael’s Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca,” June 2, 1780, in Nuxoll, 
SPJJ, II:140-141.  The “Englishmen” were Thomas Hussey and an agent named Cumberland, who had been sent to 
continue the negotiations over possible terms of peace. 
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be permitted to wither for want of watering. Influenced by this hope I shall delay transmitting 
any intelligence respecting this matter to Congress, till your Excellency shall be pleased to 
communicate his Majesty’s further pleasure on the Subject.56 
 
When Jay subsequently presented a bill for $333, Floridablanca accepted it, but said that he could 
accept no further bills without consulting the king.57 
 Near the end of the month, Jay brought matters to a head by informing Floridablanca, in 
writing, that he was counting on Spain to provide the £25–40,000 to which the count had alluded in 
the conference of May 11.  In so doing, Jay put the onus on the Spanish court to instruct him to do 
otherwise.  He did this knowing, or suspecting, that the Spanish would never give him such 
instructions, for fear that their reputation would suffer should it became known that they had declined 
to lend such a small sum.  The letter also makes clear that Jay’s decision not to inform Congress, or 
not to ask Congress to stop drawing on him, was a deliberate choice, made with the understanding 
that he held the moral high ground in the dispute, and would be able to justify his conduct in the 
event that the dispute should ultimately end in a loss of American credit.58 
It is notable that Jay framed his policy as the equivalent to that which any nation or state 
might adopt under similar circumstances. “It is not uncommon,” he wrote to Floridablanca, “for 
ancient and oppulent Nations to find it necessary to borrow money in time of war, but I believe it 
very seldom happens that they find it convenient to pay these Debts till the return of Peace.  If this be 
the case with Powerful & long established Nations, more cannot be expected from a young Nation 
brought forth by oppression, and rising amidst every species of Violence and Devastation which Fire, 
Sword, and malice can furnish for their Destruction… I am ready to pledge [my constituents’] faith 
                                                
56 John Jay to Floridablanca, June 9, 1780 in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:147, 151. 
57 See John Jay to Floridablanca, June 19, 1780 and Floridablanca to John Jay, June 20, 1780 in Nuxoll, 
SPJJ, II:161. 
58 John Jay to Floridablanca, June 22, 1780 in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:165-167.  In so doing, Jay also reasoned that 
he would be censored in Congress if he should prevent Congress—without due cause—from using the bills of 
exchange that had been drawn on his name.  
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for repaying to his Majesty within a reasonable term after the war, and with a reasonable interest any 
sums he may be so kind as to lend them. What more can I offer? What more can they do?”59 
 Floridablanca not only declined to instruct Jay not to accept further bills, but as Carmichael 
later recorded, he went to some lengths at a conference on July 5 to show “how much he interested 
himself in the Prosperity of our Affairs—more than once desiring Mr. Jay not to be discouraged, for 
that with Time and Patience all would go well, expatiating on the King’s character, his Religious 
observation of, and adherence to, his promises, and his own desire of having Mr. Jay’s entire 
Confidence.”  Jay reciprocated by “assuring [Floridablanca] of his full reliance on the King’s Justice 
and honor; and his particular and entire confidence in his Excellency…. The Conference ended with 
compliments and assurances on the one part, and other— The Count endeavouring to persuade Mr 
Jay of his Majesty’s desire to assist the States, and Mr. Jay assuring him of his reliance on His 
Excellency and of the good Effect which such proofs of his Majesty’s friendship would have in 
America at the present Juncture.”60  It was notable, however, that Floridablanca did not actually 
accept any bills at this meeting, the stated reason being that he was waiting for a certain “person” 
who was to replace Miralles in Philadelphia, and with whom he needed to converse before making 
additional payments.61   And so the tensions, and the stakes in the contest, gradually increased. 
 In the weeks that followed, bills continued to arrive and the holders—Spanish merchants in 
most cases—became increasingly vociferous in their demands for payment.  On July 11, Jay wrote to 
Floridablanca regarding bills that had come due in the amount of $1,650.  The count replied the next 
day to say that he was still waiting for “the person.”  He asked Jay to request a fifteen-day extension.  
On July 29, he wrote to apologize but said he was still waiting.  Again on August 12, he offered the 
                                                
59 Somewhat ironically, the Spanish were at that very moment trying to raise funds in France, and were 
being frustrated in their efforts by the French, who offered better terms to the bankers in question.  In part, then, 
Floridablanca was pushing the Americans off onto the French, whom he thought better able—and more fully 
obligated—to bear the financial burden of keeping the American Revolution afloat.  
60 “Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca” July 5, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:187-190. 
61 Miralles died suddenly at Morristown, NJ, in the spring of 1780. 
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same excuse, claiming to be mortified by the delays.  Thereafter he ceased to respond.  Jay wrote to 
him on August 16, 17, 18, and 25, detailing the growing pile of bills and the corresponding demands 
from the merchants, and received no answer.  Though tempted to accept some of the bills for 
payment, based on the count’s earlier assurances, he chose not to so lest that step be used as a pretext 
for refusing payment, as “appearances led me to suspect that any tolerable Excuse for such Refusal 
would have been very grateful.”62  On the 26th, Jay paid the count a visit in person but was told that 
he was “indisposed”—though later in the day he was seen going out on business.  Finally, on August 
27, Jay went to see Montmorin, the French ambassador, to ask for help.  Montmorin agreed to talk to 
Floridablanca.  He did so three days later, on the 30th but without success.63 
 When Jay met with Montmornin later in the afternoon of August 30, the ambassador urged 
him to send Floridablanca another letter.  Jay declined, saying “that while four Letters on the Subject 
remained unanswered, it could not be necessary to write a fifth.”  Montmorin urged Jay to consider 
the “Importance of Spain,” and to remember “that we were as yet only rising States, not firmly 
established or generally acknowledged &c.” and to write the Minister another Letter praying an 
audience.”  Jay now allowed the conversation to reach a point of crisis.  He answered that the object 
of his coming to Spain was to make “Propositions not Supplications.” That he considered America as 
being, “Independent in fact,” that he could not “imagine Congress would agree to purchase from 
Spain the acknowledgment of [that] fact, at the Price she demanded for it; That I intended to abide 
Patiently the fate of the Bills, and should transmit to Congress an account of all matters relative to 
them;” that I should then write the Minister another Letter on the Subject of the Treaty, and if that 
should be treated with like neglect… I should then consider my Business at an End.”  He added that 
                                                
62 See Jay’s later description of these events in his letter to the President of Congress, Nov. 6, 1780, in 
Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:331. 
63 What Jay did not know was that the Anglo-Spanish negotiations were reaching a climax at the time.  
Spain’s overall position in the war was also quite tenuous and it seemed quite possible, over the summer of 1780, 
that the Spanish might drop out of the war entirely. 
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for his part, he thought it best that the United States “rest content with the Treaty with France, and by 
avoiding Alliances with other Nations, remain free from the Influence of their disputes and 
Politics.”64 
 As with nearly step that Jay took in these negotiations, the emotions that he had just 
expressed were deliberate, strategic, and carefully considered. “How far the tone of this conversation 
may be judged to have been prudent,” he wrote to Congress, “I know not— It was not assumed 
however but after previous, and mature deliberation. I reflected that we had lost Charlestown, that 
Reports run hard against us, and therefore that this was no time to Clothe oneself with humility.”  On 
further reflection, Jay decided that if Montmorin persisted in his advice, that he would relent to the 
extent of sending his secretary to pay Floridablanca a compliment, thus giving the count a face-
saving means of renewing contact if he chose to do so.  Carmichael paid the visit on Sept. 2 and was 
told that Floridablanca might possibly see Jay on the following Tuesday, Sept. 5.  In the meantime, 
Carmichael was told, “the person” had arrived and would come to see Jay in the very near future.  
 The mysterious individual, it turned out, was Diego de Gardoqui, a prominent merchant who 
was fluent in English and had played an instrumental role in sending secret aid to America early in 
the war.  Gardoqui paid Jay a visit the very next day, and now, through the medium of this unofficial 
agent, the contest between Jay and Floridablanca came to a head.65  After the usual pleasantries, 
Gardoqui pressed home the point that the Americans offered no “Consideration” for the money they 
solicited.  When Gardoqui suggested ship timber, Jay replied as he had before that “it could answer 
no purpose to borrow money with one Hand, and instantly repay it with the other” and said that the 
United States stood ready, as all nations did, to offer their good faith in exchange for principal to be 
repaid with interest.  Gardoqui then asked whether Congress would likely draw on Jay for the entire 
                                                
64 See again Jay to the President of Congress, Nov. 6, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:333-334. 
65 The content of these conversations is described in “Account John Jay’s Conferences with Diego de 
Gardoqui and Bernardo de Campo,” Sept. 3 and 4, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:232-233. 
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£100,000.  Jay thought it not improbable “for that they would consider the acceptance of ten or 
twelve thousand Dollars, as a prelude to further Aids, naturally supposing that if the King afforded us 
any supplies at all, they would be such as would correspond with his dignity, and not limited to that 
little Pittance.”66 
 Gardoqui returned in the evening and now “pointedly proposed my offering the navigation of 
the Mississippi as a consideration for aids.” Jay refused, saying that the object could not possibly 
“come in question in a Treaty for a Loan of One hundred thousand pounds.”  He added an eloquent 
recitation of American interests in the west, saying that “Spain should consider that to render 
Alliances permanent, they should be so formed as to render it the Interest of both Parties to observe 
them.”  Gardoqui responded that the Americans should leave the matter for future generations to 
resolve and there the conference ended.  He asked Jay to meet him the next day at the house 
Bernardo del Campo, Floridablanca’s Secretary, who now removed the gloss of politeness.  After 
issuing the usual “stricture” on the “Impropriety” of Congress having drawn bills without prior notice 
or consent, he went to observe first that Congress ought to have drawn on France, which was richer 
than Spain; that “the King must first take of his own People before he could supply” the United 
States; that Spain had been brought into the war only as a consequence of the Americans’ quarrel 
with Britain, but “had received no Advantage”; that they had been told of the Americans’ “Readiness 
to assist in taking Pensacola &c. but instead of Aids… had heard of nothing but demands;” that the 
situation of the United States “was represented as being deplorable;” that some states were rumored 
at that very moment to be in negotiations for peace with England. 
 “Whether this Style proceeded from natural arrogance, or was intended to affect my 
Temper,” Jay later wrote to Congress, I cannot say— In either case I thought it most prudent to take 
no notice of it, but proceed calmly and cautiously.”  He responded with many of the same arguments 
                                                




that he had before: Miralles’ had assured the Americans of Spain’s friendly disposition, Spain 
benefitted from American arms being directed against British forces; the United States was not 
making demands but only requesting aid; that if in April, “he had been told plainly that no Money 
could be advanced, further drafts would soon have been prevented,” but that “a contrary conduct” 
had been adopted and “Expectations… excited;” that he was unaware of Spain having joined the war 
on behalf of the United States; that it was unreasonable to expect American troops to aid in the 
conquest of Pensacola while their homeland was under invasion; that rumors of the Revolution’s 
imminent collapse were spread by the enemy; that they would be willing and able to pay their debts 
after the war; and that he did not believe rumors of peace negotiations between Britain and American 
states any more than he did “of their being private negotiations between Spain and Britain for a 
separate Peace, which the Minister assured me was not the Case.”67  In all of this Jay persistently 
framed the issue as a request for a loan, predicated on the generosity of his Catholic Majesty, and 
proposed on the same terms as that available to any other bona fide nation: principal plus interest, 
payable at the end of the war.68 
 As the contest reached a climax, the question, distilled to its essence, was whether Jay would 
give up American rights to the Mississippi, or whether Floridablanca would either supply the needed 
funds or allow the United States to default on its obligations.  While the question was largely about 
material interests, it is notable that the debate was largely framed in terms of honor and morality—
the propriety of the United States having made the request that they did, and in the manner that they 
did, and the price that they ought to pay as a consequence.  In the end, Floridablanca managed to find 
a middle way forward, that avoided either of these two extremes, but it was clear that he blinked first, 
and the method by which he did so is revealing.  On September 6, Gardoqui informed Jay that he 
                                                
67 Jay was fully aware that negotiations of some sort were then on-going between Floridablanca and 
Cumberland. 
68 See again: “Account John Jay’s Conferences with Diego de Gardoqui and Bernardo de Campo,” Sept. 3 
and 4, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:232-233. 
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might accept a particular set of bills, valued at $1,110.  One week later, Gardoqui delivered a verbal 
note from Floridablanca to the effect that “the Exigencies of the State would not permit his Majesty 
to provide for the Payment of more of the Bills drawn upon [Jay] than had been already accepted.”69 
 Knowing that a message conveyed in this manner “might hereafter be either denied, or 
explained away as convenience might dictate,” Jay sent a letter to the count the next day, stating that 
“as America has been induced to Consider the friendship of his Catholic Majesty as among the 
number of hers, I must request the favour of your Excellency to tell me frankly, whether the United 
States may expect any, and what, aids from Spain.”  Floridablanca’s response, the following day, 
came in the form of a letter dictated to Gardoqui, and initially unsigned—though Gardoqui 
eventually signed it reluctantly when Jay pressed that point.  Floridablanca now averred that it was 
“not his majesty’s intention to stop assisting the States whenever means can be found to do it” but 
that money could not be spared in Europe that year because of the “undermining of some persons of 
rank in France.”70  He then went to press many of the same moral arguments that del Campo had 
used on Sept. 4, the essential ones being that the Spanish king, had been unable to “arrange his 
affairs” to meet the Americans’s needs—having received no advance notice of their request—“for 
which reasons & that Congress has not to this day given any tokens of a recompence, his Majesty 
might have just cause of dissgust.”   Nevertheless, he “does not nor will change his Ideas, & will 
always retain those of humanity, friendship, & compassion that has had towards the Colonies” and 
would be willing to guarantee a loan, if Jay raised the funds elsewhere, for approximately $150,000, 
payable in three years.71   
                                                
69 The conference with Floridablanca, however—tentatively scheduled for Sept. 5—was postponed and did 
not take place until the 23rd. 
70 The French Director General of Finance, Jacques Necker, had apparently undermined Spain’s efforts to 
raise a large loan over the summer of 1780, see editorial note in SPJJ, II:98-99. 
71 From Diego de Gardoqui, September 15, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:248. 
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 What is striking about Floridablanca’s response are the lengths that he went to defend the 
king’s ostensible sentiments of “humanity, friendship, & compassion” while effectively denying the 
request for funds.  The offer to guarantee a loan was useless—or a ploy to push the financial burden 
on to France—as the United States had no credit anywhere except for France.  The fact that the 
message was conveyed, first verbally, and then in an unsigned letter—dictated so as to further 
obscure its origins—testifies to the discomfort that Floridablanca felt in making these assertions.  In 
the face of Jay’s threat to go public with the fallout of the dispute, these were not arguments that he 
wanted to have publicly aired throughout Europe.   
From Jay’s perspective, the advantage of the communication was that Spain’s actual posture 
toward the United States was now clear.  And on the basis of Floridablanca’s communication, he was 
able to write to Congress the following day, instructing them to stop drawing bills on his name, and 
placing responsibility for that step on the Spanish court.  He had thus far given Spain no further 
grounds for moral complaint against the United States.72  Insofar as the negotiations between Jay and 
Floridablanca, over the summer of 1780, were a moral contest—in which the two parties sought to 
establish the rectitude, honor and propriety of its respective position, Jay had thus far prevailed, 
preserving not only the financial credit of the United States but also its reputation.   
 
Spain’s Finances as they Relate to Jay’s Negotiations 
 Before I go on to review the latter half of Jay’s tenure in Spain, I will pause briefly to 
consider the validity on Floridablanca’s argument that the “exigencies of state” made it impossible 
for Carlos III to meet the Americans’ needs.   Was there any merit to that claim, or was it merely a 
political ploy?  A complete survey of Spanish finances lies beyond the scope of this inquiry, but I 
will bring to bear a number of facts and figures that offer insight into this issue, which is important as 
                                                
72 See Jay to the President on Congress, September 16, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:250. 
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it serves to establish the degree to which the Spanish position in the negotiations reflected genuine 
hardship, or whether Floridablanca was merely posturing for political advantage.   
 For starters, it is certainly true that Americans impressions of Spain’s wealth and opulence 
were inflated.  In his circular letter to the states of September 1779, Jay had characterized the Spanish 
monarch—who had just declared war against Britain—as: “well prepared for war, with fleets and 
armies ready for combat, and a treasury overflowing with wealth.”  The reality, as Jay certainly 
realized by the summer of 1780, was that while the Spanish state did command greater wealth and 
naval power than most states in Europe, it was militarily and financially inferior to both Britain and 
France.  From the perspective of the court, that relative inferiority to its chief rivals was Spain’s 
defining attribute, and one that they resented and were struggling to overcome.73  It was also true, as 
Floridablanca repeatedly emphasized, that the court had suspended shipment of silver bullion from 
the Americas for the duration of the war—which amounted to 25% of the state’s annual revenue—
both to prevent capture by the enemy and also to undermine the British financial system.74  Portions 
of the Spanish economy—especially the nascent cotton and cloth industries—were also suffering as a 
consequence of the slow down in trade with the colonies.75  Perhaps most significant was the fact that 
                                                
73 Spain’s inferiority to Great Britain in the 1780s is indisputable.  As for France, by September 1781 he 
was writing to Congress that “the Treasury of Spain” was in fact “very low.”  Jay to the President of Congress, 
September 20, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:562.  As for Spain’s perceived inferiority to France, it comes out both in del 
Campo’s statement to Jay, on Sept. 4, that the Americans ought to have drawn bills on France, “who were richer 
than they,” Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:234.  According to John Lynch, the Spanish navy in particular served chiefly as a 
deterrent—being impressive in size and apparently formidable, but actually ineffective in battle, being manned with 
poorly trained sailors and officers, Bourbon Spain, 314. 
74 See del Campo’s comment to Jay on September 4 that the court “had given Orders that none should be 
sent home during the War, even if it continued these Ten Years, and this done in Order, by stopping the usual 
Current of Specie into Europe, to embarrass the measures which Great Britain must take to obtain her necessary 
Supplies.”  See “Account of John Jay’s Conferences with Diego de Gardoqui and Bernardo de Campo,” Sept. 3 and 
4, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:233.  See also Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 326 for the estimate that bullion amounted to 25% 
of peacetime revenue. 
75 See Herr, Revolution in Spain, 146. 
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wartime expenditures had increased from a norm of about 450 million reales ($22.7 million) to about 
700 million reales ($35 million) per year.76   
 The suspension of bullion, combined with the increase in wartime expenditures, created a 
very real dilemma for the state—but it was a dilemma for which the state had real (if costly) means 
of supplying.  One key fact was that the suspension in the flow of specie (bullion) was both voluntary 
and temporary.  The ore continued to be mined in the Americas, where it was available for both 
administrative and military expenses in that part of the world, and also as collateral for loans raised 
in Europe.77  The fact that Spain had to pay for a portion of its wartime expenditures with loans was 
normal.  It did not represent a hardship.  What did become an issue in the summer of 1780 was the 
fact that Spain and France were competing for loans from the same sources in Europe—and as 
already noted, the French Director of Finance had prevailed against Spain in one particular case, 
which annoyed Floridablanca—though it did not come close to causing a rift in Franco-Spanish 
relations.  Nor were loans the court’s only source of revenue.  The state always had the option of 
imposing taxes—though Carlos was reluctant to rely overly much on taxes for fear of affecting 
morale.  The primary alternative was to issue royal bonds or vales, which circulated as paper money. 
 The vales, which were conceived by a French-born banker named Cabarrús, first began to 
circulate in the fall of 1780.  In fact the first draft of vales, which was valued at 9.9 million pesos (or 
dollars), was actually issued on September 20, 1780, just one week after Floridablanca informed Jay 
that “exigencies of state” prevented him from accepting any more bills.  A second draft, valued at 5.3 
million pesos, was issued six months later, on March 20, 1781.  Finally on June 20, 1782, a third 
                                                
76 See Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 325-26.  The par value of the American dollar in this period was pegged to 
the value of the silver peso coin.  One dollar (or one peso) was in turn equal to 20 reales de vellón—the standard 
unit of accounting for the Spanish state.  See footnote 1 of the editorial note, “John Jay’s Conference with 
Floridablanca,” for a very helpful overview of European currencies in this period and their relative value, Nuxoll, 
SPJJ, II:100-101. 
77 For an overview of Spanish imperial finances in this era see Carlos Marichal and Matilde Souto 
Mantecón, “Silver and Situados: New Spain and the Financing of the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean in the 




draft was issued for just under 15 million pesos.78  To put this into perspective, the total value of the 
bills that Congress could potentially have drawn on Jay was £100,000 or $440,000.  That sum was 
equivalent to 4.5% of the vales issued in September 1780 or about 1.5% of Spain’s annual wartime 
expenditures.  One could argue that this was a significant sum of money to which the Americans 
were not entitled to—even in the form of a loan.  Yet when one considers that by mid-September 
1780, Floridablanca had committed to paying only $14,000 of the American bills, his argument 
becomes much less credible, and one begins to understand why he would not want his new policy 
conveyed in writing.79 
 A few final facts help to support this argument.  According to John Lynch, a 70-gun 
battleship that the Spanish navy had built in this era, was priced at £20,000, which was said to be less 
expensive than expected.  In his negotiations with Jay, Floridablanca suggested that “four fine 
frigates” and a handful of lighter vessels would be an appropriate form of compensation for 
£100,000, suggesting that a single frigate likely cost in the vicinity of £18,000.  Since the British 
pound was then worth about $4.40, Floridablanca’s commitment to Jay in 1780 amounted to a mere 
£3,200—perhaps the cost of one very small sailing vessel.  He made that commitment at the same 
time that he was threatening and planning to attempt another invasion of England—the cost of which 
Vergennes had estimated at 25 million livres ($4.6M), for France alone.80  It is also useful to consider 
that Spain lent over 5 million pesos (or dollars) to France over the course of the war—most of which 
                                                
78 See Earl J. Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain: 1651-1800. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947, 
pp. 79-81.  The vales experienced mild depreciation in 1781, fluctuating at 2-4% below par.  By the fall of 1782, 
they were trading at 13-14% below par—though they quickly recovered their value the following year, at wars end.  
79 In August 1780, the Spanish navy also achieved its greatest victory of the war, capturing the entire 
British East Indian fleet—which had just separated from its naval escort—with an estimated total value of £1.5 
million or $6.6M, a windfall that also supplemented Spain’s finances at precisely this juncture.  See Editorial Note 
on “John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca” in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:98. 
80 See Vergennes to Montmorin, January 29, 1780, quoted in Patterson, Other Armada, p. 228.  According 
to Hardman and Price, the failed invasion of England in 1779 cost France 100 million livres ($18.4M), and 
Floridablanca suspected that the French had deliberately sabotaged that effort, Louis XVI, 82. 
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was sent from Havana to French forces operating in the American theater.  Spain sent 500,000 pesos 
alone with de Grasse’s fleet in 1781.81 
 All that is to say that while Floridablanca was poignantly conscious of the gap between 
Spain’s finances and its aspiration, and while the state was indeed engaged in a highly delicate 
process of juggling funds needed to finance the war in fall of 1780, the narrative of poverty that 
Floridablanca presented to Jay was a fiction—arguably credible to those who were not privy to the 
details of Spain’s finances, but without merit when viewed in light of the resources actually at his 
disposal and the size of Jay’s solicitations to date.  He was clearly irritated with France—both for 
interfering with the loan of 1780, and more generally for pulling Spain into war on terms that it 
would not have chosen for itself—and had a corresponding desire to push the Americans’ financial 
problems onto Vergennes.  More importantly, it is crucial to keep in mind the macro-picture that 
Spain was engaged in a decades-long quest to restore its empire—at the very least to restore its 
capacity for autonomous self-sufficiency, if not full equality with England and France.  An essential 
component of that ambition was restoration of territory lost during the preceding decades.  
 As of the summer of 1780, Floridablanca had achieved none of his core ambitions.  The 
invasion of England had been a spectacular failure.  Gibraltar had been under siege for over a year, 
                                                
81 See Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War 
and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713-1796. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 302.  By contrast, the authors 
value Spain’s total direct contribution to the United States at 611,000 pesos, two-thirds of which was a gift and the 
remainder a loan.  Citation to José Antonio Armillas Vicente, “El Nacimiento de una Gran Nación. Contribución 
Española a la Independencia de los Estados Unidos de América del Norte,” Cuadernos de Investigación del Colegio 
Universitario de Logroño. Logroño: Colegio Universitario, 1977, 91-98. 
For a more concrete example, in September 1781, Montmorin wrote to Floridablanca to request the transfer 
of 1 million pesos to France, as Spain’s contribution to the common expenses of the war.  The king immediately 
authorized the transfer of 500,000 pesos.  When Floridablanca resisted payment of the balance, Montmorin sent a 
follow-up note from his court, effectively demanding the funds—implying that Vergennes believed Spain to have 
that sum readily available.  See Fernández, Documentos, VI:194-195 for an annotated summary of correspondence 
between Floridablanca and Montmorin from September 12–November 1, 1781. 
Finally, on August 8-9, 1780, a Spanish squadron under admiral Córdoba had also captured a 61-ship 
British convoy off the coast of Cadiz, worth £1,500,000 (cited in Dull, French Navy, 186-194.  The resources could 
have been used to aid the United States, if the Spanish had been inclined to do so.  
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and showed no signs of imminent collapse.82  Minorca was still in British hands.  Spain’s only real 
victory had come in the Americas where forces under Bernardo de Gálvez had captured Natchez and 
Mobile, enabling Spain to close the Mississippi to British shipping for the duration of the war.  Yet 
Britain still retained treaty rights to navigate the length of the river—rights that would resume their 
validity at the close of the war, unless Spain forced Britain to relinquish them—and Britain still held 
Pensacola, giving its navy full access to the Gulf of Mexico.  There seemed every possibility, 
therefore, that Floridablanca would have the dubious distinction of having presided over yet another 
disastrous war with England, in which French priorities pulled Spain into a conflict from which the 
Spanish suffered nothing but loss.  For all of these reasons it was quite understandable that 
Floridablanca was embittered with Vergennes and determined to force him to bear all costs 
associated with the American Revolution.   
 As for Spain’s long-term policy vis-à-vis the United States, he had made it clear to 
Montmorin back in January, that “the most desirable outcome… would be a weak America locked in 
long-term quarreling with Great Britain, with Spain and France acting as ‘co-protectors’ to the feeble 
thirteen states.”83  So long as that policy remained in force, he had no incentive to offer any aid to the 
United States beyond the bare minimum necessary to keep the rebellion from failing—which would 
have the disastrous consequence of freeing British forces to attack France and Spain.84  Why, then, 
did Floridablanca offer Jay the aid that he did, and entice him to stay in Spain—and continue to 
                                                
82 A British fleet under Lord Rodney had managed to break the siege and supply the fortress in January. 
83 Montmorin to Vergennes, January 10 and March 29, 1780, Citation to FrMAE: CP-E, 597: 83-84; 598: 
319-322.  Can’t remember where I found this quote but it is also referenced in Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:711, in an editorial 
note entitled, “Congress appoints John Jay Minister to Spain.”  The footnote includes citations to LDC, 11: 381–83, 
12: 71–73; Wharton, RDC, III:39–40; Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 97–102; Giunta, EN, I:29–30. 
84 One year later, on October 2, 1781, Montmorin would report to Vergennes that Jay had made so little 
progress toward a treaty that he was tempted to abandon his mission.  Montmorin added that he himself had often 
wished the Spain’s policy toward the United States was not so obvious. Quoted in footnote 4 of an editorial note on 
“Propositions for a Treaty with Spain,” in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:571 with citation to FrPMAE: CP-E, 606: 8r–1.  
According to the editors, Montmorin added that “he had been unable to convince Floridablanca that nothing could 
be gained by totally alienating the Americans, since the Spanish minister believed that Americans were tied to 
England by indissoluble bonds, could never be trusted allies, and might become dangerous enemies.” 
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accept bills—for as long as he did?  The most likely explanation is that he would not let Jay go as 
long as there was any possibility that the Americans might be persuaded to yield ground on the 
Mississippi.  If the immediate financial pressures engendered by the bills of exchange did not 
produce the desired result, there was always the possibility that time would work an improvement.  
 In the meantime, Floridablanca would pursue every other option available to him, and here 
Jay was a very useful source of leverage.  I have already cited Floridablanca’s dispatches to Germain 
(written in Hussey’s voice) from January 1780, in which he used the imminent arrival of “Mr. Jay” as 
a means of pressuring Britain into a settlement.  Once negotiations with Cumberland began in June, 
he continued to use this same device. When negotiations opened on June 21 he asserted, as means of 
establishing the king’s credibility, that “to this hour… [he had] resisted every idea of a treaty” with 
the United States.  When news arrived of the British victory at Charleston, he congratulated 
Cumberland on the “happy event” and hoped it would be followed “by the total Submission or 
reduction of the Colonies.”85  When the negotiations finally broke down in the fall, over Britain’s 
refusal to give up Gibraltar, Floridablanca warned Cumberland that the moment he left Spain 
“without settling Matters,” Carlos III would “immediately treat with Mr. Jay and acknowledge him.” 
When Cumberland actually left, however, in the early in the spring of 1781, neither negotiations, nor 
acknowledgement of American independence were forthcoming.86 
 
The Second Phase of Jay’s Negotiations: Revised Instructions from Congress 
 Jay’s experience in Madrid over the course of 1780 did nothing to change his core 
convictions regarding American claims to the Mississippi.  Congress’s views, however, did begin to 
soften as a consequence of Jay’s reports.  By February 1781—having received Jay’s early dispatches, 
indicating that the issue of navigation was an impediment to a treaty—Congress modified his 
                                                
85 This was clearly an overstatement, for an American defeat would have been highly dangerous for Spain. 
86 Citations taken from Bemis, Hussey-Cumberland, 73, 80, 92. 
 
 157 
instructions to whit that: if Spain should “unalterably” insist on exclusive navigation below the 31st 
parallel, Jay was authorized to “recede” from that demand, provided only that his Catholic Majesty 
guarantee American rights to navigate the river above that line.  Jay was also to abandon Congress’s 
earlier demand for “a free Port or Ports” below the 31st parallel—though he was still to “make every 
possible effort” to obtain that concession.87  Jay did not agree with the new instructions, yet he 
nevertheless complied with them—later writing that “whatever might have been, or may be my 
private Sentiments, they shall never in mere questions of Policy, influence me to deviate from those 
of Congress.”88  The instructions nevertheless left him with a good deal of leeway in determining 
how to comply with the will of Congress.  The strategy that he adopted, and the reasons that he set 
forth in defense of that strategy, reveal yet another core aspect of Jay’s diplomacy—a propensity to 
ground his decisions in an overt and highly refined exercise of reason and discretion.89   
 Jay first learned of Congress’s instructions in a private letter from James Lovell—a delegate 
from Massachusetts and a member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs—which arrived on May 18, 
1781.  As he later wrote to Congress, the instructions left him in a delicate position, for the question 
of whether Spain was in fact “inalterably” committed to exclusive navigation of the Mississippi was 
a matter of judgment.  If Jay should conclude that it was, and consequently cede the Americans’ 
claim, his decision would likely be called into question by those most devoted to that claim.  If, by 
contrast, he should determine not to yield the rights to Spain, it might “soon be whispered, what rich 
                                                
87 See the President of Congress to John Jay, Feb. 15, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:391. 
88 See Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:588. 
89 There was of course no inherent contradiction between submission to Congress and the exercise of 
discretion, for Congress’s instructions were limited to a just a handful of major points or objectives—the implication 
being that Jay should use his judgment in fulfilling his assignment.  It is worth noting in this context that Congress’s 
instructions were remarkably sparse in comparison with those that Vergennes sent to Gérard.  Most of Jay’s 
reasoning on the subject are contained in another of his lengthy dispatches to Congress, this one dated October 3, 
1781, and printed in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:580-602. 
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supplies, and golden opportunities the United States had lost by my obstinacy.”90  His solution was to 
subject the decision to a rigorous process of rational review, which he detailed to Congress at some 
length.  He began by permitting his “mind to dwell on these considerations… that I might, by the 
utmost degree of circumspection, endeavour to render the uprightness and propriety of my conduct as 
evident as possible.”  Having done so, he concluded that the decision hinged on the answer to two 
basic questions, both somewhat technical in nature: First, did the private letter from Lovell provide 
sufficient authority to proceed?  And second, were the Spanish “already… acquainted with the 
contents of this Instruction.”  
 Regarding the first question, Jay observed that Lovell’s letter was neither official nor had the 
instructions it contained been authenticated.  In the absence of an official letter from the President of 
Congress—which was the proper channel of communication—and on recollecting that “in some 
former Instances, [Congressional resolutions] been reconsidered, and either altered or repealed a few 
days after” having been approved, Jay concluded that it would be “imprudent immediately to hazard 
overtures on the ground of this Instruction.”  He therefore decided to proceed for the time being on 
the assumption that he did not yet have the authority to make the concession.  That stance was soon 
complicated, however, by the fact that it was readily apparent that Floridablanca was in fact fully 
acquainted with Congress’s decision, and was now simply waiting for Jay to yield as instructed.  
There was in fact evidence to suggest that Spain had been aware of Congress’s resolution as early as 
March 25, at which point Floridablanca had written to retract his earlier intimations that funds would 
be available to pay the American bills due in April. 
 Floridablanca’s decision, Jay wrote, “appeared… to be really cruel or if he had intended to 
withhold the necessary supplies, he ought to have given me notice of it, and not by keeping up my 
expectations to within a few days before the holders of the Bills were to call upon me for their 
                                                
90 Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:587. 
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money.”91   When Jay pressed the French ambassador for an explanation as to Spain’s sudden change 
of policy, “he intimated that the Court expected I should have made them some further overtures 
respecting the Mississippi.”  When Jay responded that he had no authority to do so, Montmorin 
“replied that the Minister believed I had”92—thus leading Jay to conclude that the funds were likely 
being withheld “to extort overtures from me.”  At that point, of course, Jay had no knowledge at all 
of Congress’s decision, and so the question of American policy remained in suspense for nearly eight 
more weeks, until Lovell’s letter arrived.  Once that letter was in hand, Jay decided, as already noted, 
not to immediately act on its contents, but rather wait a while longer in hopes that an official letter 
would arrive.  He did, however, begin to test the count’s reaction to the possibility that Congress 
might yield ground, with the goal of ascertaining the effect that it might have and the results that the 
Americans might expect to gain as a result. 
 During a conference on May 19, Floridablanca intimated to Jay that he was “very minutely 
informed of the State of our affairs,” and added that “the good disposition of Congress towards 
Spain, had not as yet been evinced in a manner the King expected,” and suggesting “that Congress 
were not sufficiently apprised of the importance of Spain, & the policy of complying with her 
demands.”  To all this Jay replied that “it was not in their power to give his Majesty other proofs of 
their attachment than what they had already done,” but that if he “alluded to the affair of the 
Mississippi, I could only add… that even if a desire of gratifying his Majesty should ever incline 
Congress to yield to him a point so essential to their Interest, yet it still remained a question whether 
new delays and obstacles to a treaty would not arise to postpone it.”  The count “smiled” and said 
                                                
91 Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:582.  The bills for April amounted to 
just under $90,000. 
92 Floridablanca must either have intercepted letters from Congress or received the information from 
Montmorin, who in turn learned it from Luzerne, the French minister in Philadelphia. 
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“that whenever I should announce to him, my having authority to yield that point, I might depend on 
his being explicit, & candid” on that point.”93   
 At this point in his dispatch, Jay pauses to reflect on the strategy that he would have pursued 
if circumstantial evidence did not so strongly suggest that Floridablanca was already informed of 
Congress’s resolution.  “It has uniformly been my opinion,” he wrote, “that if after sending me here, 
Congress had constantly avoided all questions about the Mississippi, and appeared to consider that 
point as irrevocable, Spain would have endeavoured to purchase it by money, or a Free-Port.”  Even 
at the present juncture, he continued—knowing that American bills were safe for at least six months, 
due to “the intervention of Doctor Franklin”—Jay would have adopted an aloof disposition and 
“appeared to give myself no concern about the Bills… applied for no aids, made no offers, and on all 
proper occasions, have treated an alliance with Spain as an event, which, tho’ wished for, was not 
essential to our Safety, and as the price demanded for it appeared to us unreasonable, it was not 
probable we should agree.”  As a general rule, Jay opined, “I am persuaded that prudent self respect 
is absolutely necessary to those nations who would wish to be treated properly by this court, and I 
have not the least doubt but that almost any spirit will prosper more here, than that of humility & 
compliance” (emphasis added).94  Jay concluded by observing that he “had no doubt” that this “plan 
of conduct” was consistent with his instructions “to make every possible Effort to obtain from his 
Catholic Majesty the use of the river aforesaid.” 
 The reality, however, was that Spain’s “hopes of a change in the Opinion of Congress” 
having been “excited, & kept alive by successive Accounts of debates, & intended debates” on the 
issue; and seeing now, in particular “that the cession of this Navigation was made to depend on their 
persevering to insist upon it, it became absurd to suppose that they would cease to persevere.”   Jay’s 
only option, in the next conference, “was to break this subject as decently as possible.”  He 
                                                
93 Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:584. 
94 Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:587-88. 
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nevertheless proceeded cautiously, and continued first to try and ascertain the gains that Congress 
was likely to secure in exchange for the cession.  At his next conference on May 23, Jay mentioned 
that he had received private letters from Congress, adding that he regretted the “miscarriage” of his 
public letters “and the more so as my private ones gave me reason to expect Instructions,” to the 
effect that “if Spain would consent forthwith to come into [a Treaty with the United States]… they 
would gratify his Majesty by ceding to him the Navigation of the Mississippi below their territories, 
on reasonable terms.”  His statement produced precisely the effect that Jay had hoped that it would 
for after reaffirming Spain’s desire to “the exclusive navigation of the Gulph of Mexico,” 
Floridablanca added, “That all these affairs could with more facility be adjusted at a general peace 
than now, for that such a particular and even secret treaty with us might then be made, as would be 
very convenient to both….”95 
 The implications of the statement, Jay later wrote to Congress, were clear.  Despite 
Floridablanca’s frequent intimations that the navigation of the Mississippi was the only obstacle to a 
treaty, the reality, Jay adjudged, was that the Spanish court had no intention of recognizing the 
United States prior to the conclusion of the war.  Though they perhaps wished to see the Americans 
achieve independence they did not wish to “be among the first to subscribe a Precedent that may one 
day be turned against them;” nor did they wish “to exclude themselves” by allying with the United 
States, from other advantages [like the British cession of Gibraltar] that “the chances & Events of the 
war” might bring their way.  “[I]n case we sink,” they do not wish “that we should be fastened to 
them by any particular ties;” and “in case we survive” they wish to be “so circumstanced as… to 
make the most of us.”  As for the negotiations in which he was presently enmeshed, Jay concluded 
that Floridablanca’s goal was to “draw from us all such concessions as our present distress, & the 
                                                
95 Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:590.  By floating the concept on the 
authority of private communication, Jay was deploying a common diplomatic strategy in that private statements 
were off the record and could later be repudiated if necessary. 
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hopes of aid may extort”—concessions which could then be formalized at the conclusion of the war 
in the form of a treaty.96  
 Jay’s analysis, it is important to note, was purely speculative at the time—based only on his 
reading of Floridablanca’s behavior and professions to date.  Yet it is clear with the benefit of 
hindsight and the documentary evidence available to historians, that his conclusions were precisely 
on the mark.  He was nevertheless still obligated to make the concession that Congress had 
authorized and he now proceeded to do so in the safest way possible—by making it conditional on 
Spain’s immediately negotiating a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States.  It took four 
more months for the full process to unfold.  After waiting two more weeks, in vain, for an official 
letter from Congress to arrive, Jay wrote a brief letter to Floridablanca on July 2.  He began by 
reiterating the American desire for a treaty and reminding the count of his frequent intimations that 
the issue of navigation was the chief obstacle.  He finally concluded by informing Floridablanca that 
Congress had authorized him: “to agree to such Terms relative to the Point in Question, as to remove 
the Difficulties to which it has hitherto given Occasion.”97  While the substance of Congress’s 
cession was clearly implied, Jay omitted the details, likely to prevent Spain from using the letter as 
evidence of a unilateral concession, apart from a treaty.  
 Floridablanca did not reply and when Jay visited him on July 11, the count said that pressing 
business would prevent him from addressing the issue until later in the month at the earliest.  Further 
delays followed until finally, on September 19, Floridablanca wrote to say that he had time to meet 
with Jay at eight o’clock that same evening.  During the conference, the count asked Jay to draw up a 
set of proposals on which the treaty might be based—giving him three days to reduce it to writing, 
and asking Jay to focus particular attention on the financial aids that Congress would desire, 
                                                
96 Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:597. 
97 Jay to Floridablanca, July 2, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:489. 
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commercial relations between the two states, and the matter of the Mississippi.98  Jay responded with 
a cursory outline, dated Sept. 22, in which he reviewed the principal points in contemplation.99  
Because he suspected that the point of the exercise was to induce the United States to make 
concessions in writing, that would not actually result in a treaty until the end of the war, Jay’s points 
were cursory in nature.  Regarding the American desire for financial aid, Jay would only say that as 
the subject depended “on his Majesty’s Pleasure,” he could propose no specific terms other than to 
reiterate that the United States would not be in a position to offer any compensation until after the 
war.  As for commerce, he proposed standard terms, subject to whatever “reasonable Regulation” the 
Spanish might propose.   
 The issue at the heart of the proposal, of course, was the Mississippi, and here Jay inserted, in 
clear and explicit language, the substance of Congress’s concession.  He appended an explanatory 
note, however, in which he stated that “if the acceptance of [this concession] should, together with 
the proposed alliance be postponed to a general Peace, the united States will cease to consider 
themselves bound by any Propositions or offers which I may now make in their behalf.”100  It is 
notable, however, that this limitation was accompanied by nearly two pages of language in which Jay 
framed the issue in moral terms.  Congress had made the cession, Jay wrote, as a consequence of the 
impression made upon them “by the magnanimity of his Majesty’s Conduct towards them,” and in 
view of “the deep wound which an alliance with so great a monarch would give to the Hopes & 
Efforts of the Enemy—the strong Support it would afford to their Independence—the favorable 
Influence which the Example of such a King would have on other nations—and the many other great 
                                                
98 See “Notes on John Jay’s Conference with Floridablanca,” September 19, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:557-
560. 
99 Propositions for a Treaty with Spain, Sept. 22, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:566-571. 
100 Propositions for a Treaty with Spain, Sept. 22, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:569. 
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& extensive good Consequences which would result, at this interesting Period, from his Majesty’s 
taking so noble and decided a Part in their Favor.”   
 The “Value they set upon his Majesty’s Friendship,” Jay continued, can be estimated by 
considering how many advantages the Americans had hoped to gain from the river—advantages that 
they were prepared to surrender, at great cost, in exchange for a treaty with Spain.  “[T]he Difficulty 
of reconciling this measure to the Feelings of their Constituents,” Jay wrote, has appeared to 
Congress in a serious Light, and they now expect to do it only by placing in the opposite Scale, the 
Gratitude due to his Catholic Majesty, and the great and various advantages which the United States 
will derive from the acknowledgment and generous Support of their Independence by the Spanish 
Monarchy, at a Time when the Vicissitudes, Dangers & Difficulties of a distressing war… renders 
the Friendship and avowed Protection of his Cath. Majesty in a very particular Manner interesting to 
them.”  For all of those reasons, Jay concluded, it was necessary to limit the duration of the proposal, 
as described above.   
 It is important to note that though Jay believed the limitation to be “not only just & 
reasonable in itself, but absolutely necessary to prevent this Courts continuing to delay a treaty to a 
general peace,” he had no instructions from Congress to act as he had.  He consequently explained 
his decision in considerable detail with the goal of enabling Congress to “communicate to me their 
Sentiments on the Subject.”101  The decision itself, however, reveals the method that Jay would 
employ in handling controversial and delicate questions that lay beyond the purview of his authority, 
but which nevertheless required immediate action.  In such instances, he subjected the decision to a 
rigorous process of rational review, in which he took into consideration not only the relative merits of 
competing claims, but the timing and the method of making proposals, and the consequences that 
                                                
101 Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:597.  Jay added that he did not think 
that, “the limitation in question can give them… offence.” 
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would likely flow from them—always being attentive to the influence of emotion and personality, 
and the need to preserve the dignity, character and reputation of the United States.102   
Though Jay would remain in Spain for another seven and a half months—departing for Paris 
in the middle of May, 1782—this conference with Floridablanca effectively brought his negotiations 
in Spain to a close.  He continued to experience embarrassment regarding the bills that Congress 
drew on him, and in the spring of 1782, actually had to “protest,” or default on, a small set of bills 
that Floridablanca had refused to pay.  It turned out, however, that ten days prior to the protest, 
Benjamin Franklin had arranged payment for the bills in Paris, and so no harm was done.103  No 
further progress was made, however, on the issue of a treaty—Floridablanca preferring to defer 
recognition of the United States until the close of the war.   
Although Jay ultimately failed to accomplish any of the objectives for which Congress had 
sent him to Spain, he nevertheless did a service to the new nation in preserving both the financial 
credit of the United States, and American claims to a border on the Mississippi River.  He prevailed 
with such apparent equanimity that his feat, to date, has elicited little scholarly attention.  Yet close 
                                                
102 Jay did derive some assistance from the French ambassador Montmorin, whom Jay occasionally 
approached for assistance.  According to the editors of the Jay papers, Montmorin wrote to Vergennes on Oct. 2, 
1781, and “reported that Jay had consulted him about how to present Congress’s position on the Mississippi and that 
he had urged Jay to put forth all that his instructions authorized him to offer, since he was certain that Floridablanca 
was fully informed about what they contained.  He also advised Jay to mention the conditions under which the 
concession might be withdrawn.  Montmorin predicted that the concession would not persuade Spain to conclude a 
treaty before a general peace and added that Jay also believed this. Montmorin remarked that he himself had often 
wished that Spain’s policy was not so obvious.  Floridablanca…gave him no opportunity to discuss the matter…. 
[being persuaded] that [the] Americans were tied to England by indissoluble bonds, could never be trusted allies, 
and might become dangerous enemies.” Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:571 with citation to FrPMAE: CP-E, 606: 8r-11r. 
103 See SPJJ, II:704 for the text of Jay’s notice of non-payment, dated March 26, 1782.  The secretary to the 
French ambassador in Madrid asked Jay not to mention the amount of money involved as “it will appear very 
Extraordinary that you should be obliged to protest the Bills of Congress for the want of such a Sum, and People 
will naturally turn their Eyes towards France, and ask how it happened that your good Allies did not assist you. It 
will look as if we had deserted you.”  Jay replied “that since the Bills must be protested I was content that my true 
Situation should be known. I admitted his inferences to be just, and naturally flowing from the facts, adding that as 
France knew my Situation and had withheld relief she had so far deserted us—but that I was, nevertheless mindful 
of the many proofs we had received of her Friendship, and should not cease to be grateful for the ninety nine Acts of 
Friendship she had done us, merely because she had refused to do the hundredth,” SPJJ, II:768.  In response to Jay’s 
letter of September 16, 1780, Congress ceased drawing on Jay in December of that year.  Congress did not 
countermand bills already drawn until late April 1781, on receiving a subsequent letter that Jay sent on January 28 
of that year, complaining that bills continued to arrive. 
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examination of Jay’s correspondence reveal that his victories required particular skill and came at 
considerable personal cost.  One of the few instances in which Jay revealed the price that he had paid 
is found in a dispatch of Oct. 3, 1781, in which he responded to a letter from the President of 
Congress informing him of a Congressional resolution, approving his conduct. “Throughout the 
whole course of your negociations and transactions,” the resolution began, “in which the utmost 
address and discernment were often necessary to reconcile the respect due to the dignity of the 
United States with the urgency of their wants and the complaisance expected by the Spanish court, 
your conduct is entirely approved by them.”104 
 “I do not recollect,” Jay wrote in response, “to have ever received a letter that gave me more 
real pleasure.” “When I considered,” he continued, 
that almost the whole time since I left America, had afforded me little else than one 
continued series of painful perplexities and Embarrassments, many of which I neither 
expected nor ought to have met with— That I had been engaged in difficult & intricate 
negotiations, often at a loss to determine where the line of prudence was to be found, & 
constantly exposed by my particular situation, to the danger of either injuring the dignity and 
Interest of my country on the one hand, or trespassing on the over-rated respectability and 
importance of this Court on the other— I say, Sir, That on considering these things, the 
approbation of Congress gave me most singular and cordial Satisfaction.105  
 
Congress had few occasions during the war to approve the conduct of their overseas emissaries in 
language remotely similar to that which they used here—for reasons that I will explore shortly—
which leads me to return to the theme with which I began the chapter, and to look more closely at the 
distinctive traits or attributes that characterized Jay’s diplomacy.  
  
                                                
104 The President of Congress to John Jay, May 28, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:450. 
105 Jay to the President of Congress, Oct. 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:592. On April 30, 1782, Congress would 
pass another resolution, approving of Jay’s conduct during the latter half of his tenure: “That the minister 
plenipotentiary of the United States at the court of Madrid be informed that Congress entirely approve of his conduct 
as detailed in his letter of the 3d of October last; that the limitation affixed by him to the proposed surrender of the 
navigation of the Mississippi in particular corresponds with the views of Congress.”  The full text of the resolution, 
which was written by Madison, is in JCC, 22:219.  Two weeks prior, Robert Livingston, the new Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, also wrote to inform Jay that “your Conduct, thro’ the whole of your negotiation has been 
particularly acceptable to Congress,” April 16, 1782, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:717. 
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The Distinctive Attributes of Jay’s Diplomacy 
 Among the more notable attributes that Jay displayed during his tenure in Spain were his 
steadiness under pressure, and the care that he exercised in deciding on a proper policy or course of 
action.  Both attributes were informed by Jay’s temperament, but they also appear to reflect a core set 
of convictions concerning the nature and proper conduct of politics.  “In the Course of the present 
Troubles,” he would later write to a friend, “I have adhered to certain fixed Principles, and faithfully 
obeyed their Dictates, without regarding the Consequences of such Conduct to my Friends, my 
Family or myself; all of whom, however dreadful the Thought, I have ever been ready to sacrifice, if 
necessary, to the public Objects in Contest.”106  
One such principle, that Jay applied early in the war, was his determination to abide by 
Congress’s rules on secrecy—despite the fact that they were routinely flouted by his peers. “As a 
member of Congress,” he later wrote, “it had appeared to me very improper to make their 
Proceedings the Topic of Conversation out of Doors, and I made it an invariable Rule to not to speak 
of their Debates or of any maters before them to any who were not members.”  In April 1779, while 
serving as President of Congress, he also wrote to Washington: “It mortifies me on this Occasion to 
reflect that the Rules of Congress on the Subject of Secrecy which are far too general and perhaps for 
that Reason more frequently violated, restrain me from saying twenty things to you which have 
ceased to be private.”  And in a letter to his father, written from Spain in 1780, he affirmed that 
standard, stating that, “On the Subject of politics I make it a Rule to write to none but Congress.”107 
 The strictness with which Jay governed his public communications points to a more general 
distinction that he drew between his public and private character or persona.  It was not merely that 
                                                
106 John Jay to Peter Van Schaack, September 17, 1782, in SPJJ, III: 151. 
107 See undated manuscript, printed in William Jay, Life of John Jay, I: 100; Jay to George Washington, 
April 26, 1779, in SPJJ, I:621; and Jay to Peter Jay, May 23, 1780, in SPJJ, II:123. 
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Jay was motivated by a sense of public duty—though that was important to him.108  He was rather 
convinced that the rules governing his public conduct were distinct from, and stricter than, those that 
governed the private realm.  I have already noted Jay’s statement on board the Confederacy, that his 
response to Gérard, “was a Tax imposed on my Feelings by regard to public good; As a private Man 
I should have acted differently.”109  On arrival in Spain, he faced a different challenge in that the high 
cost of living, and the peripatetic nature of the court made it difficult for Jay to maintain the public 
appearance—with respect to his dress, meals, and modes of transportation—that were appropriate for 
the representative of a sovereign state: “Congress have made me no Remittances,” he wrote to 
Livingston in May, 1780.  “The small Credit I had on Doctr. Franklin is expended— The Idea of 
being maintained by the Court of Spain is humiliating, and therefore not for the public Good.”  As a 
private individual, he went on to say, “I am content.”  Nevertheless, there were “public” 
inconveniences that “merit[ed] the Consideration of Congress.”  
Such convictions were not atypical in that age.  What is more unusual was the severity and 
precision with which Jay applied those standards to his own affairs.  One area in which Jay was 
exceptionally exacting was in his communications with Congress.  As he wrote to his secretary, 
William Carmichael, soon after their arrival in Cádiz:  
The transmission of Information to Congress, by which their Counsels, and Determinations 
might be affected is a very delicate business and demands the greatest care, and Precision….  
I would choose therefore with respect to all interesting Intelligence, and particularly such as I 
may transmit to Congress to possess as far as possible every circumstance necessary to form 
a judgment of its credibility, such as the Rank and Character of the Informants and the means 
they have of acquiring the Information they give, that I may represent it as entitled to that 
degree of credit only which on full consideration, it may appear to deserve.  I observe this 
less with reference to the case in question than as a general Rule.110 
                                                
108 He would write to his college friend, Robert R. Livingston, soon after his arrival in Spain: “I am 
approaching the Age of Ambition without being influenced by its Allurements.  Public Considerations induced me 
to leave the private Walk of Life—when they cease, I shall return to it. Believe me I shall not remain here a moment 
longer than the Duties of a Citizen may detain me,” May 23, 1780, in SPJJ, II:125. 
109 Jay to the President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1779, Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:741. 




The importance of such communication did not stem from any lack of confidence on Jay’s part as to 
his ability to render appropriate decisions.  They rather flowed from his conviction that it was his 
“duty as a public servant to execute my instructions without questioning the policy of them.”111  If 
the members of Congress were to give Jay instructions, they needed accurate information. 
It was troubling to Jay that, among the “public” inconveniences that flowed from his 
financial straits, he could not afford to employ many “Couriers to carry my… Dispatches to the Sea 
Side or to France”—which was problematic in that the Spanish read all the letters that he sent by 
regular post.112   Congress never took any action, in response to this information, with the result that 
he only sent formal dispatches only about once every six months.  The dispatches, however, were 
monumental documents—containing a detailed review of every major development, notes from 
every major conference, and transcriptions any significant correspondence that Jay had either sent or 
received.113  There is nothing like these dispatches in the records of early American diplomacy, and 
while they were clearly reflected Jay’s point of view, it is also evident that he was at pains to present 
an unvarnished record, with the goal of enabling Congress to render an impartial judgment and adjust 
their policy as they thought fit.  These reports—both in their quality and their thoroughness—likely 
explain much of the confidence that Congress would place in Jay during the war. 
                                                
111 JJ to the President of Congress, September 20, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:651-562. 
112 Jay to Robert Livingston, May 23, 1780, in SPJJ, II:125-126.  In the same letter he also wrote: “The 
Court is never stationary—moving from Madrid to the Pardo, then to Aranjues—thence to St. El Defonso—thence 
to the Escurial—in perpetual Rotation—To keep a House at each place is not within the Limits of my Finances—to 
take ready furnished Lodgings and keep my own Table at each, is beyond Belief expensive. I live at Aranjues, in a 
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that the dignity of America’s public character suffered in accordance with Jay’s social status and appearance. 
113 See for example, Jay’s dispatch of Nov. 6, 1780, which in modern print form is over 15 pages long—not 
including the many embedded letters and notes—and was likely longer in manuscript form.  Jay was aware that he 
was imposing on Congress’s patience.  At one point he alluded to a point of finance that, though interesting, he 
chose to omit, suspecting that “Congress already wish this letter at an end.”  SPJJ, II:337.  In a dispatch of Oct. 3, 
1781, Jay would add that he thought it “hazardous” to give “decided Opinions of the views & designs of Courts…” 
since “different men will often draw different conclusions from the same facts.”  This reality had induced Jay to 
“state facts accurately and minutely to Congress, &… be influenced only by their… opinions.”  SPJJ, II:586. 
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When it came to Jay’s negotiations with Floridablanca, one of the notable features that he 
displayed from the outset was the importance that he attributed to social or ceremonial aspects of his 
communications.  His letters were always replete with honorific forms and conventions, attributing 
dignity to those whose offices demanded it—especially the king—and expressing gratitude whenever 
it was due.  Yet the tone of his letters betrayed nary a hint of sycophancy.  They were crafted with 
precision and with the evident goal of satisfying a standard that served to advance Jay’s dignity, as a 
minister of the United States, as much as it did that of the recipient.114   
 Jay’s concern for dignity is an oft mis-understood facet of his career.  Many historians, 
including Richard B. Morris, have characterized him as a prideful.115  While it is true that Jay often 
projected a studiously cool and aloof demeanor in public, in his private capacity he was warm, witty, 
cultured and capable of the most refined and delicate emotions.  He had a profound sense of duty 
towards his family.116  He was also an exceptionally competent writer, in a variety of genres.  One 
example that captures a number of these attributes is a letter that Jay wrote to his father, in May 
1780, soon after his arrival in Spain.  For context, Jay had been compelled by circumstances to leave 
directly for Spain from Philadelphia, and had not had time to visit his father, with whom he had a 
very close relationship, who was ailing and would not likely survive Jay’s term abroad.   
Jay wrote the letter just after his first conference with Floridablanca, shortly after news of 
Congress’s bills had undermined his negotiations.  The letter was not overtly emotional.  It rather 
                                                
114 While serving as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Jay would later write, “Every man owes it to 
himself to behave to others with civility and good manners; and every nation in like manner is obligated by a due 
regard to its own dignity and character to behave towards other nations with decorum. Insolence and rudeness will 
not only degrade and disgrace nations and individuals but also expose them to hostility and insult.  It is the duty of 
both to cultivate peace and good-will and to this nothing is more conducive than justice, benevolence, and good 
manners,” Address to the Grand Jury of Richmond, VA, May 22, 1793, in Henry P. Johnston (ed.) The 
Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970 [1890], vol. III, p. 483 (hereafter 
cited as Public Papers.) 
115 Morris attributes Jay’s conduct to his “pride and fierce independence” in Peacemakers, 223.   
116 See, for example, Jay’s letter of September 16, 1779, in which he asked his brother Frederick to care for 
their ailing father, and stated his intention to resign from the presidency of Congress (and necessarily also turn down 
his appointment as minister to Spain) and take up that duty if Frederick were unable to do so.  Nuxoll, SPJJ, I:680. 
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contained a description of Jay’s journey from Cádiz to Madrid, along with a most intricate 
description of Spanish carriages and their mode of construction.  It is unlike any of Jay’s public 
correspondence.  It appears to have been written as an act filial devotion and out of a sense that the 
subject would interest his father, and thus merited the time and effort needed to capture in a letter, in 
the midst of other pressing business.117   
Another letter that captures Jay’s wit, erudition, and human frustration with his situation in 
Spain (and the paucity of communication from Congress) was a letter that he wrote to James Lovell 
in October 1782, “I would throw stones too with all my Heart,” Jay wrote, “if I thought they would 
hit only the Committee, without injuring the Members of it—Till now, I have rec. but one Letter 
from them, and that not worth a farthing, tho it conveyed a Draft for £100,000 St. on the Bank of 
Hope.  One good private Correspondent would be worth twenty standing Committees…. What with 
clever wives, or pretty girls, or pleasant walks, or too tired, or too busy, or do you do it, very little is 
done, much postponed and more neglected.”118  
Finally, one last example, that captures the distinction between Jay’s private and public 
persona comes from a letter that Justice James Iredell of North Carolina wrote to his wife while 
riding circuit with Jay in the spring of 1793.119  Iredell had held Jay in low regard, for much the same 
reason that others did—his apparent pride and irritability.  On arrival in Richmond, however, he 
wrote to his wife, “We have just arrived perfectly well, but extremely fatigued.  We have each us of 
got an excellent room in the same house.  Mr. Jay improves infinitely upon intimacy.”  A week later 
he would add, “I am perfectly well; so is Mr. Jay, with whom I am more and more pleased.”120 
                                                
117 Jay to Peter Jay, May 23, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:119-124. 
118 Jay to Lovell, October 27, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:316. 
119 The justice of the Supreme Court were required at the time to serve as circuit judges, in which capacity 
they traveled to different portions of the country, hearing appeals to cases decided by the federal district judges.   
120 James Iredell to Hannah Iredell, May 20 and 27, 1793, in Maeva Marcus (ed.) Documentary History of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985-, Vol. 2, p. 321. 
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My own view is that the aloof demeanor that observers often attribute to pride was a 
reflection of Jay’s public demeanor that he adopted with the goal of preserving the dignity of the 
United States.  In European diplomacy, it was the king who viewed as the embodiment of the 
national character, and whose reputation, consequently, had to be carefully safeguarded. The United 
States, of course, did not have a monarch, and it was as if Jay believed that the nation’s character was 
rather embodied in the public conduct of its officials—of whom he was a prominent exemplar.  
 None of this is to suggest that Jay did not also attend to his personal reputation.  As he once 
wrote to Carmichael, in explaining behavior that his secretary might think extreme: 
I will remind you… of what you most often have heard me say—that being in a responsible 
Situation—the Servant of a Republick in which the Spirit of… ostracism always exists—
exposed to Attacks from Men I have never seen, on points I never dreamt of, and perhaps to 
be called upon… to answer to one Generation for Transactions in the Days of another, I had 
determined to walk with the utmost Circumspection and be always ready and able to render a 
Reason for every part of my Conduct in public life.”121   
 
Jay’s primary motivation in adopting such standards, however, appear to have been tied to his 
conviction that reputation was essential to of his ability to conduct public affairs and preserve the 
confidence of those who had placed him in office. 
During his negotiations with Floridablanca, Jay’s attention to civility may have won respect 
for the United States.  It also denied the Spanish any opportunity to cut off negotiations on the pretext 
that Jay had offended their dignity.  It finally prevented emotional friction from interfering with more 
serious matters at hand.122  That last point, regarding the importance of emotions, is worth 
                                                
121 Jay to Carmichael, October 2, 1780, SPJJ, II:277, “I believe there are few Instances,” Jay added, “of 
Persons conducting Business with the same minute attention that I do.” 
122 Jay paid particular importance to emotions—both his own, which he kept under control, and those of his 
counterparts, to the extent that they factored in their conduct. Describing a delicate point in the summer of 1780, 
soon after the fall of Charleston and just after Jay had rejected Floridablanca’s request for American frigates, Jay 
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prudent to have given Poignancy to the Ministers feelings, for the loss of his Frigates, and the trouble of our Bills, by 
disputes about the Mississippi, &c. &c. I therefore did not remind him of the Notes he had promised…” Jay to the 
President of Congress, Nov. 6, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:328.  The following October, in describing another conference 
with Floridablanca, Jay wrote: “Throughout the whole of this conversation the Count… seemed to want Self-
possession….  I had nevertheless no reason to suspect that this change in his behaviour arose from any cause more 
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emphasizing for some historians have suggested that Jay’s later conduct in Paris was a product of the 
irritation that he felt at having been treated so poorly by Floridablanca.  In his final dispatch from 
Spain, however, dated April 28, 1782, he would advise Congress to delay a treaty with Spain until 
after the war, not as an expression of irritation but because the Americans would then be negotiating 
from a position of strength, “Why then should we be anxious for a Treaty with [Spain],” he wrote, 
“or make Sacrifices to purchase it? We cannot now treat with her on terms of equality, why therefore 
not postpone it? It would not, perhaps be wise to break with her; but delay is in our power, and 
resentment ought to have no influence” (emphasis added).123 
 The final point that needs to be addressed in this section is the question of law.  To what 
extent were Jay’s principles legal in nature, or tied to the law of nations?  Jay used the term “law of 
nations” on only a few occasions during his tenure in Madrid—usually in a technical sense to refer to 
the laws pertaining to privateering.  On May 11, 1782, for example, just days prior to his departure 
for Paris, he responded to rumors that the United States was about to declare war on Portugal.  “I 
have not recieved from Congress,” he wrote to Floridablanca, “the least Information that the United 
states of America either had commenced, or intended to commence Hostilities against Portugal; and 
therefore have no Reason to believe that the Reports in Question are well founded.  If however that 
should be the Case, His Majesty may rest assured that the Law of Nations will be punctually 
observed towards the Spanish Merchants….”124  Nor did Jay ever cite the major treatise writers—
except to inform Congress that Vattel was banned in Spain and had no authority.125   
                                                                                                                                                       
important than those variations in temper and feelings which they who are unaccustomed to govern themselves often 
experience from changes in the weather, in their health, from fatigue of business, or other such like accidental 
causes.” Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:590. 
123 Jay to the President of Congress, April 28, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:771-772. 
124 Jay to Floridablanca, May 11, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:792. 
125 James Madison—then a member of Congress—had drafted a memo for Jay’s benefit in the fall of 1780 
with the goal of elucidating the principles behind Congress’s policy on the Mississippi and to help Jay satisfy Spain 
with respect to “the Equity & Justice of [the Americans’] intentions.” Madison grounded the Americans’ claim to 
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Yet Jay’s conferences with Floridablanca were full of highly refined legal reasoning, of 
precisely the kind that Gérard had deployed in defending French policy in Philadelphia, 
demonstrating that Jay was reasonably conversant in the technical aspects of international affairs.  
Some aspects of his capacity likely flowed from his earlier career as a lawyer in New York.  He 
understood, for example, the sharp distinction between statements made on the record, and off.  As 
he wrote to Gouverneur Morris in September 1781: The “parole Promises of the Ministers… pass 
here as the continental does with you,” (“parole” promises being statements made outside the context 
of law, and the “continental” being American paper money, which had lost its value).126  
It is notable, however, legal reasoning of this kind rarely served to resolve diplomatic 
disputes.  It rather functioned as rhetorical device that statesmen employed to gain strategic 
advantage in debate.  After a particular conference with Floridablanca, for example, Jay would record 
that, “The Minister did not at any time enter into the merits of those [legal] arguments [that Jay had 
employed], nor appear in the least affected by them—His answer to them all was that the King of 
Spain must have the Gulf of Mexico to himself. That the Maxims of policy adopted in the 
management of their Colonies required it, and that he had hoped the friendly disposition shewn by 
this Court towards us would have induced a compliance on the part of Congress.”127  In the last 
analysis, diplomatic disputes were resolved through power, and when power failed, they were 
resolved through a contest over national honor and reputation.  
                                                                                                                                                       
navigation rights on the Mississippi in the “Usage of Nations.” He also cited Vattel to the effect that “An innocent 
Passage is due to all Nations with whom a State is at Peace….” See JCC, XVIII:935-947 for a text of the letter.  Jay 
received the letter at the end of January 1781, and referenced it in his dispatch to Congress of October 3, 1781, in 
Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:580-81.  The letter, he wrote, “ably… enumerates the various reasons which” had induced Congress 
not to relinquish their claims.  With respect to Vattel, however, Jay wrote separately to Gouverneur Morris that 
“Vattel’s Law of Nations, which I found quoted in a Letter from Congress, is prohibited here,” Jay to Gouverneur 
Morris, September 28, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:575. 
126 Jay to Gouverneur Morris, September 1781, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:576.  “Parole” promises were statements 
made outside the formal context of the law.  By “continental” Jay meant the American paper money, which had lost 
nearly all of its value. 
127 See again Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:581. 
 
 175 
It is in this realm that Jay’s capacities appear most clearly.  He not only knew how to employ 
technical reasoning with advantage, he also had a refined sense of his moral position.  At any point 
during Jay’s term in Spain, Floridablanca could have permitted the United States to default.  Given 
the stakes in the contest, what gave Jay the confidence to hold his ground?  Jay likely reasoned that 
the Spanish wanted to prolong his stay in Spain, in hopes that he might eventually yield.  Yet he also 
knew 1) that the “great and generous” Carlos III would not allow a petitioner to default over such 
small sums and 2) even if he did, the American position was morally defensible.  Rights to the 
Mississippi were worth far more than the £100,000 in dispute and the United States—as a bona fide 
state—ought to be able to borrow money, at interest, on the same terms as any other state.  If the 
Spanish permitted the United States to default, in the face of such reasoning, he was prepared to go 
public with the matter, confident that he had acted in accordance with the law of nations.128 
In sum, Jay’s diplomacy was notable for the strength, precision, and effectiveness of the 
principles that he employed in safeguarding the interests of the United States.  Diplomacy was at 
base a contest that involved power, procedure, and honor.  Success in this realm, lay in employing 
what Jay would call “the line of prudence,” or the process of subjecting practical decisions to a set of 
objective standards and principles.129  What did this have to do with the law of nations?  More than 
most historians have recognized to date—an issue to which I will turn in my last two chapters.  
                                                
128 As Jay declared to Montmorin, at the end of August 1780, American was “Independent in fact,” and he 
could not “imagine Congress would agree to purchase from Spain the acknowledgment of [that] fact, at the Price she 
demanded for it.” “[He] intended to abide Patiently the fate of the Bills, and should transmit to Congress an account 
of all matters relative to them.”  If Floridablanca should still not respond, he would “then consider my Business at an 
End.”  He added that for his part, he thought it best that the United States “rest content with the Treaty with France, 
and by avoiding Alliances with other Nations, remain free from the Influence of their disputes and Politics.” Jay to 
the President of Congress (Samuel Huntington), November 6, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:339. 
129 Jay would later write to an acquaintance in England, “The theory of prudence is sublime and in many 
respects simple.  The practice is difficult; and it necessarily must be so, or this would cease to be a state of 
probation. John Jay to Lindley Murray, August 22, 1794 in Henry P. Johnston (ed.), The Correspondence and 
Public Papers of John Jay. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970 [1890], vol. IV, pp. 51-52.  See also forthcoming work 
by Jonathan Den Hartog on the importance of prudence to Jay’s public conduct.  
 
 176 
The Conduct of Jay’s American Colleagues  
The significance of Jay’s attributes becomes clearer when one contrasts his conduct with that 
of his fellow American diplomats.  Only four other Americans served in a serious capacity as agents, 
commissioners, or minister plenipotentiaries of the United States, between 1776–1783: Silas Deane, 
Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and John Adams.130  Each possessed qualities or strengths that were 
valuable to the American cause; yet none displayed the principled self control, or legal acumen, that 
enabled Jay to withstand the strain that characterized his two-year tenure in Spain.  Deane was the 
first American to arrive in Paris.  Although trained as a lawyer, he was more inclined to matters 
pertaining to business, and he played a valuable role, from the summer of 1776 to the spring of 1778, 
in procuring military supplies and financial aid for the Revolution.131   
Yet Deane had little or no appreciation of his role as a public representative of the United 
States, or as an agent of Congressional will and authority.  He had a soft spot for luxury, spent 
lavishly on clothes, and mingled his personal affairs with those of Congress.  Deane’s behavior was 
not terribly unusual for the eighteenth century, yet it was far more consequential for the United States 
than it would have been for a more established nation.  Foreign affairs in Europe, it is important to 
remember, were conducted by the king and a close circle of ministers.  Personal animosities were a 
factor, but their influence was checked by hierarchies and procedures, and by the outsized influence 
of the monarch, whose opinion could settle disputes among his ministers.  Congress, by contrast, had 
no institutional apparatus for managing foreign affairs, which were “conducted” by an overworked, 
inexperienced committee, whose membership varied, and had nothing approaching an institutional 
history, fixed procedures, or guiding principles.  
                                                
130 Ralph Izard also served as commissioner to Tuscany, but had no impact on the Revolution.  Henry 
Laurens was a commissioner of peace but did not arrive in Paris until just prior to the signing of preliminaries.  
131 Brian N. Morton and Donald C. Spinelli, Beaumarchais and the American Revolution. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2003, covers the broader story of how secret aid from France and Spain helped sustain the 
Americans during the early years of the revolution.  See also Wharton, RDC, I: 569-570 for a biographical sketch of 




 From 1774 through 1777, the urgency of the American predicament imposed a need for 
unity that kept those passions in check.  With the signing of the Franco-American alliance, however, 
members of Congress became more confident, and thus less constrained.  In this context, it became 
incumbent on American agents abroad to exercise self-control and become, in effect, institutions unto 
themselves.132  This Deane failed to do, and he also left himself vulnerable to accusation by failing to 
maintain the kind of records that would be necessary to preserve his reputation, if he should fall prey 
to an accusation of impropriety.133   
Such charges arrived, early in 1777, from the pen of Arthur Lee.  Lee was a Virginian, 
educated in both Scotland (medicine) and London (law), whom Congress sent to support the efforts 
of Deane (and Franklin) in Paris.  Lee was educated, zealous, and generally familiar with European 
culture.  He was also the epitome of Republican virtue.  As noted earlier he performed a valuable 
service for the United States, in February 1777, by traveling to Spain and securing a modest, 
additional commitment of secret aid for the Revolution.  Yet he was also thoroughly impractical in 
his approach to diplomacy.  Like Jay, he viewed national honor as of paramount importance.  Unlike 
Jay he had no sense of the need to maintain unity, trust, or effective governance in time of war.  
Virtue and purity trumped all other considerations. 
On arrival in Paris, Lee was quickly convinced (without proof) that Deane was guilty of 
financial impropriety.  Rather than raising the issue quietly with his colleague, he sent his charges 
                                                
132 This last insight is taken almost directly from Rakove, National Politics, 243, who writes that, “what is 
striking about the crisis of 1779 is not that it simply exemplified or magnified divisions normally present in 
Congress, but that its explosiveness disarmed the mechanisms Congress usually employed to restrain the potential 
for such outbreaks.  See also Calvin C. Jillson and Rick K. Wilson, Congressional Dynamics: Structure, 
Coordination, and Choice in the First American Congress, 1774-1789. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 
295, who argue in particular that “the primacy of the floor” and allowing each member to have their say, created 
tremendous inefficiencies in Congress. 
133 Jay, who was a friend of Deane’s at the time, would later write to remind him that he had been “blamed 
not for omitting to finally to settle your accounts in France, but for not being in Capacity to shew (when in Am.) 
what those accts.” “Remember, Jay continued, “that time is spending Men forgetting or dying, Papers wasting &c: 
and therefore the sooner you reduce these Matters to certainty the better,” Jay to Deane, October 26, 1780, in 
Nuxoll, SPJJ, II: 314-315. For Lee’s career see Louis W. Potts, Arthur Lee, a Virtuous Revolutionary. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1981 and Richard H. Lee, Life of Arthur Lee. Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1829. 
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directly to Congress.  In the absence of evidence, Congress had no basis on which to make a decision 
and the issue soon gave rise to bitter acrimony and divisions that lasted for years, and which 
exacerbated sectional tensions that arose, during Gérard’s tenure, over the American terms of 
peace.134  Lee had a strong following in Congress, but his supporters did not constitute a majority and 
they were unable to secure a position for him, in the fall of 1779, either as Minister to Spain (the 
position for which Jay was chosen) or Commissioner of Peace (the position for which Adams was 
chosen).  Lee was eventually recalled in 1779 and had no further influence on diplomacy. 
John Adams arrived in Europe (as a replacement for Deane) in April 1778—just after the 
signing of the Franco-American alliance.135  His first year in Europe was uneventful and he returned 
to Massachusetts in the summer of 1779, but was almost immediately appointed commissioner of 
peace.  He departed again for Europe in November of that year—arriving in Paris early in the spring 
of 1780, at roughly the same time that Jay reached Spain.  It was during this latter period that he 
manifested the qualities that would characterize his diplomacy.  Adams was an associate of the 
Congressional faction that supported Arthur Lee.  He shared their zeal for American honor and 
independence, was suspicious of Franklin, and thought that the United States should stand aloof from 
France—which had its own interests in supporting the Revolution.  Yet he was far less prone than 
Lee had been to create public divisions and acrimony.   
Adams nevertheless resolved to establish American dignity by adopting an independent 
posture toward Vergennes.  On arrival in Paris, he informed Vergennes of his intent to publish his 
commission of peace—as means of projecting confidence to the British.  Vergennes, who was 
                                                
134 Deane was eventually recalled, but did not bring any papers with him (he probably did not have any) 
and so was unable to prove his innocence, thus perpetuating the conflict.  See \ Rakove, National Politics, 243-263, 
for a discussion of how the dispute between Lee and Deane exacerbated tensions over the peace terms.  See also 
Ferguson, Purse, 70-71, and 93 for a discussion of the dispute and its consequences. 
135 Regarding the residual animosity between Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee, Adams would observe: 
“There is, I think, rather more of mutual reproaches, of interested views and designs, rather more of animosity 
among the Americans here, than I remember to have seen anywhere else.”  See Adams to Richard Henry Lee, 
August 5, 1778, in Taylor (ed.), The Papers of John Adams, vol. VI, pp. 350-52. 
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acutely aware of the precarious state of the war, ordered Adams to do no such thing—on the grounds 
that it would be damaging to begin negotiations from a point of weakness. Adams sent back a “stout” 
retort in which he lectured Vergennes on the error of his ways.  Vergennes sent a point-by-point 
rebuttal, demonstrating the folly of Adams’s plan, and then broke off communications, writing on 
July 29 that: as “Mr. Franklin is the only person accredited to the King by the United States, it is with 
him only that I ought and can treat of matters which concern them.”136 
Adams eventually submitted to Vergennes’ advice, but the damage had already been done.  
Vergennes lodged a formal complaint with Franklin asking that Adams be recalled, and sent a similar 
note to his minister in Philadelphia, asking that the matter be brought to the attention of Congress: 
I inform you of these details, Sir, so that you may speak of it confidentially to… the principal 
members of Congress and put them in a position to judge whether Mr. Adams is endowed 
with a character that renders him appropriate to the important task with which Congress has 
charged him.  As for myself, I anticipate that this plenipotentiary will only incite difficulties 
and vexations, because he has an inflexibility… that renders him incapable of dealing with 
political subjects, and especially of handling them with the representatives of great powers, 
who assuredly will not yield either to the tone or to the logic of Mr. Adams…. 
 
Vergennes also urged Congress, “to give its representatives orders to show a little more regard than 
he does for the opinion of the King’s Counsel, and sespecially not to take steps relative to the 
possible commission with which he is charged (if they still wish to leave it in his hands) without 
having previously consulted the King’s ministry, and without having concerted with it in all his 
steps.”137 
The weakness in Adams’s approach stemmed form the fact that he appears not to have 
grasped the importance of protocol in establishing bonds of trust.  It was actually quite possible, as 
Jay repeatedly demonstrated in Spain, to be rigorously attentive to matters of dignity and honor, 
while retaining independent judgment.  In fact, attention to ceremonial niceties often served to 
facilitate the conduct of diplomacy, and advance national interests, by suppressing the personal 
                                                
136 See Taylor (ed.), Papers of John Adams, vol. 10, for July 17, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 1780. 
137 Vergennes to Luzerne, August 7, 1780, in Giunta, EN, I:98-99.   
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friction and irritation that often interfered with negotiations—thus allowing attention to be focused 
on matters of real import.  Such factors were especially important during the Revolution, given that 
Europeans were generally disposed to view the Americans as naïve and incompetent.  Vergennes in 
particular needed assurance that the Americans could be relied on to behave appropriately in the high 
stakes negotiations with England, whenever they began.  
The last American to serve abroad during the war was Benjamin Franklin, who does not 
present nearly as stark a contrast with Jay as the other three emissaries.  He was wise, sophisticated, 
fully committed to the American cause, and yet deliberately gracious in his interactions with the 
French.  In fulfilling Vergennes’s request, regarding Adams, he would write to the President of 
Congress: “Mr. Adams, who means our Welfare and Interest as much as I, or any Man can do, seems 
to think a little apparent Stoutness and greater air of Independence & Boldness in our Demands, will 
procure us more ample Assistance.  He thinks as he tells me himself, that America has been too free 
in Expressions of Gratitude to France; for that she is more obliged to us than we to her; and that we 
should shew Spirit in our Applications.  It is for Congress to judge and regulate their Affairs 
accordingly.”138   
Franklin, in other words, like Jay, understood the value that Europeans placed on expressions 
of honor and deference and used it to American advantage.  He played an invaluable role in Paris, in 
calming Vergennes’s anxieties, reassuring him that at least one American was sensible and familiar 
with European protocol.  It is likely that the United States secured a greater amount of financial aid 
from France, during the war, than they otherwise would have if Franklin had not been there, and Jay 
would not likely have performed that role nearly as well, if he had been in Franklin’s place. 
It is nevertheless the case that Franklin faced few diplomatic crises during his tenure in Paris, 
and he never had to negotiations with ministers hostile to American interests.  During Jay’s tenure in 
Spain, the two men corresponded with some degree of frequency—mostly over matters of finance.  
                                                
138 Giunta, EN, I:99-101. 
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They discovered each other to be like-minded with respect to Spain and American claims to the 
Mississippi. They also came to respect each other’s devotion and abilities.  “The Papers that 
accompanied [your recent letters],” Franklin would write to Jay in the fall of 1780, “gave me the 
Pleasure of seeing the Affairs of our Country in such good Hands, and the Prospect from your Youth 
of its having the Service of so able a Minister for a great Number of Years.”139   Yet when financial 
crises arose, Franklin confessed to anxiety to which Jay never seems to have succumbed.  The news, 
Franklin wrote, in September 1780, that Spain would no longer cover American bills, “mortified me 
exceedingly; and the Storm of Bills which I found coming upon us both, has terrified and vexed me 
to such a Degree that I have been deprived of Sleep, and so much indisposed by continual Anxiety as 
to be render'd almost incapable of writing.”140   
Franklin eventually mustered the courage to ask Louis XVI for help.  He was received with 
kindness and received a grant sufficient for the moment—testifying once again to the value of his 
disposition toward the French, yet there is reason to wonder if he would have stood the strain of a 
protracted negotiation in Spain, as Jay did.  (Adams, one can be certain, would never have had the 
capacity check the feelings of indignation that would certainly have arisen in response to Spanish 
policy.)  In sum, the characteristics that Jay employed during his tenure in Spain were not mere 
ornaments of personality that can be explained as expressions of legalism or a penchant for 
republican virtue.  They were precise and carefully adopted principals that were remarkably well 
suited to the conduct of eighteenth-century diplomacy—and especially its more combative aspects. 
  
                                                
139 See Franklin to Jay, October 2, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:279, in which Franklin also wrote: “Poor as we 
are, yet I know we shall be rich, I would rather agree with them to buy at a great price the whole of their Right on 
the Mississippi than sell a Drop of its Waters.”   
140 Benjamin Franklin to John Jay, October 2, 1780, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II: 558. 
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Coda: Congress’s Instructions to its New Commissioners of Peace 
 Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to recount the consequences of Adams 
altercation with Vergennes, which would set the scene for the negotiation of peace.  As noted, both 
Franklin and Vergennes had sent letters in the summer of 1780, encouraging Congress to replace 
Adams as commissioner of peace, or otherwise diminish his influence.  The French minister in 
Philadelphia, Luzerne, brought the matter before Congress in June, 1781, and did so with great 
effect.  Congress was not willing to recall Adams, but they did change his instructions—and also 
expanded the commission of peace to include a total of five commissioners.   
Luzerne was closely involved in drafting the new instructions.  Among the most notable 
changes that he introduced was the deletion of the phrase in which Adams had previously been 
instructed to “use your own judgment and prudence in securing” American territorial interests.  
Luzerne’s version, which Congress ultimately approved, gave the new commissioners “liberty to 
secure” American interests (emphasis added), subject to the following limitation: 
For this purpose you are to make the most candid and confidential communications upon all 
subjects to the ministers of our generous ally, the King of France; to undertake nothing in the 
negociations for peace or truce without their knowledge and concurrence; and ultimately to 
govern yourselves by their advice and opinion…”141 
 
In other words, the Americans had voluntarily forfeited their control over the negotiations, under the 
conviction 1) that the French would contend for their interests142 and 2) that their own commissioners 
were not capable of taking responsibility for such a delicate and consequential negotiation.143 
                                                
141 The documents pertaining to the drafting of these instructions are in Wharton, RDC, IV:479-505. 
142 Luzerne would assert that “France was moved solely by her interest in the United States and the fear that 
a negotiation on which the very existence of the United States might depend would be disrupted by some rash act.”  
See JCC 20:563-569.  Luzerne also urged Congress to have its commissioners “adopt a line of conduct” that would 
“deprive the British of every hope of causing division between the allies.”  Luzerne furthermore promised that the 
king “would defend the cause of the United States as zealously as the interests of his own crown,” and “that nothing 
but the most absolute necessity shall induce him to make the smallest sacrifice of the interest we have entrusted to 
his care.” “Report of a Conference with the French Minister, Luzerne,” dated May 28, 1781 in Wharton, RDC, 
IV:456, and Robert Livingston to John Jay, December 13, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:654-655. 
143 On learning of Congress’s decision, Vergennes would write to Luzerne: “[I]f that Body has, now or in 
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 When it came time to appoint additional commissioners of peace—to dilute Adams’s 
influence—the original intent was to add two more commissioners, for total of three.  The first vote 
was taken on June 13 and John Jay was elected unanimously to fill the first position.  When it came 
to the selection of a second commissioner, however, Congress was unable to reach a decision, with 
Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and Henry Laurens each receiving less than a majority.144  
After some deliberation, Congress resolved the impasse by adding all three men to the commission, 
for a total of five—though in the end, Jefferson declined his commission, and Laurens arrived too 
late to have much influence on the negotiations.  Adams was in Holland, when negotiations began, 
but he reached Paris in time to play an important role in the final round of negotiations. 
On receiving a copy of his new instructions Adams responded: “To both of these measures of 
Congress, as to the commands of my sovereign, I shall pay the most exact attention.  The present 
commission for peace is a demonstration of greater respect to the powers of Europe and must be 
more satisfactory to the people of Europe than any former one.”  Franklin concurred, stating that he 
“felt the King [meaning Louis XVI] had the honor and welfare of the United States at heart,” and 
could be trusted with that degree of confidence.145  Jay’s lengthy response from Spain, however, 
dated September 20, 1781, was of a decidedly different tone, and captured the convictions that had 
guided his conduct over the preceding months, including the importance of: obeying the orders of 
Congress, maintaining the nation’s dignity, and—above all else—preserving sovereignty so as to be 
able to lawfully advance American interests as circumstances permitted.   
                                                                                                                                                       
the future, the least regret at having restrained the liberty of its plenipotentiaries too much, the King will see without 
trouble that he gives them the advantage therein: but you will take care to make it known at the same time, with 
dexterity, that if Congress takes this stance, it will remain responsible for what happens; I presume that body too 
wise to expose itself to such a risk.” Sept. 7, 1781, in Giunta, EN, 1: 229-230. 
144 According to Thomas Rodney to Caesar Rodney, June 14, 1781, Jefferson received 5 votes, Franklin 4, 
and Laurens, 1.  The vote was taken three times, with the same result in each case.  See LDC, 17:320-321.  For 
evidence that Jay was elected unanimously, see Luzerne to Vergennes, June 14, 1781, in Giunta, EN, I:190. 
145 John Adams to the President of Congress, Oct. 15, 1781, in Papers of John Adams, vol. 12, p. 16.  
Franklin is quoted in O’Donnell, Luzerne, 144. 
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I know it is my “duty,” Jay began, “as a public servant…to execute my instructions without 
questioning the policy of them.”  And he further averred his willingness, in so far as personal pride 
was concerned, to accept any position that Congress should ask him to fill, whether high or low.  
“But Sir,” he continued: 
as an American I feel an interest in the dignity of my country which renders it difficult for me 
to reconcile myself to the idea of the Sovereign Independent States of America submitting in 
the persons of their Ministers to be absolutely governed by the Advice and Opinions of the 
Servants of another Sovereign, especially in a case of such national importance. 
 
It was true that the States owed France both “gratitude & confidence,” and that by demonstrating 
such confidence the Americans might well “stimulate our allies to the highest efforts of generous 
friendship in our favor.”  He also conceded that France’s influence in European affairs gave it power 
“almost to dictate the terms of peace for us.”  Nevertheless, Jay concluded, even if it should be 
admitted that the United States might well have to “relax their demands on every side” and yield on 
every point “not subversive to our Independence…this instruction… puts it out of the power of your 
ministers to improve those chances & opportunities which in the course of human affairs happen 
more or less frequently unto all men.”   
Jay ultimately declined to resign his commission immediately, out of concern that Congress 
might not be able to replace him before the negotiations began.  He asked, however, that if 
negotiations should be delayed until a later date that Congress “take an early opportunity of relieving 
me from a station where in character of their Minister I must necessarily receive… the directions of 
those on whom I really think no American minister ought to be dependant.”146  Congress did not act 
on Jay’s request, but the principles that he had articulated, regarding the preeminent importance of 
national sovereignty, would guide his conduct during the pending peace negotiations. 
 
 
                                                








































The scholarly literature on the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris (1783) centers around the 
character and diplomatic acumen of the American peace commissioners, especially that of John Jay, 
who played a leading role in a series of controversial decisions that the Americans made between 
August and November 1782—and by which they secured rights to the Mississippi River.1  Historians 
who have delved into these matters are sharply divided in their views on the legality and/or morality 
of Jay’s conduct.  One side holds that Jay’s shrewd sagacity and rectitude secured for the United 
States an honorable and advantageous peace.  Others contend that an unduly suspicious and legalistic 
personality led Jay to betray the French and besmirch the reputation of the new nation.  In the chapter 
that follows I will examine the decisions—as they have never been examined before— in light of the 
law of nations.  I will agree with those who have commended Jay’s conduct, but argue that his merit 
lies chiefly in his ability to defend the statehood of the United States, and to do so in a way that 
conformed both to contemporary understandings of international law in politics, and to eighteenth-
century conceptions of the law of nations as a facet of natural moral law.2 
The decisions, which I will review shortly in greater detail, were as follows:  1) In early 
August 1782, Jay rejected the advice and opinion of both the French Foreign Minister, the Comte de 
Vergennes, and his own compatriot, Benjamin Franklin, and declined to commence negotiations with 
a British peace commissioner empowered to negotiate with the “thirteen colonies of North America” 
                                                
1 Congress appointed five commissioners of peace: John Adams, John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas 
Jefferson, and Henry Laurens, but Jefferson declined his appointment and Laurens did not reach Paris until late 
November 1782—a few days before the preliminary terms of peace were signed.  Adams had reached Paris a few 
weeks earlier, on October 26, 1782, and played an active role in the final round of negotiation on June 23, 1782.  
Three of the five controversial decisions that I will examine in this chapter were made by Jay alone. 
2 Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, and Morris, Peacemakers contain a positive interpretation 
of Jay’s decisions.  Clarence Alvord, Lord Shelburne and the Founding of British-American Goodwill. Annual 
Raleigh Lecture on History Published for the British Academy. London: H. Milford, Oxford University, 1926; John 
J. Meng, “Franco-American Diplomacy and the Treaty of Paris, 1783,” Records of the American Catholic Historical 
Society, 44:3 (September 1933): 193-219; Dull, Diplomatic History; Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a 
Republican Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; and Andrew Stockley, Britain and France are 




rather than “the thirteen United States.”  In so doing he violated Congressional instructions, which 
required that the commissioners “govern” themselves by the “advice and opinion” of the French 
court.  The result was a two-month delay in the negotiations that—in the view of some historians—
resulted in a less favorable northern border with Canada.3  2) Approximately three weeks later Jay 
also declined to negotiate with the Spanish ambassador, Aranda, after he failed to produce standard 
letters of authorization.4  In so doing, Jay ended all hope that Spain and the United States might settle 
their dispute over the Mississippi before the war came to a close—thus offending the Spanish and 
complicating Vergennes’s efforts to orchestrate a peace that would satisfy all of France’s allies.   
In early September, having learned that a French agent had left for England—and fearing that 
the agent would undercut American claims to the Mississippi—3) Jay dispatched his own agent, 
urging the British to reject French arguments and settle quickly with the United States.  In so doing, 
he likely weakened France’s negotiating position, and took steps that—if discovered—might have 
damaged the alliance.  4) When the British responded favorably and empowered an agent to treat 
with the “united States,” the Americans—now including both Franklin and John Adams—proceeded 
in their negotiations without “the knowledge or concurrence” of the French Court, again in violation 
of their instructions.  5) Finally, having concluded their negotiations on November 30, the Americans 
signed preliminary terms of peace with England, despite the fact that neither France nor Spain had 
yet reached an accord, and despite also having pledged in the treaty of alliance “to conclude [neither] 
Truce [nor] Peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of [France] first obtain’d.”5 
                                                
3 See for example, Samuel F. Bemis, “Canada and the Peace Settlement of 1782-1783,” The Canadian 
Historical Review 14 (1933): 265-284.  The relevant portion of the instructions, dated June 15, 1781, reads: “You 
are… to make the most candid and confidential communications upon all subjects to the ministers of our generous 
ally, the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negociations for peace or truce without their knowledge and 
concurrence; and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and opinion…” Wharton, RDC, IV:505. 
4 Aranda did not have the letters in question because Spain had not yet recognized the United States. 
5 See article VIII of the Franco-American Treaty of Alliance.  
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Viewed in summary fashion, as I have just conveyed them, the decisions arguably make the 
American agents out to be little more than exemplars of Machiavellian self-interest.  I will argue, 
however, that a closer analysis of Jay’s conduct—as well as the context in which he was operating—
reveals that his decisions were based on a refined understanding of eighteenth-century conceptions of 
law and morality.  The negotiations thus offer one last opportunity to illustrate the nature and source 
of the law of nations and its role in revolutionary-era diplomacy. 
 I begin my analysis with a review of the British, French and Spanish strategic interests, 
which in combination set the context for the American negotiations.  I then examine each of the 
American decisions in turn, placing emphasis on their basis in law—as it was then understood.  My 
conclusion confirms earlier findings that the law of nations was a composite concept, rooted in 
tradition, treaties, and popular understandings of natural law—and predicated on the notion that 
states were free and equal moral entities, operating in a state of nature.  Law in this context was not 
intended to impose rigid restrictions on sovereignty.  It was rather a moral guide to conduct, rooted in 
a shared sense of justice.  The essence of statehood, in this context, was the right to exercise the 
moral and legal judgment needed to deploy law in defense of the interests and the honor of the state.    
The outcome of the American negotiations hinged on two questions: Was the United States a 
bona fide state, entitled to all of the rights and privileges that came with that status?  And was law 
located, primarily and at base, in the European state system or rather in nature where it served as a 
neutral and objective source of legal authority?  Jay’s success flowed from insistence on unvarnished 
statehood combined with his ability to satisfy European conceptions of international law, while 
ultimately basing his decisions on transcendent standards of natural law.  His strategy worked 
because European sovereigns had a vested interest in a system of law that lent stability to their 
affairs, without overly restricting their liberty, and thus did not act only on the basis of power, as so 




British Interests and Legal Strategy vis-à-vis the Negotiation of Peace  
In late March 1782 all London was abuzz with the news that Prime Minister Lord North, the 
long-time leader and proponent of the war in America, had been forced to resign.  In his place now 
stood Lord Rockingham who, along with his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Charles James 
Fox, had begun to pursue a policy of peace and reconciliation with the United States.6  To be 
specific, Rockingham and Fox favored an immediate grant of American independence, in response to 
which they expected that the United States would withdraw from the war—thus strengthening 
Britain’s hand in subsequent negotiations with the French, Spanish, and Dutch, and enabling a rapid 
conclusion of peace.  The king, however—still deeply opposed to the loss of his colonies—was not 
without hope that independence might yet be averted.  In the negotiations through which the new 
government had been formed, William Petty, the Earl of Shelburne, had been given the office of 
Secretary of State for Home and Colonial Affairs.7  Though he was also an opponent of the war, 
                                                
6 George III had been forced to accept Rockingham as Prime Minister after Lord North resigned, on March 
20, 1782, in the face of Parliamentary opposition to the war.  Rockingham agreed to take office only on condition 
that the king promise not to veto a policy of American independence.  For the details surrounding North’s 
resignation see Sir John Fortescue (ed.) The Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760 to December 
1783, 6 vols. London: Macmillan, 1927-1928, vol. V:380-395 (hereafter cited as Fortescue, George III).  The event 
was a devastating blow to the king, who as recently as November—after receiving news of the defeat at Yorktown—
had declared to Parliament that he retained, “a perfect conviction of the justice of my cause”—later writing to Lord 
North that American independence “would annihilate the rank in which the British Empire stands among the 
European States.” The King to Lord North, January 21, in Fortescue, George III, V:334.   
The best overview of the domestic political context in Britain, and its effect on the peacemaking process is 
found in the first two chapters of P.J. Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic: The United States and the British 
Empire After American Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 15-55.  Marshall emphasizes, 
in particular, that the American victory at Yorktown, “had not destroyed British military capability in America,” and 
while Parliament would no longer support offensive operations in North America, it was not the case that “a 
prostrate Britain had no option,” but to concede favorable terms to the United States on any issue other than the core 
question of independence, pp. 16-17. 
7 Shelburne was also a member of the opposition, but he favored a policy of reconciliation and hoped to 
bring the Americans back into the imperial fold on terms short of independence.  When North resigned, the king had 
hoped that Shelburne would take the office of Prime Minister, but he had declined on the grounds that Rockingham 
was in a better position to form a stable majority in Parliament.  Rockingham had nevertheless required Shelburne’s 
assistance in forming that majority, in exchange for which Shelburne accepted the office of Colonial Secretary along 
with equal status in the cabinet.  In other words, even though Rockingham led the government, Shelburne reported 
only to the king.  For George III’s initial of choice of Shelburne as Prime Minister, see The King to Lord Shelburne, 
April 12, 1782, in Fortescue, George III, V:452.  For Shelburne’s status as an equal to Rockingham in the cabinet, 
see the King to Lord Chancellor Thurlow, April 5, 1782 in Fortescue, George III, V:443-444; for the complete list of 
members of the new cabinet see: “Draft, in the King’s hand, of the new Administration,” March 27, 1782, in 
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Shelburne was known to prefer a policy of reconciliation with the Americans, on terms short of 
outright independence—perhaps along the Irish model.  The king now looked to Shelburne to 
frustrate Rockingham’s policies.8 
Shelburne’s options were limited in that George III had promised not to veto Rockingham’s 
policy of independence.  There still remained the question, however, of when, and how, and on what 
terms, the British ought to make that concession.  It was on this ground that Shelburne and the king 
looked to advance their cause.  We will support a policy of American independence, they said in 
effect, but only on condition that it not take effect until after the final treaty of peace has been signed, 
and all other points of dispute have been resolved.  The goal was to delay the grant as long as 
possible, in hopes that the tide of war might yet turn again in England’s favor.  Furthermore, 
Shelburne successfully contended that until a formal grant of independence had been enacted, all 
negotiations with the Americans properly fell under his jurisdiction as colonial secretary.9 
Before this dispute could come to a head and be formally decided, however, it was first 
necessary to make contact with the Americans and ascertain whether they would even be open to the 
possibility of signing a separate and preliminary peace with England—without the consent of France.  
There were many reasons to think that the Americans would be unlikely to take such a step.  For one 
thing, their military and financial security was almost entirely dependent on French aid.  Would they 
betray their sole ally and benefactor and cast themselves into the arms of their erstwhile oppressors?  
Furthermore, the Americans and French had mutually promised, in Article VIII of the Franco-
                                                                                                                                                       
Fortescue, George III, V:419. For an overview of Shelburne’s life and policies see Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of 
William, Earl of Shelburne. London: Macmillan and Co., 1875-1876; and for an assessment of Shelburne’s domestic 
reform efforts see John Norris, Shelburne and Reform. London: Macmillan, 1963.   
8 For additional insight into British foreign policy in this period see, H. M. Scott, British Foreign Policy in 
the Age of the American Revolution.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1990; and Vincent T. Harlow, The 
Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793, 2 vols. London: Longmans, 1952-1963.  P. J. Marshall writes 
that Shelburne had declared, as late as February 1782 that he would “never consent, under any possible given 
circumstances, to acknowledge the independency of America,” British Atlantic, pp. 24-25. 
9 Whereas negotiations with the other warring parties fell under Fox’s jurisdiction as Foreign Secretary. 
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American treaty of alliance, not “to conclude either Truce or Peace with Great Britain, without the 
formal consent of the other first obtain’d.”  Would a fledgling political entity like the United States 
risk damaging their national honor by violating a public pledge of that kind? 
The answer was that while treaty and public pledges were weighty matters that merited 
serious consideration, it was often possible to find good and substantial reasons for violating them in 
exceptional circumstances.  The Americans needed to be provided with precisely this type of reason 
or excuse.  On this point the king and his ministers were in full agreement, and to this end they 
turned their attention over the course of April and May 1782. 
In late March, just after Shelburne took office, he received a note of congratulations from 
Benjamin Franklin—who expressed hope that the change in ministry might lead to peace.  Shelburne 
seized the opportunity to establish control of the negotiations and immediately dispatched an elderly 
Scottish merchant, named Richard Oswald, to meet with Franklin in Paris.10  At the meeting, which 
took place on April 15, Franklin welcomed the prospect of negotiations, but also made a point of 
introducing Oswald to Vergennes, who stressed that peace would have to be “general” in nature—i.e. 
France and all of her allies, including Spain and Holland, would have to be included.11  Oswald 
brought the report to London, where the cabinet voted on April 25 to send him back with intimations 
                                                
10 Franklin had written regarding a recent Parliamentary Resolution: “I hope it will tend to produce a 
general Peace, which I am persuaded your Lordship, with all good men, desires, which I wish to see before I die, & 
to which I shall with infinite Pleasure contribute every thing in my Power.”  See “To the Earl of Shelburne,” March 
22, 1782, in Ellen R. Cohn (ed.), The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 37. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003, p. 24 (hereafter cited as PBF).  For Shelburne’s reply see: “From the Earl of Shelburne,” April 6, 1782, in 
Cohn, PBF, 37:102-103.  For background on Oswald see David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants 
and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
11 See also “To the Earl of Shelburne,” April 18, 1782, in Cohn, PBF, 37:165-167, in which Franklin 
summarized the results of the conversation in his own words.  Franklin asked that Oswald be sent back with “the 
Agreement of your Court to treat for a General Peace.”  According to Franklin’s private notes, PBF, 37:177-178, he 
also made an informal suggestion that Britain cede Canada so that the lands could be sold and the funds used to 
make reparations to Americans who had suffered in the war, and to loyalists whose estates had been confiscated. 
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that “the principal points in contemplation are the allowance of Independence to America, upon 
Great Britain being restored to the situation she was placed in by the Treaty of 1763.”12  
The “Treaty of 1763” was of course the treaty that had ended the Seven Years War.  That war 
had been a disaster for France and Spain; and the British knew that it was inconceivable that either 
state would agree to peace on that basis.  They also knew, however, that the Franco-American treaty 
of alliance depicted “[t]he essential and direct End,” of the alliance as being: “to maintain effectively 
the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence… of the said united States.”  In other words, once 
American independence had been secured, the French had no legal justification—article VIII not 
withstanding—for requiring the Americans to remain in the war.13  In brief, the British offer was a 
ploy, designed to provoke the French into making additional demands that would not only irritate the 
Americans but also given them just cause for immediately withdrawing from the war. 
Negotiations with France were properly under Fox’s jurisdiction as Foreign Secretary, and he 
insisted at this juncture on having his own emissary, Thomas Grenville, convey or confirm these 
“intimations” to the French.  Grenville met with Vergennes in early May and received exactly the 
kind of response that the British were hoping for.  The French, Vergennes contended, had joined the 
war after the Americans had already declared their independence, and thus had no direct connection 
with that issue.  Britain must offer additional compensation for the costs that France had incurred.  At 
                                                
12 The “Minute of Cabinet” for April 25, 1782 is found in Fortescue, George III, V:488. According to the 
editors of The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, if France had accepted these terms, Britain would have given back to 
France the islands of St. Pierre, Miquelon, and St. Lucia, and restored India to its prewar condition, while France 
would have returned the conquests that it had made since 1778, Cohn, PBF, 37: 249.  The Spanish would also have 
been compelled to restore West Florida and Minorca to the British. 
For Shelburne’s perspective on these events, see “Earl of Shelburne to the Commissioners for Restoring 
Peace (Secret and Confidential),” June 5, 1782, in K. G. Davies, (ed.) Documents of the American Revolution: 1770-
1783 (Colonial Office Series), 22 vols. Dublin: Irish University Press, 1976, vol. 21: 77-78.  According to the editors 
of The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Shelburne told Oswald that independence would only be granted if the United 
States broke entirely with France.  He also insisted that the loyalists be restored “to a full enjoyment of their rights 
and privileges.  And their indemnification to be considered….  No independence…without their being taken care 
of.” Oswald was also to float the idea of a federal union between GB and the States and warn that if negotiations 
failed, the British were prepared to wage war “with the utmost vigor.” See fn. 8 in Cohn (ed.), PBF, 37:282.   
13 The parties to the alliance had also pledged not to “lay down their arms, until the Independence of the 
united states shall have been formally or tacitly assured,” again suggesting that once that goal had been achieved, the 
Americans would be at liberty to lay down their arms. Miller, Treaties, II:36-39.   
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the very least, an alteration in the fisheries was needed and Spain must also be satisfied.  The British 
had not yet achieved their objective, however—and here we see the operation of the conventional 
law of nations—for Grenville had not yet been empowered, with a formal commission from the 
British cabinet, to negotiate on behalf of George III.  His conversations with Vergennes were 
therefore off the record and subject to repudiation. 
When the British received Grenville’s report in mid May they quickly rectified that problem, 
sending him an official commission or letter of authorization and instructing him to “make 
propositions of Peace… upon the basis of Independence to the thirteen Colonies in N. America, and 
of the Treaty of Paris—and in such case of such proposition not being accepted, to call upon Mons. 
de Vergennes to make some proposition on his part.”14  As Fox wrote to the king:  
the measures which we humbly recommend to Your Majesty upon this occasion are directed 
more with a view to the use that may be made of them for the purpose of detaching from 
France her Allies, and of conciliating the Powers of Europe to this Country, than the object of 
success in the present negotiation with the Court of Versailles.  If Mons. de Vergennes 
should reject Mr. Grenville’s proposals, and should either decline to make any on his part, or 
make such as should be evidently inadmissible, Your Majesty’s servants cannot help 
flattering themselves that such a conduct… may produce the most salutary effects with 
regard both to Europe and America.15 
 
Grenville received his new commission on May 26, and immediately acted on his 
instructions.  Before deliberations could begin, however, Vergennes objected to the fact that the 
                                                
14 See “Minute of Cabinet [In Mr. Fox’s handwriting], May 18, 1782, in Fortescue, George III, VI:32.  
Shelburne had written to the King on May 15: “There has a matter just discover’d itself relative to the Paris 
correspondence which I will have the honour to state to Your Majesty, the time not admitting of the possibility of 
doing it now.” See Fortescue, George III, VI:24. 
15 Mr. Fox to the King, May 18, 1782, in Fortescue, George III, VI:31.  For another example of a 
distinction between formal and informal communication, see Franklin’s conversation with Oswald in late April, 
during which Franklin suggested the idea of Canada being ceded to the United States as a means of compensating 
the Americans for material losses during the war.  He added that lands could be sold for that purpose, and the funds 
also used to compensate loyalists for their confiscated estates.  Franklin actually put this idea in writing, and showed 
it to Oswald, but wrote at the end: “This is mere conversation matter between Mr. Oswald and Mr. Franklin, as the 
former is not empowered to make propositions and the latter can not make any without the concurrence of his 
colleagues.” See entry in Franklin’s diary, in Wharton, RDC, V:541. 
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British ministry had only empowered Grenville to negotiate with France.16  This was unacceptable, 
he said.  All of France’s allies needed to be named in the commission. Grenville conveyed the news 
to London.  On June 14, he received a revised letter, now authorizing him “to treat with the King of 
France or his Ministers, or the Ministers of any other Prince or State whom it may concern.”  
Vergennes was now satisfied that France was no longer placed in the position of negotiating on 
behalf of its allies, and he offered a brief official response to the British offer—he expressed 
gratitude for George III’s pacific disposition, and alluded in general terms to a few issues that he 
thought worthy of attention, while avoiding any firm demands that might complicate matters with the 
Americans.17  The question remained, however, as to whether France’s allies would consider the 
commission satisfactory. 
The Spanish ambassador, Aranda, would have nothing to do with Grenville’s commission.  It 
was beneath the dignity of Carlos III, he stated, to be named in generic terms and in a manner distinct 
from the way in which the king of France had been referenced.  Nor, it turned out, would Benjamin 
Franklin.  As Franklin wrote to Oswald on the occasion: “There may be no doubt that [the terms of 
Grenville’s commission] comprehend Spain and Holland, but as there exist various Public Acts by 
which the Government of Britain denies us to be States, and none in which they acknowledge us to 
be such, it seems hardly clear,” that the terms comprehended the United States.18  Grenville insisted 
                                                
16 See related entry in Franklin’s Journal, Cohn, PBF, 37:319.  Grenville said “he could only account for 
the omission of America in the Power by supposing that it was on old official form.” 
17 See “Vergennes’ Verbal Response to Thomas Grenville,” in Giunta, EN, I:432-33.  Vergennes averted 
the British trap—vis-a by asking the British to specify their own essential interests, so that France would have a 
clear sense of the adjustments that might be possible. 
18 Franklin focused particular attention on the fact that the “Enabling Act,” by which Parliament was to 
authorize the king to negotiate a treaty of peace with the United States, had not yet passed the House of Lords.  He 
suggested that “as soon as the Enabling Act is pass’d, and the States of America are acknowledg’d to be such, I 
suppose the Words of that Commission may be clearly interpreted to mean & include those States… At present it 
seems dubious.”  Draft letter to Richard Oswald (unsent), June 26, 1782, in PBF, 37:551.  Franklin sent a letter to 
Oswald the following day with essentially the same content, though it was worded more strongly.  See PBF, 37:559. 
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that his powers were sufficient, but he later confessed to Fox that he felt “some embarrassment” on 
the subject.19  
Why had the British crafted Grenville’s commission as they had?  They were well aware of 
diplomatic protocol, and the particular importance of precedence, and they could easily have 
anticipated the Spanish objections.  The answer highlights another legal issue that would be central to 
the ensuing negotiations.  The problem confronting the British cabinet was that under the terms of the 
conventional law of nations, only states were permitted to participate in international affairs, and, 
consequently, only states could be named in international documents—including diplomatic letters of 
authorization.  If the British cabinet were to name “the United States” in Grenville’s commission, the 
act would be regarded in Europe as a tacit admission of American independence.20 
Rockingham and Fox had no objection to naming the Americans in Grenville’s 
commission—which would have been in accord with their preferred policy of an immediate grant of 
independence—but they had not yet obtained formal approval from the cabinet for that policy.  In 
fact, while events in Paris were playing out over the course of late May and early June, that very 
question had finally come to a head in the cabinet.  On May 22, Oswald had returned to London with 
the sensational news that Benjamin Franklin had remarked in passing that, in his opinion, as soon as 
the Americans received their independence, the Franco-American treaty of alliance terminated.  
There is no evidence from Franklin’s papers that he meant to suggest that the Americans would 
                                                
19 Thomas Grenville to Charles James Fox, June 21, 1782, in Giunta, EN, 1:434-35. 
20 See “To John Adams,” June 2, 1782, in PBF, 37:435 in which Franklin wrote that he had also met with 
Grenville on June 1 and expressed “my Wonder… that there should be no mention made of our States in his 
Commission: He [Grenville] could not explain this to my Satisfaction.” Franklin responded that “a special 
Commission was necessary, without which we could not conceive him authoris’d and therefore could not treat with 
him.”  “I imagine,” Franklin wrote to Adams, “that there is a Reluctance in their King to take this first Step, as the 
giving such a Commission would itself be a kind of Acknowledgment of our Independence; their late Success 
against Count de Grass [Rodney’s victory at the Battle of the Saintes] may also have given them Hopes that by 
Delay & more Successes they may make that Acknowledgment & a Peace less necessary.”  See also Grenville’s 
notes on his third peace conference with Vergennes, May 26, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:404-405. 
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immediately drop out of the war as soon as they had received their principal objective.  Oswald read 
his remark that way, however, and immediately left for London, to convey the news in person.21   
Fox was elated.  In a letter to the king he wrote: 
Mr. Oswald’s conversation confirms all that Mr. Grenville hints in his letter, and what 
induced him to come over at this moment was the desire of impressing Your Majesty’s 
Servants with the favourable disposition of Dr. Franklin toards Peace with this country, even 
without the concurrence of France, much more without that of Spain and Holland.  Mr. Fox is 
satisfied that Your Majesty’s penetration must see in a moment the incredible importance of 
this object, and the sanguine hopes which might reasonably be entertained with respect to the 
ensuing Campain [sic] in the West Indies… if we could come to such an understanding with 
America as to enable us to avail ourselves of Sir Guy Carleton’s Army for the purposes of 
Military Operations in the Autumnal Season. 
 
Fox and Rockingham went on to argue that the most effective means of persuading the Americans to 
drop out of the war would be to immediately act on their preferred policy and grant the United States 
unconditional independence.   
The king was cautious—insisting on a conference with Shelburne before taking any 
precipitous steps—but within days the cabinet had met and approved instructions specifying that: 
“the Independency of America should be proposed by [Grenville] in the first Instance, instead of 
making it a Condition of a general Treaty” (emphasis added).22  Oswald was then sent back to Paris, 
on or about May 25, with copies of Grenville’s new instructions.23  Grenville was initially hindered 
by the aforementioned issue of his commission, but once that had been resolved, he formally 
                                                
21 Franklin did not record the conversation in his notes, and it must have occurred on or about May 15, for 
he sent a letter to Shelburne on May 16, expressing disappointment that Oswald seemed intent on departing France 
the following day, and expressing his hope that he would return soon. See PBF, 37:364. 
22 See Mr. Fox to the King, May 21, 1782, and The King to Mr. Fox, May 22, 1781, in Fortescue, George 
III, VI:41.  “Peace is the object of my heart,” the king wrote, “if it can be obtained without forfeiting the Honour and 
Essential Rights of my Kingdom; I do not think myself at liberty to hazard any opinion; I must see my way clear 
before me.” 
23 On June 5, Shelburne also wrote to the British peace commissioners in North America, instructing them 
to: “make all the Advantage possible of the Concession which His Majesty from His ardent Desire of Peace has been 
induced to make with respect to the Independency of the thirteen States, especially by pressing Dr. Franklin’s own 
Idea, that the Object of the Treaty of Alliance with France being attained, the Treaty determined.” Shelburne to 
Carleton and Admiral Digby, in Giunta, EN, 1:424. 
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conveyed these terms to Vergennes—and also to Franklin, though the American had not yet accepted 
the validity of Grenville’s commission. 
The question that confronted the Americans, once Grenville had conveyed the offer was: 
What did the British actually mean by independence “in the first instance.”  The answer, which 
reveals both the subtlety of diplomacy in this era, and the importance of international law, is that the 
phrase was highly ambiguous.  In fact the British did not even agree on its meaning.  Fox thought 
that it was an offer of immediate independence.  Franklin later conveyed a similar understanding.24  
On the night before Oswald’s departure for Paris, however, Shelburne had met with the Scottish 
emissary and—in the presence of Lord Ashburton, who was asked to serve as a witness—made clear 
that the British offer of independence would only become legally binding after the Americans had 
signed a treaty of peace and withdrawn from the war.  I have “the satisfaction to apprize Your 
Majesty,” he later wrote to George III, that “Mr. Oswald goes away fully impressed of the propriety 
of making Peace either general or separate the Price of Independence, and that Your Majesty will not 
be bound by the propositions if Peace is not the consequence.”25   
In the short term, however, such questions were immaterial, for the British had not yet 
empowered an emissary to treat on terms acceptable to the Americans.26  And Fox—his own 
                                                
24 See Franklin to Oswald, July 12, 1782, in which Franklin states that he had understood from Grenville 
that independence would be granted “previous to the commencement of the treaty.” Cohn, PBF, 37:622-23. 
25 See Shelburne to the King, May 25, 1782.  The king commended the presence of a witness stating that “it 
is of the greatest importance,” that Oswald “should be fully apprized of what must be obtained at the dreadful price 
now offered to America, and that it is very material Lord Shelburne should have a witness to prove if necessary the 
exact extent of the proposition now sent.” Fortescue, George III, VI:44-45. 
At a conference in June, Vergennes showed Grenville a paper conveying his understanding of Britain’s 
offer, that: “His Britannic Majesty has resolved to recognize and declare directly the independence of the United 
States…” (emphasis added).  In response, Grenville asked that the words in italics be amended to read “proposes to 
recognize and declare.”  See “Vergennes’s Verbal Response to Thomas Grenville,” and also Grenville’s notes on his 
sixth peace conference with Vergennes, June 21, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:432-33. 
26 In early June, Grenville would pressed upon Franklin the argument that even if the United States had 
obligations to France, it had none to Spain or Holland and that if those powers should make extravagant demands, 
the Americans would be wise to step out of the war.  Franklin evaded the issue by saying that the subject was 
premature, that there would be time enough to consider that issue if it arose, and that “The first thing necessary was 
for [Grenville] to procure the full powers.” See Cohn, PBF, 37:320-21. 
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understanding of the phrase notwithstanding—soon found his position frustrated and undermined.  
On June 24, the cabinet received Vergennes’ formal, and aforementioned, response to their own 
proposition of peace.  Vergennes, as noted above, had declined to make specific demands that would 
complicate France’s relations with the United States.  He had rather foisted that responsibility on the 
British, frustrating the cabinet’s hopes of enticing the Americans into voiding the alliance with 
France, and withdrawing from the war.  The only remaining hope for Rockingham’s policy was to 
proceed immediately to a formal and unconditional grant of independence.  
At a cabinet meeting on the night of June 30, Fox brought matters to a head and called for a 
resolution in favor of that policy.  He not only lost the ensuing vote, but the very next day, 
Rockingham—who had been suffering from influenza—passed away.  The king then asked 
Shelburne to assume the office of Prime Minister, which he agreed to do.  Fox immediately resigned 
in protest, and the concept of making American independence conditional on the signing of a treaty 
of peace became firmly established as the official policy of the British government.27  Still 
unresolved, however, was the question of how to draw the Americans into negotiations without 
implicitly admitting their independence.  I will return to that question shortly. 
 
Vergennes’s Dilemma 
If the law of nations posed technical obstacles to the British, with respect to their strategic 
objectives for the pending negotiations, it posed far more substantial and consequential problems for 
Vergennes and the French Foreign Ministry.  As noted above, Vergennes had neatly evaded the snare 
laid by the British cabinet in declining to specify France’s terms of peace and in refusing to negotiate 
                                                
27 See Fox to the King, June 24, 1782, in Fortescue, George III, VI: 66; Shelburne to the King, June 30, 
1782, in George III, VI: 68-69; Shelburne to the King, July 1, 1782, and The King to Shelburne, July 1, 1782, in 
George III, V: 70-71.  Following the death of Rockingham, Shelburne would inform his peace commissioners in 
North America that the death of Rockingham, “will make no change in those principles and intentions upon which 
His Majesty’s Ministers have already made known their wishes to complete the work of Peace,” EN, 1:451. What he 
really meant was that independence would not be acknowledged until the last possible moment.  As late as August 
21, 1782, George III would write that independence was to be granted only as “the price of a certain Peace.” 
Fortescue, George III, VI:111. 
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on behalf of France’s allies.  As he told Franklin at the end of May: “[The British] want us to treat for 
you, but this the king will not agree to.  He thinks it not consistent with the dignity of your state.  
You will treat for yourselves, and every one of the powers at war with England will make its own 
treaty.”28  Vergennes’s move, however, merely delayed the necessity of resolving the underlying 
issue that had prompted the British move in the first place.  France’s principal allies, Spain and the 
United States, were still sharply divided on their objectives for the war, and it would take all the skill 
of this master diplomat to bring them into harmonious alignment. 
  The reality was that if France had been allied only with the United States, the war might 
quickly and easily have come to a close—and given the precarious state of French finances, peace 
could not come soon enough.  France’s principal objective for the war had always been American 
independence—the assumption being that with the loss of its North American colonies, Britain’s 
reign as the hegemon of Europe would come to an end.29  Though Vergennes now hinted at a need 
for further adjustments, his demands were not onerous, and could easily be adjudicated.30  His chief 
problems stemmed from the fact that France was now also allied with Spain, whose territorial 
objectives were not only “enormous” but also had yet to be satisfied.31  In particular, and as discussed 
in my preceding chapter on the activation of the Pacte de Famille, France had committed itself to 
continuing the war until Spain secured Gibraltar.  In the summer of 1782, Gibraltar was under 
siege—and a major assault was planned for September—but it had not yet fallen (and never would).   
                                                
28 See entry in Franklin’s journal, in Cohn, PBF, 37:316.  The “allies” were France, Spain, the United 
States and the Netherlands—though I will not consider the Dutch negotiations in my analysis. 
29 The assumption—though later proven false—was conventional wisdom at the time.  See George III’s 
statement in footnote 6, above, that the loss of the colonies “would annihilate the rank in which the British Empire 
stands among the European States.” 
30 See Article V of the Convention of Aranjuez for a list of French objectives, which included: Restoration 
of French sovereignty over Dunkirk; an adjustment with respect to the Newfoundland fisheries and trade with the 
East Indies; recovery of Senegal and confirmation of French possession of Dominica.   
31 See Vergennes to Louis XVI, December 5, 1778, in Hardman and Price, Louis XVI, 269-271.  Spain’s 
territorial objectives are summarized in Article VII of the Convention of Aranjuez and are discussed in my second 
chapter on the activation of the Pacte de Famille. 
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The Spanish were acutely conscious of the fact that American independence was in the 
offing, and had started to press this issue on the French ambassador in Madrid, the Comte de 
Montmorin.  In a meeting on July 8, Montmorin reported that Floridablanca had appeared highly 
agitated by his perception that Vergennes was moving precipitously toward peace.32  He warned 
France not to force Spain into a peace that would “fulfill only very imperfectly the objects that she 
had proposed.”33  He was particularly worried about Britain’s proposal to recognize American 
independence.  He feared that other subjects would “arrange themselves very easily,” and “that peace 
would be accomplished as soon as the independence of the United States would be assured.”  He 
reminded Montmorin that he “had predicted [such an outcome] from the commencement of the war,” 
and he warned the French, that if they permitted the United States to drop out of the war 
precipitously—and thus undermine Spain’s objectives—the result “would raise a chill between the 
two crowns,” i.e. Spain would retaliate by refusing to fulfill its obligations under the  
Pacte de Famille.34 
The problem was that the Spanish were not yet close to achieving their objectives for the war.  
It was typical, in European negotiations, for states to give back some of the territories that they had 
conquered during the war.   Yet the Spanish, according to Montmorin, “far from having anything to 
restore,” were not yet “in possession of what [they wanted] to obtain.”  Even if they took Gibraltar in 
September, it “would not remove all the difficulties, because then she would want to retain that place 
                                                
32 Floridablanca’s problems were compounded by the fact that he had no confidence in Aranda, whose 
appointment constituted a form of political exile.  Throughout the war, Floridablanca had kept Aranda in the dark 
regarding his strategic for the war.  Much of his planning had been predicated on the hope that Spain would mediate 
an end to the war and that he, Floridablanca, would take the leading role as mediator.  He was now compelled to 
entrust the negotiations to Aranda, whom he was loath to empower to act without close instructions. 
33 The warning took on particular poignancy in light of the fact that France had done precisely that—forced 
Spain into a disadvantageous peace—at the conclusion of the Seven Years War, an event that was still a source of 
bitter resentment in Spain.   
34 See Montmorin to Vergennes, July 8, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:455.  As noted elsewhere, one of the chief 
means of enforcing commitments under international law was by refusing to supply aid in time of need—even aid 
that one was bound to provide by virtue of treaty obligations. 
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without giving anything in exchange.”  As a consequence, he concluded, Spain’s policy toward peace 
was to “negotiate if it is absolutely impossible to avoid it… but delay as long as one can the moment 
of explaining oneself in the hope that the outcome at Gibraltar will be favorable, and then not 
concede any compensation for that place.”  “[G]iven the state of affairs,” Montmorin concluded, “it 
is almost solely for Spain that we continue the war.  May this verity not be too perceptible in the eyes 
of the Americans, who have no reason to be interested in the satisfaction of that Power, and to whom 
the war would soon become supportable if it had no more than this object” (emphasis added).35 
In sum, as negotiations commenced in the early summer of 1782, Vergennes’s challenge was 
to control the pace of events such that negotiations proceeded fast enough to satisfy the Americans—
and ensure that France’s goals were firmly in hand when peace ensued—while also ensuring that 
Spain was given a reasonable amount of time to secure its objectives. Complicating matters even 
further was the fact that Shelburne was understood to have a small base of support in Parliament.  
Parliament had gone into recess in early July, but once it returned in the fall, Vergennes was certain 
that Shelburne’s cabinet “would no longer be the master of its resolutions.”  In short, a window of 
opportunity was open from July through mid-November.  If peace could be secured within that 
frame, all would be well.  If not, the war would likely continue for at least another year, and it was 
anyone’s guess as to who would have the upper hand at the end of another campaign.36  
Vergennes’s ability to control the Spanish ministry was limited—both because Spain was a 
major power, with an experienced head of state, and because the Pacte de Famille was the 
                                                
35 Montmorin to Vergennes, July 8, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:458.  P. J. Marshall concurs with this judgment, 
and offers and extensive analysis of the many factions and interest groups that would complicate the negotiations, 
once Parliament returned, British Atlantic, 44-54. 
36 Vergennes to Montmorin, October 27, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:627-628. See also Vergennes to 
Montmorin, Sept. 28, 1782, in which he writes that “the preliminaries for the peace ought to be either settled or very 
close to agreed upon before the 15th of Nov. or the negotiation entirely broken off.” Giunta, EN I:591.  
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cornerstone of France’s national security.37  His attention therefore turned to the Americans.  To be 
specific, he needed to achieve three goals: 1) He needed the Americans to make sufficient progress in 
their negotiations with England such that they were ready to sign a treaty of peace the moment the 
French and Spanish had achieved their objectives. 2) At the same time, it was imperative that the 
Americans not actually reach a resolution with England on the core issue of independence, lest they 
think themselves justified in dropping out of the war.38  3) Finally, if at all possible, he needed the 
Spanish and Americans to resolve their differences over the Mississippi and the trans-Appalachian 
west such that the dispute did not complicate the final round of negotiations. 
He was hindered in these objectives by his decision in May that each of the warring parties 
should conduct its own separate negotiations with England.  That obstacle however, was 
counterbalanced by the instructions that Congress had passed at the insistence of his emissary in 
Philadelphia—by which the American agents were required “to make the most candid and 
confidential communications upon all subjects to the ministers of… the King of France; to undertake 
nothing in the negotiations… without their knowledge and concurrence; and ultimately to govern 
yourselves by their advice and opinion.”39  He was also helped (or so he thought) by the fact that the 
American minister to Spain, John Jay, had just arrived in Paris, where he could conduct negotiations 
with the Spanish ambassador, Aranda, under Vergennes’s watchful eye.  
 
                                                
37 On assuming office in 1774, Vergennes had written to Louis XVI that the Pacte, “establishes a unity of 
views and of conduct [between France and Spain] which admirably fulfills the double object of opposing English 
naval power with the superior united forces of the two monarchies, and of holding in check the tendency of England 
to attack France by her unwillingness to break with Spain…. It is therefore natural that the king should regard the 
Family Compact as the foundation of his policy.” Vergennes to Louis XVI, Doniol, I:20 and following, quoted in 
Meng, Vergennes, 39.  He later added in a different context: “[I]t is necessary that we be able to fulfill its 
obligations, because, whether it should be from design or from lack of means that we should fail in carrying out 
these obligations, the treaty would thereby by annulled… [and] France would be the first to feel the disastrous 
consequences,” Doniol, 1:19, quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 41.  
38 “All that is necessary for our common security,” Vergennes had told Franklin, “is that the treaties go 
hand in hand and are signed on the same day.”  Entry in Franklin’s journal, in Cohn, PBF, 37:316. 
39 Instructions for the Commissioners of Peace, June 15, 1781, Wharton, RDC, IV:505. 
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Situation on Jay’s Arrival in Paris 
When John Jay arrived in Paris on June 23, 1782, the American Revolutionaries had an 
imperative need for a rapid end to the war.40  Congressional finances were in disarray, troops had not 
been paid in months, morale was low, and the public was weary with the war.41  The public had been 
delighted to learn, earlier in the spring that Parliament had voted to terminate “the further prosecution 
of offensive warfare in North America.”42  Throughout North America, “the King’s servants” were 
later charged, “to avoid… every act that carries the appearance of attempting to reduce the revolted 
colonies to obedience by force.”43  And the British commander-in-chief, Sir Guy Carelton, was 
specifically to make the Americans aware that “the most liberal sentiments have taken root in the 
nation and that the narrow policy of monopoly is totally extinguished.”44  
The question confronting the leaders of the Revolution—and the peace commissioners in 
particular—was whether these professions of peace could be trusted, and what policy actually lay 
behind them.  To Vergennes’s mind, “The goal of the King of England, [could] not be more apparent.  
That Prince will endeavor to persuade the Americans that he is sincerely inclined to repatriate with 
                                                
40 For the date of Jay’s arrival see Frank Monaghan, (ed.) The Diary of John Jay During the Peace 
Negotiations of 1782. New Haven: Bibliographical Press, 1934.  Franklin had written on April 22: “Here you are 
greatly wanted, for Messengers begin to come & go… but I can neither make or agree to Propositions of Peace 
without the Assistance of my Colleagues.” Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:725. 
41 Thomas Fleming, The Perils of Peace: America’s Struggle for Survival After Yorktown. New York: 
Smithsonian, 2007, provides a popular rendition of these events. 
42 The vote took place on February 27-28, 1782, See footnote 8 on p. 6 of vol. 37, of Cohn, PBF.  
Additional details can be found in vol. 36, pp. 621-622. 
43 Shelburne to Governor Frederick Haldimand, April 22, 1782, in Davies, Documents, XXI:58. 
44 See Shelburne to Carleton, April 4, 1782, in Davies, Documents, XXI:54.  Carleton was also ordered to 
evacuate all military posts in New York, Charleston, and Savannah, but did not do so on grounds that he lacked 
sufficient transports.  According to P. J. Marshall, Carleton hoped to use the British military to force the Americans 
into some kind of Federal Union.  When that policy was defeated, he resigned in protest, but ultimately stayed on 
through the final evacuation of November 1783, British Atlantic, 25. 
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them, and he will spare nothing to seduce some and corrupt others either to bring about a schism in 
the interior of America or to draw the Americans into some act of perfidy with regard to France.”45   
The Americans were cognizant of Vergennes’s reasoning, for the Franco-American alliance 
was as essential to American national security as the Pacte de Famille was to that of France.  If they 
were to break faith with France, who would come to their rescue if the British subsequently betrayed 
their confidence?  Yet they were also sensitive to the issue that British commissioners began to press 
upon them—that France’s obligations to Spain might result in extravagant demands to which the 
Americans had no part.46  Furthermore, though they had no reason to doubt France’s commitment to 
American independence, they had reason to wonder whether the French were equally committed to 
secondary issues such as a western border on the Mississippi or rights to the Newfoundland 
Fisheries.47  It was consequently essential that they at least consider Britain’s ostensible offer of 
peace.  In particular the Americans were interested in Grenville’s earlier statement to Franklin that 
the British government was prepared to offer the Americans their independence “in the first 
instance.”  If the phrase meant what it appeared to mean, peace might be in the offing.  By early July, 
however, Rockingham’s death, Shelburne’s subsequent promotion and Fox’s resignation, combined 
to cast serious doubt on Britain’s readiness to act on that purported promise.48 
                                                
45 Vergennes to Luzerne, March 23, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:317.  Vergennes added: “If the Americans lost 
sight of these verities, the dangers to which they would be exposed would be incalculable.”  He had good reason to 
be suspicious for the English had previously offered valuable concessions to France if they would break their 
alliance with the United States and agree to peace on the basis of uti possidetis—meaning that Britain would retain 
the territories then under military control in North America. 
46 As already noted, in early June, Grenville had pressed on Franklin the argument that even if the United 
States had obligations to France, it had none to Spain or Holland and that if those powers should make extravagant 
demands, the Americans would be wise to step out of the war.  Franklin evaded the issue by saying that the subject 
was premature, that there would be time enough to consider that issue if it arose, and that “The first thing necessary 
was for [Grenville] to procure the full powers.” See Franklin’s Journal, in Cohn, PBF, 37:320-21. 
47 As noted elsewhere, Vergennes’s entire strategy for the war was predicated on the conviction that 
American independence would reduce British power to parity with that of France.  He believed that he was actually 
more committed to American independence than the Americans were, and he exhibited a nearly incessant state of 
mild anxiety that some among them might reconcile with England rather than fight through to the end. 
48 Franklin had written to Adams on June 2, that Britain’s “late Success against Count de Grass [Rodney’s 
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The First Controversy: Richard Oswald’s Commission 
Soon after his arrival in Paris, Jay had fallen ill with influenza, and was bed ridden for the 
first few weeks of July.  During that interval, Franklin corresponded with several of his friends and 
associates in England, probing for insight into the policy of Shelburne’s administration, and stressing 
that the negotiations could not proceed until the British had persuaded the Americans that they were 
serious about granting their independence.49  Over three weeks passed without any official response 
from the British government.  Then suddenly, on August 6, a courier arrived from England with a 
draft copy of a commission, empowering Oswald—or so the British claimed—to commence 
negotiations with the Americans.   
Accompanying the commission were a set of official instructions from the cabinet, and a 
private letter from Shelburne, both of which conveyed the impression that the core matter of 
independence had been resolved in just the way that the Americans desired.  “In case you find the 
American Commissioners are not at liberty to treaty on any terms short of Independence,” the 
instructions read, “You are to declare to them that You have Our Authority to make that Concession; 
Our earnest Wish for Peace disposing Us to purchase it at the Price of acceding to the complete 
Independence of the Thirteen States….” And in his private letter Shelburne averred that there had 
never been two opinions in the ministry regarding American independence, which was to be granted 
                                                                                                                                                       
victory at the Battle of the Saintes] may also have given them Hopes that by Delay & more Successes they may 
make that Acknowledgment & a Peace less necessary.”  See, “To John Adams,” in PBF, 37:435.  Franklin was 
correct, for as the King wrote to Shelburne on July 1, “[You] must see that the great success of Lord Rodney’s 
Engagement has again so far roused the Nation, that the Peace which would have been acquiesced in three months 
ago would now be matter of complaint.” Fortescue, George III, VI:70. 
49 On July 11, he wrote to Benjamin Vaughan, expressing concern over rumors that Shelburne aspired to 
grant the United States a partial independence, modeled on the Irish Constitution, Cohn, PBF, 37:621. The following 
day, he sent a similar note to Oswald, expressing concern over rumors that Fox had resigned in protest over 
Shelburne’s refusal to support an immediate grant of independence.  He also reminded Oswald of Grenville’s 
statement that independence would be granted “previous to the commencement of the treaty,” PBF, 37:622-23.  See 
also Oswald to Shelburne, July 12, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:470. 
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unequivocally.  “To put this Matter out of all Possibility of Doubt,” he added, Oswald had been 
empowered “to make the Independancy of the Colonies the Basis & Preliminary of the Treaty.”50  
On August 7, Oswald delivered the draft copy of his commission to Franklin and Jay and 
asked for their opinion.  Jay immediately observed that Independence was presented as a subject “to 
be treated upon”… meaning that the British likely meant to grant it only “as the price of Peace,” 
whereas “It ought to have been expressly granted by Act of Parliament… previous to any Proposal 
for Treaty.”51  More importantly, Jay noted that the document made no reference to “the United 
States.”  It rather empowered Oswald to conclude a treaty with Commissioners named by the 
American “Colonies or Plantations.”52  Finally, the commission was written in the form of a domestic 
letter patent, of the kind used for negotiations between the king and his officials, and was thus 
unsuited for use in the context of international relations.  In brief, the British appeared to be luring the 
Americans into negotiations with ostensible offers of independence, while yielding nothing of 
substance in the legal documents on which the negotiations would be founded.  
On August 10, Jay and Franklin visited Vergennes and asked for his opinion on the matter.  
To Jay’s surprise, the count encouraged the Americans to proceed—cautioning them only to be sure 
and exchange Powers with Oswald such that “his acceptance of our Powers, in which we were stiled 
Commissioners from the United States of America, would be a tacit admittance of our 
Independence.”  When Jay protested that “it would be descending from the Ground of Independence 
to treat under the description of Colonies,” Vergennes replied, “that names signified little; that the 
King of Great Britain’s stiling himself the King of France, was no obstacle to the King of France’s 
                                                
50 Shelburne to Oswald, July 27, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:479-480.  In the letter, Shelburne went to say that 
though he was known to have previously favored a political union with the colonies: “I have long since given it up 
decidedly tho’ reluctantly: and the same motives which made me perhaps the last to give up all Hope of the union, 
makes me most anxious if it is given up, that it shall be done decidedly, so as to avoid all further Risque of Enmity, 
and lay the Foundation of a new Connection.” 
51 See Oswald’s Notes on his conversations with Franklin and Jay, August 7-9 in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:39. 
52 See draft copy of Oswald’s commission embedded in Jay to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Nov. 17, 
1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:229. 
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treating with him; That an acknowledgment of our Independence, instead of preceding, must in the 
natural Course of Things be the Effect of the Treaty, and that it would not be reasonable to expect the 
Effect before the Cause.”53  Franklin was willing to proceed on that basis, but Jay was unyielding.  
The British must first fulfill their promise to grant independence “in the first instance.” 
Nearly every historian writing on these negotiations in recent years has faulted Jay for this 
decision, arguing that he not only violated his instructions from Congress—which required that he 
submit to French guidance—but also deprived the United States of a chance to secure a quick and 
advantageous peace.54 They base that judgment on a statement that Shelburne made in his private 
letter of instruction to Oswald, dated July 27, in which he averred that “if “the Articles… call’d 
necessary [were] alone retained as the Ground of Discussion, [a treaty] may be speedily Concluded.”   
He was referring here to a set of articles that Franklin had laid out in an informal conversation with 
Oswald on July 10, in which he told Oswald that the “necessary” elements of any future peace were: 
1) full independence and a withdrawal of troops, 2) a settlement of borders, 3) confinement of 
Canada to its pre-1774 borders, and 4) a right to the fisheries.”55   
Furthermore, at meeting on August 29, the British cabinet had formally modified Oswald’s 
instructions such that if the Americans should be: “ “satisfied, with these Four Articles… Mr. Oswald 
should inform them that he has no Power under the Act of the last Session of Parliament to conclude 
upon that footing, but that Your Majesty will recommend it to Your Parliament to acknowledge the 
Independence of the thirteen colonys absolutely and irrevocably.”  The historians depict these 
statements as a major concession on the part of the British, on the basis of which the Americans 
                                                
53 See Jay’s report to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Nov. 17, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:230-31. 
54 See Stockley, Britain and France, 58-60; Dull, Diplomatic History, 146; Perkins, Republican Empire, 
39-40.  Richard Morris, Peacemakers, sides with Jay, though he does not offer a detailed legal analysis of the issue.  
Samuel Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, thinks that Jay was right not to trust Vergennes’s advice, but 
also thinks that he missed an opportunity to secure a more favorable northern border with Canada.  See Bemis, 
“Canada and the Peace Settlement of 1782-83, Canadian Historical Review, 14 (September, 1933): 265-284. 
55 See Oswald to Shelburne, July 10, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:462-63. 
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might quickly and safely have concluded an advantageous peace.56  That judgment, I will contend, is 
founded on an erroneous understanding of the law of nations and legal issues at stake in the dispute.  
It is important to note, first of all, that it was only in his informal letter of instruction that 
Shelburne had intimated a willingness to settle on the basis of Franklin’s “necessary” articles.57  The 
cabinet’s formal instructions required that he also contend for the payment of pre-war debts, and the 
restitution of loyalist property.  The grant of the “backlands” or the trans-Appalachian west, was 
specifically tied to the issue of compensation for the loyalists, and Oswald was also instructed to 
contend for a “Political League of Union” with the United States.  If that should prove impossible, he 
was to insist that the Americans from no “Engagement [with another state] inconsistent with… 
absolute and universal Independence”—this being an “indispensible Condition” of the British grant 
of independence. In other words, the alliance with France would have to terminate.58 
As for the cabinet’s revised instructions of August 29, the offer to “recommend” that 
Parliament “acknowledge the Independence of the colonys,” was no concession at all, for Parliament 
was not then in session—and would not resume business until December.59  Even if it had been, it is 
almost certain that a motion to grant American independence preliminary to a treaty would have 
                                                
56 For notes of the British cabinet meeting, see Fortescue, George III, VI:118.  The “Act of the last Session 
of Parliament” to which the cabinet referred was the “Enabling Act,” by which Parliament had authorized the King 
to negotiate peace with the “colonies” and to offer independence—as one component of the final treaty. 
57 It was commonplace for statesmen to attempt to lure each other into negotiations by intimating generous 
terms of peace in an informal communications, which were later repudiated once formal negotiations began.  Later 
in August, for example, Admiral de Grasse—who had been captured by the British at the Battle of the Saintes and 
was on parole in England—paid a courtesy visit to Shelburne who intimated (according to de Grasse) that England 
was willing to 1) grant the United States their independence, 2) return certain Caribbean islands to France, 3) give 
Spain either Gibraltar or Minorca, and 4) make a few other adjustments that France desired.  When the French 
subsequently sent an agent to confirm these reports, Shelburne repudiated de Grasse’s report, saying that he had 
been misunderstood.  See Editorial note in Giunta, EN, I:554-555. 
58 Instructions to Richard Oswald, July 31, 1782, Giunta, EN, I:482-483. 
59 Oswald made this point to Jay in September—the king could not grant independence without the 




failed.60  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, George III remained implacably opposed—as late as 
August 21—to a policy of American independence except as the “the price of a certain Peace.”61  In 
other words, to receive any of these ostensible benefits, the Americans would have had to formally 
drop out of the war and sign a separate treaty of peace.  This would have voided the Franco-
American alliance and there is no evidence that the Americans were yet willing to take that step.  
One might yet argue that the Americans could have safely proceeded in their negotiations 
with Oswald and at least made some progress in resolving a host of secondary disputes—thus paving 
the way for a more rapid conclusion of peace at a future date—which is what Vergennes’s was 
hoping that they would do.  Perhaps they might even have concluded their preliminary terms of peace 
by the middle of September, before news of the British victory at Gibraltar, in mid September, 
strengthened the British hand in the negotiations.62  Yet preliminary terms of peace were by 
definition subject to revision, and so terms settled on that basis would not have had any fixed or 
immutable character.  Furthermore the fact that Oswald’s commission was domestic in form 
constituted an irregularity that would have given the British an easy pretext for disavowing the entire 
negotiation, if they subsequently had an interest in doing so.  
Finally, even if it were determined that the Americans ought to have proceeded in their 
negotiations—however tentative—merely for the sake of facilitating Vergennes’s efforts to bring the 
war to a rapid and equitable close, there still remains the core question of whether the Americans 
could safely proceed on the basis of a commission in which they were depicted as “colonies.”  Would 
such a step constitute a “descent” from the grounds of independence, as Jay contended, or were titles 
mere formalities, as Vergennes had argued in response?  Would the Americans’ interests have been 
                                                
60 See Parliament’s reaction to the preliminary terms of peace, when they were published in December. 
61 The King to Shelburne, August 21, 1782, in Fortescue, George III, VI:111. 
62 Over the summer, the Spanish and French had been preparing for a final assault on Gibraltar, which 
finally took place on Sept. 13.  The assault was a disaster for the Bourbons, as the British not only repulsed the 
attack but then also succeeded in relieving the besieged fortress with fresh supplies. 
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adequately secured by Oswald’s having formally accepted their commissions, in which they were 
depicted as representatives of “the united States”?  The legal issues surrounding these questions are 
illuminated by two memos—one drafted by the French ministry in early August, and the other 
written by John Jay in mid-September—that reveal much about 1) the content of international law, 2) 
the process by which legal disputes were resolved, and 3) Jay and Vergennes’s differing conceptions 
of the source and significance of the law of nations.    
The French memo, which is entitled “Reflections on Oswald’s Commission,” is unsigned and 
undated—though its contents suggests that it was written by either Vergennes or Gérard de Rayneval 
in early August, immediately following receipt of Oswald’s commission.63  It illustrates the type of 
moral, strategic, and legal reasoning that characterized diplomacy in this era.  The writer immediately 
notes that Oswald’s commission was domestic in nature and “completely irregular” in form, which 
would justify the Americans in rejecting it “if one did not wish to treat” (emphasis added).  The 
writer goes on, however, to note that the French had a compelling interest in “establishing [lier] the 
negotiation in some manner or other.”  The writer thus turned his attention to the question of whether 
the French could advise the Americans to proceed, without violating their duty to the United States, 
and/or undermining their own goal of securing American independence. 
With those objectives in mind, the writer went on to observe that the document was not 
entirely domestic in nature, for it authorized “negotiations for peace,” which could only take place in 
the international realm.  He further noted that the Americans were referred to as “the Colonies” rather 
than “our Colonies,” and were not styled as rebels—as had been the British practice to date.  He 
acknowledged that the British might use the acceptance of Oswald’s commission to create a “false 
inference” that the Americans had conceded a subordinate status.  He opined, however, that the 
danger could be averted by requiring the British to publicly avow that American acceptance of the 
                                                
63 Rayneval was Conrad Gérard’s brother.  He assumed the office of personal secretary to Vergennes after 
Gérard’s departure for Philadelphia in April 1778.  The memo is published in Giunta, EN, I:473-475. 
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commission would not be “inferred contrary to the independence of the United States.”  After further 
reflection, the author concluded that a public avowal was unnecessary and that it would suffice for 
Oswald simply to accept the American commission in exchange.  The writer admitted that this policy 
would not be in line with historic precedent—as the Dutch had refused to negotiate with Spain until 
the Spanish court recognized their status as an independent state.  He excused himself, however, on 
the grounds that Louis XVI, in his “wisdom and moderation” was inclined to show respect for “the 
dignity and the delicacy of the king of England.” 
As I have demonstrated many times now in the dissertation, legal norms and protocols played 
a critical role in stabilizing the conduct of eighteenth-century diplomacy.  Yet they were rarely 
binding in an absolute sense.  They were rather subject to revision or modification as circumstances 
demanded.  Yet that did not mean that statesmen could break the law at will, or in a facile manner.  
The social mores of statecraft required that they offer an excuse or justification for violations of the 
law; and the quality of their justifications were used to evaluate and determine their reputation.  
Statesmen and sovereigns attributed varying degrees of importance to reputation—which was only 
one of a number of assets that might be acquired in the context of foreign affairs.  In this particular 
case, however, Vergennes had predicated his ministry on establishing Louis XVI as a magnanimous 
and disinterested paragon of virtue, who could be entrusted with responsibility for maintaining the 
peace of Europe—and with the power that came with that role.  It was therefore of paramount 
importance that the king fulfill his commitments to the United States. 
It was an open question, however, as to 1) what those commitments were, and 2) how best to 
fulfill them.  From Vergennes’s perspective the sole essential end of the Franco-American Alliance 
was to establish the independence of the United States.  Not only so, but the attainment of that 
objective, and the successful conclusion of the war, hinged almost entirely on French military 
support.  So long as they France remained committed to the American cause—and Vergennes was in 
a position to say that they would—forms, conventions, and theoretical notions of equality were 
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immaterial.  As he wrote to Luzerne, in politics it was often necessary to yield on form so long as you 
obtained the substance desired.64  Or as he expressed it to Jay and Franklin: It was improper “to 
expect the Effect (independence) before the Cause (the signing of a treaty).”   
That is not to say that Vergennes always deemed matters of form and convention to be 
insignificant.  Throughout the war he had gone to great lengths to support the Americans’ sense of 
national dignity.  Article II of the Alliance averred that: “The essential and direct End of the present 
defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence absolute and 
unlimited of the said united States” (emphasis added) meaning that independence was, at least in 
theory, an established fact, prior to France’s having entered the war. 65   During Gérard’s tenure in 
Philadelphia, the French minister was often at pains to help the Americans avoid British attempts to 
undermine their status as a state.  And when preliminary negotiations commenced in May, Vergennes 
himself had opined that it was inconsistent with the “dignity” of the Americans’ state for France to 
negotiate on their behalf.  Yet when that status conflicted with the need to advance the negotiation of 
peace, he was willing to cede ground in this area—so long as his core objective remained firmly in 
hand.  Such judgments were the essence of law and politics.  All that the Americans needed to do, in 
his mind, was to trust the French and remain faithful to the alliance.  He would do the rest. 
Jay’s opposing views are contained in a lengthy letter to Vergennes that he drafted in 
September, but never sent.66  The essence of his position was that there was “no middle Capacity or 
                                                
64 Vergennes to Luzerne, August 12, 1782, in EN, I:525. 
65 Franco-American Treaty of Alliance, in Miller, Treaties, II:36-37. 
66 See Jay to Vergennes, [c. September 11, 1782], in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:121-142.  In his letter to the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Nov. 17, 1782, Jay states that he drafted this letter in September, and that it was 
“under Doctor Franklin’s Consideration” (Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:246) when news arrived that Oswald had received a new 
commission drafted in standard international form—thus obviating the need to send it to Vergennes.  The 
manuscript version of Jay’s letter is 39 pages in length.  It is comparable, in certain respects, to letters that John 
Adams wrote in the summer of 1780 and 1781, disputing with Vergennes, first about the propriety of immediately 
publishing his powers as peace commission, and later about the propriety of his appearing at the Vienna Peace 
Conference in a status other than that of a duly appointed representative of the United States.  The notable difference 
between the two sets of letters lies in the confidence and exhaustive mastery of his material that Jay displays, in 
contrast to the frequent vacillations and evident uncertainty that characterized Adams’s letters.  For Adams’s 
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Character between Subjection & Independence.”  Either the United States was a bona fide state, or it 
was still a colony of Great Britain.  There were no other categories or options under the law of 
nations.  He then proceeded to ground his defense of American statehood in the many public acts and 
declarations of the American Congress, from 1776 to the present day.  He began with the Declaration 
of Independence, in which the Americans had asserted their status as “free and independent states.” 
He went to the Articles of Confederation, in which they had vested in Congress “the sole and 
exclusive Right and Power of determining on Peace and War, of sending and recieving Embassadors, 
and entering into Treaties and Alliances.”  He then concluded with a long and detailed list of 
instances during the war in which Congress had refused to conduct business on any other basis than 
that which was pertinent to states in the international realm.  In each case, Jay argued, the American 
had acted in conformity with the “the Law of Nations,” which “requires that national Acts shall give 
to every sovereign and nation its proper political Name, or Stile, in the same Manner as the municipal 
Law of the Land will only take notice of Corporations, Companies and even private Citizens by their 
proper names and legal Descriptions.”  
Turning to Europe, Jay then presented an even longer list of examples from the Dutch War 
for independence, to support his contention that Europeans held to precisely the same standard that 
he had adopted.  “Can it be reasonably expected,” Jay asked in conclusion, “that we shd. consent to 
be viewed during [the negotiations] as british Subjects?”  “We are sorry to differ from your 
Excellency, but really Sir!… we can see but one Cause from whence an acknowledgmt. of [our 
Independence] can flow as an Effect vizt. the Existence & Truth of the fact… [W]e have a Right to 
expect that G. Britain will treat with us as being what we are, and not as what we are not. To treat 
about this Matter would be to suppose that our Independence was incomplete until they pronounced 
                                                                                                                                                       
correspondence with Vergennes, see: Volume 9 and 10 of The Papers of John Adams for dates July 13-29, 1780, 
and Volume 11, for dates July 7-21, 1781. 
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it to be complete— But we hold it to be complete already, and that as it never did, so that it never 
will or must depend in the least Degree, on their will and pleasure.”67  
Taken at face value, and under the circumstances that Vergennes had laid out, one might 
conclude—as many historians have—that Jay was exhibiting a legalistic personality and delaying the 
negotiations for the sake of abstract principles that had no bearing on actual American interests.  This 
was Benjamin Franklin’s position.  In a conversation with Oswald in August he opined that: “Mr. Jay 
was a Lawyer, and might think of things that did not occur to those who were not Lawyers.”  As for 
himself, “he did not see much or any difference,” between Oswald’s commission and the terms that 
Jay demanded; and he later lamented the fact that “3 or 4 millions of People” were being kept “in 
War for the sake of form.”68 
From Jay’s perspective, however, there was a major issue at stake in this dispute over form.  
At a climactic moment in his memo Jay declared: “When the United States became one of the 
Nations of the Earth they publishd the Stile or name by which they were to be known & called, and as 
on the one Hand they become subject to the Law of Nations, so on the other they have a Right to 
claim and enjoy its Protection & all the Priviledges it affords” (emphasis added).69  This, in Jay’s 
mind, was the essence of the issue.  The conflict that was being waged in defense of American 
statehood had a military dimension and a legal dimension.  If the Americans should weaken in their 
                                                
67 Jay to Vergennes, [circa September 11, 1782], unsent letter, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:121-142. For the first set 
of examples, drawn from the Congressional record, see pp. 125-129; for the latter set of examples, drawn from the 
history of Holland, see pp. 129-140 “Suppose,” Jay wrote in conclusion, “that the united States should descend from 
their present Ground of Equality, in order to treat with Mr Oswald, and that our Negociations should be 
fruitless….We should find ourselves betrayed by our too great Pliancy, and our too great Desire of Peace, to the 
Ridicule of our Enemies, the Contempt of other Nations and the Censure of our own Minds— What a page would 
this make in History,” p. 141. 
68 See Oswald’s Notes on his conversations with Franklin and Jay, August 11 in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:60; and 
then Herbert Klingelhofer (ed.), “Matthew Ridely’s Diary During the Peace Negotiations of 1782,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly, 20:1 (January, 1963), p. 112, entry for Saturday, September 21. 
69 Jay to Vergennes, [circa September 11, 1782], unsent letter, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:123. 
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legal defense of statehood, they would forfeit the rights and privileges that came with that status, in 
much the same way that they would cede territory if they should weaken in their military efforts. 
A European statesman might have responded that the Protections and Priviledges afforded by 
the law of nations—as pertaining, for example, to the conduct of warfare, trade, treaty making etc.—
were only relevant in the context of international relations.  In other words, one acquired the rights 
pertaining to the law of nations when and if other states acknowledge your status as a state and chose 
to treat you as such.  The rights did not exist in the abstract.  Jay appeared to be asserting that the 
statehood of the United States existed outside the realm of politics.  Whatever basis Jay might have 
for making that claim in theory, it had no practical implications. 
Yet there was at least one privilege that did pertain to states in the abstract: the right to 
interpret the law of nations and apply it to one’s own conduct.  Jay had alluded to this issue a year 
earlier, in voicing his objection to Congress’s requirement that the American peace commissioners 
submit to the guidance of the French court.  Even if the United States should be forced to “relax their 
demands on every side” and yield on every point “not subversive to our Independence,” Jay had 
written, Congress’s instruction “puts it out of the power of your ministers to improve those chances 
& opportunities which in the course of human affairs happen more or less frequently unto all men.”  
In the context of diplomacy, such “chances and opportunities” almost invariably involved the need to 
exercise the kind of moral, legal and strategic judgment that the author of the French memo had 
displayed in rendering a verdict on the validity of Oswald’s commission.   
Vergennes knew that such judgments were at the heart of diplomacy.  He did not think it 
necessary, or even appropriate, to grant the Americans that degree of discretion in the negotiation of 
peace—in part because he had an interest in controlling the pace of events, but also in part because 
he did not believe that the Americans were capable of using the law in an appropriate manner.  John 
Adams’ conduct the previous year offered ample evidence, and it was with that incapacity in mind 
that Vergennes had written to Luzerne that “[I]f that Body [Congress] has now or in the future the 
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least regret at having restrained the liberty of its plenipotentiaries too much, [by subjecting the 
American negotiators to French oversight] the King will see without trouble that he gives them the 
advantage therein.”  In other words, the French would allow the Americans to resume control of their 
negotiations, whenever they asked for it.  But, he continued, “you will take care to make it known at 
the same time, with dexterity, that if Congress takes this stance, it will remain responsible for what 
happens; I presume that body too wise to expose itself to such a risk.”70  Jay, as will be seen, was 
more than willing to expose himself to such risks, which he saw as the essence of independence. 
 
The Second Controversy: Ending Negotiations with Aranda 
The dispute over Oswald’s commission was resolved in September through events that I will 
describe shortly; but first, I must turn to a related set of negotiations that also took place over the 
course of August and early September 1782.  Jay had traveled to Paris with the primary goal of 
participating in the negotiations for peace.  He retained, however, his title as American minister to 
Spain, charged with negotiating a treaty of Amity and Commerce.  Shortly prior to Jay’s departure 
from Madrid, on May 21, Floridablanca had informed him that Spain’s ambassador in Paris, the 
Conde de Aranda, would be authorized to continue the negotiations.  Accordingly, two days after his 
arrival in Paris, Jay had written to inform Aranda of his readiness to “commence the necessary 
Conferences” at Aranda’s convenience.  Almost immediately thereafter Jay had fallen ill with 
influenza, which delayed the meeting for a month.  On August 3, however, he visited the ambassador 
at an appointed time, and the deliberations began.71   
                                                
70 Sept. 7, 1781, in Giunta, EN, I:229-230. 
71 The content of the subsequent negotiations is taken from Aranda’s notes, of August 3, and August 19-30, 
which he sent to Floridablanca; and Jay’s dispatch to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, which he sent on November 




Aranda opened with some preliminary remarks about the proper basis for treaties and then 
turned to the central point of dispute: the western borders of the United States.  Pulling out a map he 
asked Jay to identify the extent of the Americans’ claim.  When Jay pointed to the Mississippi, 
Aranda commenced a lengthy discourse in which he raised a host of legal objections to the American 
position—the principal one being that the Americans had never actually possessed the territory in 
question.  It had been the possession of France, he averred, until 1763, at which point it was ceded to 
Britain, but not the colonies.  Consequently, he argued, the Americans had no essential right to the 
region—most of which was under the de facto control of the Indian nations anyway.  To the extent 
that either party could claim territory on the basis of conquest, he went on to argue, Spain had the 
stronger claim, having already conquered west Florida from England, which gave them priority with 
respect to navigation rights on the Mississippi.   
The most appropriate way to resolve the issue, he concluded, would be to draw a middle line 
of separation, somewhere between the Mississippi and the American settlements.  If Jay would agree 
to this arrangement he magnanimously offered not “to dispute about a few Acres or Miles” but to 
agree on a line most convenient to the Americans.  At Jay’s prompting, Aranda agreed to draw an 
initial proposal on the map, which he promised to send to Jay within the next few days.   
As the two men were about to part company Jay produced a copy of his commission from 
Congress and showed it to Aranda, who examined it and appeared satisfied, but did not reciprocate as 
required by diplomatic convention.  He rather turned back to the map and asked if Jay would commit 
to drawing his own line, in the event that he was dissatisfied with Aranda’s.  Jay declined to promise, 
saying only that he would take Aranda’s line “into Consideration” and inform Aranda of his 
“Sentiment.”  He then turned back to the issue of diplomatic powers and expressed his hope that 
Aranda’s powers to negotiate “were equal with” his own.  Aranda responded that he had “ample 
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Powers to confer, but not to sign anything without previously communicating it to his Court.”  He 
still declined, however, to produce a document attesting to that authority.72   
 The reality was that Aranda did not have the commission that Jay was asking for—for 
precisely the same reason that the British had been reluctant to give such documents to Oswald—
because a proper exchange of powers would constitute a tacit recognition of American Independence.  
As had been the case throughout Jay’s tenure in Spain, the goal of the Spanish court was not to 
conclude a treaty with the United States.  It was rather to entice Jay into discussions in which he 
might cede ground that would strengthen Spain’s hand in the final negotiation of peace.  As Aranda 
wrote to Floridablanca, his goal was “to force the Americans to adopt a more moderate position,…. 
[by] demonstrat[ing] that we were entering into negotiations, and that we have opened the door to the 
Americans to set forth all their own views, by which we shall be governed subsequently.”73   
While Aranda’s proposal had the appearance of moderation, the reality was that, apart from a 
strip of land along the Gulf Coast, Spain had no claim to the trans-Appalachian west.  The conquests 
to which Aranda had referred extended only as far north as Natchez—some 150 miles above New 
Orleans.  The resolution of the matter consequently lay in the hands of Great Britain, which still had 
the authority, under European legal conventions, to dispose of the territory as it saw fit.  In the 
absence of either a military or legal claim to the region, Aranda was using moral pressure—
professions of friendship and moderation—to obtain Spain’s objective. 
It is worth noting that Aranda was not asking Jay to “descend from the ground of 
independence,” as the British had.  He was simply asking Jay to negotiate on the basis of informal 
and non-standard protocol.  Under the circumstances, the request was not entirely unreasonable in 
that the primary purpose of exchanging diplomatic commissions was to strengthen the reliability of 
                                                
72 Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:238-239.  For Aranda’s perspective on this first conference, see a translation of his 
notes in SPJJ, III:33-35.  He makes no reference to the discussion of his powers, or lack thereof, focusing his 
attention rather on his reasons for adopting the strategy that he had.  
73 Aranda’s notes on the Conference of August 3, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:34-35. 
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the subsequent communications.74  Communications that took place subsequent to the exchange of 
commissions implicated the honor and reputation of the sovereign.  In this case, Aranda was simply 
asking Jay to rely on his personal credit as a gentleman and public official, and in his case that was 
not entirely unreasonable, for Aranda was no mere ambassador.  He was one of the leading Spanish 
statesmen of his age—a native of Aragon, the most celebrated of Spain’s states or provinces, and an 
aristocrat by birth, who had served as a major general in the Spanish army and as head of the Spanish 
Council of State.75  If Jay had had an interest in continuing negotiations with Spain at this juncture, 
he might reasonably have relied on Aranda’s personal credit without consequence.  He declined to do 
so, however, to Aranda’s consternation.   
The process by which Jay formed and communicated his decision reveals much about his use 
and conception of international law—and the way in which legal principles could be deployed in a 
selective and strategic manner.  Several days after their initial conference, Aranda sent Jay, as 
promised, a copy of the map with a proposed line of demarcation marked in red.  The exact course of 
the line is not important to my analysis, but it ran roughly from the western tip of Lake Erie to the 
western border of the modern state of Georgia—ending just above Florida—about 500 miles east of 
the Mississippi, on average.  Jay brought the map to Vergennes and asked for his advice.  The 
minister was “very cautious and reserved” but Rayneval, who happened to be present, offered his 
personal opinion that the Americans claimed more than they had a right to.  As Jay later reported to 
Congress, he was convinced by Aranda’s map and Rayneval’s response that further negotiations 
would be fruitless, yet he still needed to articulate a reason for taking that position.76   
                                                
74 During Jay’s tenure in Spain, there was no need for Floridablanca to exchange powers with Jay since as 
the principal of the Spanish government he was entitled to speak on his own authority.  See Jay to Aranda, 
September 10, 1782, in SPJJ, III:114 in which Jay wrote, “I can only regret  that my overtures to his Excellency the 
Count de Florida Blanca, who was ex officio authorized to confer with me on such Subjects, have been fruitless.” 
75 Aranda’s appointment to Paris was a form of political exile—a consequence of his predilection to opine 
on state policy in an overbearing manner.  See Hull, Charles III, 116 and 186; and Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 293-295. 
76 Jay to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Nov. 17, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:239. 
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 He did not immediately break off negotiations, but rather pondered the matter for several 
days until, at some point near the third week of August, he had occasion to meet separately with 
Rayneval.  The French secretary asked whether Jay had made any progress in his negotiations with 
the Spanish ambassador.  Jay now raised, for the first time, Aranda’s failure to produce an official 
commission as a reason for declining to proceed.  Rayneval “expressed surprise” that Jay would have 
“any difficulties on that Head,” arguing that it would be sufficient in this context to rely Aranda’s 
“Public, as well as private Character,” for security in the negotiations.  Jay responded that he was: 
very sensible of the respectability, both of [Aranda’s] public and private Character, but, that 
neither the one nor the other authorised him to negociate Treaties with the United States of 
America; and consequently, that his Court would be at liberty to disavow all his proceedings 
in such business: That it was my duty to adhere to the forms usual in such Cases, and that 
those forms rendered it proper for Ministers to exchange Copies of their Commissions before 
they proceeded on the business, which was the Object of them.77 
 
Rayneval did not immediately press the point and the conference ended. 
Finally, on August 26, Jay visited Aranda in person and brought matters to a head.  He made 
no mention of Aranda’s failure to produce powers, but simply informed the ambassador that he had 
no discretionary authority to cede the territory in question.  All that he could do, he said, was to send 
Aranda’s proposal to Congress and ask for their advice.  Aranda, who admitted in his own report to 
Madrid that Jay did in fact lack the requisite authority, responded aggressively.  He professed to be 
incredulous that Congress would have sent a “Minister Plenipotentiary” without any discretionary 
powers.  When Jay responded that sovereigns did not typically grant their ministers authority to cede 
territory, Aranda returned to his earlier argument that the territories did not yet belong to the United 
States—adding that it was inconceivable that Congress would have failed to consider that competing 
claims that might arise, and would have sent “an attorney without power” to negotiate the matter.78 
                                                
77 Jay to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Nov. 17, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:239. 
78 Aranda himself—as he had stated at his first meeting with Jay—lacked the authority to cede any territory 
without the permission of Madrid. 
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Aranda then urged Jay to examine his papers from Congress with greater care, suggesting 
that even if Jay’s credentials did not explicitly authorize him to negotiate, then perhaps his 
instructions could be interpreted as giving grounds for him to proceed.  The Spanish, he asserted 
“had drawn a line with fundamental right to support it,” and it was Jay’s duty to refute Spain’s 
claims, and to “give reasons for the views of Congress” such that even if he “lacked sufficient power 
to conclude a treaty, the two men could “at the least clarify the claims of both sides.” Jay responded 
simply that he would have to “reflect on the situation in which he found himself.” Aranda then asked 
if Franklin had authority to negotiate.79  When Jay replied in the negative, he asked if Jay would 
consent to listen to French advice, and stated in conclusion that if Jay should persist in his refusal to 
negotiate, he should convey that decision in writing—the implication being that Jay should be 
embarrassed to have staked his position on such unsubstantial grounds.80 
It is worth emphasizing at this juncture the disparity in power and experience between 
Aranda and Jay.  One was an eminent and experienced statesman, 64-years of age, from one of the 
most powerful states in Europe; the other a 36-year old novice from an inchoate entity on the fringes 
of the Atlantic World.  On what basis did Jay purport to dispute with Aranda over technical aspects 
of international law—especially when Aranda appeared to have the backing of the United States’ 
sole ally?  The pressure only intensified some nine days later, in early September, when Rayneval 
asked Jay for a meeting.  At the conference, the French secretary entered into a lengthy discourse on 
the subject of the western territories in which he inclined strongly toward Aranda’s position.  He then 
                                                
79 Aranda’s notes of August 19-30, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:84-85. 
80 See Aranda’s notes of August 19-30, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:82-85; and Jay to the Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Nov. 17, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:239-240.  Congress had in fact given Jay discretion with respect to 
boundaries—but only in his capacity as peace commissioner. As minister to Spain he was not to yield territory 
above the 31st parallel.  It is possible that the French, who were aware of Jay’s instructions as peace commissioner, 
had informed Aranda of their content, as a means of strengthening his hand in these negotiations. 
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urged Jay to continue the negotiations, arguing in particular that since Jay had already begun to 
discuss the matter with the Spanish minister, he was obligated to continue.81  
The following day, Rayneval conveyed the same argument in writing, stating that:  
I have reflected, sir, on what you told me yesterday about the Spanish ambassador’s want of 
powers. You cannot in my opinion put forward that reason to excuse yourself from treating 
with that ambassador, without offending him, and without reversing the first steps you have 
taken towards him. This reflection leads me to advise you again to meet the Count d’Aranda 
again, and to make him some sort of proposal on the object in question. 
 
He then drew Jay’s attention to an enclosed memo, in which he suggested a solution “most likely to 
effect a reasonable conciliation.”82  The memo is important, not only because it offers the clearest 
expression of France’s position on the Mississippi as the war came to close, but also for the insight 
that it offers into French conceptions of the law of nations, and the strategic role of law in territorial 
disputes between allies. 
Rayneval began the memo by attacking American claims to the trans-Appalachian west on 
two grounds: First, he noted that in prior negotiations between France and Britain—first in 1755 and 
then in 1761—the English ministers had stated, variously, that the lands in question belonged to 
France, or were part of Canada, or belonged to the Indian nations.  But they had never stated their 
understanding that the territory in question was attached to any of the colonies on the eastern 
seaboard.  Secondly, after peace was established in 1763, the British King had gone so far as to 
prohibit the colonists from settling the region in question.  In combination, Rayneval concluded, the 
two instances proved that the British government regarded as null and void, any prior claims that the 
                                                
81 “My answer to this,” Jay wrote to Congress, “was obvious, vizt. that though I had heard Count 
d’Aranda’s Propositions, yet that I had offered none, of any kind whatever.”  Jay to the Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, November 17, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:240. 
82 Rayneval to Jay, September 6, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:101.  Aranda had met with Rayneval at least 
three times over the month of August, to discuss his on-going deliberations with Jay and to ask the French minister 
to support the Spanish position.  The content of those deliberations is summarized in Aranda’s notes of August 19-
30, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:82-85. Vergennes favored a compromise solution but left it to Rayneval to work out the 




Americans may have had from their colonial charters.  “To maintain the contrary,” he averred, “every 
Principle of the laws of Nature and Nations must be subverted.”83 (emphasis added)   
Rayneval went on to concede, however, that the Spanish had no inherent right to the territory 
either.  He nevertheless suggested that it would be useful for “the Court of Madrid and the United 
States” to reach an “eventual Arrangement”—i.e. to agree in advance on the future distribution of the 
territory in question, in the event that Britain should agree to relinquish it during the pending 
negotiations.  With that goal in mind, Rayneval proposed a complex line of separation that gave the 
United States more territory than Aranda’s line had done, but still left the Americans far from the 
Mississippi.84  Rayneval was careful to stress that the memo constituted his personal opinion—that it 
was not the official position of the French Court.  But given his position in the foreign ministry, the 
memo clearly conveyed Vergennes’s opinion and reflected the extent of support that the United 
States would receive from France in the final negotiations for peace.85 
There was nothing inherently illegitimate about Rayneval’s attempt to facilitate a 
compromise.  Nor was Vergennes’s necessarily committing an injustice in lending more support to 
the Spanish position.  For one thing, the French left most of the territory in question—the region 
north of the Ohio—for Britain to distribute as it saw fit.  Furthermore, it was indeed a fact that British 
                                                
83 Memoir on the Boundaries between Spain and the United States, Sept. 6, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:106.  
The Americans would have disputed the validity of the British actions as being in violation of British domestic law, 
and would have noted that the British policy vis-à-vis the west was one of the factors that had provoked the 
Revolution. 
84 Rayneval’s Memoir on the Boundaries between Spain and the United States, Sept. 6, 1782, in Nuxoll, 
SPJJ, III:107.  Rayneval would have left the territory north of the Ohio River in British hands, arguing that its “fate 
must be regulated with the Court of London.”  He divided the territory south of the Ohio in roughly equal portions. 
85 In his dispatch of November 17, 1782, Jay wrote that Rayneval’s memo had persuaded him 1. That 
France would oppose American claims to a border on the Mississippi 2. That France would also oppose American 
claims to navigation rights on the River 3. That France would probably support British claims to the entire territory 
above the 31st parallel and certainly above the Ohio and 4. That France would support Spain’s position over that of 
the United States, in the event that the dispute persisted. Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:241.  During Jay’s tenure in Spain 
Montmorin had urged Jay, on August 30, 1780, to consider that the United States “were as yet only rising States, not 
firmly established or generally acknowledged &c.” See Jay to the President of Congress, November 6, 1780, in 
Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:333-334.  For additional insight into the significance of the memo see Samuel Flagg Bemis, “The 
Rayneval Memoranda of 1782 and some Comments on the French Historian Doniol,” Proceedings of the American 
Antiquarian Society 47 (April 21, 1937): 15-92. 
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policy had been historically hostile to colonial possession of the west—and as late as the spring of 
1782, George III had scorned the colonial argument that it derived a right to the region from the 
colonial charters.86  Vergennes had no objection to American ownership of the west, if the United 
States could conquer the region on its own.87  Yet he had also written to Luzerne in June 1782: “[W]e 
desire that the Americans not impede the negotiations by unsustainable claims.”88 
Furthermore, with only a narrow window available to secure peace before Parliament 
returned in the fall, and with far weightier matters at issue—including independence itself—it was 
inappropriate for the Americans to complicate negotiations for the sake of secondary issues. 
As Vergennes also wrote to Luzerne in June, the territory that they already possess is already “too 
vast for their population, and they will long be without need to extend it; why then would they prefer 
to peace a contingent future that will cause neither their happiness nor that of their descendants!”89  
And although Spain did not have an inherent right to the territory, Carlos III’s primary ambition—to 
secure control over his empire—was reasonable.90 
It was also true, one might counter, that the French faced a strategic imperative to satisfy 
Spain, given the role of the Pacte de Famille in French national security.91  In other words, 
Vergennes was using moral arguments as a veil for self interest.  That was part of the equation, yet in 
                                                
86 See Fortescue, George III, VI. 
87 As he wrote to Luzerne in September 1781, If the Americans conquered the western territories, “they will 
in law and in fact sustain their claims; but if the English maintain themselves on the continent of America, the 
United States will be forced to drop its illusions,” Giunta, EN, I:230. 
88 Vergennes to Luzerne, June 28, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:446. 
89 Vergennes to Luzerne, June 28, 1782, in Giunta, EN, I:446. 
90 See Gérard’s speech to Congress, in February 17, 1779, in which he argued that “His Catholic Majesty is 
too great and too generous to desire an acquisition of territory; that he is limiting himself to administering well the 
states that Heaven had given him; and it is to the security of his borders and to preventing all trouble with his 
neighbors that he gives all his cares; that it was from this point of view… that I had been led to think that… the 
Exclusive Navigation of the Mississippi could alone fulfill this object.” Meng, Despatches, 529. 
91 See Vergennes’s aforementioned memo to Louis XVI in 1774, on his ascension to the throne of France, 
in which Vergennes described the Pacte as the foundation of French foreign policy. 
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my judgment, Vergennes wanted his decisions to align not only with interest, but also with moral 
principle, so that Louis XVI would not suffer a loss of reputation.  In this case, even though the 
Spanish declined to recognize American statehood, and had shifted the theater of war to Europe, in 
support of their own ambitions, they had nevertheless contributed essential support to the war effort, 
enabling France to fulfill its commitment to the United States.  To be blunt, without Spanish support, 
Vergennes was convinced that France would have been defeated and the American cause doomed.92   
The problem that Vergennes’ faced in the summer of 1782 was that, even though he was 
convinced of the justice of his policy, he could not deploy such arguments in his discussions with the 
Americans, who were ill disposed to favor Spanish interests, and had no treaty-based obligation to 
satisfy them.  Nor was Vergennes willing to use France’s military and economic problems to invoke 
sympathy lest the Americans lose respect for Louis XVI.93   As Vergennes wrote to Luzerne in the 
fall of 1782: “Our way of thinking, must be an impenetrable secret from the Americans.”94  
Consequently, in advancing his policy for the negotiations, it was necessary for Vergennes to make 
use of a secondary set of legal principles that seemed more likely to secure his objective—
weaknesses in American claims to the western lands, and Jay’s purported obligation to negotiate with 
Aranda on the basis of the ambassador’s personal honor.  Here were see the strategic role of law in 
diplomacy: It was vehicle used to support strategic interests, and contentious moral principles that 
were otherwise vulnerable to repudiation. 
In rendering a moral and legal judgment on the Spanish-American dispute, and guiding the 
negotiations toward what he perceived to be a just and reasonable outcome, Vergennes was acting in 
                                                
92 See Vergennes’s aforementioned letter to Louis XVI in December 1778, in which he stated that without 
Spanish support, the king faced the likely destruction of his finances and even his entire navy. 
93 Throughout the war, Vergennes and his representatives cultivated in American minds the image of Louis 
XVI as a great and benevolent monarch who was coming to the aid of an oppressed people.  See, for example, 
Gérard’s address to Congress on February 16, 1779, in which he averred that Louis XVI was invariably attached to 
the “noble” object of American independence and had “no ambitions of Conquest,” Meng, Despatches, 527. 
94 Vergennes to La Luzerne, October 14, 1782, quoted by the Jay Paper editors in the “Introduction” to 
Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:xxv, with a citation to FrPMAE: CP-EU, 22: 369. 
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accord with the highest standards of enlightened statesmen.  He was also fulfilling Louis XVI’s 
destiny as the arbiter of the European peace.95  The problem was that, in doing so, he was also 
encroaching on the American prerogative, as a free and independent state, to render such judgments 
for themselves.  The reality was—Rayneval’s assertions not withstanding—the conventional law of 
nations did not offer a firm basis for resolving territorial dispute.  As noted above, both Vergennes 
and Floridablanca had gone on record, early in the war, as supporting the American claims to a 
border on the River.96  It was only after they realized the import of the issue that they altered their 
policies—and adjusted their legal arguments accordingly.97 
Nor did Jay have the slightest obligation under law to proceed in his negotiations with 
Aranda in the absence of a valid commission.  As the writer of the French memo—possibly Rayneval 
himself—had stated with respect to Oswald’s commission, irregularities in commissions justified 
                                                
95 Montmorin had been careful to maintain a neutral stance throughout Jay’s tenure in Spain.  Vergennes’s 
letters to Luzerne and Gérard also included frequent references to his determination never to meddle with the 
domestic affairs of the United States. 
96 Floridablanca had told Montmorin in the spring of 1778 that the Mississippi was such a “visible and 
determined” frontier between the American colonies and Spain that Carlos II “had nothing to resolve or work out 
with that country,” Doniol, III:22, quoted in Cummins, Observers, 150.  Later in Philadelphia, Gérard had initially 
opposed Miralles’s desire to confine the States to the Atlantic coast and had sought to persuade him “that Congress 
would never willingly renounce the navigation of the Mississippi, which was necessary as an outlet for the immense 
settlements that the Americans proposed to make on the Ohio and other tributary rivers,” Gérard to Vergennes, July 
25, 1778, in Meng, Despatches, 186.  Three months later, Vergennes would also support that perspective, writing to 
Gérard that though he did not yet know “the intentions of the Court of Madrid”, he judged “that the Americans 
would insist upon freedom of navigation on the Mississippi on account of the establishments they propose to 
establish on the Ohio,” adding that “he would be surprised if this demand were rejected.”  Vergennes to Gérard, 
October 26, 1778, Meng, Despatches, 359.   
97 During the negotiations leading to the Franco-American Alliance, Vergennes was also reported to have 
said, with respect to the border between Spain and the United States, that “the line drawn by the last treaty of peace 
with England, the Mississippi, would be adopted, and would prevent all disputes,” recorded by Arthur Lee in his 
diary, and published in Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, 361 (see pages 357-390 for a general discussion of those 
negotiations.) Vergennes’s statement, if accurate, is significant for the French would subsequently promise, in the 
text of the treaty of alliance, to guarantee the “Possessions” of the United States “and the additions or conquests that 
their Confederation may obtain during the war,” Miller, Treaties, II:40, and it would seem that Vergennes 
understood those possessions to encompass the trans-Appalachian west.  Once Spain’s ambitions became clear, 
however, he retreated from that position and Gérard would spend much of his time, in the spring and summer of 
1779, arguing that the Americans’ “Possessions” extended only to the British Proclamation Line of 1763 and that 
Louis XVI would not “prolong the war by even one day to procure to them possessions that they coveted,” but to 
which they had no essential right.  See Gérard to Vergennes, January 28, 1779, in Meng, Despatches, 494.  The 
Americans ultimately rejected that argument and defined their Possessions as encompassing the western lands. See 
Congress’s resolution in JCC, XIV:958, dated August 14, 1779, and also contained in John Adams’s instructions. 
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their rejection “if one did not wish to treat.”  Aranda knew this of course.  In acting as he did, he had 
taken a gamble that was predicated on the expectation that a novice American would not dare to use 
a technicality to resist the social pressure of an eminent statesman.  Had he been negotiating with an 
experienced European counterpart, he would have had no grounds for complaint.  In the end, though 
the French and Spanish may have been annoyed with Jay’s response, they also knew that Jay was 
acting as they would likely have acted, had they been in his situation—which begs the question of 
where Jay acquired the knowledge, poise, and confidence that he yet again displayed in deploying 
law in his diplomacy.  
After receiving Rayneval’s memo, Jay took three days to consider the matter before him.  
Finally, on September 10, he sent Aranda a brief note informing him, in writing as requested, that he 
was “not authorized by Congress to make any Cessions to any Countries [territory] belonging to the 
United States, & that I can do nothing more respecting the Line mentioned by your Excellency than 
to wait for and to follow such Instructions as Congress on rec[eivin]g that Information may think 
proper to give me on the subject.”98  As for Rayneval’s memo, Jay acknowledged its receipt when he 
next saw Rayneval, but as it was “ostensibly written by [Rayneval], in a private Character” (emphasis 
in the original), Jay thought it neither “expedient” nor “necessary” to enter into formal discussions on 
the subject.99  On that basis Spanish-American negotiations over the Mississippi came to a close.   
“Either he has no talent,” Aranda wrote, “or he has come with no instructions other than the 
name ‘Mississippi,’ or he proceeds in bad faith.”100  The reality, as Aranda’s memos to Spain make 
clear, is that Jay had successfully used law to evade a trap that Aranda had laid, to entice Jay into 
                                                
98 Jay went to remind Aranda that he had “full Power ‘to confer treat, agree, and conclude with the 
Embassador or plenipotentiary of his Catholic Majesty, vested with equal powers; of and concerning a Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce & of Alliance,’ on principles of Equality Reciprocity & mutual Advantage,” and that it would 
give him “Pleasure to see this Business begun… as soon as your Excellency shall be pleased to inform me that you 
are authorized and find it convenient to proceed,” Jay to Aranda, September 10, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:114. 
99 Jay to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, November 17, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:241. 
100 Aranda to Floridablanca, early September 1782, quoted in Joaquin Oltra, El Conde de Aranda y Los 
Estados Unidos. Barcelona: PPU, 1987. 
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giving ground before the British could render their own verdict on the future disposition of the land.  
In so doing, Jay risked a temporary loss of personal reputation, since he did violate codes of personal 
honor—leaving him vulnerable to being disparaged by Aranda.  Yet in his formal capacity as an 
emissary of the United States he had preserved the interests and the honor of nation, by acting in 
accordance with the letter of the law, leaving neither Spain nor France with any grounds for 
complaint. Here was a practical example of the rights and priviledges of free and independent states 
that Jay was determined to uphold, in refusing to negotiate in the absence of a valid commission.  
 
The Third Controversy: Sending a Secret Agent to England 
By this point in the chapter, I have conveyed most of the points that I wish to make regarding 
the role of law in Jay’s diplomacy.  What follows are two brief sections in which I aim to correct the 
historic record pertaining to Jay’s conduct.  As noted above, a number of historians writing on these 
events in recent years have charged Jay with conduct that was immoral, illegal, or unwise.  My 
contention is that those judgments are based either on an imperfect reading of the historic record, and 
on an erroneous understanding of the law of nations.  The most severe judgments are made in 
connection with his decision, during the second week of September, to send a secret agent to 
England, to counteract what he perceived to be Vergennes’s position toward peace.101  The context 
that gave rise to Jay’s decision was this: Soon after receiving Rayneval’s memo of September 6, Jay 
learned that the Rayneval had left suddenly for England—likely to meet with the British Ministry.  
Jay immediately concluded that Rayneval’s purpose was to undermine American claims to the 
Mississippi, and he sent his own agent with a message designed to counter that move. 
Those who are critical of Jay’s conduct note that the primary purpose of Rayneval’s mission 
was to assay the validity of a recent report that Shelburne was prepared to offer generous terms of 
                                                
101 Vaughan was an Englishman who was both a confidante of Shelburne’s and a strong supporter of 
American Independence.  See entry for Vaughan in the Biographical Directory, SPJJ, III:664. 
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peace.102  The report turned out to be false—it was likely a ruse intended to lure the French into 
negotiations. Nevertheless, Rayneval did enter into negotiations with Shelburne, and in the course of 
those negotiations he did undermine the American position in precisely the way that Jay had feared 
that he would.  At an early meeting in September, Rayneval assured Shelburne that Louis XVI would 
never support “unfair demands” on the part of the Americans.  And once “the point of independence” 
was conceded he appeared “rather Jealous than partial to America upon other points.”103  
At a later conference in October, he made a point of suggesting to Shelburne that with respect 
to the western boundary of the United States, “the English ministry would find in the negotiations of 
1754, relating to Ohio, the boundaries that England, then sovereign of the 13 United States, thought 
fit to assign them.”  In other words, he urged upon the British the very same legal argument that he 
had presented in his memo to Jay.  Finally, in late October, Rayneval went so far as to inform 
Shelburne that the French had no interest in seeing a robust new nation emerge in North America, 
and were disposed “to assist” the British “as to the Boundarys.”104   
Arguably more consequential were Rayneval’s statements with respect to the pace of the 
negotiations.  Back in May, Vergennes had told Franklin that there was no risk in conducting 
separate negotiations for peace, so long as the negotiations went “hand in hand” and concluded at the 
same time.105  After Jay refused to negotiate on the basis of Oswald’s commission, however, 
Vergennes abandoned that position and—though he did not inform the Americans of his decision—
told the British emissary, near the end of August, that was opposed to Jay’s position on the 
                                                
102 As noted above, the report came via Admiral de Grasse—a French admiral who had been captured at the 
Battle of the Saintes in April, and had paid a personal visit to Shelburne in England, prior to his release.  See 
editorial note in SPJJ, III:95-98 for a description of these events. 
103 Shelburne to the King in Fortescue, George III, VI:125. 
104 Shelburne to Townshend, October 28, 1782, cited in Morris, Peacemakers, 331. 
105 “They want to treat with us for you,” Vergennes informed Franklin, “but this the king will not agree to.  
He thinks it not consistent with the dignity of your state.  You will treat for yourselves, and every one of the powers 
at war with England will make its own treaty.  All that is necessary for our common security is that the treaties go 
hand in hand and are signed all on the same day.”  See entry in Franklin’s journal, in Cohn, PBF, 37:316. 
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commission and was willing to proceed in his own negotiations.106   Now in September, Rayneval 
sent so far as to assure Shelburne, in the event that an Anglo-Bourbon accord could be reached, there 
were “ways to keep everything a secret in order to foil the curious,” and that the Americans and the 
Dutch in particular could be kept “in ignorance of the state of the negotiations between France and 
Spain and England.”107  In other words, Vergennes’s commitment to the United States was limited to 
the strict letter of the alliance, which made “independence” the sole aim of the war.  
As noted above, Vergennes’s position was not necessarily illegitimate.  He was fulfilling his 
treaty obligations to the United States and he was adapting to political realities, in seeking to bring 
the war to a rapid and reasonably equitable conclusion.  But he was also undermining Jay’s 
contention—or pretension, in Vergennes’s view—that the United States was a bona fide state, fully 
entitled to the rights and privileges that came with that status.  And he was rendering his own moral 
judgment as to the validity of the American claim to the Mississippi, and trying to force an outcome 
that accorded with the Bourbons’ perception of propriety. 
A second and related matter for which Jay is criticized has to do with the content of the 
message that his agent conveyed to Shelburne at this juncture.  Two historians, Jonathan Dull and 
Bradford Perkins, state that Jay offered to make a separate peace with England—which if true would 
have been a direct violation of the Franco-American Treaty of Alliance.108  The only documentary 
evidence that we have of Jay’s instructions to Vaughan, come from Jay’s own report to Congress, of 
November 17, in which—as was typical of all of Jay’s dispatches—he recounted at length every 
aspect of his conduct so as to enable Congress to form their own judgment as to the correctness of his 
                                                
106 Jay later learned of this from Oswald, and recorded the fact in his dispatch to the Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs on November 17, 1782, see Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:235.  Oswald specific words to Jay were: “Count de Vergennes 
told Mr. Fitzherbert that my Commission was come and that he thought it would do, and therefore they might now 
go on, and accordingly they did go on to discuss certain points, and particularly that of Newfoundland.” 
107 Quoted in Morris, Peacemakers, 330 with citation to Rayneval’s Conference of September 18. 
108 Jonathan Dull, “Franklin the Diplomat: The French Mission,” Transactions of the American 
Philosophical Society 72:1 (1982), p. 58; Perkins, Republican Empire, 41.   
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actions.109  The relevant passage reads as follows: “[A] little reflection,” Jay told Vaughan, must 
convince Shelburne, 
that it was the Interest and consequently the policy of France to postpone, if possible, the 
acknowledgment of our Independence to the very conclusion of a general Peace, and, by 
keeping it suspended until after the War, oblige us, by the terms of our Treaty and, by regard 
to our safety, to continue in it to the End.  That it hence appeared to be the obvious interest of 
Britain immediately to cut the Cords, which tied us to France; for that, though we were 
determined faithfully to fulfil our Treaty and Engagements with this Court, yet it was a 
different thing to be guided by their or our Construction of it (emphasis in the original). 
 
Jay went on to imply, in his opinion, that once the British had granted the Americans their 
independence, the alliance terminated. 
A quick reading of Jay’s statement might lead one to think that he was offering a separate 
treaty of peace.110  It is important to note first, however, that the notion that the alliance terminated 
on independence was not terribly controversial.  Franklin had offered the same opinion in May, and 
Vergennes’s conduct—in opposing a valid exchange of commissions with England—suggests that he 
also viewed this as a legitimate interpretation of the Americans’ treaty obligations.  Furthermore, it 
did not automatically follow that the Americans would act on the right to break the alliance, as soon 
as they obtained their independence.  Franklin had made that point to Grenville, back in May, when 
he said that the first thing was for the British to send a valid commission. Jay, it turns out, was of the 
same opinion.   He went on to say, in language that the historians in question do not cite:  
                                                
109 See Jay to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, November 17, 1782, Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:243-245. 
110 P. J. Marshall, whose analysis of the negotiations is generally accurate, falls into this error in British 
Atlantic, pp. 41-43, when he quotes Jay as having informed both Oswald and Benjamin Vaughan that British 
recognition of American independence would “cut the cord that ties us to France,” which he interprets as an offer to 
break ties with France.  He goes on to say that Shelburne agreed to pay the price of immediate recognition in order 
to obtain “the prize of separating America from France.”  In reality, Oswald’s revised commission only gave the 
Americans a credible excuse for voiding their treaty commitments with France.  The commission did not impose on 
the Americans an obligation to drop out of the war—nor did they ever do so.  It only pressured France to facilitate 
reconciliation between Britain and Spain since Vergennes could not longer count on American support in a 
prolonged war, fought only for Spanish interests.  For evidence that France felt such pressure, see Lord Grantham to 
the King, November 3, 1782, in which the British minister reported that “The French Minister (as appears by Private 
Letter to Lord Grantham) is anxious that Spain should not continue to impeded the Progress of a Pacification, as the 
American Commissioners declare publickly that they shall think themselves authorized to sign their Treaty, if 
France holds out upon any concerns but her own,” in Fortescue, GIII, VI:150. 
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While, therefore, Great Britain refused to yield this Object [independence] we were bound, as 
well as resolved, to go on with the War, although perhaps the greatest obstacles to a peace 
arose neither from the demands of France nor America— Whereas, that Object being 
conceded, we should be at liberty to make Peace, the moment that Great Britain should be 
ready to accede to the terms of France and America, (emphasis added) without our being 
restrained by the demands of Spain, with whose views we had no concern. 
 
In other words, Jay was not offering to conclude a separate treaty of peace, in violation of the 
French alliance.  He was rather informing the British of his opinion that once the independence of the 
United States had been secured, the Americans would be at liberty to render their own judgment as to 
the extent of their obligations vis-à-vis the Bourbon powers—in light of France’s separate treaty with 
Spain.  He explicitly declined to say how the Americans would exercise that judgment—only saying 
that they could do nothing until the British had placed them in a position to act.  Shelburne had long 
sought to use France’s ties to Spain as an inducement to the United States to sign a separate treaty of 
peace.  Jay was in effect informing Shelburne that this would never happen.  The only way forward 
was for the British to take the first step and make independence effectual before negotiations began, 
rather than after they concluded.  The British would have to take that risk without any guarantee that 
the Americans would act in a way that advanced the British cause.  
The final controversy touches upon the mechanism that Jay subsequently proposed—which 
the British ultimately accepted—for resolving the impasse over Oswald’s commission.  Around the 
time of Vaughan’s departure for England, Jay met with Oswald, who continued to press on the 
Americans the importance of commencing negotiations, and the impossibility of complying with 
Jay’s demand that Britain grant the United States preliminary independence.111  After a long 
discussion, Jay finally said, “that if Doctr Franklin would consent, he was willing, in place of an 
express previous acknowledgement of Independence, to accept of a constructive Denomination of 
Character, to be introduced in the preamble of the Treaty, by only describing their Constituents as the 
Thirteen United States of America.”  When Oswald appeared to listen to the idea, Jay added, “but 
                                                
111 Oswald argued that Parliament had not yet granted George III permission to grant American 
independence, and that any step the ministry might take before Parliament returned would have no binding effect. 
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you have no authority in your Commission to Treat with us under that Denomination.”  “The least 
[the Americans] could expect,” he continued, “was that the proposal should appear to be warranted 
by an Explicit Authority in the Commission.”  In other words, the British would have to give Oswald 
a new commission, authorizing him to treat with “the United States.”  
Oswald asked Jay to give him “in writing, some Sketch of the Alteration.”  Jay complied, 
noting that “this New Commission must be under the Great Seal, as the other was.”112  Oswald 
forwarded the request to the cabinet, which voted in mid-September to approve it.  Within two 
weeks, Oswald had received a revised commission, signed by George III under the great seal of 
England, authorizing him to negotiate with the “Thirteen United States”—the first time that the 
British had ever used that title in a public document.  Those critical of Jay’s conduct depict him at 
this Juncture as having given way to “near panic,” and of having “swerved off in a new direction”— 
agreeing to negotiate on the basis of an “equivocal” proposal that the British readily accepted 
because it did nothing to establish the independence of the United States.113   
Oswald’s record of his conversation with Jay, however, contains no hint of panic.  The 
British emissary had in fact offered Jay a number of alternatives, all of which Jay rejected, stating the 
Americans “could admit of no Authority but what was explicitly conveyed to me by a Commission in 
the usual form,” and that “to put an end to this difficulty, there was an absolute necessity of a new 
Commission.”  In his report to the British cabinet, Oswald concluded by saying:  
I think it my duty to say this much, that, by what I have been able to learn of the Sentiments 
of the American Commissioners, in case the Compromise now proposed (which with great 
difficulty they have been persuaded to agree to) is refused, there will be an end to all farther 
Confidence and Communication with them.114 
 
                                                
112 Oswald to Townshend, September 10, 1782, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, III:117-118. 
113 Dull, “Franklin the Diplomat,” 58, depicts Jay as having been in a “near panic.” Perkins, Republican 
Empire, 41 writes that he “swerved off in another direction.” Dull, Diplomatic History, 151 and Stockley, Britain 
and France, 61-62 also present Jay’s compromise solution as illusory, equivocal, or otherwise ineffective. 
114 Richard Oswald to Thomas Townshend, September 10, 1782, in SPJJ, III:120. 
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Nor is it true that Jay’s compromise represented a substantive descent from his earlier demand for a 
preliminary grant of independence.  As Jay’s aforementioned memo to Vergennes makes clear, his 
central concern was that the United States maintain the status of a free and independent state for the 
duration of the negotiations—with all the rights and privileges that came with that status.   
 Furthermore, although some members of the British cabinet suggested Oswald’s new 
commission could still be repudiated if necessary—as not actually conveying an acknowledgment of 
independence—it represented a major concession on the part of the British.  And in negotiations in 
which the British were determined to favor the interests of one of their enemies over those of the 
others, with the goal of reducing the final price of peace, the concession tilted British policy toward 
the United States.  As Shelburne wrote on the occasion to Oswald, with only some hyperbole:  
Having said and done everything, which has been desired, there is nothing for me to trouble 
you with, except to add that we have put the greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in 
man, in the American Commissioners.  It is now to be seen how far they or America are to be 
depended upon.  I will not detain you with enumerating the difficulties which have occurred.  
There never was greater risk run.  I hope the public will be the gainer, else our heads must 
answer for it, and deservedly.115   
 
As Washington wrote when he received the news, “it is a great point gained,” one that must have 
caused George III, “some severe pangs at the time he put his hand to [it].”116    
                                                
115 Quoted in Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, 1:205.  Matthew Ridley, an American in Paris at the time, 
whose diary contains a wealth of insight into the negotiations, states that Shelburne was uneasy about having issued 
the new commission because he did not believe that he had legal grounds, under the “Enabling Act” for treating with 
the United States as an independent state.  Having taken this step, he now felt compelled “for his own security” to 
conclude a deal with the United States before Parliament returned at the end of November, “for should we break off, 
and the people of England think he has gone too far in acknowledging the Independency, it may go hard with him.” 
Klingelhofer, “Matthew Ridely’s Diary,” 115-116.  See also John Cannon, “Lord Shelburne’s Ministry, 1782-3: ‘A 
Very Good List,’” in Nigel Aston and Clarissa Campbell Orr (eds.), An Enlightenment Statesman in Whig Britain: 
Lord Shelburne in Context, 1737-1805. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011, pp. 163-65, for a helpful analysis of 
the domestic political context in which Shelburne was operating.  See also P. J. Marshall’s analysis, already cited, in 
British Atlantic, 44-54.  Marshall concludes that although Shelburne was committed to a policy of reconciliation 
with the United States, he was forced to yield far more than he had hoped to, in part because of the pressures 
imposed by domestic political realities, and in part because of the American intransigence on the issue of 
independence—which once yielded, gave the British less leverage in the negotiations. 
116 Washington to Robert Livingston, January 8, 1783, in John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of George 
Washington. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1931-1944, vol. XXVI, pp. 17-18.  Washington also 
characterized the concession as “an Act of necessity” on the part of the British since the American commissioners 
“could not treat with Him unless such powers were given”—though of course Franklin would have done so. 
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The critical point to understand, in evaluating the significance of Oswald’s new commission, 
is that very few aspects of the conventional law of nations offered perfect legal security.  Even the 
terms of the most sacred treaties were subject to interpretation.  What the law offered were degrees 
of security—degrees that were marked by forms and protocol that implicated the honor and character 
of the sovereign, and of the nation. From that perspective Oswald’s revised commission was a 
significant step forward, and on that basis Anglo-American negotiations began in early October.  
 
The Final Controversies: Concluding Preliminaries without the Consent of France 
The final controversies surrounding the negotiation of peace involved John Adams and 
Benjamin Franklin, as well as Jay, and are rather straightforward as matters of law.  They require 
commentary chiefly in that other historians have rendered judgments that, in my view, reflect an 
imperfect understanding of the law of nations and its role in eighteenth-century diplomacy.  In brief, 
the Americans 1) proceeded in their negotiations with England without informing the French court of 
the content of those deliberations, and 2) signed preliminary terms of peace with England, on 
November 30, despite having promised in the treaty of alliance not to “conclude either Truce or 
Peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of the other first obtain’d.”117  The question is 
whether either of those acts constituted a violation of the law of nations. 
On the first point, it is indisputable that the Americans were violating their instructions, yet 
those instructions were of a kind that no self-respecting state in this era would ever have consented 
to—the essence of statehood being equality and independence, and the essence of statecraft being the 
right to render one’s own judgments as to the propriety of a given line of conduct.  To be fair, most 
of the historians in question acknowledge this point but nevertheless assert that the Americans were 
                                                
117 Article VIII, of the Treaty of Alliance, is found in Miller, Treaties, I:38-39.  The preamble to the 
preliminaries stated that they were “to be inserted in, and constitute the Treaty of Peace proposed to be concluded, 
between the Crown of Great Britain, and the said United States; but which Treaty is not to be concluded, until Terms 
of a Peace shall be agreed upon, between Great Britain and France; and his Britannic Majesty shall be ready to 
conclude such Treaty accordingly.” See “Great Britain, November 30, 1782,” in Miller, Treaties, I:96. 
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guilty of an act of bad faith in unwarranted suspicions of Vergennes’s motives and damaging the 
efforts of their principal all to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion.118  I do not dispute that the 
Americans complicated Vergennes’s diplomacy, nor do I dispute that Vergennes’s intentions were 
honorable.  Yet Vergennes’s policy ran counter to American interests and whether the Americans had 
an obligation to accommodate French interests in light of French aid during the war was precisely the 
kind of moral question that statesmen had to decide.  While Vergennes was irritated with the 
Americans, he never charged them with a violation of international norms. 
But what about the decision to sign preliminaries of peace?  Jonathan Dull writes that though 
the “agreement of November 30 was conditional, in theory… [but i]n practice, the news of the 
preliminary agreement was almost universally regarded in America as the end of the war.”  Andrew 
Stockley says that, though the terms were technically provisional, “in reality… [they] removed 
America from the war [and] placed pressure on France and Spain to accept lesser terms, and 
conclude a peace settlement, or face the danger of renewed warfare without American assistance.”  
And Bradford Perkins concludes that “When all extenuations are offered, the fact remains that, 
despite the pledge in the French alliance, the Americans negotiated an end to their part of the war 
and… subordinated good faith to their nation’s interest.”119 
The documentary record offers little evidence to support any of these judgments.  While the 
general populace in America may have misconstrued the preliminaries as an end to the war, the 
revolutionary leadership had no such illusions. On receiving news of the preliminaries on March 19, 
Washington wrote a series of letters not only emphasizing the inconclusive nature of the agreement, 
                                                
118 Jonathan Dull, in particular, writes that “the American betrayal of the French alliance endangered the 
process of peacemaking by unraveling a complex agreement between Britain, Spain and France laboriously knitted 
by Vergennes,” Diplomatic History, 151. 
119 Dull, Diplomatic History, 151; Stockley, Britain and France, 67-68; Perkins, Republican Empire, 45-46.  
Perkins adds that the Americans confirmed what Beaumarchais had argued to Louis XVI in 1775: ‘Sire, the policy 
of governments is not the moral law of their citizens.’”  Paul Schroeder also errs when he writes that, “The 
Americans, Benjamin Franklin in particular, followed their republican principles, first exploiting France and then 
forsaking her,” European Politics, 39. 
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but also warning that it might well represent another British ploy, designed to lure the Americans into 
a state of complacency.120  As a consequence, he took no steps to disband the army, nor did the 
British take any further steps to relax their posture in North America, or release troops for service 
elsewhere in the military arena, before a formal suspension of hostilities began in 1783.  And once 
Shelburne was forced out of office, early in the New Year, strenuous (though unsuccessful) efforts 
were made to alter the preliminaries before the final treaty was signed in September 1783. 
It is also worth emphasizing that European statesmen placed considerable weight on 
precision in legal terminology.  Diplomacy often involved disputes over fine points of distinction and 
interpretation—in much the same way that one finds in most systems of law.  In this case, the treaty 
of alliance held that the United States could not conclude a “Truce or Peace with Great Britain,” 
without the permission of France; nor could they “lay down their arms,” until their independence was 
secured by treaty.  As noted, the Americans did not lay down their arms, and the terms “truce or 
peace” were not understood to encompass preliminaries.121   
It is true that the American preliminaries weakened the Franco-American alliance, by making 
it more likely that the Americans might drop out of the war in 1783, if the French should perpetuate 
the conflict (in violation of the terms of the Franco-American alliance) for the sake of Spanish 
objectives.122  But that reality did not impose any cost on the French, who were eager for the war to 
                                                
120 To Luzerne he wrote that the preliminaries “are so very inconclusive that I am fully in sentiment with 
you, that we should hold ourselves in a hostile position, prepared for either alternative, War or Peace.”  To the 
President of Congress he wrote that while the terms were “as full and satisfactory, as we have reason to expect,” 
they were also “very inconclusive and contingent,” see Fitzpatrick, The Writings of Washington, XXVI:236-37. 
121 In the Convention of Aranjuez, to give just one counter example, the kings of France and Spain 
committed, in Article III, “not to listen to any direct or indirect proposal on the part of the common enemy without 
communicating it each to the other,” or to sign “a treaty, convention or any act of whatsoever nature without the 
knowledge and previous consent of the other” (emphasis added). Bemis, American Secretaries, I: 296.  Such 
language was available to Vergennes when the alliance was signed in 1778.  Even if that had not been an established 
point of law, Vergennes had little grounds for complaint, for he had also been willing to settle preliminary terms of 
peace with England, without the knowledge of the Americans. 
122 As Washington also wrote to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs: “The policy of G. Britain…, if I have 
formed a right judgment, is to sooth America… in order to weaken the band and maker her uneasy under the 
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end, but only on the Spanish.  And so it was, in early January, that Aranda finally agreed to sign 
preliminaries with England, without having obtained Gibraltar.  The result, as Rayneval would write, 
was like a dream, and achieved a more favorable end to the war than he ever could have thought 
possible.123  And as Vergennes later reminded the king, while the war had not always gone as hoped, 
the primary goal had always been American independence, and that objective that been achieved.124  
Some might argue that this result could not have been known at the time that the Americans took the 
steps that they did, and that they nevertheless ran a tremendous risk—both to France and to their own 
interests.  Yet the essence of diplomacy—in Jay’s view at least—was the right to render judgments, 
run the related risks, and reap the fruit (or suffer the consequences) as events dictated. 
And here, finally, we come to the real argument that those critical of the American 
commissioners are actually making:  It was improper for Jay and the American commissioners to 
assert the full rights of a free and independent state, in light of the fact that they were still an inchoate 
entity, dependent on France for their very existence.  This issue leaves us with a question that more 
properly falls under the heading of philosophy rather than law.  What constitutes a state?  And were 
the Americans justified in asserting the full prerogatives of a state, under those circumstances. 
Through out the war, Vergennes and his emissaries had gone to great lengths to support the 
Americans’ sense of dignity and independence.   Yet their conception of the international realm was 
ultimately one in which great powers acted as benign overseers, while lesser entities (like the United 
States) submitted to their judgments.  In acting as he did, Jay was rejecting that vision, and asserting 
                                                                                                                                                       
Alliance if the policy, or Situation of France with respect to the other Belligerent powers renders it necessary to 
continue the War…; what the final issue may be Heaven knows.” Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, XXVI: 242. 
123 Rayneval to Vergennes, January 28, 1783, in Doniol 5:286, quoted in Murphy, “The View from 
Versailles, 145.  
124 Vergennes to Louis XVI, March 29, 1784, quoted in Murphy, “View from Versailles,” 147 with citation 
to AAE, MD, France, 587:207.  Jonathan Dull notes that the victory came at tremendous cost to French finances, 
and did not actually achieve Vergennes’ goal of reducing British power, “France and the American Revolution Seen 
as Tragedy,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (eds.) Diplomacy and Revolution: The Franco-American 
Alliance of 1778. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981, pp. 73-106. 
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a philosophical standard in which even a novice political entity was entitled to the law of nations. 
Where did Jay learn that political philosophy?  And where did he acquire the confidence to assert that 
standard in the face of both the patent weakness of the United States and opposition from such 
experienced counterparts?125 I will turn to that question in my final two chapters. 
 
  
                                                
 125 Vergennes’s irritation with Jay is expressed in a letter to Luzerne the following summer: “I understand,” 
he wrote, “that Mr. Franklin has asked for his recall, but that Congress has not yet acted on his request.  I desire that 
it reject it, at least for the present, because it will be impossible to give Mr. Franklin a Successor as wise and also 
conciliating as he; moreover, I fear that we will be left with Mr. Jay, and he is the man with whom I would least like 






































Thus far, the principal objective of my dissertation has been to demonstrate how European 
and American diplomats, respectively, deployed “the law of nations” in their wartime negotiations—
and to what effect.  What rules were considered substantive or binding?  How were they enforced?  
What role did they play in negotiations?  In what way did these rules constrain state behavior or alter 
the outcome of conflicts?  In nearly every case, I have found that the rules in question—whether they 
pertained to military conventions, or privateering, or the proper means of empowering an emissary—
were derived from historic precedent and the general consent of European sovereigns and statesmen.  
They had no overt or visible link to the treatises that are so often depicted in the literature as the 
embodiment of eighteenth-century conceptions of international law.  One might reasonably conclude, 
therefore, that this is the end of the matter—that the treatises were nothing but aspirational and 
academic works of philosophy, whose influence on statecraft would have to wait for a later and more 
enlightened era.  Yet buried in the footnotes of the scholarly literature, one finds passing remarks that 
suggest the matter merits further consideration. Perhaps the treatises did not function in the way that 
we would expect, given our modern conceptions of international law.  Yet they may still have had 
some important role or influence.1 
As I discussed in my introduction, the historiography on the treatises contains few insights on 
this issue—having been produced, in most cases, either with the goal of analyzing the centuries-long 
development of western political thought, or identifying the origins of modern international law.  In 
both cases, historians tend to privilege those aspects of the treatises that are still deemed relevant 
today, while discounting those aspects that would fall out of favor by the early nineteenth century.2  
                                                
1 As noted in the introduction, Randall Lesaffer writes that: “legal doctrine [by which he meant the content 
of the treatises] certainly played a role, although somewhat in the background.” “Alberico Gentili,” note 12, p. 214. 
2 Legal historians, for example, often draw attention to the way that the treatises were cited in American 
courts during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, thus creating the misleading impression that the 
treatises were primarily viewed in that era as compilations of opinions on practical aspects of international affairs.  
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The method that I have devised as a consequence is to proceed directly to the treatises and read them 
from the perspective of a student in colonial America—schooled in the basics of European 
philosophy, and generally familiar with the political history of Europe, but lacking experience in 
statecraft—looking for insight into the role of law in international affairs.3  What would such a reader 
have learned from the treatises in the 1760s and 1770s?  And in light of what we now know of the 
diplomatic issues that would confront the United States during the war, what additional aspects of the 
treatises would have been most useful to novice American emissaries during the Revolution?  
The three treatises most often cited, and most directly relevant to the diplomacy of the 
Revolution, were Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (1625), Samuel von Pufendorf, On 
the Law of Nature and Nations (1672), and Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or Principles of 
Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns (1758).  Of the 
three I will focus most of my attention on the latter two—on Vattel, because his treatise was 
published just prior to the Revolution and thus offers the most current conception of European 
intellectual views on the law of nations; and on Pufendorf because his theories of natural law lay at 
the heart of Vattel’s treatise.4  Grotius, it turns out, had grounded his theory of law on principles that 
Pufendorf rejected, and which—though perhaps important in Europe—had only a secondary 
influence in America during the Revolution.5  
                                                                                                                                                       
See again Stewart Jay, “The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law,” Vanderbilt Law Review 42 
(1989): 819-849.  See also Neff, War and the Law of Nations, which focuses on those aspects of the treatises that 
related to the conduct of warfare.  Such scholarship creates the erroneous impression that the treatises were written 
primarily with the goal, shared by many internationalist attorneys today, of reducing the severity of warfare.  While 
Grotius does make a few passing remarks to that effect, he was primarily engaged in an intellectual endeavor.   
3 I am not attempting, à la R. G. Collingwood, to reconstruct the colonial mind through an act of historical 
imagination.  I rather aim to divorce the treatises from the broader philosophical context in which they were written, 
and let them speak for themselves as purportedly authoritative depictions of the rules governing international affairs. 
4 As I will discuss in my sixth and final chapter, Pufendorf’s theories were also central to Samuel Johnson’s 
understanding of natural law, which he wove into the curriculum at King’s College in the 1760s. 
5 I will discuss this matter further in the pages ahead, but in brief, Pufendorf rejected Grotius’s notion that 
the law of nations could only be derived from the common consent of nations, rather than directly from natural law. 
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Preface to Vattel 
I begin my analysis with a close reading of Vattel’s preface and introduction, allowing his 
treatise—published in 1758—to serve as an informant as to the general characteristics of the law of 
nations, as understood in the mid-eighteenth century.6  It is immediately apparent that Vattel did not 
intend his treatise as a commentary or, or compilation of, the pragmatic norms and standards that 
governed the conduct of European statecraft in that era.  He is aware of such laws, which he refers to 
as the conventional or customary Law of Nations (earlier in the dissertation, I termed them as the 
political law of nations), but he is rather interested in articulating or refining what he calls the natural 
Law of Nations.7  Vattel does not attempt to define the concept of natural law, as he assumes that his 
readers are already familiar with it.8  It is apparent, however, that he considers it to be a set of 
universal moral norms, derived from the rational observation of human nature.9   
The question of concern to Vattel is whether or to what extent the principles of natural law 
are binding on the conduct of nations and sovereigns.  The reason for thinking that it might be, he 
suggests, is that nations were corporate moral persons.  Vattel attributes this claim to the German 
philosopher, Christian Wolff, who wrote that: “Nations or sovereign States are corporate persons and 
the subjects of obligations and rights which… result from the act of association by which political 
bodies are formed.” Consequently, Wolff continued, they should “be considered as so many 
                                                
6 I will be using Charles G. Fenwick’s translation of Vattel, first published by the Carnegie Institute of 
Washington DC in 1916, but now reprinted by William S. Hein & Co.: Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or 
the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, translated by 
Charles G. Fenwick, Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1995 [1916]. 
7 See Book I, Preface, 4a, and Introduction, §27.  The full title of Vattel’s treatise was: The Principles of 
Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns.   
8 Book I, Preface, p. 12a. 
9 Book I, Preface, p. 7a.  M.S. Anderson observes in this context that “the expanding current of eighteenth-
century thought and feeling…centred around the idea of nature, [which was] seen as the ultimate source of true 
morality, and of natural rights,” Modern Diplomacy, 166. 
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individual persons living together in a state of nature, and therefore all the duties and the rights which 
nature… imposes upon all men… should be applied to States as well.”10 
Vattel presents this notion, that states are subject to the dictates of natural law, as a somewhat 
controversial matter.  “The great body of authors” he writes, have taken the opposite position, and 
followed Hugo Grotius in arguing that nations were subject only to those rules and customs that they 
had explicitly or implicitly consented to obey.11  Such a formulation, Vattel argues, “degrades” the 
Law of Nations “by misconceiving its true origin.”  The reality, he asserts is that the law of nations, 
being located in nature, is binding on states and sovereigns even without their explicit consent.  
Vattel cites both Hobbes and Pufendorf as concurring with that view, but then immediately points to 
a weakness in their theoretical formulations, which he intends to rectify or resolve.  
According to Vattel, Hobbes had held that the natural laws, or moral duties, pertaining to 
states were “exactly the same,” as the laws or duties that pertained to individuals.  “[A]s States 
acquire what are in a way the characteristics of persons,” Hobbes had written, “the same law which 
we call natural, in speaking of the duties of individuals, we call the Law of Nations when we apply it 
to the entire people of a State of Nation.”  Pufendorf had subsequently given this definition his 
“unqualified approval.”12  Vattel rejected this view.  While natural law was certainly applicable to the 
conduct of statecraft, he argued, it was necessary to take into consideration the fact that corporate 
                                                
10 Book I, Preface, 3a-4a.   
11 Book I, Preface, 4a-5a.  According to Vattel, the basic principle undergirding Grotius’s theory, as 
expressed in On the Law of War and Peace (1625), was that: “When a number of persons at different times and in 
different places maintain the same principle as true,” and when their “common opinion” can be attributed to 
“universal consent,” then the principle in question is binding on all nations.  Grotius held that natural law was only a 
“guide to the conscience” of statesmen.  It could not be used as grounds for complaint by one state against another.  
12 Vattel, Law of Nations, 5a-6a; Hobbes, On the Citizen (1642), Chap. XIV, §4; Pufendorf, On the Law of 
Nature and Nations, Chap. III, §23.   
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persons were not the same as individuals.  Hence arose a need to modify the principles of natural law, 
and make them applicable to the conduct of statecraft.13  This would be Vattel’s project. 
The process by which such modification were made, Vattel argued, constituted “a special 
science” consisting of “a just and reasonable application of the Law of Nature to the affairs and 
conduct of Nations and sovereigns.”14  At the heart of this process, he continued, was the 
foundational premise or understanding that, whereas individual human beings lived within the 
bounds of human society, states conducted business in a “state of nature.”15  Consequently, they had 
not yet yielded any of their sovereignty to a civil authority.  They were perfectly free, and 
theoretically equal, and subject only to the most basic and limited tenants of natural law.16  This 
broad conception of sovereignty, which was foundational to Vattel’s overarching theory, is 
antithetical to modern international law, and appears also to be antithetical to basic tenants of justice.  
What, one might ask, would prevent powerful states from dispensing with justice and crushing their 
foes? 
                                                
13 Vattel credits Wolff with this idea.  In brief, Vattel wrote: “as the natural law in its proper sense is the 
Law of Nature for individuals, being founded upon man’s nature, so the natural Law of Nations, is the Law of 
Nature for political societies, being founded on the nature of these societies.”  Book I, preface, 7a, footnote j.  It is 
worth noting that in the preface to the second edition of On the Law of Nature and Nations, published in 1688, 
Pufendorf acknowledged a similar weakness in his theory, stating that, “since the acts of supreme sovereigns and of 
independent states often seem to deviate from the rules of duty which private individuals have to observe in their 
dealings with one another, it would not be out of place to inquire whether at all, and if so, how far, supreme 
sovereigns are exempt from the rules of private [natural] Law, and how far those acts can be approved, which are 
commonly said to be done ‘for reasons of state,’”  Book I, Preface, iv.   
14 Book I, Preface, 3a; or as he later put it in his introduction: “The art” of applying natural law to nations 
“with a precision founded upon right reasons, constitutes of the Law of Nations a distinct science,” Introduction, §6. 
15 Book I, Preface, 9a.  The contrast between a “state of nature” and a state of society was central to early 
modern formulations of natural law.  Philosophers typically began their inquiries into natural law by positing a 
hypothetical pre-historic era when human beings wandered the earth as individuals.  In the course of time, it was 
understood, individuals gave up a portion of the liberties that they had previously enjoyed and chose to live in 
society, in order to obtain certain benefits that could only be obtained through cooperation.  As that process 
occurred, people ceded sovereignty to “some authority capable of giving commands, prescribing laws, and 
compelling those who refuse to obey” and became subject to civil law.  
16 Each independent State,” Vattel wrote, “claims to be, and actually is, independent of all the others…. 
[T]hey ought to be regarded as so many free individuals who live together in a state of nature, and recognize no 
other laws than those of nature, or of its divine author.” Book I, Preface, 9a. 
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The answer, Vattel argued, was that states were still subject to the natural law of sociality in 
that they derived benefit from “mutual communication and intercourse.”17  As a consequence, states 
had an interest in fulfilling the natural law that obligated them to supply one another with mutual 
assistance.  The reason, he continued, that statesmen had so rarely complied with this law to date was 
that no one had yet specified those aspects of natural law that were applicable to states.  That would 
be Vattel’s task, and having completed it, he expected it would be, “easy to apply this doctrine to 
Nations, and to teach them… not to feel free to do whatever can be done with impunity.”18 
 
Terms and Definitions 
Before I go on to analyze the precise principles that Vattel ultimately espoused, I should note 
a few relevant terms and definitions.  First, Vattel draws a distinction between the necessary and the 
voluntary Law of Nations.  The former he defines as the immutable standards of justice, which bind 
the conscience, but cannot always be used as the basis for a claim by one state against another.  By 
contrast, the voluntary Law of Nations consists of a more limited set of laws, necessarily modified to 
fit the actual situation of nations, which their “common good and welfare oblige them to accept.”  
The necessary laws carried greater moral weight, but in practical terms it was the voluntary laws that 
sovereigns and statesmen had to concern themselves with.19   
Vattel also acknowledged the existence of what he terms the arbitrary Law of Nations, which 
was derived from the will or consent of all nations and encompassed both the conventional law—the 
                                                
17 As noted above, the law of sociality was derived from the fact that human beings were so constituted as 
to be unable to reach their potential without the assistance of their fellows.  Vattel is applying this principle to states. 
18 Book I, Preface, 10a.  “If the leaders of Nations,” Vattel went on to say, “…were to make a serious study 
of a science which ought to be their law and their guiding compass, what benefit could not be expected from a good 
treatise on the Law of Nations?  The benefits in civil society from a good code of laws are daily felt; but the Law of 
Nations is as much superior to the civil law in point of importance as the acts of Nations and of sovereigns are more 
far-reaching in their consequences than those of individual persons.” 
19 Grotius had effectively placed the entire corpus of natural law under the heading of what Vattel calls the 
necessary law and argued that it was only binding the conscience of statesmen.  Vattel is attempting to carve out a 
portion of these laws—the voluntary laws—and establish a basis for their adaptation in the international realm. 
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content of compacts and treaties—and the customary law—which was derived from norms and 
practices that, through long usage, had acquired the force of law in certain regions or among a subset 
of nations.  These arbitrary laws were not necessarily in accord with the natural law of nations, 
though they derived their “binding force” from the natural law in so far as it obligated Nations to 
“keep their compacts, whether express or tacit.”20 
Taken by themselves, these definitions go a long way toward clarifying how statesmen in the 
eighteenth-century understood the term “law of nations.”  It was an umbrella concept that 
encompassed both the practical norms of statecraft and the theoretical principles on which the larger 
superstructure of law was thought to stand.  What those principles were, and how they may also have 
had an effect on statecraft, will be the focus of the remaining portion of this chapter.  
 
The Theoretical Structure of Vattel’s Law of Nations 
One of the foundational premises of natural law theory in the early modern period was the 
notion that individual had three sets of duties: Duties to oneself, duties to other individuals, and 
duties to God.  Those basic duties—and especially the first two of them—are woven into the 
structure of Vattel’s depiction of the law of nations.  His treatise is divided into four volumes or 
“books”, the titles of which are: I) A Nation Considered by Itself;  II) Nations Considered in their 
Relations with Other Nations ; III) War;  IV) The Restoration of Peace, and Embassies.  The first 
book considers a nation’s duties to itself; the second treats of the nation’s duties to other nations; and 
the third and fourth volumes consider matters that arise as consequence of the failure of nations to 
resolve their differences in a peaceable fashion.  I will begin with a concise overview of the treatise 
and then highlight those passages or principles that seem, on the basis of my earlier analysis in the 
diplomatic record, particularly relevant to the diplomacy of the American Revolution.   
                                                
20 Book I, Preface, 11a. 
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Vattel begins by defining the “nation”—an issue of considerable importance to the American 
Revolutionaries.  For a political entity to constitute a “nation,” Vattel asserts, “it need only be truly 
sovereign and independent; it must govern itself by its own authority and its own laws.”  To achieve 
that goal, it must fashion or establish “a public authority,” that would “regulate and prescribe” the 
duties of the members.  This was the sovereign.21  Sovereigns could vary in type or kind, but each 
was bound, by natural law, “to procure for its members the necessities, the comforts, and even the 
pleasures of life, and in general, all that is necessary to their happiness; and in order to secure to each 
individual the peaceful enjoyment of his property and a sure means of obtaining justice; and finally, 
on order to defend the entire body against all violence from without.”22   
Working from that foundation, Vattel goes on to delineate the nation’s internal duties to 
itself—with respect to matters such as agriculture, commerce, public roads, piety and religion, public 
justice, and the regulation of rivers, streams, lakes and the sea.  In the next three books, he then 
articulates the nation’s duties to other nations.  The foundational principle of the natural law of 
nations, Vattel contended was that: “Each State owes to every other State all that it owes to itself, as 
far as the other is in actual need of its help and such help can be given without the State neglecting its 
duties towards itself.  Such is the eternal and immutable law of Nature.” This obligation, Vattel 
asserted, flowed from the concept of “sociality,” or the observation “that man, by the very nature of 
his being, can not be sufficient unto himself, nor continue and develop his existence, nor live happily 
without the assistance of his fellow-man,” and is therefore obligated to cooperate with others “for the 
mutual improvement of their condition in life.”23 
                                                
21 Book I, Chap. I, §4-5. 
22 Book I, Chap. VI, §72.  “Happiness,” Vattel went on to say, “is the goal towards which are directed all 
the duties which individuals and peoples owe to themselves; it is the great end of the natural law.… it ought to be 
the prime object of the public will,” Book I, Chap. XI, §110. 
23 Book II, Chap. I, §2-3.  Vattel derived this law from the natural law as pertaining to individuals, that we 
must do “all in our power for the welfare and happiness of others, as far as is consistent with our duties towards 
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Vattel then went on to articulate a host of ways—that a state might comply with that rule.24  
If this rule were followed, he allows himself to dream, we would “see a true friendship reign among 
[Nations], which will consist in mutual affection…. Nations would mutually exchange their products 
and their knowledge; profound peace would reign upon the earth and would enrich it with its 
precious fruits; industry, science, and art would be devoted to promoting our happiness no less than 
satisfying our needs.”25  He quickly acknowledges, however, that: “the inordinate passions and 
mistaken self-interest of men will keep them from ever realizing [such an ideal].”26   Here is therefore 
compelled in the third and fourth books of his treatise to articulate principles governing the proper 
means for waging war and negotiating peace.   
 
Aspects of the Law of Nations Most Pertinent to the American Revolution 
I have identified four instances in which Vattel opined on issues related to the core question 
of American independence, and two additional instances in which he opined on legal issues related to 
other aspects of American diplomacy.  Before examining these facets of the treatise it is worth 
emphasizing that Vattel’s did not conceive his treatise as a definitive statement of international law.  
His objective was rather to persuade statesmen to submit to the dictates of natural law, and he sought 
to accomplish that objective by demonstrating the use of right reason as it pertained to the many 
moral dilemmas that statesmen faced in their conduct of foreign affairs.  Ultimate judgment, in 
Vattel’s view, rested with the sovereign, whose duty it was to weigh the various factors at play in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
ourselves.”  As will be discussed further, the rule is identical to the foundational premise on which Pufendorf 
constructed his theory of natural law, though Vattel does not credit him with the idea.  
24 For example, by providing food in time of famine, defending a neighbor against unjust invasion, or even 
providing a neighbor with a superior set of laws.  He stresses, however, that a nation “has no right to force [another 
state] to accept its offer of help.  The attempt to do so would be a violation of their natural liberty.” He specifically 
chastises the Spanish for enslaving the American Indians as a means of civilizing them.  Book I, Chap. I, §7.   
25 Book II, Chap. I, §12. 
26 Book II, Chap. I, §16. 
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given situation and render a verdict that was in line with the nation’s obligations to itself, as well as 
its obligations to its neighbors.  Nevertheless, Vattel’s demonstrations were vested with an aura of 
intellectual credibility, and they were likely useful to the novice American statesmen who read his 
work—especially as his opinions often aligned with their interests. 
With respect to the core issue of American independence, the most significant question was 
whether people had the right to rebel against their sovereign.  Vattel opined that popular resistance 
was permissible in exceptional circumstances.  He defined the sovereign as “the soul of the society,” 
whose person was therefore “sacred and inviolable.”  Yet “this high attribute of sovereignty,” he 
continued, “does not prevent a Nation from putting restraint upon an insupportable tyrant.  It may 
even pass sentence upon him… and withdraw itself from his obedience.”  On what grounds?  On the 
ground that “the essential object of civil society” being to “work in concert for the common good of 
all” the people have only yielded a portion of their liberty to the sovereign on the assumption that 
“the sovereign will use that power for the welfare of the people.”  The moment he “attacks the 
Constitution of the State the Prince breaks the contract which bound the people to him.”27 
Once a given people had made the decision to rebel a second issue arose as to whether or not 
neighboring states were permitted to support the rebel cause.  As a general rule, Vattel opined that: 
“Foreign Nations must not interfere in the domestic affairs of an independent State,” but only 
“interpose their good offices for the re-establishment of peace…[as] they are called upon to do by the 
natural law.”  Nevertheless, he continued, neighboring Nations, which are not hindered by conflicting 
treaty obligations, may “decide for themselves the merits of the case, and assist the party which 
seems to have justice on its side, should that party ask for their help.”  In practical terms, Vattel 
concludes, the issue comes down to whether “[t]he conflict should be termed a civil war”—which it 
                                                
27 Book I, Chap. IV, §51.  That said, Vattel cautions, the decision to rebel “can only be passed by the 
Nation or by a body representing it,” and “[a]s it is very difficult to oppose an absolute prince… it ought not to be 
attempted except in extreme cases.”  The people should presume, as far as possible, that the sovereign’s commands 
are “just and beneficial.”   
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should be “if the insurgents have justice on their side,” or whether it should be “termed a 
rebellion”—which it should be if it lacks “any semblance of justice.”28 
Third, Vattel suggests that the sovereign against whom the people have rebelled also faces a 
moral dilemma.  Must that sovereign, he asks, “observe the ordinary laws of war in dealing with 
rebellious subjects who have openly taken up arms against him?”  Or would that sovereign rather be 
justified in using harsh measures to put down the rebellion.  Vattel urges sovereigns to exercise 
restraint, remembering “that the rights of the sovereign are derived wholly from the rights of the 
State itself or of the civil society, from the duties intrusted to him, and from the obligation he is under 
to watch over the welfare of the Nation, to procure its greatest happiness, and to maintain order, 
peace, and justice within the country.”  “[O]nly a tyrant,” he opines, would “treat as rebels those 
brave and resolute citizens who exhort the people to protect themselves from oppression and to 
maintain their rights and privileges.  A good prince will commend those noble patriots, provided their 
zeal is tempered with moderation and prudence; if he puts justice and duty first, if he aspires to the 
lofty and immortal honor of being the father of his people.”29  
Finally, Vattel offers an opinion on the legal issue at the heart of the American Declaration of 
Independence: Did a political entity in revolt against its sovereign merit the legal designation of “a 
Nation” or a state—with all of the rights and privileges that came with that designation?  In a passage 
entitled “The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of Sovereignty & Independence,” Vattel 
answers in the affirmative: “When… the political bonds between a sovereign and his people are 
broken, or at least suspended… [both] regard each other as enemies and acknowledge no common 
judge…. Of necessity, therefore, these two parties must be regarded as forming henceforth, for a time 
at least, two separate bodies politic, two distinct Nations.”  Why?  Because the dispute is moral in 
                                                
28 Book III, Chap. XVIII, §292-296. 
29 Book III, Chap. XVIII, §287-290. 
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nature and “no one has the right to judge them… The two parties must be allowed to act as if 
possessed of equal right, and to be treated accordingly, until the affair is decided.”30 
Vattel opined on two other issues related to the diplomacy of the American Revolution: 1) 
the validity of treaties between states that differed in strength or degree of power and 2) the issue of 
how to regard treaties that were in conflict with each other.  On the first point, Vattel was vociferous 
in expressing his view that Nations, like individuals in a state of nature, were equal before the law.  
“Strength or weakness…counts for nothing.  A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small 
Republic is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful Kingdom.”31  That basic equality, he 
went on to say, retained its full force even in the context of alliances between states that markedly in 
strength.  If the allies have pledged to “make common cause and support one another with all their 
forces,” then the treaty should be classified as being equal in nature because “the contracting parties” 
have been “pleased to consider [their forces] as being so” in that instance.32 
Nor, he went on to say, did an alliance become unequal if the more powerful state should 
decide, “for some special reason [to give] more than it receives.”  In that instance, it should be 
assumed that the powerful state made the decision voluntarily in order to obtain some intangible 
benefit—for instance, to engender a feeling of gratitude in the weaker state that would make it more 
compliant.  Such treaties only became unequal in essence if “the weaker state accepts greater 
obligations [than the strong one].”  The presumption in such instances, Vattel averred, must be that 
the obligations were taken under compulsion, as “no weak state would accept such terms unless they 
were forced upon them as a means of debasing them.”  But even in such cases, Vattel went on to 
                                                
30 Book II, Chap. IV, §56.  Vattel makes a similar case in his passage on Civil War, holding that “whenever 
a large body of citizens believe themselves justified in resisting the sovereign… war should be carried on between 
them and the sovereign in the same manner as between two different Nations…. The obligation upon the two parties 
to observe towards each other the customary laws of war is therefore absolute and indispensable, and the same 
which the natural law imposes upon all Nations in contests between State and State.” Book III, Chap. XVIII, § 293 
31 Book I, Introduction, §18. 
32 Book II, Chap. XII, §172. 
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emphasize, the weaker state’s “Sovereignty continues undiminished,” provided only that “none of the 
rights which belong to it are transferred to the greater State, or are rendered dependent… upon its 
will.”33 
As for second issue—the question of how to resolve disputes that arose when two treaties 
were in conflict with each other—Vattel opined that:  “[if a] sovereign who is already bound by one 
treaty… enter[s] into others in conflict with the first…the later one is void as to [the point of 
conflict], being an attempt to dispose of a thing over which the contracting party did not have full 
control.”34    
 
Vattel’s Theories and the Real-World Law of Diplomacy 
 It should be evident, from my prior discussion of the diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
that Vattel’s opinions were both relevant to the war, and would have been a source of encouragement 
to the Americans.  Were they permitted to rebel?  Vattel offered reasons for encouragement.  Were 
other states permitted to support their cause?  They were.  Should George III follow the conventional 
laws of war in resisting their rebellion?  Definitely.  Did they possess the rights of states for the 
duration of the war?  They did.  Were they equal in their alliance with France?  Yes.  Did that 
equality continue undiminished despite the fact that the French were contributing substantially more 
men and materiel to the war?35  Yes.  Did the terms of the Franco-American alliance trump the terms 
of the Franco-Spanish Convention of Aranjuez?  Yes again.   
                                                
33 Book II, Chap. XII, §175.  Elsewhere, Vattel specifies that the sovereignty of the weaker state would 
only become impaired if it voluntarily surrendered its “right to self-government.” Book I, Chap. I, §5. 
34 Book II, Chap. XII, §165. 
35 Vergennes had granted unconditional support to the Americans in order to overcome their 
historic attachment to England.  As he wrote to the Spanish Secretary of State in July 1777, “[O]ur 
assistance,” he noted, “must become sufficiently effective to assure a total separation and forcer les 
Americains à la gratitude,” or bind them with ties of gratitude. Quoted in Meng, Vergennes, 63. 
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In sum, Vattel and the American Revolutionaries were in full agreement with respect to the 
core issues pertaining the law of nations and the diplomacy of the American Revolution.  But so 
what?  What influence, if any, did Vattel’s views have on the conduct and outcome of the 
Revolution?  Were his opinions in agreement with the standards that prevailed in the political realm?  
Would they have carried any weight in  negotiations?  Vattel himself answers these questions in the 
negative.  He was not, he said, attempting to codify the existing norms of European statecraft, nor 
were his opinions in agreement with those norms.  “The principles we are about to lay down,” he 
wrote at the outset of his section on international relations, “will seem very inconsistent with the 
policies of cabinet ministers, and, unhappily for the human race, many of those astute leaders of 
Nations will turn into ridicule the doctrines in this chapter” (emphasis added).36   
In a later passage on the negotiation of treaties he continued in the same vein: “I can see 
those so-called great statesmen smile, men who employ all their subtlety in taking advantage of those 
with whom they deal and in arranging the conditions of the treaty in such a way that the whole 
benefit of it shall accrue to their master.  Far from being ashamed of a conduct so opposed to justice 
fairness, and natural honesty, they consider themselves honored by it, and claim to merit the name of 
able negotiators.”  Finally, at the outset of his section on war, he expressed hope that “this feeble 
picture might touch the rulers of Nations and create in them, with respect to their military 
undertakings, a circumspection in keeping with the serious consequences of their acts.”37  
In sum, and as already alluded to above, Vattel’s purpose was not to articulate the prevailing 
doctrines of international law but rather to articulate a higher-order set of moral principles.  “Why 
may we not hope still,” he wrote, “to find among those who govern some wise statesmen who are 
convinced of the great truth that even for sovereigns and States the path of virtue is the surest way to 
prosperity and happiness?”  “[H]appily for the human race,” he added elsewhere, “it frequently 
                                                
36 Book II, Chap. I, §1. 
37 Book II, Chap. XVII, §173; and Book III, Chap. III, §24. 
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happens that the advantages [which dishonest statesmen] think they have gained turn out to be 
disastrous for them, and even between sovereigns candor and uprightness prove to be the safest 
policy.”  “To fancy that men, and particularly men in power,” he cautioned, “are going to follow 
strictly the Laws of Nature, would be grievous self-deception; but to lose all hope of making an 
impression upon any of them would be to despair of human nature.”38  Taken at face value, such 
statements would appear to bring to a close any discussion of the practical relevance or relationship 
between the treatises and the conduct of diplomacy during the Revolution.  If the Americans had 
relied on Vattel in their wartime negotiations, it would seem, that would simply have demonstrated 
their ignorance and naïveté.39 
A closer reading of Vattel’s treatise, however, offers reason to think that his work may have 
been important to American emissaries—if not as a definitive statement on the law, then as a source 
of insight into core aspects of European diplomacy.  It is important to remember, in this context, that 
Vattel’s purpose in writing the treatise was to make principles of natural law relevant to the conduct 
of statecraft.  In pursuing that goal, he incorporates many basic facets of European diplomacy into his 
presentation.  He frequently draws examples from European history to illustrate the application of his 
principles.  He also makes repeated reference to the customary law of nations—either with the intent 
of refining such laws or of establishing new principles on related points.40  
It is also apparent that Vattel is in tune with the moral sensibilities of his generation—which 
he uses to persuade his audience to adopt his norms.  An oft-repeated example is his frequent 
                                                
38 See Book II, Chap. I, §1, and Book II, Chap. XII, §173. 
39 During John Jay’s tenure in Spain, a Congressional committee, whose members included James 
Madison, drafted a memo for Jay’s benefit, in which they articulated a series of arguments in defense of the United 
States’ claim to a border on the Mississippi, and included citations to Vattel.  In his response, Jay praised Madison’s 
reasonings but noted that Vattel was banned in Spain, and that his opinions carried no weight. See JCC, XVIII:935-
947; Jay to the President of Congress, October 3, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:580-81; and Jay to Gouverneur Morris, 
September 28, 1781, in Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:575. 
40 With respect to prisoners of war, for example, Vattel comments that “the Nations of Europe, consistently 
with their continual efforts to alleviate the hardships of war, have introduced humane and useful customs with 
respect to prisoners” and goes on to establish principles based on those “customs.”  Book III, Chap. VIII, §153. 
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reference to the importance of national reputation and honor.  Regarding a sovereign’s obligation to 
fulfill treaty obligations, for example, Vattel writes that, “nothing is more honorable in a prince and 
his Nation than the reputation of inviolable fidelity to a promise,” whereas “the reproach of perfidy is 
looked upon by sovereigns as a grievous affront.”  In the same passage he goes on to opine that 
“national magnanimity is the source of an immortal glory; it creates the confidence of Nations and 
thus becomes the certain cause of power and honor.”  And in his later discussion of war, he asserts 
that even the “least scrupulous sovereign wishes to be considered just, fair, and peace-loving; he 
realizes that a contrary reputation might be hurtful to him.”   By contrast, a sovereign who fails to 
abide by such principles, and brings on war without just cause, is “responsible before God and 
answerable to humanity,” for “all the evils which he brings down upon his subjects.”41   
Here we have a concept that was central to the conduct of foreign affairs, for as I have 
demonstrated—in the chapter on Gérard’s mission to Philadelphia, and the chapter on the Pacte de 
Famille, statesmen in this era frequently deployed the honor and reputation of their sovereign as an 
objective source of credibility.  In a political environment infused with deceit, the king was often 
portrayed as a disinterested and moral observer and the one individual whose word could be relied 
upon.42  Not all sovereigns cared about their honor, and even when they did, there was plenty of 
room for their ministers to employ underhanded means in defending the king’s interests—ostensibly 
                                                
41 Book II, Chap. XII, §163; Book III, Chap. IV, §64; Book III, Chap. III, §24.  In this context Vattel also 
cites an historic example of an unnamed minister whose “astuteness and subterfuges… in connection with a treaty in 
which Spain had large interests at stake, worked finally to his own shame and to the injury of his sovereign; whereas 
the good faith and the generosity of England towards its allies obtained for it an excellent reputation and raised it to 
a position of great influence and respect.” Book II, Chap. XII, §173. 
42 Sovereigns cared about their reputation in part because of personal pride, but also, as noted elsewhere, 
because reputation functioned as a credit which facilitated the acquisition of assistance from other states.  Here we 
see the application of the natural law concept of “sociability.”  Nations, as moral entities in a state of nature, 
required the assistance of their peers to fulfill their duties and reach their potential. 
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without his knowledge.  But the reputation of the sovereign was an integral part of the larger legal 
system, and to this extent Vattel offered insight into its operation.43 
A second facet of the international system comes to the fore in Vattel’s repeated references to 
the need for statesmen to offer valid “reasons” for their conduct.  On the question, for example, of 
whether a sovereign was ever justified in refusing to ratify a treaty signed on his behalf, Vattel wrote 
that “cogent and substantial reasons” would be needed to justify a refusal.44  As for promises of aid 
made to an ally, Vattel writes that to refuse to such assistance, “when we have no good reason for not 
giving it,” would be to injure the ally.”45  Even promises made by treaties—which Vattel elsewhere 
describes as “sacred” obligations, lying at the very foundation of the state system—could be voided 
by a sovereign who had “good reasons for believing himself released from his promises.”46 
In emphasizing the importance of such public statements of purpose, Vattel of course meant 
to promote the use of right reason and natural law morality.  Yet he was also drawing attention to 
two other core aspects of the diplomacy, as it was actually practiced.  First was the fact that 
diplomacy in this period was often characterized by moral one-upmanship, as statesmen sought to 
bring their reputation and interests into alignment.  Though they rarely obeyed the dictates of natural 
law, statesmen did employ their moral standards.  And as I have also shown, their standards were not 
entirely debased.  They cared about public reputation and were often pursuing lofty ideals—the 
stabilization of European state system, in Vergennes’s case, or the proper and legitimate defense of 
                                                
43 “There is at least one result that may be looked for from the open declaration of sound principles,” Vattel 
wrote at the outset of his volume on international relations, “namely, that they will constrain even those who care 
least about them to keep within certain bounds less they altogether disgrace themselves. Book II, Chap. I, §1. 
44 That is not to say that valid reasons could not be found.  Vattel offers the possibility that the minister may 
have “exceeded the instructions given,” Book II, Chap. XII, §156 (emphasis added).  
45 He adds that “in doubtful cases it rests with us to decide what we are able to do… [but] our decision must 
be well-founded, and made in good faith Book III, Chap. VI, §94. 
46 Book II, Chap. XV, §222.  Vattel went so far as to say that in such instances, “other sovereigns are not 
authorized to pass judgment upon” the one who made that choice.  It is only “the sovereign who fails to keep his 
promises on clearly trivial grounds,” Vattel wrote, “or who does not even take the trouble to offer reasons… who 
deserves to be treated as an enemy of the human race.” 
 
 259 
his imperial domains, in the case of Carlos III.  Yet Vattel is correct in warning his readers that such 
moral rhetoric is often a veil or “pretext” for misbehavior, which, though having “the appearance of 
validity,” was found on closer examination to be “entirely destitute of foundation.”47  
The second way in which Vattel informs his readers of an important component of the 
international legal system is with his repeated emphasis on the moral sovereignty of sovereigns.  
Even as he emphasizes the need for sovereigns to bring their conduct into line with the dictates of 
natural law, Vattel is careful never to intrude on their ultimate right to determine the best course of 
action.   We know from natural law, he wrote in his introduction, that “liberty and independence 
belong to man by his very nature, and that they cannot be taken from him without his consent.”  
Although individuals voluntarily give up a portion of that independence in submitting to a sovereign, 
yet “the whole body of the Nation, the State, so long as it has not voluntarily submitted to other men 
or other Nations, remains absolutely free and independent.”48  
Vattel’s conception of sovereignty did not diminish in the face of increasingly consequential 
moral decisions.  On the contrary, it only increased.  The decision to wage war, he wrote—being 
arguably the most consequential decision facing a nation—was “one of so important a nature that it 
can belong only to the body of the nation, or to the sovereign who represents it.”  “It is the sovereign 
power alone… which has the right to make war.”49  So too on the question of whether a sovereign 
was obligated to provide assistance due under the terms of an alliance in support of an unjust war, 
Vattel opined in the negative, writing that, “No assistance may be given to one who wages an unjust 
                                                
47 Book III, Chap. III, §32.  He adds as a kind of saving grace that “Pretexts are, at the least, an homage 
which the unjust render to justice,” showing again that statesmen acknowledge the existence of principles even if 
they were not always willing to conform to it. 
48 Book I, Introduction, §4 (emphasis added). Of all the rights possessed by a Nation,” Vattel wrote, “that 
of sovereignty is doubtless the most important, and the one which others should most carefully respect if they are 
desirous not to give cause for offense.”  “[E]very Nation,” he later added, “should be jealous of its honor and 
vigilant in maintaining its dignity and in preserving its independence.” Book II, Chap. IV, §54 and Book II, Chap. 
XII, §177. 
49 Book III, Chap. I, §4. 
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war.”  Yet nor could a sovereign falsely use the purported injustice of a war as a pretext for refusing 
assistance that was contractually due.  Who would decide the matter?  Only the sovereign power.  
“You must conscientiously weigh the justice of [the] cause,” Vattel opined, “[T]he decision depends 
upon you alone.”50 
Vattel’s emphasis on sovereignty confirms my earlier conclusion that his treatise should not 
be regarded as a compilation of laws—at least not in the way that we think of law today.  It is rather a 
system of moral principles, to be applied to the conduct of statecraft through careful and deliberate 
acts of judgment. The need to exercise judgment in the application of the law is everywhere 
throughout Vattel’s treatise.”51  It also points, yet again, to a central component of the European state 
system as it actually functioned in the eighteenth century.  While they may have cared little for 
Vattel’s opinions, statesmen and sovereigns did attribute paramount importance to their right to 
decide how best to conduct their own affairs. 
In conclusion, any American who looked to Vattel as a source of international law, and relied 
on his opinions for security in the course of the Revolution, would have been deceived to his own 
harm.  For on nearly every issue that Vattel opined upon, the British rejected his views and were 
ready to back up their interpretation of the law with the considerable might of the British military.  
Did the Americans have a right to rebel? Did European states have a right to aid the American cause? 
Did the British have an obligation to follow the customary law of nations in suppressing the 
rebellion?  And were the Americans a bona fide state for the duration of the war, and entitled to all of 
the rights and privileges that pertained to that status?  The British answer was no, no, no, and 
                                                
50 Book III, Chap. VI, §83, 86.  Also with respect to a nation’s obligation to provide aid to a neighboring 
state, the question arose as to how much aid a sovereign could actually offer without violating his obligation to 
secure the well being of his own people.  “Sovereigns,” Vattel wrote, “must not let their magnanimous inclinations 
interfere with their duty to preserve their own State.”  Book II, Chap. I, §16. 




emphatically no.  Nor was there much point in telling either the French or the Spanish that the terms 
of the Franco-American alliance ought to trump the terms of the Convention of Aranjuez. 
Yet within the limits imposed by British hostility to the American cause, and by the Franco-
Spanish alliance, there remained a space in which it was possible for the Americans to exercise the 
sovereignty that the both the Vattelian system of natural law, and the customary or political law of 
nations accorded them.  For the central point on which the systems of law agreed was in their 
emphasis on 1) national sovereignty, 2) the right to exercise moral judgment in determining policy 
and 3) on the need to justify that conduct through public expressions of “cogent and substantial 
reasons.”  The diplomatic issues confronting the United States over the course of the war demanded 
precisely this type of judgment.  Were they really a full-fledged state, entitled to all of the 
corresponding rights and privileges, or were they—as the Spanish in particular insinuated—an 
inchoate entity that should show deference to the establish powers?  Was their alliance with France 
truly equal in the eyes of the law, or was the United States’ debt to France of such a nature that the 
Americans’ ought properly submit their affairs to the guidance of the French ministry?  These were 
the types of issues—of legitimacy and moral obligation—on which hung the outcome of the war. 
In sum, Americans emissaries needed expertise in two facets or types of international law.  
On the one hand they needed to know the relevant importance of technical aspects of the customary 
or political law of nations—which governed issues such as the convention of Saratoga, or the validity 
of Oswald’s commission, or of Aranda’s desire to negotiate on the basis of his personal character 
alone.  They also needed a clear-eyed understanding of the philosophical principles on which the 
larger international system rested—principles that governed the status and identity of states in the 
international arena.  The challenge facing most American emissaries is that, while they were 
committed, in principle, to a robust conception of their independence, most among them lacked the 
skill needed to use either facet of the law of nations.   
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The challenges posed by the customary law of nations were arguably easier to overcome, as 
they overlapped to a considerable degree with other eighteenth-century legal conventions pertaining 
to contracts etc.  What the Americans really needed was a basis in law for asserting and maintaining 
their right to use the customary law—i.e. the status as a bona fide state.  One way of looking at the 
issue is that it hung on the question of ultimate legal authority.  Did the international system 
ultimately rest on the collective opinions and judgments of statesmen in Europe?  Or was it finally 
rooted in principles of natural law?  If the former, then the Americans were at the mercy of the states 
and statesmen on whose aid they depended throughout the war, and who viewed the Americans as a 
secondary and subservient entity.52  If, however, principles of natural law had an intrinsic force and 
validity, then they might offer an alternative source of legitimacy for the United States—a source that 
American emissaries could lean on in their negotiations.  Vattel, it is important to note in this 
context, was not a philosopher per se, in that he did not attempt to derive law from philosophical 
principles.  His goal was rather to apply principles of natural law—discovered by others—to the 
conduct of states.  To understand what those principles were, and how they likely influenced Jay’s 
reading of Vattel, and his conduct in diplomacy, I turn now to the works of Samuel von Pufendorf. 
  
                                                
52 Vergennes went to great lengths to prop up the Americans’ sense of dignity and equality, but when 
matters of consequence came to the fore, he was quick to maneuver behind the scenes to undermine their 
authority—provided only that he could achieve those objectives without public notice.  See for example his letter to 
Gérard, of October 26, 1778, in which he wrote: “You are too wise, Sir, and you have too much experience not to 
feel yourself that your language must be directed in such a way that they not suspect us of wanting to interfere with 
the internal affairs of Congress or of arrogating to ourselves the right to direct it,” Meng, Despatches, 361.  Yet in 
August 1782, when Jay adopted a stance that ran counter to French policy, Vergennes had taken steps to undermine 
Jay’s position, as described in the previous chapter.  
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Introduction to Pufendorf’s Theory of Natural Law 
Pufendorf is significant to early American understandings of international law in that a) 
Vattel’s treatise was constructed on a foundation of natural law and b) Pufendorf’s treatises were not 
only regarded as among the most influential and authoritative works on natural law in British North 
America, they occupied a particularly important place in the curriculum at King’s College in the 
early 1760s.  A few contextual comments, at this juncture, will help to establish this point.  Scholars 
working on the history of philosophy—in this case legal philosophy—tend overwhelmingly to 
approach the subject from the vantage point of the writer or philosopher.  They are interested in 
questions such as: the source of a particular writer’s ideas; the differences between authors or 
theories; and the strength and weaknesses in a particular treatise or theory.  They tend to assume—
usually with good reason—that the most famous authors or philosophers had access to, or were 
familiar with, works from preceding generations, and were participating in a grand conversation—
one that tended over time toward a steady refinement of thought.   
While such an approach is capable of generating many important insights, it is not helpful 
when it comes to elucidating the way in which a practitioner of law—in any given generation—
understood and implemented a given set of concepts or theories.  In fact, the approach can be quite 
misleading, for practitioners rarely have the breadth of knowledge and insight that historians of 
philosophy assume in their analysis.  The practitioners may rather have been exposed to just a few 
key works or treatises, which they may interpret—in light of their limited or particular intellectual 
priorities—in a way that differs significantly from the interpretations that an expert in philosophy 
might deem valid or legitimate.  And as frustrating as it may be, from the philosopher’s perspective, 
it is the practitioner’s interpretation—with all its possible limitations—that is actually determinative 
when it comes to making policy, deciding on strategy, or a adopting a particular set of principles as a 
guide to conduct.   
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It is still helpful, for the purposes of my analysis, to begin with a brief contextual overview of 
Pufendorf’s work—and its place in the development of natural law theory.  But I will move quickly 
to identifying—or attempting to identify—aspects of Pufendorf’s theory that may have appeared 
particularly attractive or significant in the context of the mid-eighteenth century British North 
America.  I derive much help, in beginning the contextual overview, from an essay by Jeremy 
Waldron, a leading expert in the history of political philosophy.53  In an essay entitled “Ius gentium: 
A Defense of Gentili’s Equation of the Law of Nations and the Law of Nature,” Waldron lays out in 
very concise form the major camps or groups into which philosophers tended to fall in writing about 
both the law of nations, the law of nature, and their relationship with each other.54 
“[I]n general,” Waldron writes, “the law of nature is identified… [as] the part of God’s divine 
law that humans can figure out using their rational faculties.”  Two questions then arise: 1) How can 
one best perceive or establish the laws or principles contained in natural law and 2) Should the law of 
nations be understood as a) a facet of natural law, or b) as a separate body of legal doctrine?  
Scholarship or philosophical inquiry on these questions can be further divided into two camps.  On 
one side are “positivists” who argue that that natural law and/or the law of nations are best derived 
from the bottom-up, by examining human behavior across time and space and identifying points of 
agreement or commonality.  That is a purely empirical approach.  On the other side are rationalists 
who argue that natural law and/or the law of nations are best derived by a process of reasoning from 
first principles.55   
The lines separating these groups or camps are not always clear or distinct. For one thing, 
some writers position themselves as rationalists with respect to the natural law, but positivists with 
                                                
53 Waldron is University Professor of Law at New York University, and is widely published in the field of 
legal philosophy. 
54 Jeremy Waldron, “Ius gentium: A Defense of Gentili’s Equation of the Law of Nations and the Law of 
Nature,” in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (eds.), The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: 
Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 283-296. 
55 Waldron, “A Defense,” 284-285. 
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respect to the law of nations.  Others will define both sets of law as either positivist or rationalist.  
(Even here, however, there will be debate as to whether the law of nations is essentially synonymous 
with the Natural Law, or if a distinction should be preserved such that natural law can serve as an 
objective standard by which to judge the legitimacy of the laws applied to the conduct of human 
affairs.)  There is finally, within a particular treatise, a considerable amount of overlap, such that a 
philosopher who appears to position himself in the positivist camp may, at times, use rationalist 
arguments, and vice versa.56 
I recount Waldron’s summary here to make clear that these were the questions or issues of 
greatest interest to those working on the law of nations during this period.  They seem also to have 
hoped, at least in part, that their principles and theories would have an ameliorative effect on the 
conduct of statecraft.  The central question or intellectual problem, however, was to establish the 
concepts of natural law and the law of nations, respectively, on the most secure and solid foundation 
possible.  At least some writers, like Vattel, had a utilitarian motive—believing that a well 
established theory would be more persuasive and thus also more likely to influence the behavior of 
political actors.  For many other theorists, however, the guiding ideal was a purely intellectual quest 
for an accurate understanding of this somewhat elusive concept. 
The contextual background that I have just set forth is highly important when it comes to 
understanding the place of Pufendorf in early American understanding of the law of nations.  
Pufendorf, it is worth stating again, at the outset, is one of three seminal writers or theorists that 
historians of modern international law tend to associate with the seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
concept of a law of nations—the others being Grotius and Vattel.  Over and over again in the 
literature, historians cite these thee writers, whose magnum opuses were published in succession, in 
1625, 1672, and 1758, as having participated in the progressive development of early modern 
international law—a process that culminated in the establishment, in nineteenth century, of a set 
                                                
56 Waldron, “A Defense,” 285-287. 
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norms and standards that gave rise to modern international law.  As noted in the introduction, Martti 
Koskenniemi, a prominent scholar on the history of international affairs, has recently called this 
historical narrative a myth, invented by international lawyers in the late nineteenth century.57  
Without taking a stance on the full implications of his argument, I will show here a weakness in that 
narrative with respect to early American understandings of the law of nations. 
A gap in the literature that quickly becomes apparent when one begins to conduct a survey of 
the secondary literature on Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel, is that Pufendorf receives scarcely any 
attention—at least in the English-language world—until very late in the twentieth century.  By 
contrast, there is tremendous corpus of scholarship on Grotius—there is even a peer-edited journal 
called Grotiana—as well as a reasonably respectable body of scholarship on Vattel.58  The lack of 
interest in Pufendorf is all the more perplexing when one begins to grasp how significant he was in 
his own day.  According to J.B. Schneewind, one of the leading experts on Pufendorf today, 
Pufendorf “exercised unparalleled influence for over half a century.  His two major works on natural 
law… were translated into every major European language, reprinted innumerable times, and used as 
textbooks in dozens of universities on the continent and in Scotland and the American colonies.”59  
How is it possible that a theorist who supposedly occupied such a prominent space in the 
development of international law could attract so little attention today? 
One explanation is that it seems that the underlying philosophical debates surrounding natural 
law took a dramatic turn in the early nineteenth century such that Pufendorf was deprived of nearly 
                                                
57 See footnote 6 on p. 4 of the Introduction. 
58 See footnotes 4-7 on pp. 4-5 of the Introduction for scholarship on Grotius and Vattel. 
59 J.B. Schneewind, “Pufendorf’s Place in the History of Ethics,” Synthese 72:1 (July, 1987), 123.  
Schneewind notes that as late as 1798, Pufendorf is given a full chapter “in Christian Garve’s review of the main 
systems of moral philosophy… in which Hume is not even mentioned.” See also Donald Lutz, “The Relative 
Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought,” The American Political 




all significance.60  I would like to posit another possible explanation: because international law today 
is regarded as entirely “positivist” in nature, those interested in the history of international law may 
have a bias toward theories that are also positivist in nature.  The bias may flow from a desire to 
establish the antecedents to modern international law and to identify the theorists that can be credited 
with having delivered the concept of international law from esoteric philosophy and set it on a 
modern foundation.61  It may also stem from the fact that scholars unschooled in natural law theory 
may not feel comfortable venturing into unfamiliar territory.  Also, legal scholars are very often 
motivated by the desire to influence modern judges who may also be less inclined to take natural law 
seriously as a basis for legal doctrine today.  
Whatever their interest or motivation, Grotius supports quite well the goal of those interested 
in a positivist version of international law for though he believed in the validity of natural law, that 
was not the project that he set forth in writing De Jure Belli Ac Pacis.  The work is rather based 
overwhelmingly on a mass of citations to ancient authorities with the goal of establishing points of 
historic agreement and consensus among states, which—Grotius argues—can be used as a basis for 
the law of nations.62  Vattel also can be useful to those interested in the positivist antecedents of 
international law: 1) because although he grounded his treatise in natural law, he did not expound on 
those foundations but rather assumed that his reader was familiar with them 2) because so much of 
his work was devoted to opining on practical points of disputes relevant to contemporary statesmen 
and 3) because, by the late 1780s and 1790s, statesmen began to cite Vattel with increasing 
                                                
60 As noted in the introduction Kant would later indict “the whole lot of the natural lawyers—Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Vattel—as ‘miserable comforters’ whose legal principles were devoid of any binding force,” 
Koskenniemi, “Into Positivism,” 189-190. 
61 Chapters 6-10 of volume 8 are entitled: “On the law of war,” “On pacts relating to war,” “On pacts which 
restore peace,” “On treaties,” “On the miscellaneous pacts of kings.” 
62 It is also true that Grotius periodically inserts arguments derived from first principles—such as the 
natural law of self-preservation—when it suits his purpose, but that is not his primary method. 
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frequency and with reference to his practical opinions—largely discounting or ignoring his 
theoretical underpinnings. 
Pufendorf’s treatise, by contrast, fell squarely with the “rationalist” camp, that Waldron has 
delineated.  Not only so, but only some 35 pages of his magnum opus, De Jure Naturae et 
Gentium—which spans 950 pages, and eight volumes in total—are related explicitly to international 
affairs.63  The rest of the book is devoted to establishing the theoretical foundations of natural law 
and applying its principles to every facet of human society, from the economy, to the family, to the 
state.  Vattel does not say explicitly that he based his treatise on Pufendorf, but by choosing not to 
define natural law himself, he leaves open the possibility that someone who had read Pufendorf, and 
who took Pufendorf to be an authority on the subject, could provide the theoretical foundations for 
Vattel’s work.  The main point that I would like to make here is that though Pufendorf’s theory fell 
out of favor by the early nineteenth century and is considered largely irrelevant today, as a basis for 
international law, it quite possibly was deemed an important source of theoretical authority—and a 
fount of principles that could be used to interpret Vattel—for the founding generation—especially 
those who had been taught to regard Pufendorf as an authority.64    
  
Pufendorf and Natural Law 
The most surprising aspect of Pufendorf’s treatise, for one who has been taught to equate the 
law of nations with modern international law, is how little attention Pufendorf devotes to the 
particulars of international affairs.  Although he sprinkles the text with illustrations drawn from the 
affairs of European states, these are nearly always designed to illustrate a point of philosophical 
principle.  They are not primarily intended as rules or judgments pertaining to the conduct of 
                                                
63 The passages in question are found in chapters VI-IX of Book VIII of DJN.  
64 Thus, the fact that Madison or Hamilton read Vattel chiefly as source of authority on practical questions 
such as the rights of neutrals in time of war should not distract us from the fact that Vattel still saw himself as 
participating in a tradition that had a broader set of theoretical concerns. 
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statecraft.  The central purpose of the treatise is to establish a more secure and accurate foundation 
for the law of nature, which in Pufendorf’s theory pertains to every facet of human society, from the 
family, to the economy, to domestic governance.  Only at the very end of the treatises does he insert 
a few brief passages on the laws pertaining to war, peace, and treaties.65  Where Pufendorf’s work is 
relevant to international affairs—if in a rather indirect fashion—is with respect to his underlying 
theory of the state, as I will demonstrate near the end of this passage. 
Underlying the entire project is Pufendorf’s conviction that “the most Good and Great 
Creator,” as an expression of his kindness and concern for the “temporary happiness” of mankind on 
earth, had created a set of natural laws, which, if discovered and obeyed, would enable “man” to 
reach his full potential as a human being.66   The concept of natural law did not become obvious to all 
individuals, as a natural consequence of their maturation.  But as was the case with mathematics, the 
law could be discovered and articulated in such a way that “even men of merely ordinary intelligence 
can grasp its demonstration.”67   Pufendorf implies throughout the treatise that natural law was fully 
compatible with “divine revelation,” which “throws the greatest and clearest light upon the 
knowledge of the law of nature.”  Yet he argues that “it can still be investigated and definitely 
proved, even without such aid, by the power of reason as it has been given man by his Creator.”68  
And he argues elsewhere that it is highly desirable that the foundations of natural law be established 
                                                
65 See Book VIII, Chap. VI-X. 
66 That is not to say that God did not also, and even primarily, care about the eternal state of mankind, but 
that was a separate matter, which Pufendorf chose to set aside.  “In the system of natural law, as set forth above,” 
Pufendorf wrote later, “the immortality of the soul is not denied, but only not taken into consideration.” Book II, 
Chap. III, §19. 
67 “To demonstrate is, therefore,” he wrote elsewhere,” in our opinion, to deduce by a syllogism for things 
proposed the certain conclusion that must be unreservedly accepted from particular principles taken as their causes.” 
Book I, Chap. II, §2. 
68 Book II, Chap. III, §13. 
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on a non-theological foundation so that “all men could be brought to admit [its force and validity]… 
with due respect to whatever belief they might hold on matters of religion.”69 
Philosophers of his generation, he suggests in the preface, had only just begun to give this 
subject its due.70   Many were still skeptical that it was possible to articulate natural laws with 
precision.  Those who had made the attempt had either omitted important aspects of the law or 
established it on an improper foundation.71  Some followed Aristotle in basing the concept on the 
implicit agreement of all mankind—i.e. the shared customs and behavior of all peoples on earth; or 
had followed the Romans in basing it on the shared norms that states or sovereigns had enacted in 
connection with international affairs. The problem with such theories, Pufendorf contends, is that no 
one had accurate or sufficient knowledge concerning the norms and standards prevailing in every 
nation on earth.  Even in cases where such standards were known, there was a great deal of variety; 
and positive and natural law were interwoven in a way that made it difficult to distinguish one from 
the other.72 
The only sure method for deriving the law of nature, Pufendorf argued, was to base it upon a 
close and principled analysis of human nature.73  When Pufendorf examined the basic constitution of 
humanity, two facts were readily apparent.  First, humans had a remarkable propensity for self-
preservation.74  Second, they were characterized by tremendous “weakness and native helplessness… 
                                                
69 Book I, Preface, p. ix. 
70 “I too have devoted my efforts to the study and adornment of a most noble and useful branch of learning, 
which, long neglected and practically ignored, has in our day finally begun to lay claim to its own dignity.” Book I, 
Preface, p. vi. 
71 He cites here Grotius, Hobbes, and John Selden—the first two of whom he subjects to extensive 
coverage and criticism in the body of the treatise. 
72 Book II, Chap. III, §8-11. 
73 “There seems to us,” Pufendorf wrote, “no more fitting and direct way to learn the law of nature than 
through careful consideration of the nature, condition, and desires of man himself.” Book II, Chap. III, §14. 
74 Man “has the greatest love for himself, tries to protect himself by every possible means, and tries to 
secure what he thinks will benefit him, and to avoid what may in his opinion injure him.” Book II, Chap. III, §14. 
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[such] that if one could conceive of man as deprived of every assistance that comes to him in this 
world from other men he would think that life had been given him as a punishment.”  Third and 
finally, they were “at all times malicious, petulant, and easily irritated, as well as quick and powerful 
to do injury.”75  As a consequence of these basic conditions, Pufendorf argued, man was compelled, 
as if by force of law, into society.76  “For such an animal to live and enjoy the good things that in this 
world attend his condition,” he wrote, “it is necessary that he be sociable, that is, be willing to join 
himself with others like him, and conduct himself towards them in such a way that, far from having 
any cause to do him harm, they feel that there is reason to preserve and increase his good fortune.”77  
From that basic foundation, Pufendorf would go on to derive every other aspect of natural law. 
Throughout his treatise, Pufendorf frequently pauses to engage with other modern writers, 
summarizing particular aspects of their theories and distinguishing his views from theirs.  The two 
writers with whom he engages most frequently in this way are Grotius and Hobbes.  He finds much 
to commend in their work,78 but he is at odds with them respecting two foundational points of natural 
law—points that he repeatedly highlights in his analysis.79  Grotius’s principal error, Pufendorf 
asserts, lay in his having established the essential “rightness” of a law of legal standard in an abstract 
concept that was detached from any foundation.  In particular, Grotius argued that certain classes of 
evil were so intrinsically evil that even God could not alter their quality—i.e. that “rightness” as a 
                                                
75 Book II, Chap. III, §15. 
76 For “no greater help and comfort, after that granted man by God, comes to him than that from his fellow-
creatures.”  Book II, Chap. III, §14. 
77 Book II, Chap. III, §15. 
78 He credits Grotius as having been, “apparently the first to call his generation to the consideration of that 
study” and says of Hobbes that his “works on the science of civil government” are of such quality that “no one who 
understands such matters would deny that he has so thoroughly explored the structure of human and civil society, 
that few before his time can in this field be compared with him.  And even where he goes astray, he still causes a 
man to think about matters, which, in all probability, would otherwise never have occurred to him.” Book I, Preface, 
v-vi. 
79 In his preface he also charged Grotius with having “entirely omitted not a few matters,” and given others 
“but a passing touch.” Book I, Preface, v. 
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concept existed apart from God himself.80  Pufendorf would have nothing to do with this principle.  
The rightness of law, he argues, is entirely bound up in the character, and more importantly, in the 
will of God.   
The point was important to Pufendorf, because he also contended that law could only derive 
its binding force from the authority of a superior.81   A superior in this context, he noted, was not one 
who possessed a greater degree of power alone.  It is rather one who could also provide “just reasons 
why he can demand that the liberty of our will be limited at his pleasure.” Such a superior had the 
ability to generate in man’s “faculty of reason a fear mingled with reverence—a fear occasioned by 
such a person’s power, and a reverence arising from a consideration of the causes, which should be 
sufficient, even without the fear, to lead one to receive the command on grounds of good judgment 
alone.”   With respect to natural law, the only possible superior was God, who “as man’s creator… 
has the right to set certain limits to the liberty of will which He has deigned to vouchsafe man.”82  
How do we know God’s law, apart from revelation?  Pufendorf contended that we can know or 
discern natural law by consideration “of the condition of nature, which the Creator freely bestowed 
upon man,” a nature that demanded cooperation and “social” behavior.83  
In founding his theory of natural law on the essential characteristics of human nature, 
Pufendorf was next compelled to define what was commonly termed at the time “a state of nature.”  
                                                
80 See Book I, Chap. II, §6-9; and Book I, Chap. VI, §4-7; “[I]t is clear,” he writes, “that the acts which are 
ordered by the law of nature have an intrinsic force towards a social life, although their real existence depends upon 
the free will of men.” Book I, Chap. II. 
81 “Law,” he wrote in book I, Chap. II, §7, “is the bidding of a superior.”  “Laws,” he later wrote, “…come 
from a superior and have the power of obligating a person.” Book I, Chap. VI, §4. 
82 Book I, Chap. VI, §9; Book I, Chap. I, §4.  “[W]hen it is said,” Pufendorf writes, “…that a man is under 
an obligation to preserve himself, what is meant is that the exercise of that obligation inherent in man has its end in 
the man himself.  But, in fact, it goes back to God, the author of natural law, whose right it is to demand the exercise 
of that obligation and to punish its neglect.  And so a man is required to preserve himself, in so far as he is a servant 
of God, and a part of human society, of which God commands him to be a useful member.” Book I, Chap. I, §7. 
83 Book II, Chap. II, §6.  It is important to note that in positing God as the foundation of natural law, 
Pufendorf did not believe that he was making a theological argument.  He believed that God’s existence and 
essential character were rationally apparent.  “God… is the author of natural law,” Pufendorf wrote, “a fact which no 
sane man can question.” Book II, Chap. III, §5. 
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The “natural state of man” Pufendorf argued, ought to be defined as “that condition for which man is 
understood to be constituted, by the mere fact of his birth.”84  One considered this subject in order to 
understand “what would have been the condition of individual men had mankind discovered no 
civilization and introduced no arts or commonwealths.”  We also study the state of nature with the 
goal of understanding “whether it bears a resemblance to peace or to war; that is, whether men who 
live in a state of mutual natural liberty… should be considered friends or foes.”  Pufendorf’s 
conclusion was that man’s natural state was one of peace, and here was led to engage in a rigorous 
and lengthy dispute with Hobbes. 
Hobbes of course famously contended that man’s natural state was one of war.  He 
imagined—as did all theorists of a state of nature—a situation in which a group of individual human 
beings lived together on earth without any social rules or norms.  How would they treat each other?  
“Each man,” he argued, “is an enemy to that other, whom he neither obeys nor commands.”85  
Pufendorf adds that other authors have made a similar argument: that interactions would be 
characterized by an “intent to take what another has, and to drive the owner away from it… [with the 
consequence that] they would live in a state of constant discord.”   
Pufendorf disagreed.  He did not base his contention on the inherent tendency of man toward 
mutual love and self-sacrifice.  Rather he observed that man’s essential condition in a state of nature 
was such that he would face a rational imperative to cooperate with others for the sake of survival.  
He would consider his situation and realize that cooperation with others would lead to “safety and 
respect,” while the contrary behavior would lead to danger and misery.  “Surely,” in such 
circumstances, Pufendorf argued, it would not be “difficult for him to conclude that his Creator’s 
wish is for him to accept the guidance” of natural law.   What was, therefore, the essence of natural 
law?  It was that: “A man shall not harm one who is not injuring him; he shall allow everyone to 
                                                
84 Book II, Chap. II, §1. 
85 Book II, Chap. II, §5; citation to On the Citizen, Chap. IX, §3. 
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enjoy his own possessions; he shall faithfully perform whatever has been agreed upon; and he shall 
willingly advance the interests of others, so far as he is not bound by more pressing obligations.”86 
Pufendorf advanced a second argument against Hobbes, one that would play an important 
role in his underlying theory of international affairs.  Hobbes’s definition of the “state of nature” 
Pufendorf argues, was nothing more than hypothesis or intellectual construct.  It had never actually 
existed.  Why not?  Because “as the infallible authority of the Sacred Scriptures teaches it to us,” the 
first two human beings were “joined” by “a most holy bond,” the woman being “drawn from man 
himself, so that he might cherish her forthwith in a tender love.”  The “first men,” therefore, “lived in 
a state which was… charged with pure friendship.”  Distinctions only later emerged between family 
units because “as men multiplied they could no longer be embraced in one society.”87  This mattered, 
Pufendorf argued, because it meant that the historic origins of humanity were grounded in “society.”  
A “state of nature,” in which individual human beings roamed the earth and then elected to come 
together to form a society, had never existed.  The only “state of nature” that had existed, from an 
historic perspective, was that which characterized relations between distinct societies—which came 
into being as the first society fragmented—the interactions of which took place outside the bounds of 
civil law. 
I will return shortly to this concept of societies operating in a state of nature—a concept from 
which Pufendorf would derive his theory of the state—but one more point bears mention first: How 
was natural law enforced?  The answer is that it was not—at least not in the way that we typically 
associate with the concept of law enforcement.  Instead it imposed a moral obligation on those who 
were subject to it.  Pufendorf defined obligation as “a moral operative quality by which one is 
required to furnish or suffer something…by it some moral bridle, as it were, is slipped over our 
liberty of action.”  Obligation differed essentially, however, from coercion, in that it did not 
                                                
86 Book II, Chap. II, §9. 
87 Book II, Chap. II, §7. 
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ultimately bind or interfere with man’s will or volition.88  “Obligation,” he wrote, “affects the will 
morally, and fills its very being with such a particular sense, that it is forced of itself to weigh its own 
actions, and to judge itself worthy of some censure, unless it conforms to a prescribed rule.”89  “The 
character of nature’s offices,” Pufendorf wrote elsewhere, requires that they be rendered without 
compulsion or fear of punishment.”90 
There was an essential tension in this aspect of Pufendorf’s theory, for the one who imposed 
natural law, and whom man ought justly to fear, Pufendorf argued, was “God, the author of natural 
law, whose right it is to demand the exercise of that obligation and to punish its neglect.”91  But did 
God actually enforce the law of nature?  If he did, then his authority would have to be deemed 
compulsion, for who could resist his will or power.  If he did not, then the concept of natural law 
would lose a significant measure of force or persuasion.  Pufendorf does not address this issue 
directly, but in the course of his treatise he advances two propositions which serve to resolve at least 
some of the underlying tension.  First was the character of God, who was slow to anger and of his 
own volition gave men space and opportunity to make sovereign choices.  Second was the concept of 
natural consequences.  “[T]he Creator,” Pufendorf wrote, “has assigned to every act agreeable with 
His laws its regular and natural effect, which tends to the advantage of man.”92  Pufendorf readily 
                                                
88 “On obligation,” Pufendorf wrote, “can in no way so bind the will that it cannot… go contrary to it, 
although at its own peril.” Book I, Chap. VI, §5. 
89 “[A]n obligation differs in a special way from coercion, in that, while both ultimately point out some 
object of terror, the latter only shakes the will with an external force, and impels it to choose some undesired object 
only by the sense of an impending evil; while an obligation in addition forces a man to acknowledge of himself that 
the evil, which has been pointed out to the person who deviates from an announced rule, falls upon him justly, since 
he might of himself have avoided it, had he followed that rule.” Book I, Chap. VI, §5. 
90 Book I, Chap. VII, §15. 
91 Consequently, Pufendorf, would go on to say, “a man is required to preserve himself, in so far as he is a 
servant of God, and a part of human society, of which God commands him to be a useful member.” Book I, Chap. 
VI, §7. 
92 “[I]t pleased His goodness,” Pufendorf added, “so to constitute the nature of the world and of men that 
certain good things follow by a natural connexion the observance of natural laws and certain evils their violation.” 
Book II, Chap. III, §21. 
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acknowledged that neither the benefits of obedience nor the consequences of disobedience follow 
directly or automatically on the heels of a given action.  Nevertheless, he contended, “there is still an 
evident probability that not a few benefits will follow, or at all events more than be expected from 
evil actions.  And so on this score we are consulting far better for our safety… than if we should have 
no respect for other men, and should refer all things to our own advantage.”93   
Was such a law truly and fully efficacious?  Pufendorf admitted that it was not.  “[I] must be 
confessed that this natural peace is but a weak and untrustworthy thing…. [because of] the evil 
genius of men, their unbridled lust to increase their power, and their cupidity which menaces what 
belongs to others.”94  What was Pufendorf’s solution?  It was the state.  A state came into formation 
when “a multitude of men endowed with natural liberty and equality” having perceived their 
weakness, “united into a civil society,” and then later determined the form of government that would 
prevail amongst them.95  Several forms of government were possible.  Pufendorf specifically 
addresses the differences between a monarchy and a state ruled by “a council.”  In either case, the 
state existed to provide for the well being of the people.  Among its most important duties, however, 
was to compel citizens, through force of more direct sanction, to overcome their lethargy or 
rebellious nature and act in their own best interest by conforming to law.96   
Pufendorf has much to say about this subject that is not immediately relevant to my 
argument.  What is directly relevant is his concept that a state became a corporate moral person.  
“Now by these pacts,” he wrote, meaning the pacts by which men formed a society and then a 
government, “a multitude of men united to form a state, which is conceived as a single person with 
                                                
93 Book II, Chap. III, §21. 
94 Book I, Chap. II, §12. 
95 Book VII, Chap. II, §7; and Book VII, Chap. III, §2. 
96 The law imposed by states was “civil law” which differed from natural law in that it was the work or 
creation of men.  Civil law ought properly be in conformity with natural law, though it was not always the case.  
Pufendorf has more to say about this issue that is not relevant to my argument. 
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intelligence and will, performing other actions peculiar to itself and separate from those of 
individuals.”  “A state is a compound moral person, whose will, intertwined and united by the pacts 
of a number of men, is considered the will of all, so that it is able to make sure of the strength and 
faculties of the individual members for the common peace and security.”97   States were not the only 
types of moral persons.  Earlier in the treatise, Pufendorf had written that a composite moral person 
was formed anytime men unite in such a way that what they propose “is considered as one will.”  
Consequently, “the action which proceeds from them as such a body is regarded as one, no matter 
how many physical individuals have been concerned in it.”98  But states were the only moral person 
to actually exist in a state of nature.  
As already noted, Pufendorf had argued—in opposition to Hobbes—that individual human 
beings had never actually existed in a state of nature.  They had rather existed in society from the 
moment of their creation.  In that sense, Hobbes’s notion of a state of nature was nothing more than a 
theoretical construct.  Yet states, as corporate moral persons, did exist in a state of nature in that there 
was no society of nations and consequently no civil international law.   It was states then, rather than 
individual human beings, to whom the laws of nature most properly applied.  But were states the 
same as individual human beings?  And were the laws of nature, applicable to states in the same way 
that they were, in theory, to individuals?   Hobbes had held that states were equivalent to individuals 
in that “states, upon being constituted, take on the personal properties of men.”  Consequently, he 
argued, the “law of nations” was effectively identical to natural moral law.99  “To this statement [of 
Hobbes’s],” Pufendorf wrote in the first edition of his treatise, “we also fully subscribe.”100   
 
                                                
97 Book VII, Chap. II, §13. 
98 Book I, Chap. II, §13. 
99 Hobbes, On the Citizen, Chap. XIV, §4-5. 




In the preface to the second edition of his treatise, however, Pufendorf expressed some 
doubts as to the true validity of that judgment.  He wrote: 
[S]ince the acts of supreme sovereigns and of independent states often seem to deviate from 
the rules of duty which private individuals have to observe in their dealings with one another, 
it would not be out of place to inquire whether at all, and if so, how far, supreme sovereigns 
are exempt from the rules of private Law, and how far those acts can be approved, which are 
commonly said to be done ‘for reasons of state.’101 
 
Pufendorf includes this comment in a list of topics that he would like to pursue at some future date.  
To the best of our knowledge, however, he never did so.  The task that he set for himself, however, in 
1688, is almost precisely the task that Vattel would take up some seventy years later.  Vattel does not 
credit Pufendorf as the source of his motivation, nor does he credit Pufendorf with having informed 
his basic outlook on natural law.  Yet a close examination of the foundational principles on which 
Vattel constructed his theory makes evident that his views of natural law aligned far more closely 
with those of Pufendorf than they did of either Hobbes or Grotius—the two other principal expositors 
of natural law theory in that era. 
What were those principles?  In brief, they were that states, as moral persons operating in a 
state of nature, were characterized by perfect liberty and equality, and were free from any other 
man’s orders or judgments.102  As corporate moral entities they spoke and acted as one united will, 
and that will was located in the sovereign—which could be a monarch, a council, or a republican 
assembly.  The sovereign’s perfect liberty, however, was restricted by a law of sociability, which 
required that states cooperate to the extent necessary for mutual survival and human flourishing.  
How was the law enforced?  In part through a fear of God and primarily from rational awareness of 
the consequences that would flow, over time, from either obedience or disobedience.  The “law” in 
that sense, did not so much serve to bind as it did to persuade sovereigns to adopt a particular course 
                                                
101 Book I, Preface, p. iv. 
102 Pufendorf made the same argument about moral entities in a state of nature in Book II, Chap. II, §3. 
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of action.  It was recommended to the sovereigns of the world, and its application and beneficent 
effect depended almost entirely on their sovereign volition.  Finally, how was the law derived?  Was 
it rooted in the practice of European states?  No.  It was rather deduced “by a syllogism… the certain 
conclusion that must be unreservedly accepted from particular principles taken as their causes,”103 
and consequently existed in nature, outside and above the European state system, where it was 
accessible to all—and especially to those who had been trained to perceive or discern its force and 
applicability. 
   
Conclusion 
Historians of philosophy and experts in international law would almost certainly find 
innumerable weaknesses and contradictions in the systems of both Pufendorf and Vattel.  For my 
purposes, what matters is that these are the systems that American Revolutionaries—or at least John 
Jay—were taught to regard as authoritative.  Regardless of their flaws, these legal systems had a kind 
of internal coherence and logic that made sense in the intellectual context of the late-eighteenth 
century—especially in British North America.  For novice statesmen, lacking any real-world 
experience with European politics, an intellectual system of this kind would have been tremendously 
empowering.  Not only did it provide concrete principles on which to base statecraft, but the fact that 
it was located outside of the European state system, and was even believed to have been sanctioned 
by God, lent it an independent force that was highly appealing to an inchoate entity like the United 
States.  In combination, the theories of Pufendorf and Vattel assigned the United States the status of a 
moral entity fully equal to the empires of Europe.  More importantly, they placed in the Continental 
Congress the authority and capacity to render moral judgments that could stand in the face of 
opposition from the most experienced statesmen in Britain, France or Spain.   
                                                
103 Book I, Chap. II, §2. 
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What seems to have made this law of nations particularly effective is that the Europeans 
appear to have conceded the validity of many of these principles as well.  Did they regard Vattel’s 
treatise as possessing the binding force of law?  Not for a minute.  But there seems to have been a 
shared consensus that moral entities existed.  That states were among them.  That states possessed 
certain rights and duties that differed from other corporate moral persons.  The precise rules by which 
statesmen drew lines and enforced the “law” often differed significantly from the judgments 
contained in Vattel’s treatise, but statesmen did seem to believe that they were involved in a moral 
contest, in which self interest alone was not the only factor on which one could make policy.  There 
was, consequently, room or space in their negotiations or affairs, for the shrewd application of 
strategy based on the application of natural law principles. 
One last thought.  Many historians interested in American views of international law have 
focused on the way in which Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison cited 
Vattel during the 1780s and 1790s.  A question arises here as to whether any of these men had been 
schooled in natural law theory or had read Pufendorf—and if so, in what context.  The point matters, 
for since Vattel did not define natural law himself—but rather relied on his readers’ prior 
knowledge—it is quite possible that his readers’ views of his work would have varied considerably, 
depending on the extent of that prior knowledge.  Jay’s unique emphasis on legal principles in his 
diplomacy, I would argue, flowed from the combined influence of Vattel, Pufendorf and Samuel 
Johnson.  Johnson used Pufendorf to drill into Jay’s mind the purported reality of natural law 
principles.  Vattel then translated or applied those principles to international affairs in a way that 
rendered them practically useful to early American diplomacy.104 
 
                                                
104 The Columbia Law Library has a copy of Vattel, taken from Jay’s personal library, in which Jay 
inscribed his name in 1772.  The text contains numerous small markings—highlighting various passages—made in 



























In this final chapter I will contend that Jay’s core political convictions—that states were 
corporate moral persons, whose legitimacy and essential rights were derived from natural law, rather 
than from the recognition of other states—were acquired at King’s College in New York City, where 
Jay was a student from 1760–1764.  To be specific, I will argue that Jay’s diplomacy reflects the 
influence of Samuel Johnson (president of King’s from 1754–1763), the leading colonial authority on 
Enlightenment conceptions of natural law (of which the law of nations was a component).  Johnson 
was not merely an expert in European philosophy—though he was that.  He was also a philosopher in 
his own right, whose driving ambition in life was to create a unified theory of knowledge that 
harmonized Baconian philosophy with the religious convictions of his forefathers.  The curriculum 
that he designed for King’s was a fruit of four decades of labor, giving Johnson’s instruction on 
natural law an authority and intellectual rigor that was unmatched in the pre-Revolutionary period.1   
I will begin with a brief and contextualized biography of Johnson’s intellectual development, 
placing emphasis on the two conversions that he experienced soon after his graduation from Yale in 
1714: his intellectual conversion to the “new learning,” or the philosophy of Francis Bacon, Isaac 
Newton, and other figures in the English Enlightenment; and his theological conversion to the church 
of England.  In combination, the events liberated Johnson from the intellectual and theological 
assumptions of his youth—and launched him on an original, and profoundly ambitious course of 
intellectual inquiry.  The culmination of his efforts is contained in two works: The Elements of 
Ethics, published in 1746, and his Elements of Philosophy, published by Benjamin Franklin in 1752.2  
In combination, the works depicted a world of rationally discerned natural laws, compatible with 
Scripture, and designed by God to facilitate or enable human happiness.   
                                                
1 The one exception would be the College of New Jersey (Princeton), after John Witherspoon’s arrival in 
1768; but Witherspoon did not arrive in time to influence those who led the War for Independence. 
2 Samuel Johnson, Ethices Elementa, or the First Principles of Moral Philosophy. Boston: Rogers and 
Fowle, 1746; and Elementa Philosophica. Philadelphia: B. Franklin, 1752. 
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I will review the content of Johnson’s essays, and show the connection between his principles 
and core aspects of Pufendorf’s philosophy of natural law.  I will then go on to examine the 
distinctive features of King’s College, and to compare the curriculum, and Johnson’s distinctive 
capacities, with the type of instruction available elsewhere in the colonies in this era.  The result, I 
will argue, offers substantial reason to think that the convictions that Jay displayed in his diplomacy 
could only have been acquired at King’s.  The larger point is that in looking for the intellectual 
origins of political behavior, it is not enough to look for books or published material that a given 
leader may have read.  The context in which such ideas were encountered also matters.  In this case, I 
argue that the intellectual environment at King’s College in the 1760s was uniquely conducive to 
imparting a distinctive political philosophy to a future American diplomat.  
I will state frankly and up front that not once in his voluminous reports and correspondence 
does Jay cite either Pufendorf or Johnson as having directly influenced his way of thinking.  My 
argument rests, consequently, on circumstantial evidence—1) on the alignment between Jay’s 
political convictions and the principles at the heart of Johnson and Pufendorf’s philosophy; 2) on the 
fact that (with the brief and temporary exception of the College of Philadelphia) King’s College was 
the only institution in the pre-war era to include Pufendorf in its curriculum; and 3) on the fact that 
Johnson brought to his instruction on natural law an authority and expertise, and a singular 
perspective that was unmatched in the colonial period.   
 
The Significance of Moral Philosophy 
Before I begin my analysis, it is necessary to comment briefly on the place of “moral 
philosophy” in the colonial colleges, and in the intellectual landscape of the era more generally—this 
being the term that was used in the colonial period to encompass those aspects of natural law that 
pertained to social order, including the international realm.  Though the term or concept has long 
since fallen out of the popular American lexicon, moral philosophy was regarded in the eighteenth 
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century as the very apex of education and knowledge.  It was the study of the laws and rules that 
gave society, in all of its dimensions, a lawful and coherent form.  Colleges in this era were not, of 
course, conceived as loci for the discovery of new ideas.  They were rather vehicles through which 
knowledge of the established order was imparted to the next generation.  It is was in moral 
philosophy, more than any other course in the curriculum, that students learned the normative rules 
pertaining to government, society, and citizenship.3   
At their founding, the curricula of both Harvard and Yale had been grounded in a conception 
of knowledge known as scholasticism—which assumed that nearly every truth worth knowing was 
contained in the Bible or the classics.  In mathematics, astronomy and natural philosophy (what we 
would today call science), Aristotle and Ptolemy reigned supreme, and to the extent that moral 
philosophy was taught, it grounded firmly in Protestant doctrine—the assumption being that true 
morality was impossible outside of spiritual regeneration through faith in Christ, and thus not worthy 
of separate study.  The entire curriculum was tied together by William Ames and Petrus Ramus, 
whose “systems” of theology and logic, respectively, wove natural and revealed knowledge into a 
glorious whole.4 
                                                
3 See Cremin, American Education, 458-465.  In its broadest form moral philosophy encompassed the 
modern subjects of philosophy, economics, anthropology, sociology and political science, though it was often taught 
in a more limited fashion, depending on the texts available and the interests and capacities of the faculty at a given 
college.  For an overview of the early curriculum at Harvard, see Samuel Eliot Morison, The Founding of Harvard 
College. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935, and Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936.  For the early history of Yale, see Franklin Bowditch Dexter, A 
Documentary History of Yale University, 1701-1745. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916; George Wilson 
Pierson, The Founding of Yale. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, and Richard Warch, School of the 
Prophets: Yale College, 1701-1740. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. For a more general history, see the 
opening chapters of Frederick Rudolph, Curriculum: A History of the American Undergraduate Course of Study 
Since 1636. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1977.  See also essay on Moral Philosophy in Knud Haakonssen 
(ed.), Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
4 The best work on moral philosophy in colonial America is Norman Fiering’s, Moral Philosophy at 
Seventeenth-Century Harvard: A Discipline in Transition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981.  
For the eighteenth-century, Fiering chose to focus on Jonathan Edwards (see Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought 
and Its British Context. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981) but his depiction of the crisis that 
engulfed Harvard in the 1680s and 1690s situates moral philosophy in the broader intellectual framework of the era. 
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When the “new learning”—as the theories of Bacon et al. were generally known—began to 
reach the colonies in the 1680s and following, it had a seismic effect on the curriculum and its 
underlying assumptions.  The challenge came at two levels.  In individual subjects, like astronomy or 
mathematics, the outmoded theories of Ptolemy and Aristotle were soon overthrown by the new 
doctrines of Descartes, Copernicus, and (eventually) Newton.  At a more systemic level, the new 
theories also raised profound questions regarding the authority of knowledge, the purpose of 
education, and even the very nature of society.  In the context of the time, the great question was 
whether natural and revealed knowledge were still compatible.  Would the discoveries generated by 
the new methods agree with Protestant theology?  The idea that authoritative knowledge could be 
derived from such an unstable and uncertain foundation as rational inquiry and observation was 
terribly unsettling.  Initially, there was resistance at almost every level.  Within a remarkably brief 
period, however, colonial intellectuals came to accept the new learning—at least in the realm of 
mathematics, astronomy, and natural philosophy.  Cotton Mather captured the new consensus when 
he wrote in 1721: “Philosophy,” (meaning natural philosophy) “is no Enemy, but a mighty and 
wondrous Incentive to Religion.”5  Members of the college faculties, like Thomas Robie, Thomas 
Clap, and John Winthrop IV, were soon immersed in these subjects and winning accolades for their 
knowledge and insights. 
The faculty had a much more difficult time adopting to the changes in moral philosophy.  For 
one thing, the methods being proposed in that realm were far more subjective and imprecise.  The 
core method was introspection, wherein a philosopher looked within his own soul and drew 
inferences that were then applied more broadly to human nature or human society.  Alternatively, 
philosophers could also draw data from the historic record or from the observation of contemporary 
society.  Whatever the source of information, the conclusions were highly dependent on the a priori 
                                                
5 The phrase comes from the opening line of Mather’s introduction to The Christian Philosopher. London: 
E. Matthews, 1721, which was an edited collection of essays on science. 
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assumptions that the philosopher brought to the inquiry.  Since the subject matter at hand was so 
consequential—touching upon the nature of truth and the well-being of society—the faculty were 
understandably reluctant to proceed quickly on that basis.  The field was also populated by theorists 
who enjoyed some measure of fame in Europe and it was difficult for colonial intellectuals, on the 
periphery of the intellectual world, to make an original contribution.   
The solution, which soon emerged at virtually every college in the colonies, was to seek help 
in Europe—either in the form of a popular text book that espoused a theory in line with orthodox 
religion, or in the form of a professor, educated in Europe and who also held to orthodox doctrine, 
who could teach the subject.  The faculty at Harvard chose the first method, selecting the work of 
Henry More, and later that of Henry Grove and David Fordyce, to present the subject to their 
students.  At the College of Philadelphia and the College of New Jersey, the solution was to hire 
professors educated in Scotland—Francis Alison and John Witherspoon, respectively.  At only two 
schools, did colonial-born faculty take up the subject with any measure of originality.  President 
Thomas Clap of Yale wrote an essay for his students, in which he surveyed the field, offered a 
commentary on the major figures, and finally concluded by presenting Scripture as the only reliable 
source of moral authority.  And then there was Samuel Johnson, who as we will see, embraced the 
subject wholeheartedly, going on to become the preeminent authority in British North America.6   
 
Johnson’s Two Conversions 
Johnson was born in 1696 in Guilford, CT, a fourth-generation descendent of one of the 
founding families of the New Haven colony.  Early in life, he displayed an insatiable appetite for 
learning, which his father chose to gratify with a basic education in the classics.  By 1710, at the age 
                                                
6 Joseph Ellis, Samuel Johnson of Connecticut: The New England Mind in Transition, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973, p. 237.  The only other modern biography of Johnson is Don Gerlach and George DeMille, 
Samuel Johnson of Stratford in New England, 1696-1772. Athens: Anglican Parishes Association Publications, 
2010, which emphasizes Johnson’s efforts to promote the Anglican Church.  See also Theodore Hornberger, 
“Samuel Johnson of Yale and King’s College,” The New England Quarterly, 8:3 (September 1935): 378-397. 
 
 287 
of 14, he had satisfied the requirements for admission to the Collegiate School (now Yale) in the 
town of Saybrook.7  The college had been founded nine years earlier, by a conservative faction of 
Harvard graduates associated with the Mathers, and during Johnson’s tenure—nearly twenty-five 
years after the first of the new doctrines reached Harvard—the school’s curriculum still featured 
Ptolemaic astronomy, Aristotelian philosophy, and the theology of William Ames.  As a 
consequence, Johnson finished his degree in 1714, having learned little more than traditional 
scholasticism.   Soon after his graduation, however, Johnson happened across the works of Francis 
Bacon.  Very shortly thereafter he was also exposed to works of other seminal figures from the 
English Enlightenment, including Newton, Locke, and Boyle, whose combined impact led Johnson 
to abandon scholasticism and embark on a lifelong pursuit of expertise in the new learning. 
Most of what we know of these events comes from Johnson’s autobiography, written near the 
end of his life.  I will quote a few of the more salient passages, which capture the dramatic character 
of his conversion.8  Johnson began by characterizing his college education as “nothing but the 
scholastic cobwebs of a few little English and Dutch systems… some of Ramus and Alstad’s works 
was considered as the highest attainments.”  By the time he graduated in 1714, people had begun to 
hear of a “new philosophy… and of such names as Descartes, Boyle, Locke and Newton,” but 
students “were cautioned against thinking anything of them because the new philosophy it was said 
would soon bring in a new divinity and corrupt the pure religion of the country.”  They were “not 
allowed to vary an ace in their thoughts from Dr. Ames’s Medulla Theologiae and Cases of 
Conscience… which were the only systems of divinity that were thumbed in those days and 
                                                
7 Colleges in this period were comparable to modern high schools, in that students typically entered when 
they were 14 and graduated when they were 18—though there was far less systemization then than there is now, and 
there were many exceptions to that rule.  Professional training typically took place after graduation, in the form of 
apprenticeships. 
8 Johnson’s autobiography is printed in Herbert and Carol Schneider, Samuel Johnson, President of King’s 
College: His Career and Writings, 4 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, vol. I, pp. 1-49 (hereafter 
cited as Schneider, SJCW).  The editors state that the autobiography was written between 1768 and 1770.  The 
passages that follow, and which relate to Johnson’s intellectual conversion, are found on pages 6-7. 
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considered with equal if not greater veneration than the Bible itself.”  Despite the poor quality of the 
curriculum, Johnson had excelled as a student, going so far as to draw up “a little system of all parts 
of learning then known”—an accomplishment that had “served to blow him up with great conceit 
that he was now an adept.”9 
He continued in that confident frame of mind until he happened, one day, to light upon “Lord 
Bacon’s Instauratio Magna, or Advancement of Learning (perhaps the only copy in the country and 
nobody knew its value).”   Johnson greedily consumed its contents, and as he did so, his “towering 
imaginations” came crashing down around him.  He “soon saw his own littleness in comparison with 
Lord Bacon’s greatness whom he considered over and over again so that he found himself like one at 
once emerging out of the glimmer of twilight into the full sunshine of open day.”  At almost precisely 
the same time, the college received the gift of a library—from an English patron by the name of 
Jeremiah Dummer—which contained the works of “Shakespeare and Milton etc, Locke and Norris 
etc., Boyle and Newton etc….”10  Though Johnson was no longer a student, he apparently lived near 
the college and was given ready access to the books—for he described their influence as “a flood of 
day to his low state of mind.”  During the two years that followed, while working nearby as a 
schoolteacher, Johnson devoted his free time to reading, and began to meet regularly with a handful 
of other young ministers and recent graduates in the area, to discuss the new ideas and ponder their 
consequences.   
In 1716, the trustees of the Collegiate School hired Johnson as a tutor.  For reasons having to 
do with the relocation of the college to New Haven—and a schism that developed with a group that 
wanted the school to be located in Hartford—he was left as the only official member of the faculty 
                                                
9 In his autobiography, Johnson habitually referred to himself in the third person. 
10 For a list of the titles in that collection see Louise May Bryant and Mary Patterson, “The List of Books 
Sent by Jeremiah Dummer,” in Papers in Honor of Andrew Keogh, Librarian of Yale University by the Staff of the 
Library. New Haven: Privately Printed, 1938, pp. 7-44. 
 
 289 
during the 1716–1717 academic year.11  Starting that year, and continuing for two years thereafter, 
with the support of colleagues who later joined him in New Haven, Johnson undertook to introduce 
“the study of Mr. Locke and Sir Isaac Newton as fast as [he] could,” and to replace the Ptolemaic 
system, which “was hitherto as much believed as the Scriptures,” with the Copernican.  Johnson 
notes that the trustees would likely have opposed these innovations “if it had not been for the public 
quarrels about the [location of the] college.”  But it was now hoped “these new and better 
instructions” would “promote the credit” of the school New Haven.12   In 1719, Johnson resigned his 
post—as means of appeasing the Hartford faction, which finally consented to join the school in New 
Haven—and became the minister of a local congregation.  The book club continued to meet, 
however, and Johnson now embarked on a more intensive study of the New Learning that would last 
the rest of his life. 
The full scope of his endeavor is perhaps best captured in a list that he began to keep in 
1719—and which he maintained until 1753—in which he recorded the title of every book that he 
read.13  There are over 1,100 titles on the list, covering topics ranging from natural philosophy, to 
natural law, to political philosophy, to theology, physics, literature, logic, mathematics and the 
classics.  Johnson did not merely peruse these fields, he sought to master them all.  Early on, for 
instance, he “greatly desired to study Sir Isaac” but found that he lacked sufficient skill in 
mathematics, “a study he was averse to.”  After some deliberation, however, he “resolved to 
overcome that aversion, and by laborious application… gained the mastery of Euclid, Algebra, and 
the Conic Sections, so as to read Sir Isaac with understanding and his aversion turned into a great 
                                                
11 He received assistance from a local minister. 
12 See Schneider, SJCW, I:7-9.  In 1717, Daniel Browne, a member of Johnson’s book club, was also 
appointed tutor. In 1718, Timothy Cutler, a graduate of Harvard was appointed rector and joined the club as well. 
13 A copy of the list is found in Schneider, SJCW, I:495-526.  It includes the works of Milton, Grotius, 
Locke, Bacon, Addison, Shaftsbury, Hutcheson, Clarke, Wollaston, Leibniz, Le Clerc, Berkeley, Malebranche, 
Pufendorf, Newton and Hume, among many others. 
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pleasure.”14  Johnson’s breadth of engagement with the new learning would eventually result in his 
attaining the status of one of the most widely read intellectual authorities in the colonies at that time. 
Around the time of his resignation from the college, Johnson also experienced a second and 
equally radical conversion.  Among the volumes contained in the new library were the works of 
Anglican theologians, and for the first time in his life, Johnson encountered well-formed arguments 
in favor of the notion of apostolic succession, and other core elements of Anglican church polity.  
The subject soon became a popular topic of conversation at the book club, and over the course of the 
next few years, nearly every member of the group gradually came to the conclusion that the 
democratic system of church government, which prevailed in New England, was not Biblical.  The 
members of the club were nearly all Congregationalist ministers, or members of the college faculty, 
and their new convictions eventually created a crisis of conscience.  At the same time, rumors of their 
change of heart were also beginning to spread among the people.  The issue culminated in the fall of 
1722 when the trustees of Yale15 confronted the group and asked them to given an account of their 
beliefs.  After a series of rather intense meetings, several individuals recanted, and affirmed their 
belief in the New England way.  Johnson, Timothy Cutler (the college rector), and Daniel Browne (a 
college tutor) held firm, and proved their conviction by departing immediately for England with the 
intent of receiving ordination.16  
Barely a century separated Johnson’s conversion and the Separatists’ arrival at Plymouth.  He 
had been raised on stories of Anglican persecution of their forebears in England, and to believe that 
Anglicans were quasi-papists who had retained too much of Catholicism in the wake of the Protestant 
Reformation.  In the context of the times, a decision to side with the Church amounted to a betrayal 
                                                
14 See Johnson’s autobiography, Schneider, SJCW, I:9. 
15 The college received its current name in 1718. 
16 The events are recounted in Johnson’s autobiography, Schneider, SJCW, I:10-15. 
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of New Englanders’ “Errand in the Wilderness.”17  Johnson’s decision would have been merely 
tragic, from the perspective of his Congregationalist peers, if he had left for England, never to return.  
Instead, after his ordination, he signed on as a member of the Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in Foreign Parts (the missionary wing of the Anglican church) and returned to Connecticut, 
arriving in the fall of 1723—at the age of 27.  The next year he built a church in Stratford, and for the 
next thirty years he presided there—a perpetual thorn in the side of Establishment.18 
 
Elementa Philosophica 
Johnson never drew an explicit connection between his later intellectual endeavors and his 
earlier conversion to the new learning and to Anglicanism.  Two related themes, however, are clearly 
apparent in a pair of major essays that he published later in life, just prior to assuming the presidency 
of King’s College.  The first essay, which he began to work on in 1716, and finally published in 
1752—with Benjamin Franklin’s printing company—was his Elementa Philosophica or Elements of 
Philosophy.   The second, which he wrote in the mid-1740s, and later appended to the Elementa 
Philosophica, was his Ethices Elementa, or The First Principles of Moral Philosophy.19  In each 
essay Johnson sought to address or resolve one of two intellectual problems that had emerged as a 
consequence of his conversion—and which he had apparently been wrestling with over the course of 
the subsequent decades.  The first problem had to do with the demise of William Ames and Petrus 
                                                
17 The phrase is taken from the title of a sermon by Samuel Danforth, of Massachusetts, given in 1670. 
18 Johnson took an active role in pamphlet debates with Congregationalists over points of doctrine.  He also 
played a role in an effort to purchase property in the heart of New Haven, and then build an Anglican church directly 
across the street from the Yale campus.  After the church opened, he took a leading role in demanding that the 
college permit Anglican students to attend on Sundays—going so far as to suggest that he would ask the Archbishop 
of Canterbury to have the college charter revoked, if this liberty were denied.  President Thomas Clap eventually 
yielded to Johnson’s demands. 
19 The full text of both essays is found in Schneider, SJCW, II:357-518.  Franklin was sufficiently 
impressed with Johnson’s work that he invited him to become the first president of the College of Philadelphia—an 
invitation that Johnson declined on account of his advancing years.  See Franklin to Johnson, August 9, 1750, and 
December 24, 1751, and Johnson’s reply in January 1752, SJCW, I:141, 154-155.  
 
 292 
Ramus and their “systems” of knowledge.  Ames and Ramus had reasoned deductively from a priori 
truths that were grounded in theology and the Bible.  Was it still possible, using the inductive 
methods and assumptions of the “new learning”, to articulate an intellectual credible defense of 
God’s central role in the universe?  If so, on what basis?  If the case were made on purely theological 
grounds—then theology and philosophy would have to be divorced, and considered separate fields of 
knowledge.  The challenge was to defend the centrality of God using the new methods and new 
understanding of reason.   
Aspects of Johnson’s response to that challenge are found in both essays.  To begin with his 
Elementa Philosophica, however, the project began in 1716 as little more than a revision of his “little 
system of all parts of learning then known,” which he had first drafted as an undergraduate at the 
Collegiate School.  He initially referred to the project as an “Encyclopedia of Philosophy.”20  Over 
time, however, as the breadth of his erudition increased, Johnson gradually abandoned his attempt to 
compile the sum total of human knowledge and began to focus rather on the theoretical question of 
how knowledge could be understood as a unified whole, with God at the center.21  In the final 
published version, the totality of human knowledge is reduced to a simple table, presented in outline 
form on a single page just after the table of contents.  The essay that follows consists of six chapters, 
in which Johnson articulates a theory of knowledge grounded in the mind and nature of perception.22 
“Learning,” Johnson wrote at the top of the table, “is the knowledge of every thing that may 
contribute to our true happiness, both in theory and in practice.”  He then went on to divide learning 
into two parts: philology, or “the study of words and other signs,” and philosophy, or “the study of 
                                                
20 A copy of the 1716 revision can be found in Schneider, SJCW, II:203-216. 
21 Revised versions of the project are found in Schneider, SJCW, II under the dates 1730, 1744, and 1748. 
22 The essay consists of six chapters: I. “Of the Mind in general, its Objects and Operations,” II. “Of the 
Mind simply apprehending, and of its Objects more particularly,” III. “Of the Mind, judging, affirming, denying, 
assenting, &c.,” IV. “Of the Mind reasoning and methodizing its Thoughts,” V. “Of the Mind, affecting, willing and 
acting…,” and VI. “Of the Progress of the Mind, towards its highest Perfection.” See Table of Contents in 
Schneider, SJCW II:369-371. 
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things signified [by words] whether bodies or spirits or anything relating to them.”  Both philology 
and philosophy were then further divided into general and special “types.”  Johnson defined “general 
philology,” as that which is “common to all kinds of speaking,” i.e. grammar and rhetoric, whereas 
“special philology” consisted of: oratory, history, and poetry.   He defined “general philosophy” as 
consisting of metaphysics, logic and mathematics, whereas the “special philosophies” were “natural” 
and “moral”— natural philosophy being “the knowledge of… bodies… both in heaven and earth,” 
and moral philosophy being “the knowledge of the moral world or spirits.”  Johnson finally divided 
moral philosophy into two additional sub-types: “speculative” moral philosophy was the study of 
“pneumatology and theology, of spiritual beings, and especially God the father of all.”   “Practical” 
moral philosophy was the study of “ethics… [i.e.] behavior in general,” “economics…[i.e.] the 
conduct of families,” and “politics… [i.e.] the government of states, civil and ecclesiastical.”23  The 
Table reveals much about general understandings of knowledge in this period—for many of 
Johnson’s basic categorizations—especially in the realm of philology general philosophy are so 
similar to the curricular framework at other colleges in this period, that they certainly reflect the 
shared assumptions of his peers.  Johnson’s more particular contributions are evident in the area of 
moral philosophy.  What is striking in this area are the way in which he 1) incorporates the study of 
the supernatural or unseen realm as a co-equal branch of learning—and one apparently amenable to 
the faculties of reason and 2) makes theology, which had stood at the apex of the scholastic systems, 
a relatively minor component of the new system of knowledge, based on philosophy.   
Johnson then went on, in the body of his essay, to elaborate on the theoretical basis for that 
schema of knowledge.  Here Johnson derived considerable help from George Berkeley’s theory of 
immaterialism.24  Berkeley posited that all reality—whether we perceive it as physical or 
                                                
23 Schneider, SJCW II:368. 
24 See Ellis, Samuel Johnson, 158.  Berkeley’s theory of immaterialism, developed in opposition to Locke’s 
emphasis on empiricism, was one of the most influential theories of the early eighteenth century.  Johnson met 
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immaterial—ultimately exists only as an idea in the mind of God.  Furthermore, God did not simply 
create the world and then leave it for man to study.  He was actively at work in the present and at the 
very moment of perception, enabling human beings to perceive reality through their faculties.  
Johnson wove this proposition into the heart of his Elementa Philosophia.   “In the perception of 
objects…” Johnson wrote: 
we find… it not… in our power… whether we will see light and colors, hear sounds, etc. We 
are not causes to ourselves of these perceptions, nor can they be produced in our minds 
without a cause….  [T]hey must [rather] derive to us from an Almighty, intelligent active 
cause, exhibiting them to us, impressing our minds with them, or producing them in us; and 
consequently… it must be by a perpetual intercourse of our minds with the Deity, the great 
Author of our Beings…that they are possessed of all these objects of sense, and the light by 
which we perceive them.”25 
 
The precise means by which God conveyed such impressions to the human mind, Johnson argued, 
was through “a kind of intellectual light within us…whereby we not only know that we perceive the 
object, but directly apply ourselves to the consideration of it.”26  The great advantage to 
immaterialism, from Johnson’s perspective, is that it placed knowledge of the supernatural on the 
same level as the study of physical, measurable, objects. There was no inherent distinction between 
natural philosophy—the study of the visible world—and moral philosophy—the study of the unseen 
laws that governed all other aspects of reality.  The theory also enabled Johnson to avoid the trap of 
“an inextricable scepticism,” which he saw as the inevitable outcome of philosophy if objects and 
ideas were understood to exist independently and “external to any mind, even that of the Deity.”27   
                                                                                                                                                       
Berkeley during Berkeley’s tour of the American colonies in 1729 and corresponded with him throughout his life.  
In his biographical entry on Johnson, in John R. Shook (ed.) The Dictionary of Early American Philosophers 2 vols. 
London: Continuum, 2012, I:593-601, Stephen A. Wilson wrote, “what drew Johnson to Berkeley was the latter’s 
seeming embodiment of a modern philosophical acuity with no resulting loss of religious content” p. 595. 
25 Schneider, SJCW, II:375 
26 Schneider, SJCW, II:379.  See also, Ellis, Samuel Johnson, 167-68.  The motto of King’s College, “In 
Lumine tuo Videbimus Lumen,” or “In Thy Light We See Light,” reflects Johnson’s theory of knowledge. 
27 Schneider, SJCW, II:375. According to David J. Hoeveler, Creating the American Mind: Intellect and 
Politics in the Colonial Colleges. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, Berkeley provided Johnson 
‘not only incontestable proofs of a deity, but moreover the most striking apprehensions of his constant presence with 
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Human beings were completely dependent upon God, who was the author and source of all 
knowledge, and present in every aspect of human existence.   
The second great problem with which Johnson wrestled in these essays had emerged as a 
consequence of his conversion to Anglicanism.  This was the question pertaining to God’s character 
and man’s basic capacity as a free moral agent.  As already noted, Johnson’s conversion to 
Anglicanism had been prompted chiefly by his convictions regarding church polity.  Yet he had also 
been troubled, since his youth, by aspects of New England theology that presented God as an 
arbitrary judge who pre-destined mankind to salvation or condemnation, and gave them no choice in 
the matter.  On joining the Anglican church, Johnson had abandoned that doctrine and had become, 
in the terminology of the day, an “Arminian,” holding to a strong doctrine of free will.28  Yet because 
the core of his intellectual energies were directed to the realm of philosophy rather than theology, it 
was natural for Johnson to also express his new convictions in the context of his theory of 
knowledge.  He did so via the philosophical concept of “happiness.” 
In the fifth chapter of Elementa Philosophica, he articulated his position as follows:  
I say our highest moral perfection consists in freely doing what we know tends to make us 
entirely happy in the whole of our nature and duration: but then it must be considered, that, as 
God is our chief good, our great creator, preserver, and governor, on whom we entirely 
depend for our being, and for all our happiness, and all our hopes; and as he wills our 
happiness, as his end in giving and continuing our beings, and consequently everything as a 
means, that is conducive to it; so it must be supposed to be implied in our highest moral 
perfection, that we are entirely devoted to him, and to do every thing conducive to our 
                                                                                                                                                       
us and inspection over us, and our entire dependence on him and infinite obligations to his most wise and almighty 
benevolence,’” p. 146.  According to Norman Fiering, the traditional Puritan definition of reason was: an intuitive 
capacity of the mind to perceive principles of divine law that had an independent existence in the mind of God.  This 
was in contrast to Hobbes’s definition of reason as a purely instrumental “ability of the mind to calculate toward an 
end without also being the possessor of ends,” Moral Philosophy, 258.  Berkeley’s theory effectively gave the 
Puritan definition of reason a lease on life—though it now used rational instead of theological language. 
28 In his autobiography, for example, Johnson noted that he had “been always much embarrassed with the 
rigid Calvinistical notions” in which he had been raised, Schneider, SJCW, I:11.  Calvinists held to a strong doctrine 
of predestination, which emphasized the sovereignty of God and the innate depravity of mankind to such an extent 
that human sovereignty, or capacity to have a material choice in one’s eternal destiny, was reduced to a nullity.  
Their opponents, in the context of the time were “Arminianists” who held that God had given mankind free will in 
the matter of salvation.  For a fuller presentation of Johnson’s hostility to the doctrine of predestination see his 
polemical writing, especially “A Letter concerning the Sovereignty of God, from Aristocles to Authades,” and 
related correspondence in Schneider, SJCW, III:159-205. 
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happiness, in relation to him, and one another, in a designed conformity to him as our great 
and original pattern, and in compliance with his will, and from a sense of duty to him as our 
supreme moral governor.29 
 
In other words, Johnson argued, even though God had created human beings in such a way that they 
were utterly dependent upon him—even for their basic capacity to perceive knowledge and reality—
yet he had also given people a sovereign will, capable of making moral choices that would determine 
the outcome of their lives, both in the present and for eternity.30   
Johnson was still left with one great problem: How to define, measure or articulate the rules 
or standards, on the basis of which so much of human well-being depended.  The traditional answer 
was from the Bible, but Johnson was now also persuaded—along with so many of his generation—
that God had also created a set of natural moral laws—laws that governed every aspect of human 
affairs—that could be distinguished via reason and observation in much the same way that one could 
discern Newtonian laws of physics.  He had done so in kindness, willing the good of humanity, yet 
he had also made the realization of their benefits dependent upon the sovereign cooperation of 
individuals. How were these laws discovered or discerned?  Through moral philosophy, properly 
conceived: “Philosophy,” Johnson wrote, “teaches us… the rules of behaving ourselves, i.e., 
choosing and acting in such a manner as will make us completely happy; and this is called moral 
philosophy.”31  What were these laws?  He answered the question in his second essay, Ethices 
Elementa, or The First Principles of Moral Philosophy.32   
The great intellectual challenge that Johnson faced in undertaking the project was to define 
his system of moral philosophy in such a way that it was both in line with the philosophical standards 
                                                
29 Schneider, SJCW II:421-2; See also Hoeveler, American Mind, 148-9 for related commentary. 
30 Hoeveler, American Mind, 147-48.  See also Ellis, Samuel Johnson, 161-162.  As Hoeveler put it, 
everything in Johnson’s philosophy, “conspire[d] to make the individual a role player in his own destiny.” 
31 See “An outline of philosophy” in Schneider, SJCW II:310. 
32 The essay was first published in Boston by Rogers and Fowle, 1746.  As already noted, it was appended 
to Benjamin Franklin’s printing of Elementa Philosophica in 1752.  The full text is in Schneider, SJCW II: 442-513. 
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of the day and yet also compatible and in agreement with the basic tenants of the Christian faith.  
Johnson outlined his solution to that problem in the introduction:  
What is here attempted, is a short System of Ethics or Morals, of late called The Religion of 
nature; by which I would not be understood to mean a System of Truths and Duties which 
meer natural Reason would ever, of itself, have discovered, in the present Condition of 
Mankind, without the Assistance of Revelation or Instruction….  [It is rather t]hat System of 
Truths and Duties, which, tho’ they were are not obvious to our weak Reason, without 
Revelation or Instruction, yet when discovered, whether by the one or the other, evidently 
appear, upon due Consideration, to be founded in the first Principles of Reason and Nature,—
in the Nature of GOD and Man, and the various Relations that subsist between them,—and 
from thence to be capable even of strict Demonstration.33 
 
At essence, Johnson’s solution was to make reason subordinate to revelation as a means of 
discovering moral laws.  Yet he at the same time elevated reason to a position almost equal to 
revelation by positing reason’s ability to prove or demonstrate the validity of moral truths once they 
had been discovered.34  It was the work of the true philosopher to perform the necessary 
demonstration, and make natural moral law plain to the minds of those who would be in a position to 
act upon it for the good of the larger society.  Having established that initial ground, Johnson went on 
to perform that very work and to demonstrate, in rational and systematic fashion, the essence of 
moral philosophy.35 
Johnson answers the foundational question, “What am I?” via the standard method of the 
“new learning”— introspection.  “I find,” he wrote, that “I can reflect and look into my own Mind:—
I can consider my self, and my Powers and Actions and their Objects…”  On performing that action, 
Johnson discovered a desire for self-preservation—which was a basic answer that many other 
                                                
33 Schneider, SJCW II:442-43. 
34 There was at least one area where moral philosophy was not capable of demonstrating essential truth, and 
that was the essence of the atonement.  “Because some parts… of natural philosophy [those pertaining to spirits or 
metaphysics], and the whole of moral philosophy, are of the greatest concern to us,” Johnson wrote, “God has, of his 
special kindness to us, given us relating to the a particular and express revelation of his mind and will, and how we 
(having offended Him) may yet secure his favor, through the mediation of his Son.”  Schneider, SJCW II:442-515. 
35 The essay consists of six chapters: I. What am I?—II. How came I to be what I am?—III. For what End 
was I made and have my Being?—IV. What ought I immediately to do and be in Order to answer the End of my 
Being?—V. Whether I am what I ought to be?—If not, VI. What ought I to do, as a Means, in Order to be and do 
what I ought, and in Order finally to answer the End of my Being? 
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theorists had articulated, and which was considered elementary by the mid-eighteenth century.36  
Johnson then went on to look at the world around him where he found all manner of systems 
connected to one another in such a way that “it is manifest from their mutual Dependence and 
Subserviency, that they are contrived and designed to constitute, as in Fact they do, one harmonious 
and beautiful and useful System” all of which operate together to enable provision for the Body and 
enjoyment of life.  He also noted that the human Species appeared in particular to have been “made 
for Society,” having been equipped by language and reason, and requiring “mutual Compacts for our 
Defence and Safety, and for maintaining both private Right and public Order, and promoting the 
common Good of our Species, in the several Communities to which we belong…. so I find in Fact 
that my true Interest and Enjoyment of my self depends on the general Interest and good Order of the 
Community.”37 
This aspect of Johnson’s theory was a summary of Samuel von Pufendorf’s theory of natural 
law.38  As noted in my previous chapter, the essence of Pufendorf’s proposition was this: The fact 
that human beings were evidently incapable of attaining to their maximum potential except in 
cooperation with others should be understood as a moral imperative—a condition intentionally 
created by God with the goal that people should perceive a duty to support one another to the greatest 
extent possible without violating their duties to God and to themselves.39  Johnson goes on, in the 
remainder of the essay, to develop those aspects of Pufendorf’s theory as well, asking explicitly what 
duties human beings had to God, to themselves, and to their neighbor, and answering each with the 
                                                
36 See, for example, Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace. 
37 Schneider, SJCW, II: 458. 
38 As was common in this era, Johnson rarely cited the works of other authors who influenced his thought. 
39 Samuel von Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations (1672), a summary of which is contained in 
Pufendorf’s On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1682), which, as noted below in note 57, Johnson assigned to 
sophomores at King’s College. 
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same kind of inductive reasoning that Pufendorf employed.40  Johnson’s essay dwells far more on the 
character of God and the sinful nature of humanity than Pufendorf did—those themes being of the 
great importance to Puritan New England, and he turns often to his core theme of “happiness” in a 
way that Pufendorf never did.  Yet it is evident that Johnson was indebted to Pufendorf for the basic 
structure of his argument, the underlying principles, and for many of his methods of reasoning. 
 In conclusion, Johnson used the concept of happiness, combined with Berkeley’s theory 
immaterialism and Pufendorf’s basic theory of natural law, to fill the void left by the demise of 
William Ames and Peter Ramus.  He posited a unified theory of knowledge that was compatible—at 
least to his mind—with the principles of the “new learning” and a basic Protestant outlook on moral 
law.  The great difference between Johnson’s system and that of the Puritan scholastics (aside from 
Johnson’s Arminian theology) was that Johnson’s project no longer resided in the realm of theology.  
It rather resided in the realm of philosophy—moral philosophy.41    
 
The Importance of the Colleges 
What difference did it make that a student like John Jay learned moral philosophy during 
Johnson’s tenure at King’s College, rather than having studied it at another college or even having 
studied it on his own?  The answer would obviously depend in large part on the disposition of the 
student.  A number of observations can be made, however, about the general characteristics of 
                                                
40 Schneider, SJCW, II:490-501. 
41 As Norman Fiering put it, Johnson was participating in a “grand reversal in the philosophical 
presuppositions of the New England mind,” wherein moral philosophy was “enlarged… [to] swallow up theology,” 
“President Samuel Johnson and the Circle of Knowledge,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 28:2 
(April, 1971), 223.  Or as Hoevler puts it, “Johnson’s formidable skill lay in appropriating the liberal language of the 
Enlightenment and turning it back into the God-centered context of his own religious faith,” American Mind, 149. 
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colleges in this era, and Johnson’s curriculum at King’s in particular, that offer useful insight into 
this question.42 
A key fact that has received relatively little attention in the scholarly literature is that for most 
of the eighteenth century, the colleges represented the only institutions in the colonies able to offer 
their “members” access to a sizable collection of books, time to read them, and expert assistance in 
interpreting their content.  Books were expensive and few people had time to read them at length.  
Large libraries, of say 2,500 volumes, were a luxury that only the wealthiest merchants or plantation 
owners could afford to purchase, or take time to enjoy. It is true that Benjamin Franklin founded the 
Junto in 1727, the Library Company in 1731 and the Philosophical Society in 1743.  Membership in 
those organizations, however, was small and is more a testimony to the remarkable qualities of 
Franklin than of a widespread pattern in the colonies.43  Outside such circles, most other large 
libraries in the colonies were in the hands of individual merchants or plantation owners who were 
seeking to satisfy their intellectual curiosity, keep up with the latest developments in Europe, and/or 
achieve a reputation for sophistication.  By necessity those individuals read in relative isolation—
corresponding with like-minded peers in Europe or other colonies, but having few opportunities to 
discuss the ideas with those immediately around them.  While they may have achieved some degree 
of competence in a given field, they rarely attained true mastery or expertise.  It would appear that 
intellectual interests among such readers also tended strongly toward the fields of astronomy, 
electricity, chemistry and alchemy.  There is very little evidence of any popular interest in the field of 
                                                
42 For insight into the political ideas of founders who did not receive a college education, see for example 
Kevin J.  Hayes, The Mind of a Patriot: Patrick Henry and the World of Ideas. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2008; Jeffry H. Morrison, The Political Philosophy of George Washington. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009; Edward Neill, John Washington and Robert Orme, “The Ancestry and Earlier Life 
of George Washington,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 16:3 (October, 1892): 261-298; and 
Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. 
43 The New York Society Library of New York, for instance, was not founded until 1754. 
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moral philosophy.44  At a popular level, most people’s reading was confined to the world of 
pamphlets and newspapers that Bernard Bailyn and Caroline Robbins have so famously reviewed.  
By contrast, most colonial colleges came into possession of substantial libraries soon after 
their founding.  While the early collections at Harvard and Yale were largely focused on works of 
divinity, by the mid-eighteenth century their libraries and those of their peer institutions included a 
wide range of works including much of the latest works of philosophy.45  The students who attended 
these schools were in the most formative years of their lives.  While there was far less systemization 
than we see today, the norm was to enter at the age of 14 and graduate at the age of 18.  Unlike most 
English universities at the time—where students rented rooms in the local town—nearly all of the 
colonial colleges were boarding schools.  The college consisted of one or more large halls, the 
ground floor of which was dedicated to classroom space while the upper floors were used for 
dormitories.  At least some members of the faculty, including the college president, resided on site 
and ate meals with the students.  The day usually began early with a compulsory prayer service, 
followed by breakfast, and then time for study before classes began around 8 AM.  The rest of the 
day was then filled with a mixture of recitations, lectures, oratory exercises and time for study, with a 
break only for lunch.  The end of the day was marked by dinner, another time of prayer, and then 
                                                
44 Most of these observations come from notes taken during a lecture on “Readers and Reading in Colonial 
America” that Anthony Grafton gave at the New York Society Library on March 23, 2015.  Grafton made frequent 
reference to the library and reading habits of James Logan, a wealthy merchant in Philadelphia, whose habits appear 
to have been typical of those in his class.  Benjamin Franklin, who was another example of such merchant readers, 
was an exception to the rule that such readers rarely achieved fame or expertise.  The lack of popular interest in 
Moral Philosophy is at least partially evidenced by the fact that of the 500 copies of Johnson’s Elementa Philosohica 
that Benjamin Franklin printed in 1752 only 50 sold in Philadelphia along with a presumably smaller number in 
other cities.  See Franklin to Johnson, April 15, 1754, in Schneider, SJCW, I:183. 
45 As already noted Yale had received a library of 500 volumes from Jeremiah Dummer around the year 
1714.  By 1730, the library had grown to about 2,000 volumes, at which point George Berkeley added another 1,000 
books in 1731.  While the faculty at Yale in particular was alert to the dangers posed by new ideas, there is little 
evidence that books were rejected on that basis.  Given its comparably greater wealth and institutional longevity, 
Harvard would have had a much larger library than this, details of which are almost certainly to be found in Samuel 
Eliot Morison’s works.  The College of New Jersey, King’s College, and the College of Philadelphia would have 
had smaller libraries at their respective founding in 1746, 1754, and 1755, but these would have grown rapidly given 
the great wealth of the colonies at the time.  For a description of the early library at the College of William and Mary 
see: John M. Jennings, The Library of the College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1693-1793. Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1968. 
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time for evening study before a mandatory curfew around 10 PM.46  While such schedules may seem 
rather ordinary in the context of the times, the colleges represented a rare opportunity for future 
leaders to receive concentrated exposure to great books and leading ideas. 
The content of the students’ education of course, depended to a very large extent on the 
faculty, whose quality varied considerably from school to school, and even from year to year.  The 
chief problem was the relative dearth of individuals in the colonies who were competent to teach the 
full curriculum, especially in light of the rapid developments that were taking place in the realm of 
natural philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy.  Harvard appears to have been well supplied with 
faculty in all of those fields—drawn chiefly from its own graduates.  Yale was limited in part by the 
doctrinal standards imposed on the faculty in the wake of Timothy Cutler’s conversion to 
Anglicanism (see above in connection with Johnson’s conversion), and much of the teaching in these 
fields, during the mid-eighteenth century, was done by president Thomas Clap, who developed 
considerable expertise in mathematics and astronomy in particular.  In the early years of King’s 
College, however, there were often large gaps in the faculty, often occasioned by fatalities from 
small pox—or temporary absences as faculty moved out of the city during an epidemic—and a dearth 
of competent replacements.47  Whatever their particular limits, however, the colleges in general 
appear to have attracted to their faculties a sizable portion of those in the colonies who possessed 
expertise, not only in Greek and Latin, but also in natural philosophy and its related fields. 
                                                
46 See David C. Humphrey, From King’s College to Columbia, 1746-1800. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976, 160-162; Mary-Elaine Swanson, The Education of James Madison. Montgomery, AL: The 
Hoffman Education Center, 1992, who notes that the bell rang for prayer each day at the College of New Jersey at 6 
AM and 5 PM, p. 27. 
47 A professor by the name of Daniel Treadwell, for example, taught mathematics for a season at King’s 
College and was reputed to be one of the knowledgeable experts on the subject in the colonies.  When he died 
suddenly of small pox in April 1760, Johnson was unable to find a replacement and was forced to teach mathematics 
himself, in addition to his other responsibilities. For the faculty at Harvard see Samuel Eliot Morison, Three 
Centuries of Harvard. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936.  For Thomas Clap at Yale see Louis Leonard 




There seems to have been far more variation in quality, however, when it came to instruction 
in the field of moral philosophy.  As I noted at the outset of this chapter, the course in moral 
philosophy was situated at apex of the colonial college curriculum.  It was typically taught during the 
senior year, often by the college president.  And it was the medium through which students received 
instruction in the rules that governed society.  In its broadest conception, the course encompassed 
virtually every non-material aspect of society from individual ethics, to the economy, to government, 
jurisprudence and the law of nations.48  Yet at most schools the course was not taught to its potential.  
The faculty had neither the expertise nor the interest in pursuing these questions in all of their 
dimensions.  Moral philosophy was rather presented as a course in personal ethics, with an overlay of 
theology.  Instruction in the subject was also characterized by a strong dose of caution as the faculty 
tended to perceive the notion of rationally discerned moral law as a threat to their core mission and 
identity.  They tended to select the works of European theorists whose views were deemed 
reasonably orthodox, and modify the content with the goal of upholding the status quo.   Although 
the course still remained the capstone of the curriculum, there is no evidence that the subject was 
presented with anything approaching the intellectual energy that characterized the instruction in 
mathematics, astronomy and the natural sciences.49   
                                                
48 Cremin’s, American Education, offers the most comprehensive overview of colonial American 
education. In a chapter entitled “Politics and Education,” Cremin characterizes Moral Philosophy as “an outgrowth 
of the traditional study of case divinity, in which man was explored first in and of himself and then in relation to 
God and his fellow men….  Assuming a rational man responsible to a morally perfect God, it considered such 
fundamental topics as the source of human action…, the purposes of God in creating man for temporal and eternal 
happiness (divinity and ethics), and the proper balance of rights and obligations in family life (economy) and social 
affairs (government, jurisprudence, and the law of nations)…. [H]owever abstruse or arcane the analysis, there was 
no missing the burning relevance of the central question, What political arrangements are ethically desirable in light 
of the laws of nature and the teachings of God?” p. 460. 
49 David W. Robson, Educating Republicans: The College in the Era of the American Revolution, 1750-
1800. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985, 83-84 makes that general statement.  For additional evidence see 
Hoeveler, American Mind, 175-6, who argues that Francis Alison of the College of Philadelphia used Francis 
Hutcheson’s theory of a moral sense, but emphasized human dependence on God to a greater degree than Hutcheson 
had.  At Yale, Thomas Clap wrote an Essay on the Nature and Foundation of Moral Virtue and Obligation, for the 
benefit of his students, in which he reviewed the major European writers on moral philosophy, identified the logical 
fallacies in their work and pointed his students to Scripture as the only true and reliable foundation for virtue. There 
is also very little on politics in the works of either Henry Grove or David Fordyce, which were taught at Harvard. 
 
 304 
Distinctive Features of King’s College 
In light of these facts, King’s College under Samuel Johnson stands out in the following 
ways.  It was first of all smaller than either Harvard or Yale, which admitted more than 25 students 
per year by mid-century.  During Johnson’s presidency, from 1754–1763, an average of just under 9 
students were admitted each year—only 40% of whom remained to graduation (the others usually 
leaving during their second or third year to enter business, pursue another profession, or attend a 
different school).  The faculty at King’s was also smaller than that of its peer institutions, with 
Johnson typically receiving the help of only one or two other tutors or professors.50  When combined 
with the fact that students and faculty resided at college, at meals together, and lodged in the same 
building, the result was that the faculty had far more personal interaction with, and influence on, the 
students—who were usually the age of modern high school students—than is normal today. 
Not all faculty, of course, fostered a cordial relationship with their students.  Thomas Clap, 
for example, was a strict disciplinarian who, though respected by the more serious students, was 
ultimately driven out of office by a student rebellion.51   Johnson, however, had an especially warm 
and even fatherly personality, and he envisioned college as an extension of his family.  In the 1730s 
and 1740s, he had run a grammar school in his home in Stratford, Connecticut.  Many students 
boarded with his family (including Jay’s older brother Augustus) and Johnson hoped to preserve that 
familial relationship at King’s.  In his public orations he would often refer to students as “my dear 
sons” or “my dear children… whom I tenderly love.”  In 1762, he opened his final “Exhortation to 
                                                
50 The tutor was Leonard Cutting, a graduate of Pembrook College, Cambridge.  The first professor of 
Mathematics and Natural Philosophy was Daniel Treadwell, a recent graduate of Harvard, who died of small pox in 
April 1760.  He was replaced in November 1761 by Robert Harpur, who had graduated from the University of 
Glasgow.  See The matricula or Register of admissions & graduations, & of officers employed in King's College at 
New York   [between 1920 and 1940] Electronic reproduction.  Columbia University Libraries, 2009. JPEG use copy 
available via the World Wide Web. Master copy stored locally on DVD#: ldpd_7441339_000. Columbia University 
Libraries Electronic Books. 2006.  Harvard and Yale admitted about 25 students per year by mid-century.  At 
Harvard, there were four tutors, each of whom followed a class through all four years, and 2 chaired professorships 
in divinity and natural philosophy, in addition to the president.  See Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard.  
51 See again, Tucker, Puritan Antagonist. 
 
 305 
the Graduates” with the words: “My dear pupils: As you have now finished the usual course of your 
studies… and are going forth into a treacherous and vexatious world, to act your part in this uncertain 
course of life; assure yourselves, that I part with you with inexpressible tenderness and great concern 
for your best good.”52 When the college hall was under construction in the mid-1750s, he expressed 
an eager desire to see it completed so that he and his family could reside with students under one 
roof, and “eat, sleep, study, and pray together, almost as a family.”53  
Jay happened to arrive at King’s at precisely the moment that Johnson’s vision for a familial 
atmosphere began to be realized.  Though the college was founded in 1754, “tuition” initially took 
place in rooms lent to the school by Trinity Church.   Two months prior to Jay’s matriculation, 
however—in May 1760—a new college hall was completed.  As Johnson had just remarried (his first 
wife had died several years earlier) Jay’s first two and half years at college coincided with a period of 
domestic felicity in Johnson’s life that enabled him to fulfill, for a brief period, his vision for the 
college.54   Only five others students were admitted with Jay in the summer of 1760.  As Johnson 
handled all of the teaching at King’s, during students’ first three semesters (and also led morning and 
evening prayers) Jay had nothing but Johnson, from morning to evening, as he began his course of 
study.  Not all students would have welcomed such an environment, but Jay was reputed to be pious 
and studious, and it is not likely that he resented the atmosphere.   
                                                
52 Johnson’s exhortation to the graduates is found in Schneider, SJCW, IV:278. 
53 See Humphrey, King’s College, 116-118.  Humphrey notes that the relationships in Johnson’s own 
family were remarkably intense and personal. As an example of Johnson’s care for his students in the grammar 
school, Humphrey cites a letter from Johnson to Peter Jay (John Jay’s father), concerning eleven-year-old Augustus, 
who was then a student at Johnson’s school, “I assure you we both love him as near to our own as is possible,” 
Johnson wrote, “…And you may still depend upon it, that no care or pains shall be wanting for his best advantage, 
for my Wife & I have this winter, in taking pains to teach him to read, done that for him which we never did for our 
own, now could we have patience to do, but for one whom we love like our own.”  Citation to Frank Monaghan, Dr. 
Samuel Johnson’s Letters to Peter Jay. New York: Columbia University Press, 1933. 
54 See again the Matricula or Register, which states that the college building was completed in May and 
that one Mr. Willet was chosen as Steward, as the faculty and students began to reside at college.  Johnson’s second 
wife would die of small pox in the fall of 1762, prompting his resignation and return to Connecticut in early 1763. 
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The chief distinction of King’s College, however, lay in Johnson’s views on moral 
philosophy, or natural moral law, and the authority, confidence, and optimism with which he imbued 
that subject.55  Jay did not likely read Johnson’s Elementa Philosophica while at King’s, as the text 
was assigned to seniors during Johnson’s tenure as president, and he retired during Jay’s junior 
year—though Jay may well have read Johnson’s Ethics.56  But my argument is not that Jay was a 
“Johnsonian” in the sense that he imbibed or committed himself to Johnson’s theory in all of its 
details.  I rather contend that Johnson instilled in Jay a general confidence in the authority of natural 
moral law, as a precise and rationally discernable extension of divine law, intended for the good of 
human society.  That concept was woven into the entire curriculum—a summary of which is found in 
an advertisement that Johnson wrote in 1754, a few weeks before the college opened: 
[I]t is… the design of this college to instruct and perfect youth in the learned languages, and 
in the arts of reasoning exactly, of writing correctly, and speaking eloquently; and in the arts 
of numbering and measuring, of surveying and navigation, of geography and history, of 
husbandry, commerce and government, and in the knowledge of all nature in the heavens 
above us, and in the air, water and earth around us, and the various kinds of meteors, stones, 
mines, and minerals, plants and animals, and of everything useful for the comfort, the 
convenience and elegance of life, in the chief manufactures relating to any of these things; 
and finally, to lead them from the study of nature to the knowledge of themselves, and of the 
God of nature, and their duty to Him, themselves, and one another, and everything that can 
contribute to their true happiness, both here and hereafter.57 
                                                
55 The only other college president with a similar degree of engagement with theories of moral philosophy 
was John Witherspoon of Princeton, who did not arrive at Princeton until 1768—too late to influence the leaders of 
the Revolution. (He had a greater influence on the post-war generation, including James Madison.) See for example 
Jeffry H. Morrison, John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2005; and James H. Smylie, “Madison and Witherspoon: Theological Roots of American 
Political Thought,” The Princeton University Library Chronicle 22:3 (Spring 1961): 118-132; Witherspoon offers an 
interesting contrast to Johnson in that he rejected Berkeley’s idealism, and emphasized the intellectual realism of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, on which see: Douglas Sloan, The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal. 
New York: Teachers College Press, 1971, and M. A. Stewart, (ed.) Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
56 See Johnson to East Apthorp, December 1, 1759, in SJCW, IV:57 for evidence that Johnson typically 
“explained… my Noetica and Ethica” at “the latter end of their last year.” See John B. Pine, “Samuel Johnson, D.D. 
First President of King’s College,” Columbia University Quarterly 1, March 1899, pp. 131-132, for the new 
curriculum that was approved in the spring of 1763, and by which “Johnson’s Noetica” was moved to the 
sophomore year, while “Johnson’s Compendium of Ethics” was to be taught during the third year, and as Jay was 
only half way through his third year at the time, he may well have read it that spring.  





Johnson’s concluding phrase: “the knowledge of themselves, and of the God of nature, and 
their duty to Him, themselves, and one another...” was a distillation of Pufendorf’s framework for 
natural law—which was built on a tri-part notion of natural moral obligation; and Johnson began to 
sow the seeds for these concepts during the students’ first few semesters at college when, as he wrote 
to a friend in Boston, he taught the students himself in order that: “at the same time I am teaching 
them Latin and Greek I may endeavor in these evil times to make them intelligent and serious 
Christians,” and he accomplished that goal by first leading them “through the Greek Testament… 
giving them a plan of Christianity with its evidences,” and introducing them to “a system of ethics” 
and to the Hebrew Scriptures, which he viewed as “the true fountains of all knowledge both natural 
and divine, moral and political.”58 
Johnson’s method of mingling “ethics” with “Scripture” and “knowledge both natural and 
divine, moral and political” strikes the modern mind as either naïve, vague, or otherwise imprecise.  
Yet to others of that era who heard of Johnson’s curriculum the notable features were that it took 
religion seriously and constituted cutting edge science.  The Boston correspondent, for example, to 
whom Johnson described the curriculum, responded: “Your lectures on the New Testament are a 
great improvement on the method of education in the English universities, where the principles of 
religion are too much neglected, and are never taught as a science.”59  Scattered references of this 
kind do not, in themselves, constitute weighty evidence, but when combined with the content of 
Johnson’s aforementioned essays, one begins to understand the respect with which his ideas were 
received, and the authority with which his teaching was imbued, in the context of that era.60 
                                                
58 See again, Johnson to East Apthorp, December 1, 1759, in Schneider, SJCW, IV:56. 
59 East Apthorp to Johnson, February 11, 1760, Schneider, SJCW, IV:58. 
60 As noted above (note 19) Benjamin Franklin published Johnson’s Elementa Philosophica and invited 
him to become president of the College of Philadelphia—suggesting that he found Johnson’s theories meritorious.  
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As noted, the distinctive aspect of Johnson’s philosophy lay in his having amalgamated 
Baconian philosophy with Protestant theology in a manner that satisfied the intellectual standards of 
that era.  It was not merely that he presented the God of nature as synonymous with the God of the 
Bible and Christianity.  Many, if not most, colonial intellectuals believed that this was the case.  
What made Johnson unique was his ability to articulate an intellectual defense of this proposition, in 
the idiom of moral philosophy—rather than using the scholasticism of Williams Ames.  As a 
consequence, he was able to take a strong stance, in his instruction at King’s College, in favor of 
natural moral law—its validity and utility, and to argue forcefully for the truth of basic Christian 
doctrines—whereas the faculty at other colleges tended to align themselves more fully with one fount 
of moral authority or the other.61 
The “chief thing that is aimed at in this college,” he would write, for example, in 1754, “is to 
teach and engage the children to know God in Jesus Christ, and to love and serve Him in all sobriety, 
godliness, and righteousness of life….”  In 1762, he would exhort the graduating class to do “nothing 
that you may have occasion to reproach yourselves with a 1000 years hence…and above all things, to 
the love of God, your supreme good, your Father, Redeemer, and Comforter… [and to] let nothing 
ever tempt you in these dangerous days, to apostatize from the holy religion of the blessed Jesus, 
which is the truest wisdom, because it is the most infallible way to the highest happiness.”62  And yet 
he also could enjoin his students to conform to the dictates of natural as well as Biblical law, which 
were two components of the same overarching standards.  
                                                
61 As noted above, both Thomas Clap of Yale and Francis Allison at Philadelphia, were cautious in their 
approach to the subject of natural moral law.  William Small, Jefferson’s tutor at the College of William and Mary, 
would likely have inclined more strongly toward theories of natural law. 
62 Schneider, SJCW, IV:278-9.  It is notable that a correspondent to whom Johnson described his 
curriculum, responded: “Your lectures on the New Testament are a great improvement on the method of education 
in the English universities, where the principles of religion are too much neglected, and are never taught as a 
science.” East Apthorp to Johnson, February 11, 1760, Schneider, SJCW, IV:58.  For the state of university 
education in eighteenth-century England see John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of the Enlightenment: Science, 
Religion and Politics from the Restoration to the French Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989 
and L. S. Sutherland & L. G. Mitchell, The History of the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
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So how would intellectual principles of this kind have influenced the intellectual outlook of a 
future revolutionary like John Jay?  To date, few scholars have shown any interest in this question—
not only with respect to Jay and King’s College, but also the more general influence of the colonial 
colleges on the intellectual assumptions of the founding generation.63  The few exceptions—for 
example David Robson’s Educating Republicans: The College in the Era of the American 
Revolution, 1750–1800—are of limited utility in that they are interested only in the origins of the 
Revolution.   Robson correctly identifies moral philosophy as the course in which students would 
have been exposed to political ideas.  He one of the very few scholars to identify King’s as one of the 
only colleges to have featured Pufendorf and Grotius in its curriculum.  But he dismisses their 
significance on the grounds that they did not sanction colonial rebellions, while also depicting 
Johnson as a mere “moralist” who promoted  “order and public virtue, and love of… country,” but 
was otherwise unimportant from a political perspective.64   
Such conclusions, I suggest, point to a need to broaden our focus and move beyond the issue 
of origins (not only the origins of the Revolution, but also the origins of the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution, and other founding-era documents) and ask where the 
Revolutionaries acquired the principles on which they based their conduct—both individual conduct 
and also corporate.  As I have stressed throughout this dissertation, Americans were lacking in first-
hand experience with international affairs when the war began.  They also lacked the kind of 
institutional structures that, in Europe, lent coherence and order to the formulation and 
                                                
63 In her PhD Dissertation of 1965, Rebecca Brooks Gruver attempted to “discover the ideas and factors 
which molded the mind and personality of John Jay.”  In her first chapter, entitled, “The Mind of John Jay,” she give 
just one sentence to Jay’s education at King’s College, stating that he studied “Latin, Greek, rhetoric, English 
composition, and the classics,” and was familiar with Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding by the time he 
graduated, The Diplomacy of John Jay, the University of California at Berkeley, p. 3.  
64 Robson, Educating Republicans, 82-87; The question of origins was of course made famous by Bernard 
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1967.  Two other works that touch on the connection between the colleges and the Revolution, but do not 
develop it in any depth are John Roche, Colonial Colleges in the War for American Independence. Millwood, NY: 
Associated Faculty Press, 1986 and James J. Walsh, Education of the Founding Fathers of the Republic: 
Scholasticism in the Colonial Colleges. New York: Fordham University Press, 1935. 
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implementation of foreign policy.  The records of Jay’s diplomacy reveal principles that not only 
rendered his negotiations efficacious—they also earned the trust of his compatriots and stabilized the 
conduct and implementation of foreign policy, in so far as it concerned his particular assignment.  In 
effect, Jay was not merely a skilled international lawyer, he was also an institution unto himself—
supplying through the rules to which he subjected himself, the kind of structure, order and 
consistency that is normally provided by institutions. 
Where did he get these ideas?  They were not notably present among Jay’s peers—at least 
with the rigor with which he applied them—and thus cannot be attributed to the general social, 
intellectual, or political milieu of the pre-war colonies.  They must have had a particular origin, and 
Jay’s purportedly proud and legalistic personality does not suffice as an explanation.  The only 
intellectual sources that we know to have been available to Jay, that contain these ideas were the 
treatises of Pufendorf and Vattel.  As noted above, there was a copy of Vattel in Jay’s library, 
inscribed with the date 1772.  I have already alluded to Pufendorf’s importance to Johnson’s 
philosophy—and to Vattel’s overarching conception of international norms.   
We know of Pufendorf’s particular place in the curriculum at King’s from three sources: In 
an early draft of Elementa Philosophica, likely written around 1748, Johnson listed the “best 
authors” in each field of knowledge.  With respect to “Civil Politics” he recommended “Plato, 
Aristotle, Grotius, Puffendorf, Justinian’s Institutions, Wood’s Institutes.”65  In late 1759, just prior to 
Jay’s matriculation, Johnson wrote to a friend that, “In the second year I send [students at King’s 
College] partly to Mr. Cutting who… about the middle of the year takes them wholly and explains 
Tully De Oratore, Caesar’s Commentaries, Tully’s Offices and Puffendorf’s De Officio….”—“De 
Officio,” being a reference to On the Duty of Man & Citizen, an abridged version of On the Law of 
                                                
65 See Schneider, SJCW II: 319.  In this context, “Grotius” and “Puffendorf” almost certainly refer to the 




Nature and Nations, which Pufendorf wrote for the use of students.66  Finally, in the spring of 
1763—at which point Jay was a junior—the college trustees approved a new curriculum for the 
college in which “Grotius: de jure bellie et pacis, or Pufendorf” were made required texts for the 
senior class.67  Of these, only the second reference offers anything close to definitive proof that Jay 
had read Pufendorf— for in theory, he could have read Grotius rather than Pufendorf during his 
senior year—and as noted above, he never cited Pufendorf by name in his correspondence.  Yet Jay’s 
larger conception of foreign affairs—especially his understanding of the United States as a corporate 
moral person, endowed with natural rights—was Pufendorfian in a way that is highly suggestive. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of a Pufendorfian and Vattelian strain in Jay’s thinking comes 
from his later years as Chief Justice when, while riding circuit in the spring of 1793, he gave a charge 
to a grand jury in which he included the following statement about the law of nations: 
By the laws of nations our conduct relative to other nations is to be regulated both in peace 
and in war.  It is a subject that merits attention and inquiry, and it is much to be wished that it 
may be more generally studies and understood.  It may be asked who made the Law of 
Nations.  The answer is he from whose will proceed all moral obligations, and which will is 
made known to us by Reason or by Revelation.  Nations are with Respect to each other, in 
the same situation as independent individuals in a state of nature….  In like manner the 
nations throughout the world are like so many great families placed by Providence on the 
earth, who having divided it between them, remain perfectly distinct from and independent of 
each other.  Between them is no judge but the great Judge of all.68 
 
                                                
66 Johnson to East Apthorp, December 1, 1759, Schneider, SJCW IV:56.  Leonard Cutting had earned a 
Bachelor’s degree from Pembrook College in Cambridge and was a tutor at King’s.  “Puffendorf’s De Officio” was a 
reference to On the Duty of Man and Citizen, an abridged version of On the Law of Nature and Nations, published in 
1682 for use in general education. 
67 Again, in this context, “Pufendorf” is a reference to On the Law of Nature and Nations.  The curriculum is 
contained in John B. Pine, “Samuel Johnson, D.D. First President of King’s College,” Columbia University Quarterly 
1, March 1899, pp. 131-132. Johnson retired that spring, and so he did not personally teach those texts to John Jay, 
who was then a junior, and would have read them the following year with Myles Cooper.  For Cooper’s presidency 
see Clarence Hayden Vance, “Myles Cooper, M.A., D.C.L., LL.D. Second President of King’s College, Now 
Columbia University, New York City,” Columbia University Quarterly 22:3 (September, 1930): 261-286.  Aside 
from a brief period, of about one year, when William Smith taught Pufendorf at the College of Philadelphia, King’s 
College is the only school to have used these texts in its curriculum. 
68 Address to the Grand Jury of Richmond, VA, May 22, 1793, in Johnston (ed.), Public Papers, III:482. 
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The notion that natural law had its origins in a natural obligation to sociability, ordained by God for 
the amelioration of human society, was central to Pufendorf’s theory—which Vattel had developed, 
emphasizing as he did the equality and moral accountability of states in the international realm.69 
Jay was not the only Revolutionary familiar with Vattel and Pufendorf;70 nor was he the only 
Revolutionary to have imbibed Johnson’s perspective on natural law.71  But he was one of the only 
Americans familiar with all three sources of insight—each of which played a vital role in his larger 
conception of international affairs: Pufendorf offered a foundational theory of natural law, Johnson 
infused that theory with divine authority in manner relevant to the intellectual concerns of the 
colonies, and Vattel made it applicable to the conduct of European diplomacy.  Jay’s character likely 
inclined him toward these concepts; but the concepts themselves did not emerge ex nihilo from his 
precocious mind.  They were more likely acquired from the sources that I have just laid out. 
 
 
                                                
69 The reference to families is significant in that Pufendorf had argued that the original state of nature was 
one in which families, rather than discrete individuals, lived outside the bonds of human society—a fact, he said, 
that further supported the notion that humans were subject to a law of sociability.  
70 As noted above (Introduction, note 34) Franklin circulated a copy of Vattel in Congress in 1775; and in 
interviewing John Adams for admission to the bar, in 1758, a Boston attorney recommended “Grotius and 
Puffendorf” and recommended that, “a Lawyer through his whole Life ought to have some Book on Ethicks or the 
Law of Nations always on his Table,” the implication being that Pufendorf was a known entity among Boston 
attorneys of that era—see The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, III: 271-272. 
71 Robert Livingston, the first American Secretary for Foreign Affairs, entered King’s College one year 
after Jay.  The two were best friends at time, and briefly practiced law together after the war.  They had a falling out 







In the spring of 1789, George Washington faced the daunting task of nominating individuals 
to the many offices that had been created under the new Constitution.1  The most prestigious of these 
offices was that of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the office for which he nominated John Jay.  
The president informed Jay of his decision in the following words:  
Sir, It is with singular pleasure that I address you as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States….  In nominating you for the important station… I not only acted in 
conformity to my best judgment; but I trust I did a grateful thing to the good Citizens of these 
United States; and I have a full confidence that the love which you bear to our Country, and a 
desire to promote the general happiness, will not suffer you to hesitate a moment to bring into 
action the talents, knowledge and integrity which are so necessary to be exercised at the head 
of that department which must be considered as the key-stone of our political fabric.2 
 
Jay had been one of the best lawyers in New York before the war, and had later served as Chief 
Justice of the New York State Supreme Court.  Yet he was not the most esteemed jurist or legal 
scholar of his generation.  What “talents” and “knowledge” was Washington referring to?3  Part of 
the answer lies in the fact that courts, in that era, were heavily involved in foreign affairs.  Jay was 
one of the leading American experts in diplomacy in 1789, and in this sense he was an ideal choice.4 
                                                
1 “No part of my duty will be more delicate,” Washington wrote, “than that of nominating or appointing 
persons to offices….  I shall, however… have the satisfaction to reflect that I entered upon my administration… 
with the… fullest determination to nominate… those persons only, who, upon every consideration, were the most 
deserving, and who would probably execute their several functions to the interest and credit of the American 
Union.” Washington to James Bowdoin, May 9, 1789, in Theodore Crackel (ed.) The Papers of George Washington, 
Digital Edition. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008, Presidential Series, vol. 2, p. 236. 
2 George Washington to John Jay, October 4, 1789, in Marcus, History of the Supreme Court, Vol. 1, part I, 
p. 11.    
3 See Herbert A. Johnson, John Jay: Colonial Lawyer. PhD, Columbia University, 1965; and “John Jay: 
Lawyer in a Time of Transition, 1764-1775,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 124:5 (May 1976): 1260-
1292, for Jay’s early law career.  James Wilson would have been a better choice if Washington were looking for an 
expert in legal theory.  Wilson was nominated for a seat on the court, but not for the position of Chief Justice. 
4 William Casto makes this point in, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of 
John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995.  Washington would later 
write of his appointment of Jay as special emissary to Great Britain in 1794: “Was there an abler man, to be found to 
conduct the [negotiations] or one more esteemed?” “Comments on Monroe’s A View of the Executive of the United 
States, c. March 1798, in Crackle, Papers of George Washington, Retirement Series, vol. 2, p. 171. 
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Of at least equal influence, however, was the fact that the new Supreme Court constituted the 
first instance in the history of Anglo-American law in which a court had been given co-equal status 
with the executive and judicial branches of government.  The Court was thus an experiment in 
political theory, the outcome of which would depend on the conduct of those who first occupied the 
bench.  It was in this sense that Washington described the court as “the key-stone of our national 
fabric”; and for that reason he would have aspired to nominate justices whose principles and 
convictions aligned closely with his own political philosophy. 
Washington rarely expressed his philosophy overtly.  A notable instance was his circular 
letter of 1783.5  A “happy conjuncture of times and circumstances,” he wrote, had resulted in:  
The foundation of our Empire [being laid]… at an Epocha when the rights of mankind were 
better understood… than at any former period, the researches of the human mind, after social 
happiness, have been carried to a great extent, the Treasures of knowledge, acquired by the 
labours of Philosophers, Sages and Legislatures… are laid open for our use, and their 
collected wisdom may be… applied in the Establishment of our forms of Government… 
 
Washington’s emphasis on themes like “the rights of mankind” or “researches… after social 
happiness” is reminiscent of the curriculum at King’s College.  The fact that he went on to cite 
“…the growing liberality of sentiment, and above all, the pure and benign light of Revelation,” 
seems to confirms that he also viewed Scripture and philosophy as compatible sources of insight. 
 Historians have long known that American intellectual life during the eighteenth century was 
characterized by an amalgamation of religion and science that clashes with modern sensibilities.6  
                                                
5 June 8, 1783, The George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799, digital edition.  At 
the time that he wrote the letter, Washington expected to imminently and permanently retire from public life, and the 
letter was equivalent to his later “farewell address”—a concise expression of advice to the new nation. See Jeffry H. 
Morrison, The Political Philosophy of George Washington. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, 
p. 148-153 for analysis of the letter’s significance.   
6 Norman Fiering writes that: “The long-term impetus in America was toward philosophical structures that 
would reinforce and protect the essential elements of the inherited religious tradition…. The New Englanders neither 
fell back on dogmatic reliance on Scripture nor diluted their essential theism, but they added the evidence of God-in-
nature, including human nature, to their former trust in revealed truth,” Moral Philosophy, 241. Joseph Ellis writes 
in a similar vein in, “Habits of Mind and an American Enlightenment,” American Quarterly 28:2 (Summer 1976): 
150-164; as does D. H. Meyer in, “The Uniqueness of the American Enlightenment,” American Quarterly 28:2 
(Summer 1976): 165-186. 
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They have struggled, however, to demonstrate the relevance of such thinking to the founding era, and 
to the American Revolution in particular.7  I would like to suggest that Jay’s application of the law of 
nations to the realm of diplomacy sheds important light on this issue.  As I have demonstrated 
throughout the dissertation, Jay was always careful to inform Congress of the principles on which he 
acted.8  It is thus likely that those who earlier lauded Jay’s conduct in Spain or appointed him co-
negotiator of the Treaty of Peace or Secretary for Foreign Affairs admired—even shared—his 
political convictions.  
That is not to say that all Americans shared Jay’s depth of conviction regarding the authority 
of natural law.  Yet they appear to have had in common a basic understanding of the source of moral 
law or moral authority and its applicability to the conduct of governance. A distilled expression of 
this general outlook can be seen in a letter of introduction that Jay sent to Floridablanca, soon after 
his arrival in Spain.  “[T]he People of the united States,” he wrote: 
are convinced, that Virtue alone can animate and support their Governments; and that they 
can in no other way establish and perpetuate a national Character, honorable to themselves & 
their Posterity; than by an unshaken Adherence to the Rules, which Religion Morality and 
Treaties, may prescribe for their Conduct.9 
 
There is more here, I would like to suggest, than mere republican ideology.  The statement appears 
rather to be a succinct expression of American moral philosophy, whereby laws governing political 
conduct were derived from a combination of revelation (religion), science (morality), and the 
customary law of nations (treaties).   
                                                
7 See the controversy surrounding Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind: From the Great 
Awakening to the Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.  For similar reasons many scholars 
have had trouble appreciating Johnson.  Henry May viewed him as: “an ardent proponent of idealism… who 
achieved no success whatever,” The Enlightenment in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 79; 
Woodbridge Riley wrote that he was “the metaphysical double of [Berkeley] but withal unsuccessful in spreading, to 
any great extent, that form of idealism,” American Philosophy: The Early Schools. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1907, p. 
121; the Schneiders judged him a “pathetic, but dramatic, figure… caught between two worlds,” SJCW, II:21. 
8 As noted, he did so because, as the servant of Congress, he thought himself obligated to put Congress in a 
position to correct his conduct as they saw fit. 
9 Jay to Floridablanca, March 6, 1780, Nuxoll, SPJJ, II:51. 
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As noted above, Pufendorfian philosophy was widely—if superficially—known in the pre-
revolutionary era.10 The pervasiveness of such ideas may shed light on an understudied question 
pertaining to the Revolution: how did the Americans manage to maintain a semblance of unity, 
despite their diversity of interests and the major structural deficiencies in the Articles of 
Confederation?11  Historians interested in the intellectual aspects of the Revolution have devoted 
very little attention to this question.  I suggest that scholars who pursue it will likely find that the 
basic moral outlook to which I alluded above functioned as a kind of unwritten Constitution, setting 
limits on political conduct in an era when political institutions were inchoate or non-existent.  
 At the heart of that outlook was the concept of a law of nations and this leads to my last 
point: How did Americans acquire their basic understanding of the treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf 
and Vattel?  The aforementioned literature suggests that many Americans encountered the treatises in 
sermons, pamphlets, the popular press, and private libraries.  As I have demonstrated, they were also 
taught in at least some colleges, and I would like to suggest that the college faculty played a much 
greater role in framing their interpretation than has been recognized to date.  Historians tend to 
discount the significance of the colleges on the grounds that they appear to have been theological 
seminaries, whose faculty members were often engaged in denominational conflict.12   
                                                
10 See again earlier references in J.G.A. Pocock, “Political Thought in the English Speaking Atlantic”; 
Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire; and Ward, The Politics of Liberty, to the effect that Americans were generally 
familiar with writers on the law of nations during the colonial era.  See also David Hendrickson’s statement that 
“from 1776 onward appeal to the law of nature and of nations… was woven closely into the fabric of the American 
position [on foreign affairs], and might even be mistaken for being the American position,” Peace Pact, p. 53. 
11 See again Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics; and Jillson and Wilson, Congressional 
Dynamics, for the dysfunction of Congress.  Vergennes, in particular, saw no danger that the United States would 
ever become a powerful nation, given the chaotic nature of Congressional deliberations.  The deficiencies of early 
American institutions is of interest to economic historians of Latin America, some of whose theories suggest that 
problems of this kind should have hampered American economic growth—raising the question of why they did not.  
See Alan Dye, “The Institutional Framework,” Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, vol. 2, pp. 169-207, 
for a useful discussion of this historiography, much of which is based on the theories of Douglass North.   
12 For example liberals and conservatives fought over the future of Harvard in the 1690s; New Light 
Presbyterians of the College of New Jersey later contended with Old Lights at the College of Philadelphia; In the 
1750s, Anglicans and Presbyterians fought over the religious affiliation of King’s College; and in the 1760s, 
strenuous efforts were made efforts to break the Congregationalists’ control of Yale.  
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It is true that professors at most schools were religiously inclined and placed a primacy on 
doctrinal purity.  Yet beneath that outward veneer of religious conflict, I have found they were 
largely unified in their outlook toward European philosophy.13  Much of their intellectual energies, in 
fact, were geared toward rendering the “new learning” compatible with prevailing religious 
sensibilities.  Johnson’s life history makes evident just how much intellectual labor was involved in 
that process; and the colleges stand out in this context as one of the only colonial institutions with a 
mandate to conduct that work and convey the results to the rising generation.  Few members of the 
college faculty approached the task with the zeal of a Samuel Johnson—and in that sense he was 
unique.  Yet the ubiquity of the new ideas, and their relation to the capstone course in moral 
philosophy, made it necessary for most members of the faculty to engage with this process to at least 
some extent—with results that entered colonial society through the lives of their students. 
 In sum, I contend that Jay’s application of the law of nations to the diplomacy of the 
Revolution—insofar as it reflected Samuel Johnson’s interpretation of European philosophy as taught 
at King’s College—brings into view a key process by which Enlightenment-era theories pertaining to 
politics were imported into British North America during the colonial era.  It was in the colleges, and 
especially the course on moral philosophy, that such ideas were molded into a culturally appropriate 
form that was critical to the later conduct of the Revolution.14  It is a process and a subject that merits 
additional inquiry. 
                                                
13 An example of the uniformity of intellectual outlook can be seen in Johnson’s correspondence with 
Thomas Clap of Yale.  The two men engaged in a fierce polemical battle over Clap’s requirement that Anglican 
students attend Sunday worship on campus—a Congregationalist service—rather than in their own denomination. 
Yet when it came to the “new learning” the two men were largely in agreement. Clap had written an essay on ethics 
for the benefit of his students. In 1765, he sent Johnson a copy, to which Johnson replied: “I thank you for your 
essay, with which I do entirely agree as to the substance of it…. The main difference between us is that you begin 
where I end: you write in the synthetical order of thought, I in the analytical method, which to me seems more 
obvious to young beginners.  Nor can I form any notion of moral perfection either in God or creature, without 
beginning with happiness as an end.” Johnson to Thomas Clap, July 6, 1765, in Schneider, SJCW, II:343. 
14 The emphasis in moral philosophy was on the natural laws of morality that governed individual conduct, 
but as I have demonstrated throughout my dissertation, states were conceived in this era as corporate moral persons, 
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